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2009 DIGILAW 113 (AP)

Union of India, rep. By the General Manager v. South Central Railway, Secunderabad

2009-02-26

NOOTY RAMAMOHANA RAO

body2009
Judgment : Common Order: These batch of Applications are moved under subsections (5) and (6) of Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (henceforth referred to as 'the Act'), seeking intervention of the Designate of the Chief Justice for constituting an Arbitral Tribunal and for referring the disputes between the parties for adjudication to that Tribunal. The parties are common and the questions that fall for consideration are also common. However, the facts in A.A.No.43 of 2008 are dealt with herein below in detail though the works awarded in the other cases are indicated in brief. The applicant - a Class-I contractor with the Respondent Railways, was awarded the following works by the Railways: 1. A.A.No.43of 2008: 1. 1. TSR (P) of existing wooden sleepers including recoupment of ballast cushion and deep screening of ballast on main line in Samalkot yard. (Agreement No.15/N/BZA/ 88, dt. 25-03-1988). .2. A.A.No.44of 2008: .Replacement of worn out lever frames and point connections in 5 Stations - VKT, VDE, PGU, TMC and AXR Stations. (Agreement No.12/S/BZA/ 93, dt. 26-02-1993). .3. A.A.No.45of 2008: .CTR (P) of existing 90 R rails with new 52 kg rails and deep screening of ballast between Smalkot and Kakinada Port Stations. (Agreement No.25/N/BZA/88, dt. 12-08-1988). .4. A.A.No.46of 2008: .Repairs and replacements of damaged water supply and drainage system at Rajahmundry. (Agreement No.34/N/BZA/87, dt. 14-07-1987). .5. A.A.No.47of 2008: .Proposed repairs to existing bank by making up case and side slopes on UP and DOWN lines in PW1/NLR Section. (Agreement No.51/S/N/BZA/88, dt. 25-05-1988). .6. A.A.No.48of 2008: .Proposed lifting of track by 15 cm in stages of not less than 5 cm each with initial packing etc. on UP and DOWN lines between Rajahmundry and Samalkot Stations. (Agreement No.24/N/BZA/88, dt. 12-08-1988). 2. 7. A.A.No.49of 2008: Provision of trapezoidal mansonry longitudinal drains between UP and DOWN lines between NDDCU Stations. (Agreement No.35/N/BZA/87, dt. 14-07-1987). The total value of the work was Rs.1,87,846/-. An agreement bearing No.15/N/BZA/88, dated 25-03-1988 was entered into in that regard. The work was to be completed within six months from the date of award of the letter of acceptance on 03-11-1987. However, It is asserted that the currency of this contract has been extended up to 30-06-1989. The applicant submits that he had completed the work, but the amounts due to him have not been paid and the security deposit furnished by him has not been released. However, It is asserted that the currency of this contract has been extended up to 30-06-1989. The applicant submits that he had completed the work, but the amounts due to him have not been paid and the security deposit furnished by him has not been released. It is stated that he has been making requests with the Railway authorities for finalizing the contract and for obtaining the 'no due certificate'. Since, the Railway administration has not acceded to his demands in that respect, he has got issued a notice on 26-10-2006, demanding the disputes to be referred for adjudication. The respondents have rejected the said request and asserted that the claim is barred by limitation and hence, they need not refer them to the Arbitrator. Hence, these Applications have been moved. The applicant asserts that in view of the contract having not been finalized till date, the claim of the applicant cannot be termed as to have been barred by limitation. Further, the respondents cannot unjustly retain the security deposit amount with them after the work was executed by him, nor, can they unjustly deny him the payment, which is due for the works executed by him. Since, the respondents have failed to constitute the Arbitral Tribunal and refer the disputes, the present Applications have been moved. The respondent -Railways have contested these Applications. It is their case that the claims are hopelessly barred by limitation and that they are stale and sterile matters, which are sought to be resuscitated by moving these Application now. It is pointed out that for the first time, after the applicant abandoned the work half way through, he sought to raise certain disputes through his representation dated 26-10-2006 by addressing the General Manager, South Central Railway, Secunderabad. Hence, the claim made by the applicant is declared as to have been time barred, by the Railway administration. It is further asserted that the contract was awarded in favour of the applicant under an agreement dated 25-03-1988 for a total value of Rs.1,87,846/-. The work was to be completed within six months from the date of award of the letter of acceptance on 03-11-1987. It is further asserted that the contract was awarded in favour of the applicant under an agreement dated 25-03-1988 for a total value of Rs.1,87,846/-. The work was to be completed within six months from the date of award of the letter of acceptance on 03-11-1987. The applicant commenced the work only on 10-05-1988 and in spite of granting extension of time, he had executed the work to a tune of Rs.1,62,657/- only and he has abandoned the balance work, after the CC – IV bill was measured on 28-03-1989. The applicant has not completed the work at all and he did not even solicit any further extension of time beyond 