JUDGMENT A. K. PATNAIK, C. J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner is an association of the residents of Mhow, a cantonment near Indore in Madhya Pradesh, and is registered as a Society under the madhya Pradesh Society Registrikaran adhiniyam, 1973 and has filed this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution for appropriate reliefs. ( 2 ) THE facts relevant for deciding this writ petition briefly are that Mhow originally was part of the Indian State of Maharaja of holkar. In 1818, Maharaja of Holkar entered into the Treaty of Mandsaur and under Article VII of the Treaty of Mandsaur, the britishers bound themselves to support a field force to maintain the internal tranquillity of the territories of Maharaja Holkar, and to defend the territories from foreign enemies and Maharaja Holkar agreed to provide some place of security where the British forces would be stationed and the stores would be deposited. Pursuant to the Article VII of the treaty of Mandsaur, Mhow came to be occupied by the British forces and the stores. In 1836, by Order No. 179 the Governor general of India in Council made regulations regarding houses and premises located in the military cantonment including the cantonment of Mhow. Thereafter, in exercise of the powers under the proviso to Section 2 (1) of the Government of India Act, 1935, his Majesty made the Indian (Foreign Jurisdiction)Order in Council, 1937 and provided in clause 2 thereof that from the commencement of the Government of India Act, 1935, the powers so far as they are connected with the exercise of the function of the Crown in its relations with Indian States, will be powers of his Majesty's representative for the exercise of those functions of the Crown, and he may delegate those powers to such extent and in such manner as he thinks fit. The Crown's representative in exercise of such powers conferred by the Indian (Foreign Jurisdiction)Order in Council, 1937, then made the Central India Administered Areas (Application of Laws) Order, 1937 and included the cantonment of Mhow in the "administered areas" and applied the Cantonments Act, 1924, to the Cantonment of Mhow. The Crown's representative in exercise of such powers conferred by the Indian (Foreign Jurisdiction)Order in Council, 1937, then made the Central India Administered Areas (Application of Laws) Order, 1937 and included the cantonment of Mhow in the "administered areas" and applied the Cantonments Act, 1924, to the Cantonment of Mhow. On the eve of independence, however, a notification dated 9th August, 1947, was issued by the Crown representative stating that with effect from 14-8-1947 the jurisdiction over the areas known as "mhow Cantonment" be restored to the Maharaja Holkar of Indore and cancelled all notifications issued under the Indian (Foreign Jurisdiction) Order in council, 1937. Simultaneously, a notification dated 14-8-1947 was issued by the Government of the Maharaja Holkar, Foreign Department, saying that the Crown Representative has been pleased to retrocede to the maharaja Holkar with effect from 14-8-1947, the jurisdiction exercised by him in the area then comprising the Cantonment of Mhow, in 1947, the Maharaja of Holkar signed the instrument of accession acceding to the Dominion of India and in 1948 the rulers of gwalior, Indore and certain other States in central India signed a covenant for the formation of Madhya Bharat. Thereafter, the constitution of India was adopted on 26-1-1950 and under Article 1 (1) read with Schedule I of the Constitution, Madhya Bharat was included in India as a Union of States. ( 3 ) IN the meanwhile, in the Mhow Cantonment area, several bungalows along with the adjoining lands were given by the authorities of Mhow Cantonment to different civilians for occupation and the civilians occupied the bungalows and the adjoining lands. In 1970 and thereafter, 63 notices were issued by the Defence Estate Officer, Mhow, to different civilians who were in occupation of bungalows and the land for resumption and the resumption notices were challenged in different proceedings in Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants)Act, 1971 and in civil suits. Appeals were also filed against the orders passed by the authorities under the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 respondent Nos. 1 and 3 have taken possession of 45 bungalows. Cases in respect of 19 bungalows are pending at various stages in different Courts including the High Court in revisions and Second Appeals. Appeals were also filed against the orders passed by the authorities under the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 respondent Nos. 1 and 3 have taken possession of 45 bungalows. Cases in respect of 19 bungalows are pending at various stages in different Courts including the High Court in revisions and Second Appeals. In the background of these facts, the petitioner has filed this writ petition on behalf of the civilian residents of Mhow as a Public Interest Litigation for declarations that the lands in Mhow cantonment do not belong to the Central government and that the Cantonment Land administration Rules, 1937 do not apply to mhow Cantonment. The petitioner has further prayed that a direction to the respondent nos. 1 and 3 to exclude the civilian occupied areas from Mhow Cantonment and to direct the Union of India to excise the civilian areas from Mhow Cantonment in favour of the State of Madhya Pradesh. The petitioner has also prayed for a direction to the respondents to recognise the title deeds and the settled possession of civilian residents of mhow Cantonment and for a declaration that order No. 179 of the Governor General of india in Council is void. PRELIMINARY ISSUES RAISED BY the RESPONDENTS. ( 4 ) MR. B. L. Pavecha, learned senior Counsel, appearing for respondent Nos. 1,3 and 4, raised some preliminary issues with regard to maintainability of the writ petition. He submitted that the writ petitions cannot be entertained as a Public Interest Litigation (PIL) as the petitioner has filed this writ petition to further the interest of its office bearers and members. He submitted that in paragraph 1 of the writ petition, Dr. Behram M. Masani is described as the President of the petitioner association and Dr. Behram M. Masani has interest in Bungalow No. 102 situated at Simrole Road, Mhow because he was a member of the Bandharan Committee of the Parsi Zorastrian Anjuman of Mhow which had purchased the bungalow on 1-1-1958 by a registered sale deed. He submitted that in paragraph 1 of the writ petition, mr. Zal Cowasji has been described as the secretary of the petitioner association and mr. Zal Cowasji was the occupier of Bungalow No. 53, Mall Road, Mhow and he is also the trustee of the trust which occupied bangalow Nos. He submitted that in paragraph 1 of the writ petition, mr. Zal Cowasji has been described as the secretary of the petitioner association and mr. Zal Cowasji was the occupier of Bungalow No. 53, Mall Road, Mhow and he is also the trustee of the trust which occupied bangalow Nos. 41, 42, 53, 57, 75 and 91 and possession of these bungalows has already been taken by the respondent No. 1 and compensation has been paid to Mr. Zal Cowasji. He further submitted that Ms. Aruna rodrigues has been described in paragraph 1 of the writ petition as member of the petitioner association and Ms. Aruna Rodrigues was the occupier of Bungalow No. 55, simrole Road, Mhow along with her sister mrs. Ann Chandiramani and she has filed a suit challenging the resumption proceedings initiated by the respondent No. 1 in Civil Suit no. 91/04 in the Court of Civil Judge Class ii, Mhow. He submitted that Ms. Rodrigues is also the occupier of Bungalow No. 69, R. N. Bhaya Road, Mhow along with her sister and the respondents initiated proceedings under the Public Premises (Eviction of unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 in respect of the Bungalow No. 69 and she filed a writ petition W. P. No. 846/1995 but the writ petition was dismissed by the Court on 10-4-1997. He also submitted that paragraph 1 of the writ petition describes Mrs. Shirin Seth as the Treasurer of the petitioner association and Mrs. Shirin Seth is the occupier of Bungalow No. 93, Cunnigham Road, Mhow which had been put on auction sale by the m. P. State Financial Corporation Ltd. for recovery of loan advanced to her husband mr. C. B. J. Seth but the respondent No. 12 has objected to the proposed sale on the ground that the M. P. State Financial Corporation has no authority to auction the property belonging to the respondent No. 1 and the auction sale has been stayed. He vehemently submitted that all these facts would show that the present writ petition is an attempt to serve the self interest of the aforesaid four persons under the guise and cloak of public interest