JUDGMENT Sanjay Karol, J.-In these proceedings, under Section 34 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), the Himachal Pradesh State Electricity Board (in short HPSEB) has assailed the impugned award dated 14.1.2003 passed by the Sole Arbitrator Shri S.C. Mahajan, Chief Engineer (P&M) (Retd.), awarding a sum of Rs.1,71,17,359/- along with interest @ 18% p.a. w.e.f. 13.11.1995 up to 14.1.2003 (date of award) and further @10% per annum up to the date of payment to the Contractor as against its claim of Rs.6,01,95,704/- along with pendente lite and future interest @ 24% per annum. 2. For the construction of Civil Works of Baner Hydel Project in District Kangra, Himachal Pradesh comprising of “Intake Structure, Link Tunnel, Underground Desilting Tank, Head Race Tunnel, Surge Shaft, Penstock Profile, Anchor Blocks and Saddles, Power House (Civil Work) and Tail Race”, HPSEB had awarded contract to M/s. Satluj Construction Company, Chandigarh. The work could not be completed, hence the contract for completion of the unfinished work was further awarded to M/s. Ansal Properties and Industries Ltd. (APIL) (referred to as the contractor). The Contract Agreement No. 1 of 1991, dated 21.2.1991 was entered into between the HPSEB and the Contractor and the total estimated cost of the work for Rs.4,20,54,420/-, was to be completed within two years. With the Contractor abandoning the work on 31.7.1996, HPSEB got it completed from a third party on 8.4.1997. However, with respect to the works executed by the Contractor under the agreement, final bills dated 13.11.1995, 23.3.1996 & 31.10.1996 were submitted to HPSEB. 3. In terms of letter dated 13.11.1995 the Contractor lodged claims for a sum of Rs.6,24,92,000/- which were rejected by HPSEB, hence certain disputes having arisen between the parties a petition was filed before this Court seeking appointment of the Arbitrator in terms of Clause 25 of the agreement which was allowed in terms of order dated 4.10.1996. Consequently vide office order dated 31.10.1996, HPSEB appointed Shri R. K. Sharma, the then Chief Engineer (Contracts), Nathpa Jhakri Power Corporation, Shimla as Sole Arbitrator. However, in terms of letter dated 27.6.1997, he was superseded and in his place Shri J.M.S. Jaswal, Chief Engineer (Design) HPSEB, upon appointment as Sole Arbitrator conducted certain proceedings. Consequently vide office order dated 31.10.1996, HPSEB appointed Shri R. K. Sharma, the then Chief Engineer (Contracts), Nathpa Jhakri Power Corporation, Shimla as Sole Arbitrator. However, in terms of letter dated 27.6.1997, he was superseded and in his place Shri J.M.S. Jaswal, Chief Engineer (Design) HPSEB, upon appointment as Sole Arbitrator conducted certain proceedings. Before the conclusion of the arbitral proceedings even he was superseded by Shri S. R. Khitta, Chief Engineer (Investment & Planning) HPSEB, as sole Arbitrator, who also did not adjudicate the claims and eventually Shri S. C. Mahajan, Chief Engineer (P&M) HPSEB was appointed as Arbitrator in terms of office order dated 25.9.2001. This Arbitrator entered into reference on 16.10.2001 and after seven hearings and a visit to the site passed the impugned award. 4. In the 2nd hearing held before him on 12.12.2001, the procedure for conduct of the proceedings was adopted in the presence of the parties. The record of the proceedings as reflected in the impugned award, reads as under:- “During the proceedings, it was decided that the Arbitrator will proceed in the matter from the stage at which these were left by the previous Arbitrator. The Arbitrator decided the procedure to be adopted in the matter as follows:- 1. Submission of claim by the Contractor, 2. Submission of reply by the Respondent, 3. Submission of rejoinder by the Claimant. It was argued by the Respondent that they would like to file their reply to rejoinder of the claimant which was not agreed to by the claimant. It was decided by the Arbitrator that this is not required as it will delay the matter. 4. Framing of Issues. 5. Submission of written/oral argument by the Claimant. 6. Submission of written/oral arguments/ counter arguments by the respondent. The documents related to Item Nos. 1 to 3 of the procedure laid above had not been made available by Er. S. R. Khitta, previous Arbitrator to Er. S.C. Mahajan, the new Arbitrator. In order, therefore, to avoid further delay in settlement of the claims, the claimant has submitted spare copy of the following record which was given to the respondent for verification of its correctness at their end. 1. Statement of Claims of claimant. 2. Reply filed by the respondent. S. R. Khitta, previous Arbitrator to Er. S.C. Mahajan, the new Arbitrator. In order, therefore, to avoid further delay in settlement of the claims, the claimant has submitted spare copy of the following record which was given to the respondent for verification of its correctness at their end. 1. Statement of Claims of claimant. 2. Reply filed by the respondent. It was decided that in case these documents are found to be as per the original submissions, these shall be submitted to the Arbitrator during the next hearing. In case there are some discrepancies in the documents, these will also be pointed out in the next hearing.” (Emphasis supplied) 5. Record reveals that no discrepancy was pointed out. 6. In the 4th hearing dated 6.5.2002, it was so recorded that “the respondent intimated that since they have not filed any counter claim, as such, they are not proposing any issue for framing” and 15 issues were framed. 7. In the 7th hearing dated 1.10.2002, the Arbitrator recorded as under:- “With the submission of above stated documents, it was informed by both the claimant as well as the respondent that they have no more documents to submit. With this the documentation in the instant Arbitration case is complete. It was also agreed by both the parties that they were given full opportunity to present their case and they were fully satisfied with the proceedings.” (Emphasis supplied) 8. Having heard the parties and appreciated the material on record, the Arbitrator passed the impugned award by awarding a sum of Rs.1,71,17,359/- along with interest @ 18% w.e.f. 13.11.1995 upto 14.1.2003 (date of award) and thereafter @ 10% up to the date of payment to the contractor 9. The Arbitrator structured the award claims/issueswise and in all framed 15 issues which were further sub-divided into various sub-claims/issues. 10. The Arbitrator structured the award claims/issueswise and in all framed 15 issues which were further sub-divided into various sub-claims/issues. 10. HPSEB has filed the instant objection petition pleading the following grounds:- (a) no reasons have been assigned for arriving at the conclusion; (b) determination of the quantities of the claims is without any evidence; (c) the written submissions placed on record by HPSEB were not considered; (d) with respect to certain items quantities has been awarded in excess of what was claimed by the Contractor in its final bill submitted on 31.10.1996; (e) Claims of damages under issues No.4 to 13 were decided without any evidence led by the parties and in the absence of any admission by HPSEB, the same could not have been awarded. The award is based on no evidence and purely on hypothetical considerations; (f) the award made under claims E-1 to E-22 is contrary to the provisions of Clause 12 of the Agreement; (g) the award of interest, pendente lite is in violation of the prohibitory clause contained in Clause 6.1 of the Agreement; (h) while awarding claim under issue No.3 Clause 13 of the Contract has been ignored; (i) while awarding claim of extra and deviated items, the analysis of rates submitted by the HPSEB have not been taken into account; (j) the award has been improperly procured; (k) the Arbitrator has awarded interest on interest; (l) and hasexceeded the scope of reference; 11. The net effect is that the award is in conflict with the public policy of the India, suffers from non-application of mind, is based on hypothetical considerations and not borne out from the material on record which, in any event, has been ignored and hence is liable to be set-aside. 12. The Contractor filed reply, inter alia taking preliminary objection that the objections are based on mere generalities, inasmuch as no specific instances have been mentioned pointing out the allegations and errors apparent on record with respect to questions of fact and law. The award which is sufficiently reasoned is based on the material on record. 12. The Contractor filed reply, inter alia taking preliminary objection that the objections are based on mere generalities, inasmuch as no specific instances have been mentioned pointing out the allegations and errors apparent on record with respect to questions of fact and law. The award which is sufficiently reasoned is based on the material on record. With regard to the specific grounds, response is as under:- Ground (a) the reasoned award has been passed after due and proper application of mind; (b) disputes with regard to quantities mentioned in final bill resulted into the arbitralproceedings; (c) the ground taken is too general, vague and without any specific instance; (d) (e) bald allegations without any specific instances have been made; (f) the HPSEB accepted that items covered by Claims E-1 to E-7 and E-13 to E-23 are extra items and with regard to extra items covered under Claims E-8 to E-12, the Arbitrator had discussed the claims in the context of conditions of the contract; (g) keeping in view the ratio of law laid down by the Apex Court in Central Bank of India v. Ravindra {2002(1) SCC 367}, the expression “principal sum so adjudged would also include the amount of interest, therefore, it could not be said that the Arbitrator awarded interest on interest; (h) Clause 12(1) deals with only plus deviation and Clause 13 needs to be harmonized in a manner which is consistent with the principles of natural justice, fundamental principles of justice, equity, good conscience and fair play; (i) the Arbitrator has considered the analysis of rates submitted by both the parties and most of the contractor’s claims were dismissed; and (j) bald allegations with regard to the award being improperly procured are vague and are un substantiated. 13. In effect, it is pleaded that full opportunity was afforded to the parties to tender evidence,raise contentions and argue the issues framed by the Arbitrator in consultation and the arbitral proceedings were concluded by passing a speaking award, consistent with the principles of natural justice, fundamental principles of justice, equity, good conscience and fair play. The contractor’s claims No. 7, 8, 9, 10 & 11 were rejected in toto by the Arbitrator. The final bill dated 31.10.1996 was up dated in terms of bill dated 16.3.1998. The contractor’s claims No. 7, 8, 9, 10 & 11 were rejected in toto by the Arbitrator. The final bill dated 31.10.1996 was up dated in terms of bill dated 16.3.1998. The quantities in the final bill were subsequently revised vide bill dated 16.3.1998 which was paid by HPSEB but, however, was received under protest as the same was under paid. Variation is only where the final awarded quantity by HPSEB is less than what was claimed by the Contractor. 14. This Court on 17.12.2003, framed the following issues:- 1. Whether the award is not reasoned and thus contrary to the provisions of Section 31 of the Arbitration Act and clause (25) of the agreement between the parties? OPO 2. Whether the award is not in conformity with the policy of India, as alleged? ……..OPO 3. Whether the objection petition and the accompanying affidavit are not verified/filed by the authorized person? ……OPR 15. Mr. Bhogal, learned senior counsel for HPSEB has made the following general submissions:- (a) the award is unreasoned; (b) it is based on no evidence; (c) not only relevant material has been ignored but it is also contrary to the provisions of the agreement; d) it is an excess of the claims; (e) it is beyond the terms of the agreement and in any event certain claims awarded are outside the scope of the Arbitrator; (f) the claims have been duplicated and awarded as such. 16. Per contra, Mr. 16. Per contra, Mr. Sharma, learned senior counsel for the Contractor has defended the award by making the following submissions:- (i) It is within the legal frame work; (ii) The objections are vague and do not pontificate to any specific issue calling for interdiction by this Court; (iii) The objections do not fall within any of the grounds laid down under Section 34 of the Act (iv) In what manner the award is contrary to public policy has not been spelt out either in the objection petition or during the course of the hearing; (v) The procedure adopted by the Arbitrator with the consent of the parties was just, fair, reasonable and therefore it could not be contended that adequate opportunity was not afforded to the parties; (vi) Clauses 9, 12 & 13 of the general conditions of the contract are; (a) Neither prohibitory; (b) Nor applicable and thus its rigors not attracted; Issues No. 1 and 2 as framed by the Court: I propose to answer these issues together and while doing so refer to and deal with each of the issues decided by the Arbitrator while adjudicating the claims. The relevant clauses of the contract are reproduced as under:- Clause 6.10: PROPORATIONING OF CONCRETE The exact proportions in which the different ingradients are to be used for different parts of the work shall be determined by the Engineer-in-Charge from time to time, during the progress of the work and as analysis and tests are made of the samples of the aggregates and the resulting concrete. It shall be the responsibility of the contractor to obtain on the works, concrete of specified quality, density & strength corresponding to the laboratory test as directed by the Engineer-in-Charge. No extra payment or deductions shall made in the unit rates for variations in the several ingradients except for change in cement content. It shall be the responsibility of the contractor to obtain on the works, concrete of specified quality, density & strength corresponding to the laboratory test as directed by the Engineer-in-Charge. No extra payment or deductions shall made in the unit rates for variations in the several ingradients except for change in cement content. Clause-12 ALTERATIONS IN SPECIFICATIONS AND DESIGNS AND QUANTITIES The Engineer-in-Charge shall have power of make any alterations in omissions from, additions to or substitutions for, the original specifications, drawings, design & instructions, that may appear to him to be necessary during the progress of the work, and the contractor shall carry out the work in accordance with any instructions which may be given to him in writing signed by the Engineer-in-Charge, and such alterations, omissions, additions or substitutions shall not invalidate the contract and any altered, additional or substituted work which the contractor may be directed to do in the manner specified above as part of the work shall be carried out by the contractor on the same conditions in all respects on which he agreed to do the main work. The time for the completion of the work shall be extended in the proportion that the altered, additional or substituted work bears to the original contract works on the basis of CPM/PERT programme and the decision of the Engineer-in-Charge shall be conclusive as to such extension of time. The rates for such additional, altered or substituted items of work under this clause shall be worked out in accordance with the following provisions in their respective order; (i) If the rates for the additional, altered or substituted work are specified in the contract for the work, the contractor is bound to carry out the