JUDGEMENT 1. Heard counsel for the parties in both the cases. 2. In both of these applications, the order taking cognizance under Section 10 of the Equal Remuneration Act (hereinafter to be referred to as the Act) has been assailed by the petitioners who have been summoned to face trial. 3. Mr. Anil Kumar Jha, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner in both the cases has firstly submitted that the Marketing Division of Indian Oil Corporation would not fall within the purview of the Act, inasmuch as, by Notification No. SO 257(E) dated 1.4.1997, only by manufacture of gas in gas works and distribution through mains to household, industrial, commercial and other users has been covered. In other words, Mr. Jha, in other words is of the view that even though the manufacturing unit of the Indian Oil Corporation would be covered by the provisions of the Act, the administrative offices thereof shall not fall within the purview of the Act. 4. In the considered opinion of this Court, such arguments seem to be one of desperation. Section 1(3) of the Act lays down that the Act shall come into force only on such date not being later than three years from the passing of the Act, as the Central Government may, by notification, appoint and different dates may be appointed for different establishments of employments. It has to be noted that the Act came into force in March, 1976 when initially it was made enforceable against the banks, insurance company, another financial institution vide notification dated 8.3.1976 and thereafter the Central Government kept on extending it for other establishment/employment and in that process, the notification no. SO 257 dated 1.4.1977 was issued; "in respect of employment in respect of employments in relation to electricity, gas (including steam) and water, specified as under 1. Electricity (i) Generation and transmission of electric energy. (ii) Distribution of electric energy to household, industrial and commercial and other users. 2. Gas (including steam) Manufacture of gas in gas works and distribution through mains to household, industrial, commercial and other users. 3. Water Water supply, this is to say, collection, purification and distribution of water." 5. Electricity (i) Generation and transmission of electric energy. (ii) Distribution of electric energy to household, industrial and commercial and other users. 2. Gas (including steam) Manufacture of gas in gas works and distribution through mains to household, industrial, commercial and other users. 3. Water Water supply, this is to say, collection, purification and distribution of water." 5. From the reading of the aforementioned provisions of Section 1(3) of the Act read with Notification dated 1.4.1997, it is more than clear that the employments in relation to manufacture and/or distribution gas as a whole is within the purview of the Act. This Court cannot read between the lines to confine it to be applicable only in the gas manufacturing plants only when the intent of legislature is very clear that payment of equal remuneration to man and women workers have to be secured by preventing discrimination on the ground of sex against women in the matter of specified employment. It would be very difficult for this Court to accept that even though the Act will be applicable in manufacturing unit of a gas producing company its offices dealing with the distribution of such manufactured gas including its head office monitoring the work of manufacturing and/or distributing gas would not be covered within the ambit of the Act. That being so, the first part of submission of the counsel for the petitioner must fail. 6. Mr. Jha, then contended that in any event, there was no violation of Section 10(a) of the Act because such register about which allegation was made in the complaint petition of Labour Enforcement Officer was not to be maintained in the headquarters or administrative offices but only in the manufacturing units where the gas was being produced. 7. Attractive though the aforementioned submissions may be, but when one looks to the import of Section 10 of the Act, it becomes clear that the mandate and/or liability for maintenance of such register is on the employer. The employer under Section 2(c) of the Act has been given the same meaning as assigned under Clause-f of Section 2 of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972. The employer under Section 2(c) of the Act has been given the same meaning as assigned under Clause-f of Section 2 of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972. When one goes to the definition of employer under the Payment of Gratuity Act, it is found that an exhaustive definition has been given therein in the following terms: 2(f) "employer" means, in relation to any establishment, factory, mine, oilfield, plantation, port, railway, company or shop (i) belonging to, or under the control of the Central Government or State Government, a person or authority appointed by the appropriate Government for the supervision and control of employee, or where no person or authority has been so appointed, the head of the Ministry of the Department concerned; (ii) belonging to, or under the control of, any local authority, the person appointed by such authority for the supervision and control of employment or where no person has been so appointed, the chief executive officer of the local authority; (iii) in any other case, the person, who, or the authority which has the ultimate control over the affairs of establishment, factory, mine, oil field, plantation, port, railway company or shop and where the said affairs are entrusted to any other person whether called a manager, managing director or by any other name, such person. 8. Section 2(f)(iii), therefore, makes the authority who has the ultimate control over the affairs of the establishment as an employer. It would thus be very difficult to escape from the wide definition of employer defined in the Payment of Gratuity Act specially when Indian Oil Corporation is also an organization belonging to or under the control of the Central Government and therefore, the person or authority appointed by the Indian Oil Corporation for the supervision and control of employees will definitely fall within the meaning of employer. 9. Having thus examined the aforementioned aspect of the matter as also concluded that not only the Act is applicable to any and every establishment of Indian Oil Corporation dealing in manufacturing and distribution of gas it would automatically follow even the administrative offices looking any part of the manufacturing and distributing work would also fall within the ambit of the Act. 10. That would leave this Court to consider the remaining submission advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner as with regard to the individual liability of the two petitioners. Mr. 10. That would leave this Court to consider the remaining submission advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner as with regard to the individual liability of the two petitioners. Mr. Jha has submitted that though the petitioner, namely, S.K. Shankar @ Shree Krishna Shankar being an Area Manager of Indian Oil Corporation may be liable but Mr. S.Basu @ Supriya Basu the petitioner in the other case being the Deputy General Manager of HRD, Indian Oil Corporation posted at Calcutta would never be held to be liable for such violation of maintaining the register. 11. In the opinion of this Court, Section 11 of the Act again would directly answer the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner. The offence, in question, was found to have been committed by the company i.e. Indian Oil Corporation and in that view of the matter the provisions of Section 11, relating to offences by companies, under the Act needs to be examined. Section 11 of the Act reads as follows: 11. Offence by companies. (i) Where an offence under this Act has been committed by a company, every person who at the time the offence was committed, was in charge of, and was responsible to, the company for the conduct of the business of the company, as well as the company, shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly: Provided that nothing contained in this sub-section shall render any such person liable to any punishment, if he proves that the offence was committed without his knowledge or that he had exercised all due diligence to prevent the commission of such offence. (ii) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), where any offence under this Act has been committed by a company and it is proved that the offence has been committed with the consent or connivance of or is attributable to, any neglect on the part of any director, manager, secretary or other officer of the company, such director, manager, secretary or other officer shall be deemed to be guilty of that offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly." 12. Thus, the question as to whether the accused petitioner, namely, S. Basu @ Supriya Basu was in-charge or not cannot be gone into at the time of taking cognizance. Thus, the question as to whether the accused petitioner, namely, S. Basu @ Supriya Basu was in-charge or not cannot be gone into at the time of taking cognizance. This aspect of the matter, however, will be definitely looked into by trial court at the time of trial when it will be open for the petitioners to raise all their contentions as with regard to his individual liability under the Act. 13. That being so, this Court would not find any merit in both of these applications and accordingly, they are dismissed. 14. It is, however, made clear that whatever observations in this order while dealing with submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioners the same will not prejudice the petitioners in course of trial.