and such an attempt should be nipped in the bud by a summary dismissal with exemplary costs. ( 5 ) MR. He vehemently submitted that all these facts would show that the present writ petition is an attempt to serve the self interest of the aforesaid four persons under the guise and cloak of public interest and such an attempt should be nipped in the bud by a summary dismissal with exemplary costs. ( 5 ) MR. Pavecha cited Subhash Kumar v. State of Bihar and others, (1991) 1 SCC 598 : AIR 1991 SC 420 in which the Supreme court has held that personal interest, grudge or enmity cannot be enforced through the process of the Court under Article 32 in the garb of public interest litigation. He also relied on Dattaraj Nathuji Thaware v. State of maharashtra and others, (2005) 1 SCC 590 : air 2005 SC 540 in which the Supreme court has observed that Public Interest Litigation is a weapon which has to be used with great care and circumspection and the judiciary has to be extremely careful to see that behind the beautiful veil of public interest, ugly private malice, vested interest and publicity seeking is not lurking and it is to be used as an effective weapon in the armoury of law for delivering social justice. He also cited R. and M. Trust v. Koramangala, Residents Vigilance Group and others, (2005) 3 scc 91 : AIR 2005 SC 894 in which the supreme Court has held that the jurisdiction of the court to entertain PIL is meant for the purpose of coming to the rescue of the downtrodden and not for the purpose of serving private ends. He cited Printers (Mysore) Ltd. v. M. A. Rasheed and others, (2004) 4 SCC 460 , for the proposition' that when a plea is raised that a PIL should not be entertained, the court should determine the issue and submitted that since the respondents have raised a plea that the writ petition has been filed not in the public interest but to enforce the interest of some members and office bearers of the petitioner association, the court should decide this question. ( 6 ) MR. ( 6 ) MR. A. M. Mathur, learned senior Counsel, appearing for the petitioner, on the other hand, submitted that the writ petition has been filed by the petitioner association consisting of members who are the civilian residents of Mhow and the reliefs claimed in the writ petition if granted will protect the property rights of the members of the public residing in Mhow and therefore the writ petition has been rightly filed as a PIL. He relied on the Janta Dal v. H. S. Chowdhary and others, AIR 1993 SC 892 , in which the Supreme court has observed in para 56 at page 908 of the AIR that the seeds of the concept of PIL were initially sown in India in Mumbai kamgar Sabha, Bombay v. Abdulbhai faizullabhai and others, AIR 1976 SC 1455 , in which Krishna Iyer, J. observed that Article 226, viewed on a wider perspective, may be amenable to ventilation of collective or common grievances, as distinguished from assertion of individual rights. He submitted that in Guruvayoor Devaswom Managing committee and another v. C. K. Rajan and others, 2003 (7) SCC 546 : AIR 2004 SC 561 , S. B. Sinha, J. writing the judgment for v. N. Khare, C. J. , G. P. Mathur, J. and himself has summarised in para 50 at pages 568 and 569 of the SCC the principles evolved by the Supreme Court on different types of public interest litigations and his Lordship has mentioned that in an appropriate case, although the petitioner might have moved this Court in his private interest and for redressal of personal grievances, the Court in furtherance of public interest may think it necessary to enquire into the state of affairs of the subject of litigation in the interest of justice and has referred to the decision of the supreme Court in Shivajirao Nilangekar Patil v. Dr. Mahesh Madhav Gosavi, (1987) 1 SCC 227 : AIR 1987 SC 294 as an illustration of this kind of public interest litigation. He submitted that S. B. Sinha, J. speaking for N. Santosh Hegde and himself has reiterated this position in Ashok Lanka and another v. Rishi dixit and others, (2005) 5 SCC 598 : AIR 2005 SC 2821 in para 42 at page 618 of the scc. He submitted that S. B. Sinha, J. speaking for N. Santosh Hegde and himself has reiterated this position in Ashok Lanka and another v. Rishi dixit and others, (2005) 5 SCC 598 : AIR 2005 SC 2821 in para 42 at page 618 of the scc. ( 7 ) WE are of the considered opinion that the writ petition filed by the petitioner association is really a representative action on behalf of the civilian residents of Mhow. From the pleadings of the writ petition, it appears that the civilian residents of Mhow are aggrieved by the notices issued on behalf of the Union of India for resumption of land and bungalows in Mhow under their occupation and they have collectively filed the writ petition contending that the lands and bungalows under their occupation are not the property of the Union of India but the property of the State of Madhya Pradesh and have prayed for a declaration that the lands in the mhow Cantonment do not belong to the Central Government and for a direction to the union of India to excise the civilian occupied areas from Mhow Cantonment in favour of the State of Madhya Pradesh. Such collective or representative action is recognised as one kind of public interest litigation. ( 8 ) WE may now cite authorities for this view. In Mumbai Kamgar Sabha, Bombay v. Abdulbhai Faizullabhai and others (supra), krishna Ayer, J. observed : "test litigations, representative actions. pro bono publico and like broadened forms of legal proceedings are in keeping with the current accent on justice to the common man and a necessary disincentive to those who wish to by-pass the real issues on the merits by suspect reliance on peripheral procedural shortcomings. Even Art. 226, viewed on wider perspective, may be amenable to ventilation of collective or common grievances. as distinguished from assertion of individual rights, although the traditional view, backed by precedents has opted for the narrower alternative. Public interest is promoted by a spacious construction of locus standi in our socio-economic circumstances and conceptual latitudinarianism permits taking liberties with individualisation of the right to invoke the higher Courts where the remedy is shared by a considerable number, particularly when they are weaker. Less litigation, consistent with fair process, is the aim of adjectival law. Public interest is promoted by a spacious construction of locus standi in our socio-economic circumstances and conceptual latitudinarianism permits taking liberties with individualisation of the right to invoke the higher Courts where the remedy is shared by a considerable number, particularly when they are weaker. Less litigation, consistent with fair process, is the aim of adjectival law. " In this case, Mumbai Kamgar Sabha, a union of workers, assailed the findings of the Industrial Disputes Tribunal and the respondents before the Supreme Court raised a preliminary objection that the Union not being party to the dispute which was between the workers oh the one hand and the establishment of the other had no locus standi and the real disputants were the workers, but the supreme Court rejected this preliminary objection. ( 9 ) THIS view taken by the Supreme Court in Mumbai Kamgar Sabha, Bombay v. Abdulbhai Faizullabhai and others (supra) in the context of industrial dispute, also applies to disputes relating to right to property which is a civil dispute. A civil dispute is governed by the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (for short 'the CPC' ). Order 1, Rule 8 of the CPC itself provides that where there are numerous persons having the same interest in one suit, one or more persons may sue on behalf of or for the benefit of all persons so interested with the permission of the Court. Hence, representative action on behalf of numerous persons having the same interest in one suit is also permissible in civil dispute including a property dispute. In Chairman, Tamil Nadu housing Board, Madras v. T. N. Ganapathy, air 1990 SC 642 , T. N. Ganapathy on behalf of, himself and on behalf of number of allottees of residential plots filed a suit against the Chairman, Tamil Nadu Housing board and one of the contentions raised before the Supreme Court was that the provision of Order 1, Rule 8 of the CPC were not applicable in the case and the representative suit was not maintainable. The Supreme court rejected the contention of the Chairman, Tamil Nadu Housing Board saying that the provisions of Order 1, Rule 8 of the CPC have been made in the public interest so as to avoid multiplicity of litigation. The Supreme court rejected the contention of the Chairman, Tamil Nadu Housing Board saying that the provisions of Order 1, Rule 8 of the CPC have been made in the public interest so as to avoid