additional, altered or substituted work at the same rates as are specified in the contract for the work. ii) If the rates for the additional, altered or substituted work are not specifically provided in the contract for the work, the rates will be derived from the rates for a similar class of work as are specified in the contract for the work. ii) If the rates for the additional, altered or substituted work are not specifically provided in the contract for the work, the rates will be derived from the rates for a similar class of work as are specified in the contract for the work. Provided always that if the rate for a particular part or parts of these items cannot be derived from the rates for a similar class of work as specified in contract, the rate for such part or parts will be determined by the Engineer-in-Charge on the basis of prevailing market rates, whose decision will be binding on the contractor. (iii) If the rates for the altered, additional or substituted work cannot be determined in the manner specified in sub-clauses (i) & (ii) above then the contractor shall, within 7 days of the date of receipt of order to carry out the work, inform the Engineer-in-Charge of the rate which he intends to charge for such class of work, supported by analysis of the rate or rates claim and the Engineer-in-Charge shall determine the rate or rates on the basis of prevailing market rates and pay the contractor accordingly. However, the Engineer-in-Charge by notice in writing, will be at liberty to cancel his order to carry such class of work and arrange to carry it out in such manner as he may consider advise. But under no circumstances the contractor shall suspend the work on the plea of non settlement of rates of items falling under the clauses. Clause-12(A): RATES FOR ITEMS EXCEEDING DEVIATION LIMIT: (i) In the case of any contracted or substituted item(s) which individually exceeds the quantity stipulated in the contract by more than twenty percent, the contractor shall within seven days from the receipt of order, claim revision of rate, supported by proper analysis in respect of such item(s). For quantity in excess of the said 20 percent limit, notwithstanding the fact that the rate for such item(s) exists in the tender for the main work or can be derived in accordance with the provisions of sub-clause (ii) of clause -12 and the Engineer-in-Charge may revise its rate, having regard to the prevailing market rate and the contractor shall be paid in accordance with the rate, so fixed. The Engineer-in-Charge shall, however, be at liberty to cancel his order to carryout such increased quantity of work by giving notice in writing to the contractor and arrange to carry it out in such a matter as he may consider admissible. But under no circumstances the contractor shall suspend the work on the plea of non-settlement of rates of item(s) falling under this clause. (ii) All the provision of the preceding paragraph shall equally apply to the decrease in the rates of items for quantities in excess of the deviation limit, notwithstanding the fact that the rates for such items exist in the tender for the main work or can be derived in accordance with the provisions of subclause (ii) of the preceding clause-12, and the Engineer-in-Charge may revise such rates having regard to the prevailing market rates. (iii) The executed quantities of a substituted item shall be clubbed with executed quantities for an original item for the purpose of determining whether the quantities of the item have exceeded the deviation limit or not. (iv) The total value of all the additional items (item other than contract or substituted items), taken together, rates for which are derived in accordance with the provisions of sub-clause (i) & (ii) of clause -12, shall be limited to ten percent of the value of the contract as a whole at the time of signing the agreement. For any work relating to the additional items in excess of the limit of ten percent referred to above, the contractor within seven days of exceeding the said limit or in case of additional items whose rates cannot be determined in accordance with the provisions under sub-clause (i) & (ii) of Clause-12, claim revision determination of rate(s) duly supported by a proper analysis for consideration and approval of Engineer-in-Charge who may revise/ determine the rates, as the case may be having regard to the prevailing market rates and the contractor shall be paid in accordance with the rate(s), so fixed. The Engineer-in-Charge shall, however, be at liberty to cancel his order to carry out the additional quantities of work by giving notice in writing to the contractor and arrange to carry it out in such a manner as he may consider admissible but under so circumstances, the contractor shall suspend the work on the plea of non-settlement of rate(s). The Engineer-in-Charge shall, however, be at liberty to cancel his order to carry out the additional quantities of work by giving notice in writing to the contractor and arrange to carry it out in such a manner as he may consider admissible but under so circumstances, the contractor shall suspend the work on the plea of non-settlement of rate(s). CLAUSE-13 :NO COMPENSATION If at any time after the commencement of the work, the Engineer-in-Charge shall, for any reasons whatsoever, not require the whole work or part thereof as specified in the tender to be carried out, the Engineer-in-Charge shall give, notice in writing of the fact to the contractor who shall have no claim to any payment of compensation whatsoever on account of any profit or advantage which he might have derived from the execution of the work in full, but which he did not derive in consequence of the full amount of the work not having been carried out, neither/shall he have any claim for compensation by reasons of any alterations having been made in the original specifications, drawings designs and instructions which shall involve any curtailment of the work as originally contemplated. Provided that the contractor shall be paid the charges for the cartage only of materials actually and bonafide brought to the site of the work by the contractor, and rendered surplus as a result of the abandonment or curtailment of the work or any portion thereof and then taken back from the contractor, provided however, that the Engineer-in-Charge shall have in all such cases the option of taking over all or any such materials at their purchase price or at market rates whichever may be less. In the case of such stores having been issued from Board stores, supervision charges and storage charges shall be refunded in addition to the issue rate of materials. In the case of such stores having been issued from Board stores, supervision charges and storage charges shall be refunded in addition to the issue rate of materials. CLAUSE-16: NOTICE TO BE GIVEN BEFORE WORK IS COVERED UP (i) The contractor shall give not less than seven days notice in writing to the Engineer-in-Charge or his subordinate in charge of the work before covering up or otherwise placing beyond the reach of measurement any work in order that the same may be measured, and correct dimensions thereof be taken before the same is so covered up or placed beyond the reach of measurement and shall not cover up and place beyond the reach of measurement, any work without the consent in writing of the Engineer-in-Charge or his subordinate in charge of the work who shall within the aforesaid period of seven day inspect the work, and if any work shall be covered up or placed beyond the reach of measurement without such notice having been given or the Engineer-in-Charge’s consent being obtained, the same shall be uncovered at the contractors expense, or in default thereof no payment or allowance shall be made for such work or the materials with which the same was executed. (ii) In case of works like concreting, rockbolting, grouting, shot-creting, etc. it will be binding on the contractor that no such work will be executed by him until and unless an authorised representative of Engineer-in-Charge is present at the site of work or in default thereof, no payment or allowance shall be made for such work or the materials with which the same was executed. (iii) Should the Engineer-in-Charge consider it necessary in order to satisfy himself as to the quality of the work, the contractor shall at any time during the execution of the work, pull down or cut into any part of the work and make such openings into and to such an extent through the same as the Engineer-in-Charge may direct and the contractor shall make good the whole to the satisfaction of the Engineer-in-Charge. Should the work prove to be faulty or in any respect not in accordance with the terms of the contract documents, the Engineer-in-Charge will be at liberty to order such further removal and cost of remaking shall be borne by the contractor. “BOQ. 2.2.1 Providing and laying reinforced cement concrete or plain cement concrete M-15 grade (250 kg. Should the work prove to be faulty or in any respect not in accordance with the terms of the contract documents, the Engineer-in-Charge will be at liberty to order such further removal and cost of remaking shall be borne by the contractor. “BOQ. 2.2.1 Providing and laying reinforced cement concrete or plain cement concrete M-15 grade (250 kg. of cement per cum) with 20 mm or 40 mm maximum size graded crushed aggregate including preparing surfaces, centering and shuttering, fixing embedding joints, sealing compounds, primary embedded parts, gates stop-logs etc. laying cement slurry before pouring concrete, mixing, placing, vibrating, curing and finishing for all leads and lifts etc. and contract grouting as necessary complete in all respects but excluding the cost of providing and fixing reinforcement as per specifications and drawings or as directed (i) Tunnel, desilting tank, flushing galleries etc. Cum 325 2.2.2.2 Providing and laying reinforced cement concrete or plain cement concrete M-20 grade (325 Kg. of cement per cum) with 20mm or 40mm maximum size graded crushed aggregate including preparing surfaces, centering and shuttering. Fixing embedding joints, sealing compounds, primary embedded parts and trash rack, gates, stop logs etc. laying cement slurry before pouring concrete, mixing, placing, vibrating, curing and finishing for all leads and lifts etc. and contract grouting as necessary complete in all respects but excluding the cost of providing and fixing reinforcement as per specifications and drawings or as directed by the Engineer-in-Charge. (i) Tunnel, desilting tank, flushing galleries etc. Cum 6,745 (ii) Surge shaft. Cum 270 1.1.1 Excavation in all kinds of soils including dressing the sides, transporting the excavated materials, stacking of serviceable materials and disposal of unserviceable materials beyond the working area for all leads and lifts including dewatering as necessary complete as per specifications and drawings or as directed by the Engineer-in-Charge. Cum 520 1.1.2 Excavation in all kind of soils including dressing the sides, transporting the excavated materials, stacking of serviceable materials & disposal of unserviceable materials beyond the working area for all leads and lifts, compete as per specifications and drawings or as directed by the Engineer-in-Charge. Cum 55110” The law as it stands laid down by the Apex Court I shall firstly refer to various decisions of the Apex court on the points involved. Judgments cited by the learned counsel for the parties have also been considered. Cum 55110” The law as it stands laid down by the Apex Court I shall firstly refer to various decisions of the Apex court on the points involved. Judgments cited by the learned counsel for the parties have also been considered. Courts approach to uphold the Award In Smt. Santa Sila Devi vs. Dhirendra Nath Sen, AIR 1963 SC 1677, the Supreme Court has observed as follows:- “Before dealing with this point it is necessary to emphasis certain basic positions. The first of them is that a Court should approach an award with a desire to support it, if that is reasonably possible, rather than to destroy it by calling it illegal (See Selby v. Whitbread and Co., (1917) I KB 736 at p. 748). Besides it is obvious that unless the reference to arbitration specifically so requires the arbitrator is not bound to deal with each claim or matter separately, but can deliver a consolidated award. The legal position is clear that unless so specifically required an award need not formally express the decision of the arbitrator on each matter of difference. (Vice re. Brown and the Croydon Canal Co., (1839) 9 Ad and Ell 522 : 112 ER 1309 and Jewell v. Christie (1867) 2 CP 296. Further, as Parke, B. himself put in during course of arguments in (1853 138 ER 1254 : "Unless the contrary appears the Court will presume that the award disposes finally of all the matters in difference" and to reseat a sentence from the extract quoted earlier: Where an award is made de praemissis, the presumption is, that the arbitrator intended to dispose finally of all the matters in difference; and his award will be held final, if by an intendment it can be made so. We shall approach the argument addressed to us in the light of these considerations. We shall approach the argument addressed to us in the light of these considerations. Now the award opens with a paragraph which recites, after setting out the reference: “Whereas I have heard and duly considered all the allegations advanced evidence adduced before me regarding the respective cases of the parties..........I do hereby make and publish this, my award in writing as to all the disputes mentioned above.” It need hardly be added that the arbitration agreement and the statements filed extracts from which we have set out earlier were among the documents incorporated with this award and included among the matters considered by the arbitrator which disputes he intended to resolve by this award. The award, therefore, on its face intended and purported to decide all the disputes raised for this adjudication and therefore the Court will assume that he has considered and disposed of every claim made or defence raised. Since the award now impugned expressly states that it is made "de praemissis" i.e., of and concerning all the matters in dispute referred to the arbitrators, there is a presumption that the award is complete. In the circumstances the Principles of construction enunciated by Parke, B. aptly covers the case and the silence of the award as regards the claim for accounting must therefore, be taken to be intended as a decision rejecting the claim to that relief.” (Emphasis supplied) Scope of Judicial Intervention The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 was enacted, as is evident from the objects and reasons, with a specific Parliamentary objective of minimizing the supervisory role of Courts in the arbitral process. As per Section 5 of the Act, no judicial authority shall intervene in matters governing by Part I except where it is so provided. An arbitral award may be set aside by the Court only if one of the grounds set out in Clause (a) or (b) of Section 34(2) is established. 17. As per Section 5 of the Act, no judicial authority shall intervene in matters governing by Part I except where it is so provided. An arbitral award may be set aside by the Court only if one of the grounds set out in Clause (a) or (b) of Section 34(2) is established. 