Judgment 1. This Criminal Revision Case filed under Sections 397 and 401 Cr.P.C. is directed against the judgment of the learned Additional District-cum-Sessions Judge (Fast Track Court), Vellore, dated 10. 2005 made in C.A.No.176 of 2004 on the file of the said court, confirming the judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by the learned District Munsif-cum-Judicial Magistrate, Arcot dated 112. 2004 made in C.C.No.283 of 2003. 2. A case was registered on the file of All Women Police Station, Ranipet in Crime NO.7 of 2003 on the said police station against the petitioners 1 and 2 in the criminal revision case for alleged offences punishable under Section 498(A) IPC and Section 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act. The said case was registered based on the complaint of P.W.1 – Smt. Sowndari, who is none other than the wife of the second petitioner/second accused. The first petitioner/first accused is the mother of the second petitioner/second accused. P.W.2 and P.W.3 are the parents of P.W.1. P.W.5 is the brother of P.W.1. The said case was registered as Crime No.7 of 2003 by the Sub-Inspector of Police, All Women Police Station, Ranipet who was examined as P.W.9. The Inspector of Police, All Women Police Station, Ranipet who was examined as P.W.10, conducted the investigation and submitted the final report alleging commission of offences punishable under the above said penal provisions. The final report submitted by P.W.10 was taken on file by the District Munsif-cum-Judicial Magistrate, Arcot as C.C.No.283 of 2003 on the file of the said court. 3. In the trial that took place in the trial court, 10 witnesses were examined as P.Ws.1 to 10 and only one document was marked as Ex.P1 on the side of the prosecution. No witness was examined and only one document was marked as Ex.D1 on the side of the accused. After considering the evidence brought before it, the trial court held both the accused (the petitioners 1 and 2 in the criminal revision case) guilty of the offence under Section 498(A) IPC and convicted them for the said offence by directing the first petitioner to undergo six months simple imprisonment and the second petitioner/second accused to undergo simple imprisonment for two years without imposing any fine. However, both of them were acquitted of the charge under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. 4. However, both of them were acquitted of the charge under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. 4. An appeal preferred by the petitioners herein/accused, namely C.A.No.176 of 2004 was dismissed by the learned appellate judge, namely Additional District-Cum-Sessions Judge (Fast Track Court), Vellore, confirming the conviction and sentence passed by the trial court. The correctness and legality of the said judgment of the learned Additional District-cum-Sessions Judge (Fast Track Court), Vellore, dated 10. 2005 made in C.A.No.176 of 2004 is questioned in this criminal revision case. 5. This court heard the submissions made by Mr. N. Subbarayalu, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners and by Mr. R. Muniapparaj, learned Government Advocate (Crl.Side) representing the respondent police. The materials available on record were also perused. 6. The first petitioner in the criminal revision case/first accused is the mother of the second petitioner/second accused. The de facto complainant, who was examined as P.W.1 in the trial court, is the wife of the second petitioner herein/second accused. Their marriage took place on 11. 2000. The case of the prosecution is as follows:- After marriage, for about seven months P.W.1 lived with her husband happily and thereafter, went to her parental house for delivery, where she delivered a female child. As the child happened to be a female, the petitioners in the criminal revision case/accused demanded a sum of Rs.50,000/-. After persuasion, the petitioners took the child and P.W.1 to their house six months after the birth of the child, even though their demand for payment of a sum of Rs.50,000/-was not met with. However, after taking P.W.1 and her child to their house, the petitioners/accused stated subjecting P.W.1 to physical and mental cruelty and harassment, as their demand for the payment of the above said sum had not been met with. Ultimately, P.W.1 and her child were made to starve after locking them out, which forced her to take refuge in the house of her parents after informing one Pacchaippan, the head of the village. Subsequently, the petitioners/accused came to the house of the parents of P.W.1 to take her back. At that juncture, P.W.1 informed them that she would come, when she would be in a position to bring the amount demanded by the petitioners/accused. She also refused to hand over the child to the petitioners herein/accused, when they demanded so. Subsequently, the petitioners/accused came to the house of the parents of P.W.1 to take her back. At that juncture, P.W.1 informed them that she would come, when she would be in a position to bring the amount demanded by the petitioners/accused. She also refused to hand over the child to the petitioners herein/accused, when they demanded so. Therefore, the petitioners herein/accused locked her inside the house and took the child along with them, following which P.W.1 lodged a complaint on the file of Kalavai Police Station. However, the police effected a compromise and sent P.W.1 along with petitioners herein/accused. To the shock and surprise of P.W.1, when they reached home, the petitioners herein/accused threatened to set her on fire stating that she could give complaint only if she was let out. Therefore, once again, P.W.1 had to leave her matrimonial home and live with her parents. While so, about a month thereafter, P.W.1 received a lawyers notice from the second petitioner/second accused. Pursuant to the receipt of the said lawyers notice, P.W.1 lodged a complaint on the file of All Women Police Station, Ranipet. But the police did not take any concrete action. On the other hand, they did conciliation. As the cruelty on P.W.1 continued unabated even thereafter, she gave another complaint on 12.05.2003, which has been marked as Ex.P1 and based on which, First Information Report was prepared and a case was registered by the police. 