multiplicity of litigation. In the language of the Supreme Court : "the provision of O. 1, R. 8 have been included in the Code in the public interest so as to avoid multiplicity of litigation. The condition necessary for application of the provisions is that the persons on whose behalf the suit is being brought must have the same interest. In other words either the interest must be common or they must have a common grievance which they seek to get redressed. " ( 10 ) IF a suit can be instituted as a representative action on behalf of numerous persons having the same interest with a view to avoid multiplicity of litigation, a writ petition can also be filed as a representative action on behalf of numerous persons having the same interest against the State and public authorities and such a writ petition would be categorised as a public interest litigation on behalf of all such numerous persons who have the same interest. In para 5 in Dattaraj nathuji Thaware v. State of Maharashtra and others (supra) cited by Mr. Pavecha, the Supreme Court while explaining the meaning of "public interest litigation" has extracted from Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, Vol. 4 (4th edn.), the following definition of public interest : "public interest- (1) A matter of public or general interest 'does not mean that which is interesting as gratifying curiosity or a love of information or amusement; but that in which a class of the community have a pecuniary interest, or some interest by which their legal rights or liabilities are affected'. . . " Thus, the meaning of "public interest" in public Interest Litigation covers not only general interest of the public at large but also the same interest of a class of the community provided such class of the community has the same interest in the litigation. This will be also clear from para 53 of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Janta Dal v. H. S. Chowdhary (supra), which is quoted hereinbelow :"the, expression 'litigation' means a legal action including all proceedings therein, initiated in a Court of law with the purpose of enforcing a right or seeking a remedy. This will be also clear from para 53 of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Janta Dal v. H. S. Chowdhary (supra), which is quoted hereinbelow :"the, expression 'litigation' means a legal action including all proceedings therein, initiated in a Court of law with the purpose of enforcing a right or seeking a remedy. Therefore, lexically the expression 'pil' means a legal action initiated in a Court of law for the enforcement of public interest or general interest in which the public or a class of the community have, pecuniary interest or some interest, by which their legal rights or liabilities are affected. " ( 11 ) WE find from the facts of this case that several notices issued by the respondent no. 3 for resumption of land in Mhow under the occupation of civilian residents of Mhow who are members of the petitioner Association and such resumption notices have triggered a number of litigations in different courts. The members of the petitioner Association possibly have an apprehension that such notices for resumption of land may also be issued by the respondent No. 3 in the near future affecting the common interest of many other civilian residents of Mhow who are members of the petitioner Association. To avoid multiplicity of litigations one writ petition has been filed on behalf of all such civilian residents of Mhow by the petitioner association as a PIL contending that it is the state of Madhya Pradesh and not the Union of India which was the Owner of the land under the occupation of the civilian residents in Mhow. The High Court should not dismiss the writ petition as not maintainable, particularly when substantial questions of law relating to interpretation of Article 295 of the Constitution and the provisions of the cantonment Act, 1924 have been raised which need to be decided by the High Court. The office bearers and some members of. the petitioner Association may be pursuing their own litigations against the respondents Nos. 1 and 3 in respect of the land and bungalows under their occupation, but other members of the petitioner Association have also their similar common grievances which are sought to be redressed through this writ petition. The office bearers and some members of. the petitioner Association may be pursuing their own litigations against the respondents Nos. 1 and 3 in respect of the land and bungalows under their occupation, but other members of the petitioner Association have also their similar common grievances which are sought to be redressed through this writ petition. This is therefore not a case where individuals have filed the writ petition to enforce their own personal interest only but a writ petition filed by a class of the community residing in Mhow Cantonment through their Association for redressal of their common grievances. The writ petition is a kind of public interest litigation and cannot be dismissed in limine. ( 12 ) MR. Pavecha next submitted that the conduct of the petitioner is such that this court should throw out the writ petition at the threshold and should not decide the writ petition on merits. He submitted that the petitioner had earlier filed W. P. No. 2023/2007 before the Indore Bench of the High Court seeking various reliefs which it has claimed in the present writ petition and when the matter came up before the Division Bench at indore on 18-5-2007, the learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner sought permission of the Court to delete by way of amendment clause (a) of paragraph 3 of the writ petition in which the petitioner had stated that the petitioner has challenged the Cantonments Act, 2006 as having been enacted in derogation of the fundamental right to equality before the law guaranteed under article 14 of the Constitution and the right to respectable life guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution. He submitted that thereafter the petitioner filed an application for amendment on 10-3-2008 but did not pray for deletion of clause (a) of para 3 of the writ petition and only sought for amendment of para 7 (e) and added para 7 (e) to the effect that the Cantonment Land Administration rules, 1937 are beyond the rule-making power under Section 280 (2) (a) of the Act, 1924 and therefore be declared ultra vires. He submitted that the petitioner also did not disclose in the writ petition the interests of dr. Behram M. Masani, President of the petitioner Association, Mr. Zal Cowasji, Secretary of the petitioner Association, Ms. Aruna Rodrigues, Member of the petitioner association and Mrs. He submitted that the petitioner also did not disclose in the writ petition the interests of dr. Behram M. Masani, President of the petitioner Association, Mr. Zal Cowasji, Secretary of the petitioner Association, Ms. Aruna Rodrigues, Member of the petitioner association and Mrs. Shirin Seth, Treasurer of the petitioner Association in various lands and bungalows in Mhow and did not also state that resumption proceedings had been initiated and that cases are pending in or have been disposed of by various Courts. He vehemently argued that the petitioner has therefore suppressed material facts and the writ petition is liable to be dismissed in limine on this ground alone. ( 13 ) WE find that in paragraph 5 (P) at pages 10 and 11 of the writ petition, the petitioner has stated : "properties have been "resumed" since 1971 without compensation for the land and petty compensation as value of authorised structure. Tenants in outhouses of such properties have fared even worse; they have been ignored and the thousands staying in them have been summarily evicted. The civilian population has been consistently denied permission to repair, improve, rebuild, etc. , to accommodate additional generations of family and tenants, or to mutate their properties, unless 'admission Deeds' are signed, which forces them to accept that the Central Government is the acknowledged owner of the property. Many have signed at some point in the past without a true understanding of its implications and then stopped after "resumption" notices began to be served from around the 1960s onwards. The strictures put on the civilian residents are not just impossible to keep, but are perverse, because permission to renovate or repair or mutate property is habitually denied without an 'admission deed'. Thus, properties are now registered in the names of dead people. This is untenable. It is also a serious denial of civil rights and liberties not to be able to freely sell, or inherit or Will property to beneficiaries and next of kin, because they are not reflected in the official records, unlike the rest of Indian citizenry. The DEO/army Authorities