17. The Apex Court inOlympus Superstructures Pvt. Ltd. vs. Meena Vijay Khetan and others, AIR 1999 SC 2102 and in Konkan Railway Corporation Ltd. vs. Mehul Construction Co., (2000) 7 SCC 201, has held that the Act as compared to the Arbitration Act, 1940 had limited the intervention of the Court with the arbitral process to the minimum and that in interpreting the provisions of the Act, it was not open to the Court to ignore the object and purpose of the enactment. Moreover, even though the expression “public policy” is recognized judicially as being an “elusive concept”, difficult to define and capable of interpretation both in narrow as well as in broad terms, that would not be a warrant for the Court to extend judicial intervention in arbitral awards beyond the restricted sphere envisioned by the Parliament. 18. The expression “public policy” is a concept which relates to the public good and to public interest. In Renusagar Power Co. Ltd. vs. General Electric Co., AIR 1994 SC 860, the Supreme Court noted that the doctrine of public policy is somewhat open-textured and flexible and comprehends a narrow and a broad view. The narrow view is that Courts cannot create new heads of policy, while the broader view is that heads are not necessarily closed for judicial interpretation. The position in England was considered where the ground of public policy is held to be capable of being invoked where the enforcement of an award “would affront some moral principle the maintenance of which admits no possible compromise”, such as (i) where the fundamental conceptions of English justice and disregarded; (ii) Where English conceptions or morality are infringed; (iii) Where a transaction prejudices the interest of a nation or its good relations with foreign powers; (iv) where the foreign law or status offends English conception of human liberty and freedom of action. 19. 19. The Apex Court in Smita Conductors Ltd. vs. Euro Alloys Ltd., (2001) 7 SCC 728 and Oil & Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. vs. Saw Pipes Ltd., (2003) 5 SCC 705, held that the expression “public policy of India” would mean that a foreign award cannot be recognized or enforced if it is contrary to (i) the fundamental policy of Indian Law; (ii) the interests of India; (iii) justice or morality. 20. Conscious as the Court must be of the varying content of the doctrine of public policy, it would be appropriate to regard a breach of public policy as involving a conflict with something so fundamental so as to constitute or lie at the root of legal principles in India. Similarly, something which is so unconscionable so as to be contrary to fundamental notions justice or morality may well be regarded as a breach of public policy. But, however, it would not be permissible for the judge to reappreciate the reasons underlying an arbitral award or for that matter to reappreciate the oral or documentary evidence on the record before the Arbitrator. Factual evaluation of an arbitral award is not permissible. The Court would not be justified in interfering with an arbitral award merely because in a given case, the interpretation which is sought to be placed on the terms of the contract by the Arbitrator does not accord with the interpretation which the Court would have placed. So long as the Arbitrator has acted within jurisdiction in interpreting the provisions of the contract, and has applied the law to his evaluation of the facts, the Court must rest with the decision of the Arbitrator unless the Court is satisfied that the arbitral award is in conflict with the public policy of India. 21. The arbitrator is a Judge appointed by both the parties after reaching a consensus and once it is found that the view of the Arbitrator is a plausible one, the Court cannot reverse it by interfering with the award. Moreover, the interpretation of a contract is a matter solely within the domain of the arbitrator. In case two views are possible, the Court is not justified in interfering with the award by adopting its own interpretation. PUBLIC POLICY 22. In McDermott International Inc. vs. Burn Standard Co. Ltd. and others, (2006) 11 SCC 181, Hon’ble Mr. Moreover, the interpretation of a contract is a matter solely within the domain of the arbitrator. In case two views are possible, the Court is not justified in interfering with the award by adopting its own interpretation. PUBLIC POLICY 22. In McDermott International Inc. vs. Burn Standard Co. Ltd. and others, (2006) 11 SCC 181, Hon’ble Mr. Justice S.B.Sinha, (as His Lordship then was) after taking into account his earlier view taken in ONGC Ltd. vs. Saw Pipes Limited, (2003) 5 SCC 644, has held as under:- “58. In Renusagar Power Co. Ltd. v. General Electric Co. [(1994) Supp 1 SCC 644], this Court laid down that the arbitral award can be set aside if it is contrary to (a) fundamental policy of Indian Law, (b) the interests of India; or (c) justice or morality. A narrower meaning to the expression public policy was given therein by confining judicial review of the arbitral award only on the aforementioned three grounds. An apparent shift can, however, be noticed from the decision of this Court in Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. v. Saw Pipes Ltd. (for short ONGC)[(2003) 5 SCC 705]. This Court therein referred to an earlier decision of this Court in Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Ltd. v. Brojo Nath Ganguly [(1986) 3 SCC 156] wherein the applicability of the expression public policy on the touchstone of Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act and Article 14 of the Constitution of India came to be considered. This Court therein was dealing with unequal bargaining power of the workmen and the employer and came to the conclusion that any term of the agreement which is patently arbitrary and/ or otherwise arrived at because of the unequal bargaining power would not only be ultra vires Article 14 of the Constitution of India but also hit by Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act. In ONGC (supra), this Court, apart from the three grounds stated in Renusagar (supra), added another ground thereto for exercise of the courts jurisdiction in setting aside the award if it is patently arbitrary. “59. Such patent illegality, however, must go to the root of the matter. The public policy violation, indisputably, should be so unfair and unreasonable as to shock the conscience of the court. “59. Such patent illegality, however, must go to the root of the matter. The public policy violation, indisputably, should be so unfair and unreasonable as to shock the conscience of the court. Where the Arbitrator, however, has gone contrary to or beyond the expressed law of the contract or granted relief in the matter not in dispute would come within the purview of Section 34 of the Act. However, we would consider the applicability of the aforementioned principles while noticing the merit of the matter. What would constitute public policy is a matter dependant upon the nature of transaction and nature of statute. For the said purpose, the pleadings of the parties and the materials brought on record would be relevant to enable the court to judge what is in public good or public interest, and what would otherwise be injurious to the public good at the relevant point, as contradistinguished from the policy of a particular government. [See State of Rajasthan v. Basant Nahata, (2005) 12 SCC 77]. In ONGC (supra), this Court observed: "31. Therefore, in our view, the phrase "public policy of India" used in Section 34 in context is required to be given a wider meaning. It can be stated that the concept of public policy connotes some matter which concerns public good and the public interest. What is for public good or in public interest or what would be injurious or harmful to the public good or public interest has varied from time to time. However, the award which is, on the face of it, patently in violation of statutory provisions cannot be said to be in public interest. Such award/judgment/decision is likely to adversely affect the administration of justice. Hence, in our view in addition to narrower meaning given to the term "public policy" in Renusagar case10 it is required to be held that the award could be set aside if it is patently illegal. The result would be award could be set aside if it is contrary to: (a) fundamental policy of Indian law; or (b) the interest of India; or (c) justice or morality, or (d) in addition, if it is patently illegal. Illegality must go to the root of the matter and if the illegality is of trivial nature it cannot be held that award is against the public policy. Illegality must go to the root of the matter and if the illegality is of trivial nature it cannot be held that award is against the public policy. Award could also be set aside if it is so unfair and unreasonable that it shocks the conscience of the court. Such award is opposed to public policy and is required to be adjudged void." (Emphasis supplied) 32. The Court reiterated its earlier view that once it is found that the view taken by the Arbitrator is plausible one, the Court would refrain itself from interfering. The correspondences exchanged by the parties were held to be required to be taken into consideration for the purposes of construction of contract. Interpretation of a contract is a matter for the arbitrator to determine, even if it gives rise to determination of a question of law. Once it is held that the arbitrator had the jurisdiction, no further question shall be raised and the court will not exercise its jurisdiction unless it is found that there exists any bar on the face of the award. With respect to the issue of determination of actual loss suffered by the party, the Court opined that it depends upon the circumstances and the method to compute the damages. How the quantum was to be determined was purely within the domain and jurisdiction of the Arbitrator. 33. This view stands reiterated by the Apex Court in Venture Global Engineering vs. Satyam Computer Services Ltd. and another, (2008) 4 SCC 190, Delhi Development Authority vs. R.S.Sharma and Company, New Delhi, (2008) 13 SCC 80 and Hindustan Zinc Ltd. vs. Friends Coal Carbonisation, (2006) 4 SCC 445. 34. In Centrotrade Minerals & Metals Inc. vs. Hindustan Cooper Ltd., (2006) 11 SCC 245, the Court held:- “Section 34 which refers to "challenge to arbitral award" strives to balance between the party autonomy and judicial control of the arbitral result with the object of speed and efficiency. The balance has to come down strongly in favour of finality, and against judicial review, except in few circumstances. So, the main object of the provision is to determine whether the award has become final and binding or not. Thus, the section depicts a position whereby an arbitral award can be challenged for the purpose of setting aside of the same at the first instance without much delay. So, the main object of the provision is to determine whether the award has become final and binding or not. Thus, the section depicts a position whereby an arbitral award can be challenged for the purpose of setting aside of the same at the first instance without much delay. The Court would set aside the award only on certain circumstances. Thereby, it is the legislative intention that such a matter is settled without much delay or much intervention of court. So, the finality of the challenged award would be decided by Court under section 34 of the 1996 Act and appeals are allowed against certain orders of courts or tribunals on certain grounds under Section 37 of the Act.” “The expression “public policy” in India has been used for three different situations, namely, under Sections 34(2)(b), 48 (2)(b) and 57(10(b).” “The doctrine of public policy must be held to be a ground for setting aside an arbitration agreement and consequently an award. Such patent illegality, however, must go to the root of the matter. The public policy, indisputably, should be so unfair and unreasonable so as to shock the conscience of the court. In the context of the 1996 Act, an arbitration agreement which would be contrary to the provisions of the laws governing the contract between the parties would be void being opposed to public policy. Further, where the arbitrator, has gone contrary to or beyond the expressed law of the contract or granted relief in the matter not in dispute would come within the purview of Section 34 of the Act.” (Emphasis supplied) ERROR APPARENT ON THE FACE OF THE AWARD/ ERROR OF LAW: 35. The Apex Court in Jajodia (Overseas) Pvt. Ltd. vs. Industrial Development Corporation of Orissa and others, (1993) 2 SCC 106 has held as under:- “We may refer with advantage to this Court’s judgment in Bungo Steel Furniture Pvt. Ltd. vs. Union of India, AIR 1967 SC 378. the Court quoted the well-known passage from the judgment of Lord Dunedin in Champsey Bhara and Co. v. Jivraj Balloo Spinning and Weaving Co. the Court quoted the well-known passage from the judgment of Lord Dunedin in Champsey Bhara and Co. v. Jivraj Balloo Spinning and Weaving Co. Ltd., 50 IA 324 :AIR 1923 PC 66, thus: ‘An error in law on the face of the award means, in their Lordships” view, that you can find in the award or a document actually incorporated thereto, as for instance a note appended by the arbitrator stating the reasons for his judgment, some legal proposition which is the basis of the award and which you can then say is erroneous. It does not mean that if in narrative a reference is made to a contention of one party, that opens the door to seeing first what that contention is, and then going to the contract on which the parties’ rights depended to see if that contention is sound.’” It went on to observe: "An award may be set aside by the court on the ground of an error of law apparent on the face of the award but an award is not invalid merely because by a process of inference and argument it may be demonstrated that the arbitrator has committed some mistake in arriving at his conclusion." (Emphasis supplied) 36. A similar view was also taken by the Apex Court in Union of India vs. A.L.Rallia Ram, AIR 1963 SC 1685. 37. In N.Chellappan v. Secretary, Kerala State Electricity Board, AIR 1975 SC 230, the Supreme Court observed that “…The Court has no jurisdiction to investigate into the merits of the case and to examine the documentary and oral evidence on the record for the purpose of finding out, whether or not the arbitrator has committed an error of law.” ERROR OF LAW – MEANING 38. In Food Corporation of India vs. Joginderpal Mohinderpal and another, (1989) 2 SCC 347, the Apex Court held as under:- “In case of errors apparent on the face of the award, it can only be set aside if in the award there is any proposition of law which is apparent on the face of the award, namely, in the award itself or any document incorporated in the award. Error of law as such is not to be presumed. If there is legal proposition which is the basis of the award and which is erroneous then only the award can be set aside. Error of law as such is not to be presumed. If there is legal proposition which is the basis of the award and which is erroneous then only the award can be set aside. If the award is a speaking award in the sense that the arbitrator has chosen to give the reasons, then unless it is demonstrated to the Court that such reasons are erroneous as propositions of law or that the arbitrator has taken a view which it could not possibly be sustained on any view of the matter, the challenge to the award of the arbitrator cannot be sustained. Arbitration as a mode for settlement of disputes between the parties, has a tradition in India. It has a social purpose to fulfil today. It has a great urgency today when there has been an explosion of litigations in the Courts of law established by the sovereign power. However, in proceedings of arbitration there must be adherence to justice, equity, law and fair play in action. The proceedings of arbitration must adhere to the principles of natural justice and must be in consonance with such practice and procedure which will lead to a proper resolution of the dispute and create confidence of the people for whose benefit these processes are resorted to. It is, therefore, the function of courts of law to oversee that the arbitrators act within the norms of justice. Once they do so and the award is clear, just and fair, the courts should, as far as possible, give effect to the award of the parties and make the parties compel to adhere to and obey the decision of their chosen adjudicator. It is in this perspective that one should view the scope and limit of correction by the Court of an award made by the arbitrator. The law of arbitration should be made simple, less technical and more responsible to the actual realities of the situations, but must be responsive to the canons of justice and fair play. The arbitrator should be made to adhere to such process and norms which will create confidence, not only by doing justice between the parties, but by creating a sense that justice appears to have been done. (Emphasis supplied) 39. The arbitrator should be made to adhere to such process and norms which will create confidence, not only by doing justice between the parties, but by creating a sense that justice appears to have been done. (Emphasis supplied) 39. In Madhya Pradesh Housing Board vs. Progessive Writers and Publishers, (2009) 5 SCC 678, the Apex Court has reiterated its earlier view taken in various decisions and held that “interpretation of a contract, it is trite, is a matter for the arbitrator to determine. Even in a case where the award contained reasons, the interference therewith would still be not available within the jurisdiction of the court unless, of course, “the reasons are totally perverse or award is based on wrong proposition of law”. 