7. But the police did not take any concrete action. On the other hand, they did conciliation. As the cruelty on P.W.1 continued unabated even thereafter, she gave another complaint on 12.05.2003, which has been marked as Ex.P1 and based on which, First Information Report was prepared and a case was registered by the police. 7. The petitioners herein/accused totally denied the allegations made in the complaint and contended that P.W.1 was not prepared to do any agricultural work and hence, she had gone to the house of her parents deserting her husband, namely the second petitioner herein/second accused; that intending to work in the City, P.W.1 made her husband (second petitioner/second accused) to set up a separate residence for them at Nerkundram, Chennai; that despite the fact that the second petitioner/second accused obliged to do so, a relative of P.W.1 was set up by her to assault the second petitioner/second accused and drive him out; that there was neither cruelty nor harassment nor any demand of dowry on the part of the petitioners as alleged by the prosecution; that in fact, P.W.1 made a demand in the police station that all her belongings should be handed over to her and that as per the said demand, all the belongings of P.W.1 were handed over to P.W.1 in the presence of police and that not satisfied with the same, P.W.1 with the help of one Kuppan, has got the case registered, based on a false complaint lodged by her. 8. 8. It is contended before this court by the learned counsel for the petitioners that both the courts below failed to note the contradictory statements of P.W.1 in the complainant and in her evidence; that the courts below, having come to the conclusion that the offence of dowry demand was not substantiated, should have held that there was no demand of money and consequently, no cruelty of harassment as alleged by P.W.1; that the reliance made on the testimony of interested witnesses without subjecting them to the test of careful scrutiny was erroneous; that the delay in setting the criminal law in motion by lodging a complaint, in the absence of acceptable explanation, should have led to the conclusion that the charge was not proved beyond reasonable doubt and that in any event, the courts below committed a grave error in convicting the petitioners/accused for an offence punishable under Section 498(a) IPC, when there are so many contradictions in the evidence adduced on the side of the prosecution giving room for a reasonable suspicion that the prosecution case could not be true. It is the further contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that there is suppression of material facts, besides the fact that there was unexplained delay in filing the complaint; that the very fact that the de facto complainant(P.W.1) got back all her belongings through police when the police conducted enquiry in respect of a previous complaint made by P.W.1 has been suppressed will give rise to a reasonable suspicion that the present complaint is the consequence of an afterthought, as the same had been lodged after receipt of a lawyers notice sent by the second petitioner/second accused, a copy of which is marked as Ex.D1; that the admission made by P.W.1 to the effect that with the influence of one Kuppan alone, the same was registered, had not been properly appreciated by the courts below; that the non-production of the previous complaints or copies of the same was also fatal to the prosecution case, as they caused serious doubt on the genuineness of the allegations made against the petitioners in the present complaint and that viewed from any point, the judgment of the courts below holding the petitioners herein/accused guilty of the offence punishable under Section 498(A0 IPC show perversity and hence, they should be set aside and the petitioners/accused should be acquitted of the said offence also. 9. Per contra, the learned Government Advocate (Crl. Side) would contend that normally the revisional court should not interfere with the concurrent findings of fact by the courts below in exercise of its revisional powers. According to him, both the courts below gave a concurrent finding on an appreciation of evidence and convicted the petitioners herein/accused for the offence under Section 498(A) IPC and hence, this court, in exercise of its revisional powers, should not interfere with the said concurrent findings of the courts below. In support of his contention, the learned Government Advocate (Crl. Side) relies on the observations made by the Honble Supreme Court in 1) Manoj v. State of Maharashtra reported in 1999 SCC (Cri) 533, 2) in Jagtar Singh v. State of Punjab reported in 1988(1) SCC 712 and 3) in 10. Of course, it is true