are on record as stating that any deviation from their rules will be acted upon by either Resumption or 'notices' under the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Persons) Act, 1971, hereinafter referred to as the PP Act. The DEO/army Authorities are on record as stating that any deviation from their rules will be acted upon by either Resumption or 'notices' under the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Persons) Act, 1971, hereinafter referred to as the PP Act. This is a terrible travesty of justice and a dangerous fraud on the civilian residents of mhow. " Hence, the petitioner has stated in the writ petition that properties have been resumed since 1971 without compensation for the land and payment of petty compensation as value of authorised structure has been made and that action has also been taken by the authorities for eviction under the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants)Act, 1971. The names of the members or office bearers of the petitioner Association against whom such resumption proceedings or eviction proceedings have been taken by the authorities of the respondent No. 1 have, however, not been disclosed in the writ petition. In paragraphs 5b2, 5b3, 5b4 and 5b5 at pages 17, 18 and 19 of the writ petition, the petitioner has also stated that W. P. No. 2023/2007 was filed as a PIL before the indore Bench of the High Court and that orders were passed by the Indore Bench from time to time on the applications filed by the petitioner and the respondents in the said writ petition before the Indore Bench. There may be however some omissions or mistakes in the presentation of facts in the writ petition with regard to the proceedings in W. P. No. 2023/2007 before the Indore Bench. On these facts, we cannot hold that the petitioner has intentionally suppressed material facts to mislead the High Court and that the conduct of the petitioner is such that the writ petition should be dismissed by the High Court at the threshold. ( 14 ) MR. Pavecha next submitted that the high Court does not entertain a writ petition to decide title to property and for establishing title to property, a party must resort to a private law remedy such as a civil suit. He submitted that the reliefs claimed in the present writ petition is also a declaratory relief and a declaratory relief is not normally granted by the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. He submitted that the reliefs claimed in the present writ petition is also a declaratory relief and a declaratory relief is not normally granted by the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. He cited Parvatibai subhanrao Nalawade v. Anwarali Hasanali makani and others, (1992) 1 SCC 414 : AIR 1992 SC 1780 in which the Supreme Court has held that the High Court was not justified either entertaining the writ petition or deciding the merits of the dispute between the tenant and the landlord. He also relied upon the observations of the Supreme Court in Dwarka Prasad Agarwal and another v. B. D. Agarwal and others, (2003) 6 SCC 230 : ( AIR 2003 SC 2686 ) that the remedy under article 226 cannot be invoked for resolution of a private law dispute as distinct from a dispute involving public law character and that a writ remedy is not available for resolution of a property or a title dispute. Mr. Mathur, in reply, submitted that reliefs claimed in this writ petition can be granted by the Court on the basis of interpretation of article 295 of the Constitution, the Cantonment Act, 1924 and the Cantonment Land administration Rules, 1937 and the High court need not go into any factual disputes to grant the reliefs. He submitted that these matters are within the field of public law and the High Court in exercise of its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution can grant the reliefs. ( 15 ) IN Gulam Abbas and others v. State of U. P. and others, AIR 1981 SC 2198 , gulam Abbas and others filed a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution on behalf of the Shia community of the Mohalla doshipura in Varanasi contending that the shia community had been performing religious rites, practices and observances on certain plots and properties situated in the mohalla Doshipura in the city of Varanasi but the respondent, the State of U. P. , was interfering with the performance of those religious rites, practices and observances on the plots and properties and sought a declaration that 9 plots of land and the building structures thereon belong to Shia Waqf of mohalla Doshipura and also a declaration that the members of Shia community of that mohalla have a right to perform their religious functions and practices on these plots and in the structures standing thereon. The supreme Court held that ordinarily adjudication of questions of title and granting declaratory relief consequent upon such adjudication are not undertaken in a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution, but as the title and ownership of the plots of land and the structures thereon are distinct from the customary rights of the Shia community to perform their religious ceremonies and functions on the plots and in the structures thereon, the relief sought by the Shia community for enforcement of their customary rights has to be considered on merits and whatever relief they may be found legally and properly entitled to may have to be granted to them. ( 16 ) IN the present case, the claim of the civil residents of Mhow is that their constitutional right to property under Article 300-A of the Constitution is in jeopardy, and they have filed this writ petition through their association seeking a declaration that the lands and bungalows in Mhow under the occupation of the civilian residents do not belong to Union of India, but to the State of M. P. and the High Court can decide whether the declaration can be granted or not on an interpretation of Article 295 of the constitution and the provisions of the Cantonments act, 1924, and on the facts which are not disputed in exercise of its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. Rather, the High court should decide the disputes raised in the writ petition to avoid multiplicity of litigations and conflicting opinions of different courts on the interpretation of very important provisions of the Constitution relating to the properties of the Union of India and the States constituting the Union and the provisions of the Cantonments Act, 1924 vis-a-vis the right to property of the residents of the Mhow Cantonment. ( 17 ) MR. Pavecha next submitted that the main dispute raised in this writ petition is whether the land and bungalows occupied by the civilian residents of Mhow belong to the union of India or the State of Madhya pradesh and this dispute can only be decided by the Supreme Court because under Article 131 of the Constitution, the Supreme Court has the exclusive original jurisdiction to decide a dispute between the Government of india and a State. Mr, Mathur, in reply, submitted that Article 131 of the Constitution will not apply where one of the parties to the dispute is a private party and the Government of India and the Stale are other parties. In support of his submission, he relied upon state of Bihar v. Union of India and another, air 1970 SC 1446 and Tashi Delek Gaming solutions Ltd. and another v. State of karnataka and others, (2006) 1 SCC 442 : ( AIR 2006 SC 661 ). ( 18 ) WE find that in State of Bihar v. Union of India and another (supra ). the Supreme court has held that the most important feature of Article 131 is that it makes no mention of any party other than the Government of India or any one or more of the States who can be arrayed as a disputant and there is no scope for suggesting that a private citizen, a firm or a corporation can be arrayed as a party on one side and one or more States including the Government of India or the other nor is there anything in the Article which suggests claim being made by a private party jointly or in the alternative with a State or the Government of India. In Tashi Delek gaming Solutions Ltd. and another v. State of Karnataka and others (supra), the Supreme court has observed that it is now well settled by various decisions that Article 131 will not be applicable where citizens or private bodies are parties either jointly or in the alternative with the State or the Government of India. Thus, the contention of Mr. Pavecha that the present dispute filed by the petitioner association is within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Constitution is misconceived. ( 19 ) MR. Pavecha submitted that Article 363 of the Constitution creates a constitutional bar to interference by Courts in disputes arising out of certain treaties, agreements, etc. with Rulers of Indian States. He submitted that since the present