40. The Apex Court further held that in case there is no erroneous application of law by the arbitrator or any improper and incorrect findings which “demonstrable on the face of the material on record”, the findings given by the Arbitrator cannot be said to be perverse to give rise to legal misconduct deserving intervention. The Court was also dealing with a case where the Arbitrator had taken judicial note of certain facts which were in the realm of conjectures and surmises. 41. To the similar effect is the decision of the Supreme Court in Kwality Manufacturing Corporation vs. Central Warehousing Corporation, (2009) 5 SCC 142. 42. In Gujarat Water Supply and Sewerage Board v. Unique Erectors (Gujarat) (P) Ltd., (1989) 1 SCC 532, the Apex Court held that an award of an arbitrator should be read reasonably as a whole to find out the implication and the meaning thereof. 43. In Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. vs. Annapurna Construction, (2003) 8 SCC 154, it has been held that “there lies a clear distinction between an error within the jurisdiction and error in excess of jurisdiction. Thus, the role of the arbitrator is to arbitrate within the terms of the contract. He has no power apart from what the parties have given him under the contract. If he has travelled beyond the contract, he would be acting without jurisdiction, whereas if he has remained inside the parameter of the contract, his award cannot be questioned on the ground that it contains an error apparent on the face of the record.” 44. He has no power apart from what the parties have given him under the contract. If he has travelled beyond the contract, he would be acting without jurisdiction, whereas if he has remained inside the parameter of the contract, his award cannot be questioned on the ground that it contains an error apparent on the face of the record.” 44. In Pure Helium India (P) Ltd. vs. Oil & Natural Gas Commission, (2003) 8 SCC 593, the Apex Court has approved the ratio of law laid down in its earlier decision in Rajasthan State Mines & Minerals Ltd. v. Eastern Engg. Enterprises, (1999) 9 SCC 283, as under:- “35. In Rajasthan State Mines & Minerals Ltd. (supra) whereupon Mr. Rohtagi placed strong reliance, this Court held that the dispute to the arbitrator could not be termed as without jurisdiction but proceeded to consider the question as to whether he will have authority or jurisdiction to grant damages or compensation in the teeth of the stipulation providing that no escalation would be granted and that the contractor would only be entitled to payment of the composite rate as mentioned and no other or further payment of any kind or item whatsoever shall be due and payable by the Company to the contractor. 36. It was concluded : (SCC pp 309-10, para 44) " 44 (a) It is not open to the Court to speculate, where on reasons are given by the arbitrator, as to what impelled the arbitrator to arrive at his conclusion. (b) It is not open to the Court to admit to probe the mental process by which the arbitrator has reached his conclusion where it is not disclosed by the terms of the award. (c) If the arbitrator has committed a mere error of fact or law in reaching his conclusion on the disputed question submitted for his adjudication then the Court cannot interfere. (d) If no specific question of law is referred, the decision of the Arbitrator on that question is not final, however much it may be within his jurisdiction and indeed essential for him to decide the question incidentally. In a case where specific question of law touching upon the jurisdiction of the arbitrator was referred for the decision of the arbitrator by the parties, then the finding of the arbitrator on the said question between the parties may be binding. In a case where specific question of law touching upon the jurisdiction of the arbitrator was referred for the decision of the arbitrator by the parties, then the finding of the arbitrator on the said question between the parties may be binding. (e) In a case of non-speaking award, the jurisdiction of the Court is limited. The award can be set aside if the arbitrator acts beyond his jurisdiction. (f) To find out whether the arbitrator has travelled beyond his jurisdiction, it would be necessary to consider the agreement between the parties containing the arbitration clause. Arbitrator acting beyond his jurisdiction is a different ground from the error apparent on the face of the award. (g) In order to determine whether arbitrator has acted in excess of his jurisdiction what has to be seen is whether the claimant could raise a particular claim before the arbitrator. If there is a specific term in the contract or the law which does not permit or give the arbitrator the power to decide the dispute raised by the claimant or there is a specific bar in the contract to the raising of the particular claim then the award passed by the arbitrator in respect thereof would be in excess of jurisdiction." Mere Mistake by the Arbitrator – No ground for interference 45. In M/s Sudarsan Trading Co. vs. Government of Kerala and another, (1989) 2 SCC 38, the Apex Court held that “An award may be set aside on the ground of error on the face of the award, but an award is not invalid merely because by a process of inference and argument it may be demonstrated that the arbitrator has committed some mistake in arriving at his conclusion.” “..Therefore, it appears to us that there are two different and distinct grounds involved in many of the cases. One is the error apparent on the face of the award, and the other is that the arbitrator exceeded his jurisdiction. In the latter case, the courts can look into the arbitration agreement but in the former, it cannot, unless the agreement was incorporated or recited in the award.” (Emphasis supplied) Even erroneous construction of the terms of contract interference is not warranted. 46. In Himachal Pradesh State Electricity Board vs. R.J.Shah and Company, (1999) 4 SCC 214 : JT 1999(3) SC 151, the Apex Court held as under:- “23. 46. In Himachal Pradesh State Electricity Board vs. R.J.Shah and Company, (1999) 4 SCC 214 : JT 1999(3) SC 151, the Apex Court held as under:- “23. From the aforesaid decisions of this court, and the last one in particular, it is clear that when the arbitrator is required to construe a contract then merely because another view may be possible the court would not be justified in construing the contract in a different manner and then to set aside the award by observing that the arbitrator has exceeded the jurisdiction in making the award. 25….. The dispute before the arbitrators, therefore, clearly related to the interpretation of the terms of the contract. The said contract was being read by the parties differently. The arbitrators were, therefore, clearly called upon to construe or interpret the terms of the contract. The decision thereon, even if it be erroneous, cannot be said to be without jurisdiction. It cannot be said that the award showed that there was an error of jurisdiction even though there may have been an error in the exercise of jurisdiction by the arbitrators.” No Appellate Jurisdiction 47. In Puri Construction Pvt. Ltd. vs. Union of India, (1989) 1 SCC 411, the Apex Court held that “When a court is called upon to decide the objections raised by a party against an arbitration award, the jurisdiction of the court is limited, as expressly indicated in the Arbitration Act, and it has no jurisdiction to sit in appeal and examine the correctness of the award on merits with reference to the materials produced before the arbitrator. The court cannot sit in appeal over the views of the arbitrator by reexamining and re-assessing the materials.” 48. The Apex Court in Delhi Development Authority vs. R.S.Sharma and Company, New Delhi, (2008) 13 SCC 80, held that Civil Court does not sit in an appeal against the award and the power of the court when an award is challenged is rather limited. The award of the arbitrator is ordinarily final and conclusive as long as the arbitrator has acted within his authority and according to the “principle of fair play”. An arbitrator’s adjudication is generally considered binding between the parties for the reason that it is a selected Tribunal with the consent. Even if the arbitrator commits an error in construction of the contract that is an error within its jurisdiction. 49. An arbitrator’s adjudication is generally considered binding between the parties for the reason that it is a selected Tribunal with the consent. Even if the arbitrator commits an error in construction of the contract that is an error within its jurisdiction. 49. In Bhagwati Oxygen Ltd. vs. Hindustan Copper Ltd., (2005) 6 SCC 462, the Apex Court has held that an Arbitrator is a Judge appointed by the parties and as such the award passed by him is not to be lightly interfered with. The jurisdiction is not appellate in nature and an award passed by an Arbitrator cannot be set aside on the ground that it was erroneous. It is not open to the court to interfere with the award merely because in the opinion of the court, other view is equally possible. It is only when the court is satisfied that the Arbitrator had misconducted himself or the proceedings or the award had been improperly procured or is `otherwise invalid that the court may set aside such award. INTEREST 50. In Board of Trustees for the port of Calcutta vs. Engineers-de-space-age, (1996) 1 SCC 516, the Apex Court was dealing with a case where the contract envisaged the following clause:- "No claim for interest will be entertained by the Commissioners with respect to any money or balance which may be in their hands owing to any dispute between themselves and the Contractor or with respect to any delay on the part of the Commissioners in making interim or final payment or otherwise." 51. While considering the question as to whether for the period subsequent to the reference it was open for the Arbitrator to award interest, the Court held that bar to award interest was only confined to the Commissioner and not the Arbitrator. Hence it upheld the award whereby the Arbitrator had awarded interest pendente lite. Reasons and reasonableness of Reasons 52. In Union of India vs. Mohan Lal Capoor and others, (1973) 2 SCC 836, the Apex Court while reviewing the administrative decision taken by an executive authority whereby certain officers were superseded, held that reasons are the links between the materials on which certain conclusions are based and the actual conclusions. They disclose how the mind is applied to the subject matter for a decision whether it is purely administrative or quasi-judicial. Reasons reveal a rational nexus between the facts considered and the conclusions reached. They disclose how the mind is applied to the subject matter for a decision whether it is purely administrative or quasi-judicial. Reasons reveal a rational nexus between the facts considered and the conclusions reached. Only in this way can opinions or decisions recorded be shown to be manifestly just and reasonable. 5. In Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs. M/s Jagan Nath Ashok Kumar and another, (1987) 4 SCC 497, the Apex Court had the occasion to deal with the award passed by the Arbitrator appointed under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act, 1940. The award was assailed on the ground that the Arbitrator had not assigned reasons, which were reasonable. Relying upon the definition of the word “reasonable” in Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary, Fourth Edition, page 2258, the Court held reason varies in its conclusions according to the idiosyncrasy of the individual, and the times and circumstances in which he thinks. The reasoning which built up the old scholastic logic sounds now like the jingling of a childs toy. But mankind must be satisfied with the reasonableness within reach; and in cases not covered by authority, the verdict of a jury or the decision of a judge sitting as a jury usually determines what is "reasonable" in each particular case. “The word "reasonable" has in law the prima facie meaning of reasonable in regard to those circumstances of which the actor, called on to act reasonably, knows or ought to know. See the observations, in Re a Solicitor, 1945 KB 368 at p. 371 of the report”. 54. This view was reiterated in Union of India vs. Shiv Shanker Kesari, (2007) 7 SCC 798. 55. In Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. vs. Indian Carbon Ltd., (1988) 3 SCC 36, the Apex Court while dealing with the petition assailing the Arbitrator’s award, after referring to Justice R.S.Bachawat: Law of Arbitration, First Edition 1983, Pages 320 and 321, held that proper and adequate reasons must be given which would not only be “intelligible” but also “deal with the substantial points that have been raised”. When the arbitration clause requires the arbitrator to give reasons which in fact are given, “the sufficiency of the reasons depends upon the facts of the particular case”. Further “he is not bound to give detailed reasons. The Court does not sit in appeal over the ward and review the reasons. When the arbitration clause requires the arbitrator to give reasons which in fact are given, “the sufficiency of the reasons depends upon the facts of the particular case”. Further “he is not bound to give detailed reasons. The Court does not sit in appeal over the ward and review the reasons. The Court can set aside the award only if it is apparent from the award that there is no evidence to support the conclusions or if the award is based upon any legal position which is erroneous”. 56. In Gujarat Water Supply and Sewerage Board vs. Unique Erectors (Gujarat) (P) Ltd. and another, (1989) 1 SCC 532, the Court has held as under:- “Reasonableness as such of an award unless the award is per se preposterous or absurd is not a matter for the court to consider. Appraisement of evidence by the arbitrator is ordinarily not a matter for the court. It is difficult to give an exact definition of the word reasonable. (Emphasis supplied) 57. In Jajodia (overseas) Pvt. Ltd. vs. Industrial Development Corporation of Orissa Ltd., (1993) 2 SCC 106, the Apex Court has held that setting out the conclusions upon the questions or issues that arise in the arbitration proceedings without discussing the reasons for coming to these conclusions does not make an award a reasoned or speaking award. Importantly, here the Court was dealing with the case where the Arbitrator had simply answered the issues framed by him in a cryptic manner. 