that in all those cases, the Honble Supreme Court has opined that the concurrent findings of fact should not be interfered with in exercise of the powers of revision. Of course, it is true that in all those cases, the Honble Supreme Court has opined that the concurrent findings of fact should not be interfered with in exercise of the powers of revision. But, such a proposition is subject to one exception, namely when the finding of fact can be termed perverse, then there wont be any impediment for interference with the same in exercise of revisional powers. In this case, the learned counsel for the petitioners has pointed out several factors and infirmities to show that the finding of fact recorded by the courts below can be termed perverse. Apart from the same, the learned counsel for the petitioners has also pointed out the fact that there was inordinate delay in lodging the complaint. It has been repeatedly held in several cases that unexplained delay shall be fatal to the prosecution case. While taking into account the delay in lodging the complaint, the courts are to be cautious, keeping in mind that they delay in lodging the complaint alone shall not be enough to reject the complaint and on the other hand, the delay capable of giving room for suspecting the genuineness of the allegations made in the complaint alone shall be held fatal to the prosecution case. The unexplained delay should lead to an interference that the delay could have been used for concoction and embellishment and that the story propounded by the prosecution based on the complaint could not be true but could be a concocted version after deliberation. 11. While deciding such an issue, the other factors also have to be taken into consideration. In this case, the petitioners/accused have clearly established that there had been suppression of material facts in the complaint. The previous complaint allegedly given by P.W.1 and the action taken on the said complaint by the police were all suppressed in the complaint Ex.P1. The complaint of P.W.1 dated 12.05.2003, based on which the case was registered, has been produced and marked on the side of the prosecution as Ex.P1. In the said complaint, she has made reference to a former complaint on 17.04.2003 lodged on the file of Ranipet All Women Police Station. What action was taken on the said complaint is not made clear by the prosecution witnesses. In the said complaint, she has made reference to a former complaint on 17.04.2003 lodged on the file of Ranipet All Women Police Station. What action was taken on the said complaint is not made clear by the prosecution witnesses. However, in Ex.P1 itself, P.W.1 has stated that the petitioners herein gave statement before the police to the effect that they would take P.W.1 with them and treat her properly, based on which she chose to go along with the petitioners. However, she would state in the complaint that 20 days thereafter, namely on 08.05.2003 the petitioners drove her out proclaiming that she would be allowed to live with her husband only if she was able to get Rs.50,000/-from her parents. No where in the complaint, she had stated that the petitioners herein/accused either made an attempt or threatened to set her on fire. However, in her evidence, she would state that soon after they reached the house of the petitioners, the petitioners threatened to set her on fire after pouring kerosene on her if she was not prepared to put a signature in the paper they showed to her. The calculation of time also seems to be patently contradictory, when the contents of the complaint is compared with the evidence of P.W.1. 12. In the complaint, only one previous complaint is referred to, whereas in her evidence P.W.1 has referred to two previous complaints, one lodged with the Kalavai Police Station and the other lodged in the All Women Police Station, Ranipet. The complaint dated 17.04.2003 referred to in Ex.P.1, complaint is stated to be given at Kalavai Police Station. In between the said complaint dated 17.04.2003 and Ex.P1 dated 12.05.2003, no complaint was given, according to the chief examination testimony of P.W.1. The evidence of P.W.1 seems to be self-contradictory in this regard. She has stated that, when the police encores on her complaint dated 17.04.2003, she expressed her unwillingness to go and live with her husband and demanded that all her belongings should be given to her and that pursuant to the same, the petitioners/accused handed over all her belongings on 20.04.2003 itself in the presence of the police to P.W.1. That being so, it is quite improbable that P.W.1 would have gone with her husband to be again treated with cruelty and harassment on 08.05.2003 as alleged by her. That being so, it is quite improbable that P.W.1 would have gone with her husband to be again treated with cruelty and harassment on 08.05.2003 as alleged by her. The time gap between the date on which the belongings of P.W.1 were handed over to her in the police station and the date of occurrence giving rise to the registration of the present case was only 18 days. Admittedly, her belongings were handed over to her on 20.04.2003. If at all the occurrence took place on 08.05.2003, the time gap would be only 18 days. On the other hand, if the chief-examination evidence of P.W.1 is taken into account, it will give an inference that after the alleged occurrence of intimidating her, she went to her parents place and lived there for about a month and that only thereafter she received the lawyers notice, a copy of which is marked as Ex.D1. It is her admission that she lodged a complaint with the All Women Police Station, after receiving the lawyers notice. 