dispute arises out of the Treaty of Mandsaur, 1818, entered into by Maharaja Holkar, a Ruler of Indian state, and by the predecessor of the Government of the Dominion of India the jurisdiction of the High Court was barred under Article 363 of the Constitution. with Rulers of Indian States. He submitted that since the present dispute arises out of the Treaty of Mandsaur, 1818, entered into by Maharaja Holkar, a Ruler of Indian state, and by the predecessor of the Government of the Dominion of India the jurisdiction of the High Court was barred under Article 363 of the Constitution. In support of this contention, he relied upon State of seraikella and others v. Union of India and another, AIR 1951 SC 253 . Mr. Mathur, on the other hand, submitted that the Treaty of mandsaur entered into by Maharaja Holkar is only the origin of how British forces came to occupy Mhow but the dispute raised by the petitioner Association in this case does not arise out of the Treaty of Mandsaur and article 363 of the Constitution therefore was not attracted to the facts of the present case. In support of this submission he cited the decisions of the Supreme Court in Jagannath bchera and others v. Raja Harihar Singh maharaj Bhramarbara Roy, AIR 1958 SC 239 and Madhav Rao Jivaji Rao Scindia Bahadur of Gwalior and others v. Union of India and another, 1971 (1) SCC 85 : AIR 1970 SC 530. ( 20 ) ARTICLE 363 of the Constitution is quoted herein below: "363. Bar to interference by Courts in disputes arising out of certain treaties, agreements etc.- (1) Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution but subject to the provisions of Article 143, neither the Supreme Court nor any other Court shall have jurisdiction in any dispute arising out of any provision of a creaty, agreement covenant, engagement, sanad or other similar instrument which was entered into or executed before the commencement of this Constitution by any Ruler of an Indian State and to which the Government of the Dominion of India or any of its predecessor Governments was a party and which has or has been continued in operation after such commencement, or in any dispute in respect of any right accruing under or any liability or obligation arising out of any of the provisions of this Constitution relating to any such treaty, agreement, covenant, engagement, sanad or other similar instrument. (2) In this article- (a) "indian State" means any territory recognised before the commencement of this constitution by His Majesty or the Government of the Dominion of India as being such a State; and (b) "ruler" includes the Prince, Chief or other person recognised before such commencement by His Majesty or the Government of the Dominion of India as the Ruler of any Indian State. " A plain reading of Article 363 of the Constitution would show that the first limb of this article will apply where the treaty, agreement, covenant, engagement, sanad or other similar instrument in question has or has been continued in operation after the commencement of the Constitution. This is the view of the Supreme Court in State of Seraikella and others v. Union of India and another (supra)as will be clear from the following passage of the judgment in the case :"if therefore the dispute arises in respect of a document of that description and if such document had been executed before the Constitution by a Ruler and which was or had continued in operation after such commencement, this Court has no jurisdiction to determine such issue. It was argued that as the agreement had to be in operation after the commencement of the Constitution, no dispute can arise in respect of such document before the commencement of the Constitution and therefore as the dispute in the present case had arisen before the commencement of the Constitution, Article 363 had no operation. In my opinion, this is not a correct reading of Article 363 (1), The time factor is related only to the document in question and not the dispute. It is provided that-such document should have been executed before the constitution came into force and has to be in operation after the Constitution, but the dispute, which is the subject matter of the litigation, may arise before or after. " In the present case, nothing has been shown to us by the respondents to establish that the Treaty of Mandsaur entered into in 1818 by Maharaja Holkar has or has been continued in operation after the commencement of the Constitution. Hence the first limb of Article 363 of the Constitution is not applicable to the facts of the present case. Hence the first limb of Article 363 of the Constitution is not applicable to the facts of the present case. JUDGMENT A. K. PATNAIK, C. J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner is an association of the residents of Mhow, a cantonment near Indore in Madhya Pradesh, and is registered as a Society under the madhya Pradesh Society Registrikaran adhiniyam, 1973 and has filed this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution for appropriate reliefs. ( 2 ) THE facts relevant for deciding this writ petition briefly are that Mhow originally was part of the Indian State of Maharaja of holkar. In 1818, Maharaja of Holkar entered into the Treaty of Mandsaur and under Article VII of the Treaty of Mandsaur, the britishers bound themselves to support a field force to maintain the internal tranquillity of the territories of Maharaja Holkar, and to defend the territories from foreign enemies and Maharaja Holkar agreed to provide some place of security where the British forces would be stationed and the stores would be deposited. Pursuant to the Article VII of the treaty of Mandsaur, Mhow came to be occupied by the British forces and the stores. In 1836, by Order No. 179 the Governor general of India in Council made regulations regarding houses and premises located in the military cantonment including the cantonment of Mhow. Thereafter, in exercise of the powers under the proviso to Section 2 (1) of the Government of India Act, 1935, his Majesty made the Indian (Foreign Jurisdiction)Order in Council, 1937 and provided in clause 2 thereof that from the commencement of the Government of India Act, 1935, the powers so far as they are connected with the exercise of the function of the Crown in its relations with Indian States, will be powers of his Majesty's representative for the exercise of those functions of the Crown, and he may delegate those powers to such extent and in such manner as he thinks fit. The Crown's representative in exercise of such powers conferred by the Indian (Foreign Jurisdiction)Order in Council, 1937, then made the Central India Administered Areas (Application of Laws) Order, 1937 and included the cantonment of Mhow in the "administered areas" and applied the Cantonments Act, 1924, to the Cantonment of Mhow. The Crown's representative in exercise of such powers conferred by the Indian (Foreign Jurisdiction)Order in Council, 1937, then made the Central India Administered Areas (Application of Laws) Order, 1937 and included the cantonment of Mhow in the "administered areas" and applied the Cantonments Act, 1924, to the Cantonment of Mhow. On the eve of independence, however, a notification dated 9th August, 1947, was issued by the Crown representative stating that with effect from 14-8-1947 the jurisdiction over the areas known as "mhow Cantonment" be restored to the Maharaja Holkar of Indore and cancelled all notifications issued under the Indian (Foreign Jurisdiction) Order in council, 1937. Simultaneously, a notification dated 14-8-1947 was issued by the Government of the Maharaja Holkar, Foreign Department, saying that the Crown Representative has been pleased to retrocede to the maharaja Holkar with effect from 14-8-1947, the jurisdiction exercised by him in the area then comprising the Cantonment of Mhow, in 1947, the Maharaja of Holkar signed the instrument of accession acceding to the Dominion of India and in 1948 the rulers of gwalior, Indore and certain other States in central India signed a covenant for the formation of Madhya Bharat. Thereafter, the constitution of India was adopted on 26-1-1950 and under Article 1 (1) read with Schedule I of the Constitution, Madhya Bharat was included in India as a Union of States. ( 3 ) IN the meanwhile, in the Mhow Cantonment area, several bungalows along with the adjoining lands were given by the authorities of Mhow Cantonment to different civilians for occupation and the civilians occupied the bungalows and the adjoining lands. In 1970 and thereafter, 63 notices were issued by the Defence Estate Officer, Mhow, to different civilians who were in occupation of bungalows and the land for resumption and the resumption notices were challenged in different proceedings in Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants)Act, 1971 and in