58. In Subhash Aggarwal Agencies vs. Bhilwara Synthetics Ltd. and others, (1995) 1 SCC 371, the Court has observed that “an illuminating passage is found in Arbitration Law by Robert Merkin, 1991 Edn. It is stated in the following paragraphs as under: "19.23: It would seem that where arbitrators do determine to give reasons for their award, or are ordered to do so by the High Court or the parties themselves, no great obligation is involved; this is by way of contrast to the old special case procedure. The often repeated guidelines were laid down by Donaldson LJ in Bermer Handelegesellschaft mbH v. Westzucker GmbH (No.2) (1981) 2 Lloyds Rep 130 at p-132. It is of the greatest importance that trade arbitrators working under the 1979 Act should realise that their whole approach should now be different. The often repeated guidelines were laid down by Donaldson LJ in Bermer Handelegesellschaft mbH v. Westzucker GmbH (No.2) (1981) 2 Lloyds Rep 130 at p-132. It is of the greatest importance that trade arbitrators working under the 1979 Act should realise that their whole approach should now be different. At the end of the hearing they will be in a position to give a decision and the reasons for that decision. They should do so at the earliest possible moment..... No particular form of award is required..... All that is necessary is that the arbitrators should set out what in their view of evidence, did or did not happen, and should explain succinctly why in the light of what happened, they have reached their decision and what that decision is..... Where a 1979 Act award differs from a judgment is in the fact that the arbitrators will not be expected to analyse the law and the authorities. It will be quite sufficient that they should explain how they reached their conclusion..... The point which I am seeking to make is that a reasoned award, in accordance with the 1979 Act, is wholly different from an award in the form of a special case. It is not technical, it is not difficult to draw and above all it is something which can and should be produced promptly and quickly at the conclusion of the hearing. The Courts have, consistently with this passage, stressed that awards are not legal judgments and thus must not be viewed in a pedantic or overcritical fashion. Equally, the fact that an award is short does not mean that it is inadequately reasoned. In particular it is not necessary for arbitrators to set out list of rival submissions or factual propositions and to choose between them. It is enough that the award demonstrates why the arbitrators have found for one party rather than the other.” (Emphasis supplied) 59. It further held that an arbitrator is not bound by the technical rules of procedure which the Court must follow, nor need he record separate findings on the various points on which the parties are at issue or write a reasoned judicial decision. All that he is required to do is to give an intelligible decision which determines the rights of the parties in relation to the subject matter of the reference. 60. All that he is required to do is to give an intelligible decision which determines the rights of the parties in relation to the subject matter of the reference. 60. It upheld the view taken in Indian Oil Corporation (supra) that sufficiency of the reasons was dependant upon the facts of the particular case and that the Court does not sit in appeal over the award and review the reasons and can set aside the award only if it is apparent from the award that there is no evidence to support the conclusions or if the award is based upon any legal proposition which is erroneous the arbitrator is not bound to give detailed reasons. 61. In Pure Helium India (P) Ltd. vs. Oil & Natural Gas Commission, (2003) 8 SCC 593, the Court has gone to the extent of holding that while considering the objections to the award, the Court is precluded from reappraising the evidence and even in a case where the award contains reasons, the interference therewith would still be not available within the jurisdiction of the court unless, of course, “the reasons are totally perverse or the judgment is based on a wrong proposition of law”. 62. Further an error apparent on the face of the records would not imply closer scrutiny of the merits of documents and material on record and once it is found that the view of the arbitrator is plausible one, the court will refrain itself from interfering with it. 63. In McDermott International Inc. vs. Burn Standard Co. Ltd. and others, (2006) 11 SCC 181, the Court held as under:- “In Bachawats Law of Arbitration and Conciliation, Fourth Edition, pages 855-856, it is stated: "…Reason is a ground or motive for a belief or a course of action, a statement in justification or explanation of belief or action. It is in this sense that the award must state reasons for the amount awarded. The rationale of the requirement of reasons is that reasons assure that the arbitrator has not acted capriciously. Reasons reveal the grounds on which the arbitrator reached the conclusion which adversely affects the interests of a party. The contractual stipulation of reasons means, as held in Poyser and Mills Arbitration. In Re, "proper, adequate reasons". Such reasons shall not only be intelligible but shall be a reason connected with the case which the court can see is proper. Reasons reveal the grounds on which the arbitrator reached the conclusion which adversely affects the interests of a party. The contractual stipulation of reasons means, as held in Poyser and Mills Arbitration. In Re, "proper, adequate reasons". Such reasons shall not only be intelligible but shall be a reason connected with the case which the court can see is proper. Contradictory reasons are equal to lack of reasons. The meaning of the word "reason" was explained by the Kerala High Court in the contest of a reasoned award… "Reasons are the links between the materials on which certain conclusions are based and the actual conclusions…." A mere statement of reasons does not satisfy the requirements of s.31(3) . Reasons must be based upon the materials submitted before the arbitral tribunal. The tribunal has to give its reasons on consideration of the relevant materials while the irrelevant material may be ignored…. Statement of reasons is mandatory requirement unless dispensed with by the parties or by a statutory provision." 64. In Delhi Development Authority New Delhi v. M/s Alkaram, New Delhi; AIR 1982 Delhi 365 the Delhi High Court has observed as follows:- “The theory propounded before us that the Court can see the ‘reasonableness of the reasons’ if accepted “would cut at the root of the whole purpose of arbitration, the basic idea of which is that the arbitrator’s decision shall be final”. (per Wilmer L.J. in Tersons Ltd. v. Stevenage Development Corporation, (1963) 3 All ER 863, 867).” It will be right to point out here that though the arbitrator by the terms of the arbitration clause is required to give reasons for the award he is not to write a detailed judgment as we judges do in courts. The requirement of reasons meets the elementary demand of the parties to be told “the reason why” for a particular conclusion arrived at by the arbitrator. For the arbitrator it is an act of self-discipline. But to say that the court will be entitled to examine the ‘reasonableness of the reasons’ is to allow the concept of reasons to run wild. For the arbitrator it is an act of self-discipline. But to say that the court will be entitled to examine the ‘reasonableness of the reasons’ is to allow the concept of reasons to run wild. The theory is a disguised attempt to turn questions of fact into questions of law with a view to having them retried by the court, with the result that all the objects sought to be attained by means of arbitration – decision by the tribunal chosen by the parties, and finality and quickness and cheapness – would be defeated by protracted proceedings in the courts, as has happened in this case before the single Judge and before us. There is a danger of attempts being made to reopen issues of fact which are concluded by the arbitrator’s findings …. However, sufficiency and quality of evidence is a matter for the arbitrator.” Perversity in Award 65. In ONGC Limited vs. Garware Shipping Corporation Limited, (2007) 13 SCC 434, the Apex Court has held that if the Arbitrator’s award is perverse or when the very basis of the award is wrong, the Court would not be slow to interfere. This view is reiterated by the Apex Court in Security Printing and Minting Corporation of India Limited and another vs. Gandhi Industrial Corporation, (2007) 13 SCC 236. NON-CONSIDERATION OF MATERIAL DOCUMENTS 66. In K.P.Poulose vs. State of Kerala and another, (1975) 2 SCC 236, the Court has held that non-consideration of relevant and material documents would render the award passed by the Arbitrator to be vulnerable for the arbitrator having misconducted himself. 67. In the said case, the Court laid down the principle that an award could be set aside on the ground of arbitrator’s misconduct, when it was found that on the face of the record the Arbitrator had arrived at an inconsistent decision even on his own finding or arrived at a decision by ignoring very material documents which throw abundant light on the controversy to help in arriving at a just and fair decision. The issues as decided by the Arbitrator. Issue No.1 reads as under:- Whether the Claimants, M/s Ansal Properties & Industries Limited, is entitled to an amount of Rs. 1,49,56,271.00 or any other amount on account of difference of rate for extra item executed at site but not paid for by H.P.S.E.B. as billed by APIL, including escalation and interest charges thereof. Issue No.1 reads as under:- Whether the Claimants, M/s Ansal Properties & Industries Limited, is entitled to an amount of Rs. 1,49,56,271.00 or any other amount on account of difference of rate for extra item executed at site but not paid for by H.P.S.E.B. as billed by APIL, including escalation and interest charges thereof. 68. The aforesaid issue contains 23 claims. Claim Nos. E-14 and E-17 stand rejected by the Arbitrator and with regard to the remaining 21 claims, a total sum of Rs.35,07,443/- as against a claim of Rs.1,49,56,271/- stands awarded. 69. A chart showing the amount claimed and the amount awarded is as under:- 70. Since submissions made by the parties with respect to all the claims is more or less same, therefore, during the course of hearing two claims were randomly picked up and examined. 71. Claim E-1 arises on account of difference of rate in providing and laying extra cement consumed in different grades of concrete in open and underground works, difference in cost of price escalation and interest charges thereon. As per the contractor, while using extra quantity of cement they had to incur not only the cost of extra cement but also other charges like loading/unloading, transportation, storage charges, labour and equipment etc. The Arbitrator specifically recorded that “the respondent agreed that extra quantity of cement has been used as per the requirement at site and has also paid for extra quantity but does not want to pay the additional charges for use of extra cement as claimed by the claimant”, and held the contractor entitled to payment of extra charges incurred by him for producing the specified grade of concrete. 72. Taking into account that 30824 bags of extra cement had been used, the Arbitrator allowed the claims as under: 73. The Arbitrator specifically recorded that the percentage of overheads and profits allowed on the labour component is equivalent and same to what stands charged by HPSEB from the contractor on account of execution of certain works at his cost. 74. Thus, a figure of Rs.11,97,481/- was worked out and awarded. Taking into account the rate analysis submitted for the year 1991 and also the month and the date of the execution of work, escalation thereupon amounting to Rs.1,76,454/-was also awarded. Thus, a sum of Rs.13,73,935/- stands awarded. 75. Mr. 74. Thus, a figure of Rs.11,97,481/- was worked out and awarded. Taking into account the rate analysis submitted for the year 1991 and also the month and the date of the execution of work, escalation thereupon amounting to Rs.1,76,454/-was also awarded. Thus, a sum of Rs.13,73,935/- stands awarded. 75. Mr. Bhogal has submitted that the Arbitrator has erred in awarding the said amount as, (a) there was no evidence to prove the difference in quantity. HPSEB had only admitted use of 30001 extra bags of cement and no reasons have been assigned for taking into account the figure of 30824 as claimed by the Contractor; (b) the extra quantities were governed by clause 2.2.2.1 – Claims/ claims Sub Amount claimed byContractor (in Rs. ) the Amount Awarded byArbitrator (in Rs.) the E-1 65,45,511/- 13,73,935/- E-2 2,75,446/- 78,392/- E-3 3,44,481/- 80,565/- E-4 1,96,469/- 17,822/- E-5 32,560/- 1,798/- E-6 19,198/- 2,828/- E-7 2,300/- 146/- E-8 20,10,869/- 4,59,771/- E-9 3,63,961/- 1,07,654/- E-10 13,89,732/- 3,70,011/- E-11 70,018/- 33,036/- E-12 1,27,101/- 11,903/- E-13 9,54,322/- 2,79,589/- E-14 1,07,363/- - E-15 4,70,441/- 2,11,392/- E-16 4,77,441/- 1,51,611- E-17 1,91,475/- - E-18 6,01,754/- 47,269/- E-19 4,11,423/- 1,15,179/- E-20 16,787/- 7,709/- E-21 23,241/- 9,135/- E-22 94,321/- 52,354/- E-23 2,30,057/- 95,344/- “(1) Storage charges Disallowed. (2) Concrete vibration charges : Disallowed. (3) Contractor’s over heads and profits Allowed 20% as overheads and profits materials as per CWC norms and 33% labour components as against a claim35%.” on on of 2.2.2.2 of the contract (part IV, pages 4-7 & 8), hence the rates could have been determined only by the Superintending Engineer as so specifically provided under Clause 12; as such the dispute falling within the exception clause, was beyond the scope of adjudication by the Arbitrator; (c) No reasons were assigned to show as to why clause 12 was not applicable and why Clause 12-A was applicable, and (d) Since cement had been supplied by the State, hence, there was no question of awarding escalation. 76. Vide letter dated 13.2.1991 (Vol. 4, page 48), HPSEB had specifically asked the respondent to carry out the works, inter alia subject to the following terms:- “1. Your request for referring the question of tunneling rates to a Committee has not been agreed to by the Board. You are required to do the tunneling work as per rates quoted by M/s. Satluj Construction Company, Chandigarh. 4, page 48), HPSEB had specifically asked the respondent to carry out the works, inter alia subject to the following terms:- “1. Your request for referring the question of tunneling rates to a Committee has not been agreed to by the Board. You are required to do the tunneling work as per rates quoted by M/s. Satluj Construction Company, Chandigarh. However, you may send detailed justification for higher rates for tunneling.” (Emphasis supplied) 77. So the scope of enhancement of the rates awarded to the contractor was not ruled out. There is material on record to show that Contractor had submitted analysis claiming higher rates. 78. From the analysis of rates filed by HPSEB (Page 136) it is evident that loading, unloading and stacking charges form part of the components for determination of the rates. 