30-06-1989, hence, it is, he, who has breached the contract. Since, the applicant has not completed the work awarded, the question of refunding the security deposit amount, which has been offered as a security for due performance of the contract, would not arise. For the first time after 1989, the applicant moved the General Manager, South Central Railway, on 26-10-2006, i.e., beyond 17 years period, thus, the claim of the applicant for referring the disputes to arbitration, is hopelessly belated and a sterile one. The process of this Court cannot be used for resuscitating such claims at this distant point of time and hence, these Applications deserve to be dismissed as barred by limitation. The principal question that falls for consideration in these cases is whether the claims made by the applicant deserve to be referred for adjudication to the Arbitral Tribunal or not. The essential purpose for which the process of arbitration resorted to is, for securing effective and speedy resolution of the disputes, but, this process cannot be used for resuscitating old and sterile claims, therefore, the Chief Justice or his Designate is required to examine as to whether the claims are tenable or not and that they are not barred by limitation. If a prima facie opinion can be arrived at that the claims are not barred by limitation and that they are tenable, then, the issues in that regard can be left for determination of the Arbitral Tribunal. If a prima facie opinion can be arrived at that the claims are not barred by limitation and that they are tenable, then, the issues in that regard can be left for determination of the Arbitral Tribunal. It would be profitable to notice at this stage what the Supreme Court has pointed out in this regard in SBP and Company v. Patel Engineering (2005) 8 SCC 613 ) at Paragraph No.37 and the same reads as follows: " It is fundamental to our procedural jurisprudence, that the right of no person shall be affected without be being heard. This necessarily imposes an obligation on the Chief Justice to issue notice to the opposite party when he is moved under Section 11 of the Act. The notice to the opposite party cannot be considered to be merely an intimation to that party of the filing of the arbitration application and the passing of an administrative order appointing an arbitrator or an Arbitral Tribunal. It is really the giving of an opportunity of being heard. There have been cases where claims for appointment of an arbitrator based on an arbitration agreement are made ten or twenty years after the period of the contract has come to an end. There have been cases where the appointment of an arbitrator has been sought, after the parties had settled the account and the party concerned had certified that he had no further claims against the other contracting party. In other words, there have been occasions when dead claims are sought to be resurrected. There have been cases where assertions are made of the existence of arbitration agreements when, in fact, such existence is strongly disputed by the other side who appears on issuance of notice. Controversies are also raised as to whether the claim that is sought to be put forward comes within the purview of the arbitration clause concerned at all. The Chief Justice has necessarily to apply his mind to these aspects before coming to a conclusion one way or the other and before proceeding to appoint an arbitrator or declining to appoint an arbitrator." The undisputed facts brought on record are these: The agreement has been entered on 25-03-1988 and though the work was supposed to be completed by 02-05-1988, extension of time was granted up to 30-06-1989, but, still the work could not be completed. According to the Railways, a substantial portion of work has been left abandoned. The averments made by the applicant that he had taken up the matter with the Railways by way of submitting various representations prior to 26-10-2006, could not be substantiated, in spite of the opposite party asserting that they have never received any such communication and that the averments in that regard and the material produced in support thereof by the applicant, are clear fabrication for the purpose of entertaining the present Applications. It is further asserted by the Railways that the applicant has never made any attempt to complete the balance work and hence, the question of refunding the security deposit amount, would not have arisen. In the face of this fact situation, if the applicant had failed to completely execute the work in accordance with the terms of the contract awarded by the Railways to him, his claim for refund of security deposit money becomes untenable. Security deposits are offered for due performance of the contract. Until and unless the entire work is completely executed in accordance with the terms of the contract or it is mutually agreed to by and between the parties,otherwise, the question of releasing the security deposit, would not arise. Similarly, the question of preparation of a final bill would arise only at the end of execution of the entire work. If the contractor were to abandon the work that was awarded under a contract without subjecting it to termination by way of consent or mutual agreement and or completion, the question of preparation of final bill for the work would not arise. Therefore, the applicant cannot seek to rake up such issues after passage of long years of time. In sofar as payments, which are due for the works that are executed, are concerned, the