civil suits. Appeals were also filed against the orders passed by the authorities under the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 respondent Nos. 1 and 3 have taken possession of 45 bungalows. Cases in respect of 19 bungalows are pending at various stages in different Courts including the High Court in revisions and Second Appeals. Appeals were also filed against the orders passed by the authorities under the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 respondent Nos. 1 and 3 have taken possession of 45 bungalows. Cases in respect of 19 bungalows are pending at various stages in different Courts including the High Court in revisions and Second Appeals. In the background of these facts, the petitioner has filed this writ petition on behalf of the civilian residents of Mhow as a Public Interest Litigation for declarations that the lands in Mhow cantonment do not belong to the Central government and that the Cantonment Land administration Rules, 1937 do not apply to mhow Cantonment. The petitioner has further prayed that a direction to the respondent nos. 1 and 3 to exclude the civilian occupied areas from Mhow Cantonment and to direct the Union of India to excise the civilian areas from Mhow Cantonment in favour of the State of Madhya Pradesh. The petitioner has also prayed for a direction to the respondents to recognise the title deeds and the settled possession of civilian residents of mhow Cantonment and for a declaration that order No. 179 of the Governor General of india in Council is void. PRELIMINARY ISSUES RAISED BY the RESPONDENTS. ( 4 ) MR. B. L. Pavecha, learned senior Counsel, appearing for respondent Nos. 1,3 and 4, raised some preliminary issues with regard to maintainability of the writ petition. He submitted that the writ petitions cannot be entertained as a Public Interest Litigation (PIL) as the petitioner has filed this writ petition to further the interest of its office bearers and members. He submitted that in paragraph 1 of the writ petition, Dr. Behram M. Masani is described as the President of the petitioner association and Dr. Behram M. Masani has interest in Bungalow No. 102 situated at Simrole Road, Mhow because he was a member of the Bandharan Committee of the Parsi Zorastrian Anjuman of Mhow which had purchased the bungalow on 1-1-1958 by a registered sale deed. He submitted that in paragraph 1 of the writ petition, mr. Zal Cowasji has been described as the secretary of the petitioner association and mr. Zal Cowasji was the occupier of Bungalow No. 53, Mall Road, Mhow and he is also the trustee of the trust which occupied bangalow Nos. He submitted that in paragraph 1 of the writ petition, mr. Zal Cowasji has been described as the secretary of the petitioner association and mr. Zal Cowasji was the occupier of Bungalow No. 53, Mall Road, Mhow and he is also the trustee of the trust which occupied bangalow Nos. 41, 42, 53, 57, 75 and 91 and possession of these bungalows has already been taken by the respondent No. 1 and compensation has been paid to Mr. Zal Cowasji. He further submitted that Ms. Aruna rodrigues has been described in paragraph 1 of the writ petition as member of the petitioner association and Ms. Aruna Rodrigues was the occupier of Bungalow No. 55, simrole Road, Mhow along with her sister mrs. Ann Chandiramani and she has filed a suit challenging the resumption proceedings initiated by the respondent No. 1 in Civil Suit no. 91/04 in the Court of Civil Judge Class ii, Mhow. He submitted that Ms. Rodrigues is also the occupier of Bungalow No. 69, R. N. Bhaya Road, Mhow along with her sister and the respondents initiated proceedings under the Public Premises (Eviction of unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 in respect of the Bungalow No. 69 and she filed a writ petition W. P. No. 846/1995 but the writ petition was dismissed by the Court on 10-4-1997. He also submitted that paragraph 1 of the writ petition describes Mrs. Shirin Seth as the Treasurer of the petitioner association and Mrs. Shirin Seth is the occupier of Bungalow No. 93, Cunnigham Road, Mhow which had been put on auction sale by the m. P. State Financial Corporation Ltd. for recovery of loan advanced to her husband mr. C. B. J. Seth but the respondent No. 12 has objected to the proposed sale on the ground that the M. P. State Financial Corporation has no authority to auction the property belonging to the respondent No. 1 and the auction sale has been stayed. He vehemently submitted that all these facts would show that the present writ petition is an attempt to serve the self interest of the aforesaid four persons under the guise and cloak of public interest and such an attempt should be nipped in the bud by a summary dismissal with exemplary costs. ( 5 ) MR. He vehemently submitted that all these facts would show that the present writ petition is an attempt to serve the self interest of the aforesaid four persons under the guise and cloak of public interest and such an attempt should be nipped in the bud by a summary dismissal with exemplary costs. ( 5 ) MR. Pavecha cited Subhash Kumar v. State of Bihar and others, (1991) 1 SCC 598 : AIR 1991 SC 420 in which the Supreme court has held that personal interest, grudge or enmity cannot be enforced through the process of the Court under Article 32 in the garb of public interest litigation. He also relied on Dattaraj Nathuji Thaware v. State of maharashtra and others, (2005) 1 SCC 590 : air 2005 SC 540 in which the Supreme court has observed that Public Interest Litigation is a weapon which has to be used with great care and circumspection and the judiciary has to be extremely careful to see that behind the beautiful veil of public interest, ugly private malice, vested interest and publicity seeking is not lurking and it is to be used as an effective weapon in the armoury of law for delivering social justice. He also cited R. and M. Trust v. Koramangala, Residents Vigilance Group and others, (2005) 3 scc 91 : AIR 2005 SC 894 in which the supreme Court has held that the jurisdiction of the court to entertain PIL is meant for the purpose of coming to the rescue of the downtrodden and not for the purpose of serving private ends. He cited Printers (Mysore) Ltd. v. M. A. Rasheed and others, (2004) 4 SCC 460 , for the proposition' that when a plea is raised that a PIL should not be entertained, the court should determine the issue and submitted that since the respondents have raised a plea that the writ petition has been filed not in the public interest but to enforce the interest of some members and office bearers of the petitioner association, the court should decide this question. ( 6 ) MR. ( 6 ) MR. A. M. Mathur, learned senior Counsel, appearing for the petitioner, on the other hand, submitted that the writ petition has been filed by the petitioner association consisting of members who are the civilian residents of Mhow and the reliefs claimed in the writ petition if granted will protect the property rights of the members of the public residing in Mhow and therefore the writ petition has been rightly filed as a PIL. He relied on the Janta Dal v. H. S. Chowdhary and others, AIR 1993 SC 892 , in which the Supreme court has observed in para 56 at page 908 of the AIR that the seeds of the concept of PIL were initially sown in India in Mumbai kamgar Sabha, Bombay v. Abdulbhai faizullabhai and others, AIR 1976 SC 1455 , in which Krishna Iyer, J. observed that Article 226, viewed on a wider perspective, may be amenable to ventilation of collective or common grievances, as distinguished from assertion of individual rights. He submitted that in Guruvayoor Devaswom Managing committee and another v. C. K. Rajan and others, 2003 (7) SCC 546 : AIR 2004 SC 561 , S. B. Sinha, J. writing the judgment for v. N. Khare, C. J. , G. P. Mathur, J. and himself has summarised in para 50 at pages 568 and 569 of the SCC the principles evolved by the Supreme Court on different types of public interest litigations and his Lordship has mentioned that in an appropriate case, although the petitioner might have moved this Court in his private interest and for redressal of personal grievances, the Court in furtherance of public interest may think it necessary to enquire into the state of affairs of the subject of litigation in the interest of justice and has referred to the decision of the supreme Court in Shivajirao Nilangekar Patil v. Dr. Mahesh Madhav Gosavi, (1987) 1 SCC 227 : AIR 1987 SC 294 as an illustration of this kind of public interest litigation. He submitted that S. B. Sinha, J. speaking for N. Santosh Hegde and himself has reiterated this position in Ashok Lanka and another v. Rishi dixit and others, (2005) 5 SCC 598 : AIR 2005 SC 2821 in para 42 at page 618 of the scc. He submitted that S. B. Sinha, J. speaking for N. Santosh Hegde and