79. As is evident from Annexures 16-A to 16-F (support of written arguments) HPSEB itself had also claimed overhead charges @ 33% from the Contractor for supply of labour. Even as per analysis of rates submitted by the HPSEB they themselves added 20% as profits and overheads on the labour component. It is also evident from Annexure A-1 (page-90 counter arguments of the respondent). 80. Further the BOQ did not include the loading/unloading and stacking charges of extra cement used in concreting of different grade. 81. In any event, Clause 12(ii) is not applicable as additional/altered or substituted work would fall under Clause 6.1 and consequently the claims to be determined necessarily have to be under Clause 12(A)(iv). Clause 6.10 specifically provides that no extra payment or deductions shall be made in the unit rates for variation in the several ingredients, except for change in cement content. Hence, the above Clause stipulates that the expenditure, only on account of cement content is payable. Further Clause 12(A)(iv) clearly stipulates that the rates which are derived in accordance with the provisions of sub Clauses (i) & (ii) of Clause 12, shall be limited to 10% of the deviation to the value of contract. Clause 12(A)(iv) thus restricts applicability of Clauses 12(i) & (ii) only upto deviation of 10%. 82. Clause 12(i) and (ii) are not prohibitory and Clause 12-A (iv) limits the application of Clause 12(i) and (ii) to the extent of only 10% whereas Clause 6.10 is positive in nature conferring a right on the contractor if there is change in the cement contents. 82. Clause 12(i) and (ii) are not prohibitory and Clause 12-A (iv) limits the application of Clause 12(i) and (ii) to the extent of only 10% whereas Clause 6.10 is positive in nature conferring a right on the contractor if there is change in the cement contents. Since shuttering material and labour differ from item to item qua cement content therefore for the purposes of analysis it is not analogous. Roof shuttering cannot be same as floor shuttering. 83. In the instant case as is evident from the BOQ item No. 2.1.1 for cement M-10 grade specified as 175 kg of cement per Cum, had to be used but variation in contents of cement is evident from the final bill and the variation is from 175 kg. to 249 kg per Cum which turns out to be 42.2 % increase in the cement contents. Importantly the contractor had also submitted his rates of analysis on 5.5.1992 for extra cement for open concrete and underground concrete at various sites which is evident from letter dated 5.5.1992 (Page 48 of claim petition and pages 50 and 51 of the claim petition). Relevant portion of the said letter is reproduced is as under:- “Further as per Contract Clause 6.10 of Chapter IV Part II of the agreement the concrete of specified quality density and strength corresponding to the laboratory test as directed by the Engineer-in-Charge. Since the cement as per mix design adopted is in excess to the Cement contents as shown in the schedule of quantity of the agreement for various contents as such in accordance with above Clause the Unit Rates of the concrete are now required to be revised due to change in mix design only.” 84. Hence, Clause 12(A)(iv) excludes the applicability of Clause 12(i) & (ii). It cannot be said that Clause 12 (A) is not arbitrable. No reasons have been assigned for it to be so. 85. Clause 12(ii) of the agreement is not restrictive in nature, thus if the Engineer-in-Charge was to decide upon the rates of any additional labour, altered or substituted work as per the market rate, then he should have submitted the analysis of the then prevalent market rates upon which he had arrived at a decision determining a particular market rate. 86. Clause 12(ii) of the agreement is not restrictive in nature, thus if the Engineer-in-Charge was to decide upon the rates of any additional labour, altered or substituted work as per the market rate, then he should have submitted the analysis of the then prevalent market rates upon which he had arrived at a decision determining a particular market rate. 86. It is true that no reasons have been furnished by the arbitrator for not applying Clause 12(ii) and Clause 2.2.2.2 and Clause 2.2.2.1 of BOQ but that by itself would not render the award to be faulty as reasons for awarding the amount have been sufficiently furnished. His conclusions are based on reasons. It is not one of those cases where the arbitrator has only arrived at its conclusions without any supportive reason. He has relied upon the relevant applicable clauses of the agreement. 87. Undisputedly, nothing has been placed on record to show whether the Engineer-in-Charge had considered the then prevalent market rates for determining the market value of a particular item. It was incumbent upon the Engineer-in-charge to determine the rates in terms of the agreement. 88. With regard to the actual consumption of cement bags there appears to be variation and discrepancy on record. Before the Arbitrator, initially HPSEB had pleaded that 29780 number of cement bags were used which subsequently was agreed to be 30001. Based on the final bill, showing month-wise/quarter-wise consumption, the contractor made a claim of 31195 bags which was restricted to and accepted by the Arbitrator to 30824 bags. Perusal of Annexures A-3 (page 108 Vol.9) detail of extra cement used would only show that even HPSEB has determined the quantity of bags on theoretical basis and not on the basis of consumption of actual number of bags. Except for the aforesaid documents, there is nothing on record to prove the number of bags which were either issued to the Contactor or received by him. The number of cement bags supplied or used are sought to be determined on the basis of the quantity of work executed and not the bags actually supplied to the contractor. Importantly, the difference in percentage comes to only 2.6%, which is marginal and the award cannot be faulted on that ground itself. 89. The Arbitrator has clearly considered the material on record, applied his mind and assigned reasons to arrive at its conclusion. Importantly, the difference in percentage comes to only 2.6%, which is marginal and the award cannot be faulted on that ground itself. 89. The Arbitrator has clearly considered the material on record, applied his mind and assigned reasons to arrive at its conclusion. Certain claims have been disallowed, certain claims have been allowed, and the award claims are based on CWC norms and the accepted terms specifically agreed to inter se between the parties. 90. That apart, that part of the award recording that HPSEB had agreed that the extra quantity of cement had been used as per its requirement at site has not been challenged at all in the objection petition. It is not the case of HPSEB that the Arbitrator has not recorded the proceedings correctly. Importantly, on each date of hearing the parties have been appearing and assisting the Arbitrator. Adequate opportunity was afforded to the parties at every step. The Arbitrator who is an expert has considered the material while arriving at its conclusion, hence it cannot be held that there was no material on record before the Arbitrator to have determined the quantum awarded to the Contractor. 91. Clause 6.10 is amply clear and there is no ambiguity in the same. There has been change in the cement content and, therefore, extra payment for variation in the ingredients i.e. cement, was required to be made to the Contractor under the contract. No doubt cement was supplied to the Contractor by HPSEB but however, while determining the rates payable to the Contractor under the contract with respect to BOQ items 2.1 to 2.2.2.2, this component was also taken into account. Charges for loading etc. as awarded by the Arbitrator were taken into account even by HPSEB. Therefore, the fact that the material was supplied by HPSEB would be of no consequence. 92. Clause 12 is not determinative of the rates between the parties, neither is Clause 12(A) beyond the scope and purview and jurisdiction of the Arbitrator. Keeping in view the letters dated 26.12.1995 (Page 93 of counter argument of respondent Vol.9), 13.2.1991 (Part 4, page 48), 13.2.1990 (Part 4, page 36) it cannot be said that the bar contained under Clause 12 interposes a bar in the jurisdiction of the arbitrator to decide the disputes. Keeping in view the letters dated 26.12.1995 (Page 93 of counter argument of respondent Vol.9), 13.2.1991 (Part 4, page 48), 13.2.1990 (Part 4, page 36) it cannot be said that the bar contained under Clause 12 interposes a bar in the jurisdiction of the arbitrator to decide the disputes. Except for the said Clause there is no other Clause which has been brought to the notice of the Court from which it can even be inferred that the contract prohibits adjudication of claims by the Arbitrator. 93. Importantly as is evident from the letters dated 26.12.1995 and 10.7.1996 (page No. 11 and 27 of the statement of facts and claims) there was no dispute with regard to the quantities. The dispute was only with regard to the rate of difference. Bare reading of the award indicates that the quantities were never disputed by HPSEB even before him. The issues as framed by the Arbitrator, in the presence of the parties is also indicative of the said fact. HPSEB had objected to the payment of additional charges for the use of extra cement as claimed by the Contractor. Claim E-2 deals with difference of rate in fixing of R.C.C. Sleeper, difference in cost of price escalation and interest charges thereon. The claimant made a claim with regard to 6885 number of RCC sleeper @ Rs.18/-. 94. The Arbitrator recorded that ‘the respondent agrees with the contention of the Claimant and has treated this item as an extra item. On this count, the Respondent has already paid to the Claimant @Rs.5.40 per sleeper although their analyzed rate works out to Rs.8.25 per sleeper’. 95. After going through the rates submitted by both the parties the Arbitrator took into account the R/A bill and while disallowing the claim of lighting arrangement for fixing of RCC sleepers, awarded @ 20% overheads and profits on materials as per CWC norms and 33% on labour component against the claimed amount of 35%. The foundation, reasoning and material being the same which was adopted while awarding Claim No.E-1. 96. Taking into account the quantity as per 75th R/A bill i.e. 6885 and the rate to be Rs.16/- per sleeper, a sum of Rs.72,981/- was determined and made payable after fixing of the sleepers. Escalation of Rs.5411/-, based on the rate analysis submitted in the year 1991 and taking into account the date of work executed was awarded. 96. Taking into account the quantity as per 75th R/A bill i.e. 6885 and the rate to be Rs.16/- per sleeper, a sum of Rs.72,981/- was determined and made payable after fixing of the sleepers. Escalation of Rs.5411/-, based on the rate analysis submitted in the year 1991 and taking into account the date of work executed was awarded. Thus, a sum of Rs.78,392/- was awarded towards the said claim. 97. In addition to the grounds taken while assailing Claim E-1 the challenge is on the ground that there is a difference in quantity inasmuch as as per the final bill total quantity is 6303 whereas as per HPSEB the figure is 5771. The Arbitrator has not assigned any reason while arriving at the quantity and was also not considered non-compliance of Clauses 8 and 16 of the Agreement. 98. Undisputedly even as per the case set up by the HPSEB payment at the rate of Rs. 5.40 per sleeper stands paid to the contractor. The RCC sleepers were to be supplied by HPSEB which were to be fixed by the contractor. The sleepers, after installation admittedly were to be covered by concrete and no measurements thereof, after the concreting could take place. The record does not reveal the exact quantity of sleepers supplied by HPSEB to the contractor. While executing the works, the contractor had submitted the consumption of the sleepers on quarterly basis. From the statements placed on record (page 53 of the claim), works pertaining to 6885 sleepers stands documented. 99. Importantly this document was never denied by the Board and perhaps that is why even the Arbitrator has recorded that “the respondents agree with the contention of the claimant and has treated this as extra item”. Apparently there was no dispute with regard to the exact number of sleepers used. The extra item of fixing the RCC sleepers is payable as per Clause 12 (A)(iii) and hence market rate is payable. In the claim petition the contractor categorically mentioned that all items not specifically provided for in the BOQ were to be separately charged as per rate analysis and is payable under Clause 12 (A)(iii) which fact is not denied by HPSEB. The Arbitrator has only awarded the claim towards overhead and profits on material as per CWC norms, as also labour component to the extent of 33% as against the claim of 35 %. 100. The Arbitrator has only awarded the claim towards overhead and profits on material as per CWC norms, as also labour component to the extent of 33% as against the claim of 35 %. 100. The contention that the measurement book is indicative of the exact work executed under this head cannot be accepted to be of any binding nature for the simple reason that the MB’s were signed under protest. In any event letter dated 12.12.1991 (Vol. 7, page 21) evidences the fact that the contractor had indicated a requirement of 21500 sleepers, contents of which were not disputed. 101. Why and how clause 8 of the agreement is applicable has not been shown. 102. With respect to each of the other remaining claims the contention of Mr. J. S. Bhogal, learned Senior Counsel is identical. Considering the material placed on record it cannot be said that the awarded sum is against the contract, is without any evidence is based on non consideration of defence, is not borne out from the record or is contrary to the material placed on the record. The issue in fact appears to have been decided on the basis of agreed terms between the parties. It is nobody’s case that the Arbitrator had recorded the findings incorrectly. Issue No. 2 reads as under: Whether the Claimant, M/s Ansal Properties & Industries Limited, is entitled to an amount of Rs. 75,52,143.00 or any other amount on account of deviated items towards (+) side including escalation and interest charges thereof. 103. Issue No. 2 is sub divided into 10 claims (D-1 to D10). The Arbitrator out rightly rejected claims No. 4, 7 and 9 and partly allowed the other claims. As against the contractor’s claim of Rs. 75,52,143/- Arbitrator has awarded a sum of Rs. 15,03,798/-. Claim-wise sum awarded is as under: Claims/ claims Sub Rate claimed byContractor (in Rs. ) the Amount Awarded by the Arbitrator (in Rs.) D-1 Rs.2182 per cum 144.70 cum for 1,21,721/- D-2 Rs.2741 per cum 161.88 cum for 43,456/- D-3 Rs.2408 per cum 1177.591 cum for 9,36,155/- D-4 Rs.45000 per MT 6.75 MT for Nil. D-5 Rs.2741 per cum 100.04 cum for 45,918/- D-6 Rs.3152 per cum for 2,63,987/- 371.29 cum D-7 Rs.1636 per 25.769 cum cum for Nil. D-5 Rs.2741 per cum 100.04 cum for 45,918/- D-6 Rs.3152 per cum for 2,63,987/- 371.29 cum D-7 Rs.1636 per 25.769 cum cum for Nil. D-8 Rs.424 per 447.30 cum cum for 36,880/- D-9 Rs.3332 per 215.20 cum cum for Nil D-10 Rs.14299.00 p73.734 MT er MT for 64,591/- 104. Since submissions made by the parties with respect to all the claims is more or less same, therefore, during the course of hearing two claims were randomly picked up and examined. 105. Claim D-1 pertains to the difference of rate for deviated item for open excavation in intake structure, difference in the cost of price escalation and interest charges thereupon. 