right to claim payments would arise immediately upon execution of such works, subject to adjustments provided for in the contract. If the applicant had not made a claim in that regard immediately thereafter, it would amount to giving up such rights. The normal period, to be paid for a work executed, is three years. In the instant case, the applicant has not bothered to raise any such claim within that period of time. If the applicant had not made a claim in that regard immediately thereafter, it would amount to giving up such rights. The normal period, to be paid for a work executed, is three years. In the instant case, the applicant has not bothered to raise any such claim within that period of time. On the contra, the Railways have asserted that, for the first time a claim in that respect has been made by the applicant only on 26-10-2006 and by which date, 17 years period has elapsed. By no stretch of imagination, a claim can be raised in that respect for the first time after lapse of so many years. The learned counsel for the Applicants placed reliance upon the following judgments: 1. 1. Vidya Securities Limited V. Comfort Living Hotels (AIR 2003 Delhi 214) 2. 2. Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Limited V. Verma Transport Company (AIR 2006 SC 0-2800) 3. 3. Hari Shankar Singhania V. Gaur Hari Singhania. (AIR 2006 SC 0-2488) 4. Groupe Chimique Tunisien V. Southern Petrochemicals Industries Corpn. Ltd. (AIR 2006 SC 2422) 4. 5. Utkal Commercial Corporation V. Central Coal Fields Limited. ( AIR 1999 SC 801 ) 5. 6. Union Of India Rep. By Gm, Scr V. Mohan Enterprises. (1996 An.W.R. (1) 523) 6. 7. Union Of India And Another V. V.S. Engineering (P) Ltd. (2006 Sccl.Com.954) 7. 8. Northern Railway Administration, Ministry of Railway V. Patel Engineering Company Ltd. (2008 SCCL.COM.1090) In all these cases, the parties concerned have not allowed the period of limitation for the cause, to commence. They are either negotiating or working out for finding a solution to their disputes amongst themselves. Whereas in the instant case, the applicant has raked up the issue after 17 years have lapsed, after he abandoned the works halfway through. Therefore, the ratio in the above cases is not attracted in the present fact situation. Every party to a contract is entitled to determine the rights and obligations arising from out of such a contract and provide therefore the necessary financial outlay and thus, regulate their conduct. It would be reasonable for a party to plan for or anticipate contingencies to develop within the proximateness of any event. It would be extremely difficult to foresee such contingencies for over a long period and then provide for necessary financial allocation for years together, to meet squarely any such eventuality arising /fructifying therefrom. It would be reasonable for a party to plan for or anticipate contingencies to develop within the proximateness of any event. It would be extremely difficult to foresee such contingencies for over a long period and then provide for necessary financial allocation for years together, to meet squarely any such eventuality arising /fructifying therefrom. It is all the more so, if one of the parties to a contract is a Public Sector Unit or a Department of the Government. No one will be able to be in readiness and preparedness for meeting such unforeseeable expenditure years later. If the costing of the works also have a bearing upon the pricing of services, then it will be all the more difficult for the other party to make good or retrieve the increased outlay from the end users afterseveral years have elapsed. The respondent in this case, is the Indian Railways. It is entitled to contemplate for its tariffs depending upon the costing of the Projects undertaken by it. Hence, it would not be appropriate to allow claims to be resuscitated after lapse of unreasonably long years. There is also a greater danger and risk for one of the parties, who would suffer the disadvantage of not being in a position to effectively counter the claims made by the opposite parties, after lapse of several years. It is quite possible and probable that the persons, who were in the know of the actual facts relating to the execution of the works, may have retired from the service and consequently may not be available for it to draw upon their factual knowledge. It is also possible that the records relating to the work, after lapse of so many years, may not have been safely preserved in anticipation of claims. Hence, for this reason also it would be difficult for the respondents herein to effectively defend the claims made by the opposite party after lapse of more than 15 years period. If one of the parties to a contract or a dispute were subjected to such a grave disability, wholly due to the lethargy of the opposite party, there cannot be any justification for such claims to be entertained belatedly. It may even, in fact, amount to paying a premium for the lack of decisive approach of one of the parties to a dispute. It may even, in fact, amount to paying a premium for the lack of decisive approach of one of the parties to a dispute. Hence, I am firmly of the opinion that the cases here do not deserve any further consideration, as they are state and sterile matters. They deserve to be dismissed as hopelessly barred by limitation. Hence, all the Applications are dismissed with costs, to be paid to the State Legal Services Authority by the Applicant. Consolidated hearing fee is fixed at Rs.5,000/-.