himself has reiterated this position in Ashok Lanka and another v. Rishi dixit and others, (2005) 5 SCC 598 : AIR 2005 SC 2821 in para 42 at page 618 of the scc. ( 7 ) WE are of the considered opinion that the writ petition filed by the petitioner association is really a representative action on behalf of the civilian residents of Mhow. From the pleadings of the writ petition, it appears that the civilian residents of Mhow are aggrieved by the notices issued on behalf of the Union of India for resumption of land and bungalows in Mhow under their occupation and they have collectively filed the writ petition contending that the lands and bungalows under their occupation are not the property of the Union of India but the property of the State of Madhya Pradesh and have prayed for a declaration that the lands in the mhow Cantonment do not belong to the Central Government and for a direction to the union of India to excise the civilian occupied areas from Mhow Cantonment in favour of the State of Madhya Pradesh. Such collective or representative action is recognised as one kind of public interest litigation. ( 8 ) WE may now cite authorities for this view. In Mumbai Kamgar Sabha, Bombay v. Abdulbhai Faizullabhai and others (supra), krishna Ayer, J. observed : "test litigations, representative actions. pro bono publico and like broadened forms of legal proceedings are in keeping with the current accent on justice to the common man and a necessary disincentive to those who wish to by-pass the real issues on the merits by suspect reliance on peripheral procedural shortcomings. Even Art. 226, viewed on wider perspective, may be amenable to ventilation of collective or common grievances. as distinguished from assertion of individual rights, although the traditional view, backed by precedents has opted for the narrower alternative. Public interest is promoted by a spacious construction of locus standi in our socio-economic circumstances and conceptual latitudinarianism permits taking liberties with individualisation of the right to invoke the higher Courts where the remedy is shared by a considerable number, particularly when they are weaker. Less litigation, consistent with fair process, is the aim of adjectival law. Public interest is promoted by a spacious construction of locus standi in our socio-economic circumstances and conceptual latitudinarianism permits taking liberties with individualisation of the right to invoke the higher Courts where the remedy is shared by a considerable number, particularly when they are weaker. Less litigation, consistent with fair process, is the aim of adjectival law. " In this case, Mumbai Kamgar Sabha, a union of workers, assailed the findings of the Industrial Disputes Tribunal and the respondents before the Supreme Court raised a preliminary objection that the Union not being party to the dispute which was between the workers oh the one hand and the establishment of the other had no locus standi and the real disputants were the workers, but the supreme Court rejected this preliminary objection. ( 9 ) THIS view taken by the Supreme Court in Mumbai Kamgar Sabha, Bombay v. Abdulbhai Faizullabhai and others (supra) in the context of industrial dispute, also applies to disputes relating to right to property which is a civil dispute. A civil dispute is governed by the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (for short 'the CPC' ). Order 1, Rule 8 of the CPC itself provides that where there are numerous persons having the same interest in one suit, one or more persons may sue on behalf of or for the benefit of all persons so interested with the permission of the Court. Hence, representative action on behalf of numerous persons having the same interest in one suit is also permissible in civil dispute including a property dispute. In Chairman, Tamil Nadu housing Board, Madras v. T. N. Ganapathy, air 1990 SC 642 , T. N. Ganapathy on behalf of, himself and on behalf of number of allottees of residential plots filed a suit against the Chairman, Tamil Nadu Housing board and one of the contentions raised before the Supreme Court was that the provision of Order 1, Rule 8 of the CPC were not applicable in the case and the representative suit was not maintainable. The Supreme court rejected the contention of the Chairman, Tamil Nadu Housing Board saying that the provisions of Order 1, Rule 8 of the CPC have been made in the public interest so as to avoid multiplicity of litigation. The Supreme court rejected the contention of the Chairman, Tamil Nadu Housing Board saying that the provisions of Order 1, Rule 8 of the CPC have been made in the public interest so as to avoid multiplicity of litigation. In the language of the Supreme Court : "the provision of O. 1, R. 8 have been included in the Code in the public interest so as to avoid multiplicity of litigation. The condition necessary for application of the provisions is that the persons on whose behalf the suit is being brought must have the same interest. In other words either the interest must be common or they must have a common grievance which they seek to get redressed. " ( 10 ) IF a suit can be instituted as a representative action on behalf of numerous persons having the same interest with a view to avoid multiplicity of litigation, a writ petition can also be filed as a representative action on behalf of numerous persons having the same interest against the State and public authorities and such a writ petition would be categorised as a public interest litigation on behalf of all such numerous persons who have the same interest. In para 5 in Dattaraj nathuji Thaware v. State of Maharashtra and others (supra) cited by Mr. Pavecha, the Supreme Court while explaining the meaning of "public interest litigation" has extracted from Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, Vol. 4 (4th edn.), the following definition of public interest : "public interest- (1) A matter of public or general interest 'does not mean that which is interesting as gratifying curiosity or a love of information or amusement; but that in which a class of the community have a pecuniary interest, or some interest by which their legal rights or liabilities are affected'. . . " Thus, the meaning of "public interest" in public Interest Litigation covers not only general interest of the public at large but also the same interest of a class of the community provided such class of the community has the same interest in the litigation. This will be also clear from para 53 of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Janta Dal v. H. S. Chowdhary (supra), which is quoted hereinbelow :"the, expression 'litigation' means a legal action including all proceedings therein, initiated in a Court of law with the purpose of enforcing a right or seeking a remedy. This will be also clear from para 53 of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Janta Dal v. H. S. Chowdhary (supra), which is quoted hereinbelow :"the, expression 'litigation' means a legal action including all proceedings therein, initiated in a Court of law with the purpose of enforcing a right or seeking a remedy. Therefore, lexically the expression 'pil' means a legal action initiated in a Court of law for the enforcement of public interest or general interest in which the public or a class of the community have, pecuniary interest or some interest, by which their legal rights or liabilities are affected. " ( 11 ) WE find from the facts of this case that several notices issued by the respondent no. 3 for resumption of land in Mhow under the occupation of civilian residents of Mhow who are members of the petitioner Association and such resumption notices have triggered a number of litigations in different courts. The members of the petitioner Association possibly have an apprehension that such notices for resumption of land may also be issued by the respondent No. 3 in the near future affecting the common interest of many other civilian residents of Mhow who are members of the petitioner Association. To avoid multiplicity of litigations one writ petition has been filed on behalf of all such civilian residents of Mhow by the petitioner association as a PIL contending that it is the state of Madhya Pradesh and not the Union of India which was the Owner of the land under the occupation of the civilian residents in Mhow. The High Court should not dismiss the writ petition as not maintainable, particularly when substantial questions of law relating to interpretation of Article 295 of the Constitution and the provisions of the cantonment Act, 1924 have been raised which need to be decided by the High Court. The office bearers and some members of. the petitioner Association may be pursuing their own litigations against the respondents Nos. 1 and 3 in respect of the land and bungalows under