106. As per BOQ 1.1.1 the total quantity of the said work to be executed was 520 Cum. There is no dispute that the claim of the contractor set up is for 768.77 Cum. This was so claimed in terms of R/A Bill No. 67. The HPSEB however restricted this quantity to 582 Cum in R/A Bill No. 68. This, according to the contractor, was done so as to bring it within the permissible deviation limit and thus deprive him of its legitimate claim of extra item. 107. The Arbitrator, after examining the record and noting down the submissions of the parties held that once the quantity is incorporated against a particular item in a particular running account bill, the contractor would be entitled to payment against the said item at the same rate and it would not be open for HPSEB to arbitrarily shift the quantity entered in one bill against another item in subsequent bill. The Arbitrator clearly held this to be a manipulation on the part of the Board to deprive the contractor of his right of extra item. After reducing the claim, the Arbitrator allowed Rs. 455/- per cum on the basis of “established civil engineering norms” and over and above the sum allowed 20% overheads and profits on materials as per CWC norms and 33% on labour component against the claim of 35%. Thus total sum of Rs. 1,12,721/- was awarded for the said claim. 108. Submissions made on behalf of the Board have been considered by the arbitrator by the arbitrator. Thus total sum of Rs. 1,12,721/- was awarded for the said claim. 108. Submissions made on behalf of the Board have been considered by the arbitrator by the arbitrator. It may be true that the Arbitrator has not assigned reasons while rejecting the same but however it is equally true that the findings of the Arbitrator are based on the material on record and it cannot be said that there is no proper application of mind or without any reasons. While referring to claim No. 1 undisputedly the work executed by the contractor in terms of BOQ Item No. 1.1.1 was more than the permissible deviated limits. The contractor had also submitted bills with regard to the same. The work pertained to excavation. Importantly for the 67 running bill (page 85, Vol. 7) payments initially had been made by HPSEB to the contractor. Now if HPSEB had allowed claims for excavation with dewatering up to 520 cum below the surface level into the earth then with respect to the remaining 186.77 cum (768.77 cum – 582 cum) can it even be urged that there was no water below the level of 520 cum and that the contractor had actually executed work which fell within the ambit and scope of BOQ item No. 1.1.2 . Further nothing has been placed on record to show that below the level of 520 cum, the work ordered to be executed by HPSEB was for “excavation without dewatering”. The item executed being more than the permissible deviation limit, the contractor was entitled to payments as awarded by the Arbitrator. 109. Similarly with respect to claim No. 2 on account of difference of rate for deviated quantity of M-15 concrete in surge well, difference in price escalation and interest thereon by taking into account the BOQ item No. 2.2.1.2 the Arbitrator has awarded rates @ Rs 1052/- per cum plus 20% overheads and profits on materials as per CWC norms and 33% on labour component, even though the rate claimed was Rs. 2741 per cum. 110. It cannot be contended that the same has been arrived at without any basis. The analysis of rates are on record (page 136 of counter arguments of HPSEB). It cannot be said that there is no proper application of mind on the part of the Arbitrator. 2741 per cum. 110. It cannot be contended that the same has been arrived at without any basis. The analysis of rates are on record (page 136 of counter arguments of HPSEB). It cannot be said that there is no proper application of mind on the part of the Arbitrator. He has partly allowed the claim after due consideration and more particularly on the basis of the analysis submitted by the HPSEB. 111. The final running bills were not accepted as is sought to be urged on behalf of HPSEB. It is for this reason that the contractor took recourse to arbitral proceedings. Further the Arbitrator is an expert and therefore based on his best judgment the rates were determined. Importantly while deciding issue No. 2 there is no dispute about the quantity. 112. The position with respect to the other issues is more or less the same. Issue No. 3 reads as under: Whether the Claimant M/s Ansal Properties & Industries Limited is entitled to an amount of Rs. 14,18,482.00 or any other amount of deviated items towards (-) side. 113. As against a total claim of Rs. 14,18,482/- the Arbitrator has awarded a sum of Rs. 4,28,932/-. 114. The claim in effect is towards the reduction of the different quantities of the work awarded to the contractor. 115. Since the contractor had made all arrangements for execution of the work, therefore, men and machinery could not be utilised which remained idle for sufficient period resulting into loss. The claim was rejected by HPSEB for the reason that Clause 12(i) only permitted payments for increase of deviation and not reduction thereof. With respect to two items i.e.: S.No. ItemBOQ in Description of item Quantity as BOQ per Quantity actually executed. 1. 9 Pressure Grouting 16920 bags 529 bags 2. 4 Steel Supports 316 MT 69.541 MT, the work executed was just up to 33% and 32% respectively and therefore, loss of anticipated profit was awarded by the Arbitrator. 116. The contractor had mobilized at site entire infrastructure, men and machinery, for execution of the work. Importantly in the present case nothing has been placed on record to show that notice as stipulated under Clause 13 of the contract was issued to the Contractor. 116. The contractor had mobilized at site entire infrastructure, men and machinery, for execution of the work. Importantly in the present case nothing has been placed on record to show that notice as stipulated under Clause 13 of the contract was issued to the Contractor. Hence it cannot be held that no claim for payment of compensation of any kind of loss of profit could have been entertained or sum awarded in favour of the contractor. In this view of the matter, it cannot be contended that the contractor was not entitled to payment for loss of profit on account of negative deviation. 117. HPSEB itself has been taking a vacillating stand whereas in the Court it is argued that the claim is hit by Clause 12 but however in the objection petition reference made is of Clause 13. There is no notice on record in terms of Clause 13 therefore claim was to be adjudicated under Clause 12-A under which the Arbitrator had jurisdiction to decide. Reasons and conclusions are based on the material on record. Issue No. 4 reads as under: Whether the claimant M/s Ansal Properties & Industries Limited is entitled to an amount of Rs. 1,02,44,800.00 or any other amount on account of idling of resources due to delay in supply of approved construction drawings. 118. As against the total claim of Rs. 1,02,44,800/- the Arbitrator has held the contractor entitled to a sum of Rs. 62,28,020/-. 119. The claim essentially pertains to the abnormal delay in supply of construction drawings. According to the contractor even though construction programme giving complete details of the work to be executed at various stages was enumerated in the contract but however HPSEB did not diligently adhere to the tentative schedule of supply of drawings of construction resulting into delay of work thus rendering the resources mobilised i.e. labour, machinery etc. as idle. The total number of days and the loss for keeping the resources idle as claimed by the contractor and noticed by the Arbitrator is as under: “S. No. Description of Activity No. of days. 1. Delay in supply of Power House Drawings 607 days 2. Delay in supply of Open Works Drawings 172 days 3. Delay in supply of drawings for U/G works 815 days. 1. Delay in supply of Power House Drawings 607 days 2. Delay in supply of Open Works Drawings 172 days 3. Delay in supply of drawings for U/G works 815 days. The Claimant has submitted his claim on the basis of idling of resources as below for open works:- S. No. Description Charge/day 1. Machinery Rs. 1225/- 2. Assets Rs. 265/- 3. Workshop Charges Rs. 200/- 4. Electricity Charges Rs. 600/- 5. Manpower Rs. 2910/- Rs. 5200/- per day For underground works:- S. No. Description Charge/day 1. Machinery Rs. 2975/- 2. Assets Rs. 730/- 3. Workshop Charges Rs. 200/- 4. Electricity Charges Rs. 700/- 5. Manpower Rs. 2995/- Rs. 7,600/-per day” 120. HPSEB itself had placed on record chart showing various dates on which the drawings had been issued. HPSEB had urged that the relevant drawings formed part of the tendered document, which contention was found to be factually incorrect by the Arbitrator. The Arbitrator has held that “normally, if the construction programme submitted by a contractor in the first instance, is not adhered to for some reason, he is asked to submit revised construction schedules from time to time. These schedules are formally approved by Competent Authority of the owner and are monitored. If the contractor is found wanting in respect of any item of work, it is brought to his notice immediately and action taken against him as per contract provisions. 121. I find from the submitted records that the respondent never followed established practices for monitoring construction schedules. It is also not getting established from the records that the contractor had been lagging in his work. 122. From the documents, I have come across specific instances wherein the claimant has been asked to do works other than those for which he had requested for drawings (Document No. E113, Page III-208 & 209 of reply of respondent). In another letter written by the respondent to the claimant (Document No. E-114, Page III-210 of reply by the respondent) he has mentioned that the excavation drawings of approach tunnel & bye-pass tunnel are under finalization in the design cell. These instances prove beyond any doubt that the respondent had not been supplying the drawings in time. 123. In another letter written by the respondent to the claimant (Document No. E-114, Page III-210 of reply by the respondent) he has mentioned that the excavation drawings of approach tunnel & bye-pass tunnel are under finalization in the design cell. These instances prove beyond any doubt that the respondent had not been supplying the drawings in time. 123. Number of days for which delay in supply of drawings has been accepted on the basis of documents on record and these delays have not been specifically contradicted by the respondent in any of his letters. 124. Mr. J. S. Bhogal, learned Senior Counsel has orally mentioned about the Civil Suit filed by the HPSEB against the contractor which is subject matter of adjudication before this Court. The same is with respect to the claims arising out of delay on the part of the Contractor in the execution of the work. Since the Arbitrator had adjudicated the contractor’s claim arising out of non supply of the drawings within time, I am proceeding to decide this question in these proceedings. In the 4 hearing held before the Arbitrator on 6.5.2002, HPSEB had not pressed for any counter claim and had got the issue framed for adjudication. 125. In my view the Arbitrator has extensively dealt with this question and assigned reasons while arriving at its conclusion. The fact that the contractor had been requesting for supply of drawings from time to time stands evidently proved on record from letters dated 18.4.1991, 20.5.1991, 17.6.1991,8.7.1991, 17.7.1991, 25.8.1991, 16.9.1991, 2.12.1991, 20.12.1991, .7.1992, 2.11.1992, 5.12.1992, 19.12.1992, 22.9.1995, 25.9.1995, 7.10.1995, 25.11.1995, 8.12.1995, 10.12.1995 (Page 226 statement of claim). The fact that the drawings were not part of the tendered document and that they were also not supplied as per the schedule is evident from the letters issued by HPSEB including letter dated 26.7.1991 (page 203 of reply filed by the Board). Evidently the letters record/establish the fact that the drawings were under preparation with the design cell of HPSEB. 126. As per the award there is nothing on record to show that even HPSEB had informed the contractor that in spite of supply of drawings issued to him, work had not commenced. 127. The delay in supply of the drawings stands calculated period wise as detailed in statement of claim (page 218) which has been accepted to be true by the Arbitrator for want of any denial. 128. 127. The delay in supply of the drawings stands calculated period wise as detailed in statement of claim (page 218) which has been accepted to be true by the Arbitrator for want of any denial. 128. Letters dated 11.10.1995 and 30.11.1995 (page 226 and 208 of the reply) and letter dated 8.7.1991 (page 218 and 232 to 254 of the claim) are with respect to non supply of drawings in time. To the contrary there is no letter on record even suggesting that the drawings had been handed over by HPSEB within time. HPSEB defaulted in supplying the drawings in time is evident from the fact that for the contract awarded in the year 1991 and to be completed within 24 months, the drawings for lining of surge shaft dome were supplied only on 30.9.1995. 129. I have not gone into the question of corresponding delay on the part of the contractor, as alleged by HPSEB, to execute the contract within the stipulated period or in accordance with the provisions of the contract as the matter pertaining to the default on the part of the contractor is pending adjudication in a civil suit. 130. Non supply of drawings is a fundamental breach and non fulfilment of contractual obligations leads to abandonment of duties. Clause 2 of the agreement is inapplicable in the facts of the case as the question of contractor’s claim for non supply of drawings in time does not interdict a bar. Apparently HPSEB itself was in default, hence liquidated damages were not imposed. Issues No. 5 and 6: The claims pertaining to issues No. 5 and 6 were not extensively argued for the reason that the contentions raised in law were common to all issues. Issues No. 7 to 11: These issues were not discussed as no amount was awarded by the Arbitrator. Issue No. 12: Whether the Claimant M/s Ansal Properties & Industries Limited is entitled to an amount of Rs. 21,07,428.00 or any other amount on account of reimbursement of charges for arranging explosive at construction site by Ansal including interest charges thereon. The contractor was awarded sum of Rs. 68,610/-. This was so done keeping in view the letter dated 13.12.1990. The letter has been correctly appreciated and therefore it would not be right to contend that the defence as set up by the HPSEB was not considered. The contractor was awarded sum of Rs. 68,610/-. This was so done keeping in view the letter dated 13.12.1990. The letter has been correctly appreciated and therefore it would not be right to contend that the defence as set up by the HPSEB was not considered. Issue No. 13: Whether the Claimant M/s Ansal Properties & Industries Limited is entitled to an amount of Rs. 15,93,994.00 or any other amount on account of balance excavation and concrete upto pay line. 131. After considering the relevant provisions of the contract the Arbitrator held that the contractor was entitled to sums for the excavation and concreting up to the payline amounting to Rs. 15,93,994/-. 132. The challenge is on the ground that the Arbitrator has not considered the evidence and the documents placed on record by the Board. 133. The defence as set out by the Board in response to the claim appears to be that in terms of clause 4.9 the contractor was to be paid for the excavation outside the limit of payline beyond a limit of 100 mm excavation line only if seven days notice in writing was issued to the Engineer-in-charge or his subordinate. 