13. Admittedly, the lawyers notice was sent on 28.03.2003. In the said notice, P.W.1 was called upon to come and live with the second petitioner/second accused. Only thereafter, the complaint dated 17.04.2003 could have been lodged. P.W.1 has admitted in her evidence that on 20.04.2003 all her belongings were handed over to her by the petitioners herein in the presence of the police officers in the police station. Therefore, it is quite improbable that she could have gone along with the petitioners thereafter. A consideration of the evidence of P.W.1 in its entirety would show all kinds of concoction and improbabilities of the prosecution version. The vital fact that the belongings of P.W.1 were handed over to P.W.1 on 20.04.2003, as admitted by her in her evidence, has been suppressed in the complaint, has not been properly considered by the courts below. It is also admitted by P.W.2 and P.W.3 that the petitioners/accused did not demand any dowry till P.W.1 gave birth to a female child. The case propounded by P.W.1 is that after she gave birth to a female child, neither her husband nor her mother-in-law came to see the child for about a period of three months, whereas P.W.3 has admitted that soon after the child was born, the petitioners came to the hospital and saw the child. The case propounded by P.W.1 is that after she gave birth to a female child, neither her husband nor her mother-in-law came to see the child for about a period of three months, whereas P.W.3 has admitted that soon after the child was born, the petitioners came to the hospital and saw the child. P.W.1 in her evidence has stated that Kuppan had not come with her to the police station, while she gave the complaint, whereas the said Kuppan, while deposing as P.W.4, admits that he went to the police station and only after he spoke to the police, the complaint was taken on file by the police. There are also admissions by P.W.1 to the effect that she was working in a shoe company in Kalavai, when she gave birth to the child and that subsequently, during the pendency of the case, she was working in a shoe company in Ranipet. P.W.2 and P.W.3 have also admitted the same. There is also an admission that the second petitioner/second accused set up a separate residence at Nerkundram, Chennai for a short span of time and the second petitioner/second accused and P.W.1 had to part with each other shortly after they set up a residence there. Though there is admission by the prosecution witnesses that the second petitioner, after a short span of time left Nerkundram and came down to his native place, they have not chosen to give the reason for the same. On the other hand, it has been suggested on behalf of the petitioners/accused that the second petitioner/second accused was attacked by a relative of P.W.1 and was driven out from the residence they had set up at Nerkundram. 14. The cumulative effect of the contradictions and suppression of facts pointed out supra shall lead to the inescapable conclusion that the prosecution theory could not be true and that at least there is reasonable suspicion regarding the alleged theory of cruelty and harassment. The courts below have committed a grave error in brushing aside these aspects pointed out supra and mechanically coming to a conclusion that the allegation of harassment demanding dowry was proved beyond reasonable doubt. The courts below have committed a grave error in brushing aside these aspects pointed out supra and mechanically coming to a conclusion that the allegation of harassment demanding dowry was proved beyond reasonable doubt. Having come to the conclusion that the charge of demanding dowry punishable under Section 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act was not proved beyond reasonable doubt, the courts below should have also disbelieved the case of the prosecution that the petitioners demanded a sum of Rs.50,000/-as dowry. Apart from that the inordinate delay in lodging the complaint was also overlooked by the courts below. Absence of cohesion found in the story propounded by the prosecution, in the light of the contradictions found in the evidence of prosecution witnesses, has not been properly appreciated by the courts below. All these factors will definitely lead to a conclusion that the concurrent findings of the courts below to the effect that the charge under Section 498(A) IPC was proved beyond reasonable doubt, is a perverse one capable of being interfered with and reversed in exercise of the revisional powers of this court. The petitioners have made out a clear case for interference. Therefore, this court comes to the conclusion that the conviction recorded and sentence awarded by the trial court and confirmed by the appellate court are liable to be set aside and that the petitioners/accused are entitled to be acquitted of the charge for the offence under Section 498(A) also. 15. In the result, this Criminal Revision Case is allowed and the judgment dated 10. 2005 made in C.A.No.176 of 2004 by the Additional District-cum-Sessions Court (Fast Track Court) Vellore, confirming the judgment dated 112. 2004 made in C.C.No.283 of 2003 by the District Munsif-cum-Judicial Magistrate, Arcot is set aside and the petitioners are acquitted of all the offences with which they stood charged including the offence punishable under Section 498(A) IPC.