134. The drawings submitted by the contractor and undisputedly received by the Board, indicating the extent of the work to be carried out are on record (filed with the written arguments). Letter dated 7.9.1991 (Part-IV, page 156) and the graph of pay line (page 162 and 163 of vol. 7) are on record. In my considered view as has been rightly argued by Mr. Chetan Sharma, learned Senior Counsel for the contractor this fact by itself would constitute sufficient notice. The receipt of the graph document is not denied. Said drawings pertain to the total calculation of the tunnel excavation area up to a minimum excavation line and hence no notice as stipulated under clause 16(i), in addition to the submissions of these drawings was required to be issued. The whole purpose of the notice was to make the party aware of the area and the extent of the work which was required to be carried out and the drawings were obviously submitted for the said purpose. 135. The arbitrator has rightly come to its inclusion based on the material on record. The whole purpose of the notice was to make the party aware of the area and the extent of the work which was required to be carried out and the drawings were obviously submitted for the said purpose. 135. The arbitrator has rightly come to its inclusion based on the material on record. Issue No. 14: Whether the Claimant M/s Ansal Properties & Industries Limited is entitled to an amount @ 24% p.a. or any other amount on account of pre-suit pendente lite and future interest. 136. As against the contractor’s claim of interest @ 24% per annum the Arbitrator has awarded interest @ 18% per annum w.e.f. 13.11.1995 up to the date of award i.e. 14.1.2003 and 10% thereafter. 137. At the time of hearing of the present petition the learned counsel for the contractor consented to the fixation of appropriate rate of interest, keeping in view the principles to equity and justice. 138. Keeping in view the decision rendered by the Apex Court in Krishna Bhagya Jala Nigam Ltd. versus G. Harischandra Reddy and another, (2007) 2 SCC 720, the period of claim and the current market rates, I am of the view that ends of justice would be met if the contractor is held entitled to interest on the awarded amount at the rate of 8% per annum with effect from 13.11.1995 till the date of payment. 139. The question is what is the legal misconduct committed by the arbitrator in the instant case? Whether the award by the arbitrator perpetrates gross miscarriage of justice? Is it reduced to mockery of a fair decision of the lis between the parties to the arbitration? 140. In the present case the objections filed are skeletal and pithy. The objections as has been held in Mcdermott (supra) have to be based on the pleadings founded with cogent and decisive material. In the instant case no case of infraction of natural justice, violation of rules of procedure agreed upon or unfaithful or wrong recording of the proceedings by the Arbitrator has been made out. The challenge to the jurisdiction in terms of Section 34 of the Act has also not been made out. 141. The award is reasoned, based on the analysis of the documents placed on record. The Arbitrator being an expert appointed by the HPSEB has rendered a speaking award disclosing his application of mind. The challenge to the jurisdiction in terms of Section 34 of the Act has also not been made out. 141. The award is reasoned, based on the analysis of the documents placed on record. The Arbitrator being an expert appointed by the HPSEB has rendered a speaking award disclosing his application of mind. Since only extra item was in issue hence no principle was to be evolved or adjudicated and only mathematical calculations were required to be carried out. 142. Importantly the rates have been awarded based on the Central Works Commission norms hence it cannot be said that there is no basis or any arbitrariness in arriving at such figures. 143. Further the Arbitrator has adopted the very same method for rejecting the claims as it did for allowing and that too in part. The procedure adopted by the Arbitrator shows full opportunity granted to the parties and principles of natural justice stood fully complied with and the Arbitrator’s award is not injunctive of substantive virus of principles of natural justice. The procedure adopted was in consultation and agreement with the parties. 144. It is not disputed that the contract had exceeded 10% of the contract value. It is evident that none of the claims as adjudicated by the Arbitrator are barred or expressly prohibited under any of the prohibitory clauses. The Arbitrator did have jurisdiction to interpret the clauses and therefore this Court cannot sit over in a judgment. There is no infraction of jurisdiction or any expressed terms of the agreement. The Award is liable to be set aside only if it deals with the dispute not contemplated by or not falling within the terms of submission to arbitration or it contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of submission to arbitration. The Arbitrator has remained within the parameters prescribed by the contract and in my view, rightly construed the provisions thereof. 145. In my view, most of the objections sought to be raised are neither pleaded nor proved. It cannot be said that the Award is in conflict with public policy of India or any one of the principles laid down by the Apex Court in its decisions. The claims and the amounts awarded are all questions of fact which the Arbitrator has gone into after painstakingly considering the material in its entirety. 146. It cannot be said that the Award is in conflict with public policy of India or any one of the principles laid down by the Apex Court in its decisions. The claims and the amounts awarded are all questions of fact which the Arbitrator has gone into after painstakingly considering the material in its entirety. 146. The Award is made fairly after giving adequate opportunity to the parties to place their grievance in any manner as provided in the Arbitration agreement. The Court is not to examine the correctness or otherwise of the conclusions reached by the Arbitrator as it is a matter of interpretation of the contract referred to by the parties to the Arbitration. 147. Whether or not HPSEB had committed any default in handing over the drawings or not discharged its contractual obligations and whether or not the Contractor had suffered any loss on that account and to what extent, are all questions of fact on which the Arbitrator was entitled to take a view as has been done in the present case. Further whether the Contractor was entitled to the claim and to what extent are matters which depend upon the appreciation of evidence and the material placed on record. I do not find any clause of the agreement whereby the claims made by the Contractor could be described as barred by any law or awarding of the claims cannot be held to be tentamounting to unjust enrichment of the contractor or granting undue advantage to it so as to be in conflict with public policy of India. It is neither perverse nor erroneous. The Arbitrator has given reasons based on clear, cogent, reliable and undisputed material. 148. Even prohibitory clause has to be seen in the light of the correspondence exchanged between the parties. Illegality, if any, must go to the root and unjust enrichment must be seen with probity. Mere error by itself cannot be permitted to be an unjust enrichment. 149. The Arbitrator’s award is not to be analysed in a split hair manner. The award has to be seen so as to effectuate the same. Aggregate reading of the award shows reasonableness and rationality of the findings of the Arbitrator. 150. There has been proper application of mind on the part of the Arbitrator as 35% of the claim stands awarded whereas 65% of the claim stands disallowed. The award has to be seen so as to effectuate the same. Aggregate reading of the award shows reasonableness and rationality of the findings of the Arbitrator. 150. There has been proper application of mind on the part of the Arbitrator as 35% of the claim stands awarded whereas 65% of the claim stands disallowed. The Arbitrator is an expert and only after four Arbitrators failed to pass the award he took up the onerous task upon himself to decide the claim by going through the voluminous record and deciding the issues and that too in less than seven hearings. It is nobody’s case that the Arbitrator is not a man of integrity having impeccable reputation. He retired as senior officer from HPSEB itself. 151. Even in the objection petition the challenge which is sought to be made orally has not been canvassed or highlighted. The attack in the instant case is in the form rather than substance. 152. There are limits for judicial reviewability and the Courts exercise limited jurisdiction in the proceedings for setting aside an award. The Courts do not exercise appellate jurisdiction over the verdict of an arbitrator and as such cannot go into the merits of the case nor the Courts can reappraise and re-examine the evidence led before the arbitrator unless it is ex facie erroneous. The Courts also cannot look into the insufficiency of the evidence led before the arbitrator. It is not for the Courts to either see the sufficiency or the reasonableness of the reasons given by the arbitrator. What reasons are required to be furnished depends upon the facts of each case. 153. Giving reasons does not mean that the arbitrator is required to give a detailed judgment or detailed reasons. The award should be speaking one. The arbitrator has indicated his mind whereby it can be ascertained as to how he has arrived at a particular conclusion. The arbitrator indicated the trend of his thought process. The award is neither non-speaking/unreasoned nor is it is unintelligible. Even though it is one thing to say that the award is unintelligible and is another to say that the award is bad because it is a non-speaking award. The Arbitrator has given reasons for arriving at its conclusion. In my view, there is no error of fact or law. The view taken by the Arbitrator is possible and plausible. Even though it is one thing to say that the award is unintelligible and is another to say that the award is bad because it is a non-speaking award. The Arbitrator has given reasons for arriving at its conclusion. In my view, there is no error of fact or law. The view taken by the Arbitrator is possible and plausible. It is not an impossible view. It is one thing to say that that reasons should be stated and another thing to state that a detailed judgment to be given in support of an award. There is no obligation in law to give a detailed judgment. In the present case, issues are simple, points are fresh and facts are clear. The reasons given by the Arbitrator are cogent, clear and convincing. It is not the requirement of law that each and every contention raised by the party needs to be dealt with separately and exhaustively by the Arbitrator. It is apparent that the Arbitrator has not acted irrelevantly or unreasonably. 154. Reading the award in its entirety, it is evident that the Arbitrator has decided the arbitrability and the amount awarded on the points which are sustainable. The Arbitrator has recorded the consent given during the course of hearing while deciding the issues, giving of which is not disputed in the objection petition. The parties had agreed to and the Arbitrator had proceeded with the consent of the parties in deciding the issues before him and in not deciding the question of the arbitrability as a separate, distinct and preliminary issue. 155. The conduct of the parties would also be a relevant factor in the matter of construction of contract. The correspondence exchanged between the parties has been noticed earlier. The scope of the present proceedings are as to whether the Arbitrator exceeded his jurisdiction in making the award or not. The construction of contract agreement was within his jurisdiction having regard to the wide nature, scope and ambit of the arbitration agreement. Considering the conduct of the parties and also the circumstantial evidence it cannot be said that the Arbitrator had misdirected himself in passing the award. The award cannot be set aside simply because there is another view possible. 156. Considering the conduct of the parties and also the circumstantial evidence it cannot be said that the Arbitrator had misdirected himself in passing the award. The award cannot be set aside simply because there is another view possible. 156. The claims are not barred in law or the agreement or in conflict with the public policy of India, therefore, I see no reason to interfere with the impugned award. 157. My reasons are based on the ratio of law as discussed in the earlier part of the judgment. 158. The award in my considered view requires to be upheld as it cannot be said that the award does not assign any reasons or is contrary to the provisions of Section 31 of the Act or Clause 25 of the agreement between the parties. It also cannot be said that the award is not in conformity with the public policy of India. The Arbitrator had the jurisdiction to interpret the provisions of the contract and has rightly applied the law to his evaluation of facts. There is no illegality, perversity which goes to the root of the matter. The award definitely does not shocks the conscious of the Court as it cannot be said that there is violation/ infraction of rights of the parties or public policy or that it is unfair or unreasonable. It is not likely to adversely affect the administration of justice. While determining the question, the Arbitrator has adopted the established formulas as per well settled standards of business practice and has uniformly applied the same. There is no error of law apparent on the face of record which, in any event cannot be presumed or inferred. As already observed, there has been due adherence to principle of justice, equity, law and fair play. No case of gross miscarriage of justice has been made out at all. 159. It cannot be held that the quantities were determined without any evidence on record. No relevant material has been ignored by the Arbitrator while arriving at its conclusion nor is the award in excess of the claims. 160. The procedure adopted by the Arbitrator was on the agreed terms. The parties had not desired to lead any oral evidence. The award cannot also be said to have been improperly procured. 161. Mr. No relevant material has been ignored by the Arbitrator while arriving at its conclusion nor is the award in excess of the claims. 160. The procedure adopted by the Arbitrator was on the agreed terms. The parties had not desired to lead any oral evidence. The award cannot also be said to have been improperly procured. 161. Mr. Sharma, learned senior counsel for the Contractor is right in contending that the objections raised are vague and do not fall within any of the grounds laid down under Section 34 of the Act. 162. Mr. Bhogal, learned senior counsel also informed that no administrative action was either contemplated or taken against the officials appearing before the Arbitrator for having given their consent as recorded in the award. 163. Issues No.1 and 2 as framed by this Court are thus answered. Issue No.3 framed by this Court. 164. The onus to prove issue No.3 was on the respondent which has not been discharged. The petition has been verified as also the accompanying affidavit signed by Shri Arun Kumar Sharma, Superintending Engineer (Project Construction), who is stated to be the authorized signatory of the Board. In the absence of anything, the petition cannot be said to have been signed, verified and filed by a person not authorized to do so. 165. For the foregoing reasons, the present objection petition is dismissed. The impugned award is modified to the extent indicated in the judgment.