their occupation, but other members of the petitioner Association have also their similar common grievances which are sought to be redressed through this writ petition. The office bearers and some members of. the petitioner Association may be pursuing their own litigations against the respondents Nos. 1 and 3 in respect of the land and bungalows under their occupation, but other members of the petitioner Association have also their similar common grievances which are sought to be redressed through this writ petition. This is therefore not a case where individuals have filed the writ petition to enforce their own personal interest only but a writ petition filed by a class of the community residing in Mhow Cantonment through their Association for redressal of their common grievances. The writ petition is a kind of public interest litigation and cannot be dismissed in limine. ( 12 ) MR. Pavecha next submitted that the conduct of the petitioner is such that this court should throw out the writ petition at the threshold and should not decide the writ petition on merits. He submitted that the petitioner had earlier filed W. P. No. 2023/2007 before the Indore Bench of the High Court seeking various reliefs which it has claimed in the present writ petition and when the matter came up before the Division Bench at indore on 18-5-2007, the learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner sought permission of the Court to delete by way of amendment clause (a) of paragraph 3 of the writ petition in which the petitioner had stated that the petitioner has challenged the Cantonments Act, 2006 as having been enacted in derogation of the fundamental right to equality before the law guaranteed under article 14 of the Constitution and the right to respectable life guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution. He submitted that thereafter the petitioner filed an application for amendment on 10-3-2008 but did not pray for deletion of clause (a) of para 3 of the writ petition and only sought for amendment of para 7 (e) and added para 7 (e) to the effect that the Cantonment Land Administration rules, 1937 are beyond the rule-making power under Section 280 (2) (a) of the Act, 1924 and therefore be declared ultra vires. He submitted that the petitioner also did not disclose in the writ petition the interests of dr. Behram M. Masani, President of the petitioner Association, Mr. Zal Cowasji, Secretary of the petitioner Association, Ms. Aruna Rodrigues, Member of the petitioner association and Mrs. He submitted that the petitioner also did not disclose in the writ petition the interests of dr. Behram M. Masani, President of the petitioner Association, Mr. Zal Cowasji, Secretary of the petitioner Association, Ms. Aruna Rodrigues, Member of the petitioner association and Mrs. Shirin Seth, Treasurer of the petitioner Association in various lands and bungalows in Mhow and did not also state that resumption proceedings had been initiated and that cases are pending in or have been disposed of by various Courts. He vehemently argued that the petitioner has therefore suppressed material facts and the writ petition is liable to be dismissed in limine on this ground alone. ( 13 ) WE find that in paragraph 5 (P) at pages 10 and 11 of the writ petition, the petitioner has stated : "properties have been "resumed" since 1971 without compensation for the land and petty compensation as value of authorised structure. Tenants in outhouses of such properties have fared even worse; they have been ignored and the thousands staying in them have been summarily evicted. The civilian population has been consistently denied permission to repair, improve, rebuild, etc. , to accommodate additional generations of family and tenants, or to mutate their properties, unless 'admission Deeds' are signed, which forces them to accept that the Central Government is the acknowledged owner of the property. Many have signed at some point in the past without a true understanding of its implications and then stopped after "resumption" notices began to be served from around the 1960s onwards. The strictures put on the civilian residents are not just impossible to keep, but are perverse, because permission to renovate or repair or mutate property is habitually denied without an 'admission deed'. Thus, properties are now registered in the names of dead people. This is untenable. It is also a serious denial of civil rights and liberties not to be able to freely sell, or inherit or Will property to beneficiaries and next of kin, because they are not reflected in the official records, unlike the rest of Indian citizenry. The DEO/army Authorities are on record as stating that any deviation from their rules will be acted upon by either Resumption or 'notices' under the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Persons) Act, 1971, hereinafter referred to as the PP Act. The DEO/army Authorities are on record as stating that any deviation from their rules will be acted upon by either Resumption or 'notices' under the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Persons) Act, 1971, hereinafter referred to as the PP Act. This is a terrible travesty of justice and a dangerous fraud on the civilian residents of mhow. " Hence, the petitioner has stated in the writ petition that properties have been resumed since 1971 without compensation for the land and payment of petty compensation as value of authorised structure has been made and that action has also been taken by the authorities for eviction under the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants)Act, 1971. The names of the members or office bearers of the petitioner Association against whom such resumption proceedings or eviction proceedings have been taken by the authorities of the respondent No. 1 have, however, not been disclosed in the writ petition. In paragraphs 5b2, 5b3, 5b4 and 5b5 at pages 17, 18 and 19 of the writ petition, the petitioner has also stated that W. P. No. 2023/2007 was filed as a PIL before the indore Bench of the High Court and that orders were passed by the Indore Bench from time to time on the applications filed by the petitioner and the respondents in the said writ petition before the Indore Bench. There may be however some omissions or mistakes in the presentation of facts in the writ petition with regard to the proceedings in W. P. No. 2023/2007 before the Indore Bench. On these facts, we cannot hold that the petitioner has intentionally suppressed material facts to mislead the High Court and that the conduct of the petitioner is such that the writ petition should be dismissed by the High Court at the threshold. ( 14 ) MR. Pavecha next submitted that the high Court does not entertain a writ petition to decide title to property and for establishing title to property, a party must resort to a private law remedy such as a civil suit. He submitted that the reliefs claimed in the present writ petition is also a declaratory relief and a declaratory relief is not normally granted by the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. He submitted that the reliefs claimed in the present writ petition is also a declaratory relief and a declaratory relief is not normally granted by the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. He cited Parvatibai subhanrao Nalawade v. Anwarali Hasanali makani and others, (1992) 1 SCC 414 : AIR 1992 SC 1780 in which the Supreme Court has held that the High Court was not justified either entertaining the writ petition or deciding the merits of the dispute between the tenant and the landlord. He also relied upon the observations of the Supreme Court in Dwarka Prasad Agarwal and another v. B. D. Agarwal and others, (2003) 6 SCC 230 : ( AIR 2003 SC 2686 ) that the remedy under article 226 cannot be invoked for resolution of a private law dispute as distinct from a dispute involving public law character and that a writ remedy is not available for resolution of a property or a title dispute. Mr. Mathur, in reply, submitted that reliefs claimed in this writ petition can be granted by the Court on the basis of interpretation of article 295 of the Constitution, the Cantonment Act, 1924 and the Cantonment Land administration Rules, 1937 and the High court need not go into any factual disputes to grant the reliefs. He submitted that these matters are within the field of public law and the High Court in exercise of its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution can grant the reliefs. ( 15 ) IN Gulam Abbas and others v. State of U. P. and others, AIR 1981 SC 2198 , gulam Abbas and others filed a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution on behalf of the Shia community of the Mohalla doshipura in Varanasi contending that the shia community had been performing religious rites, practices and observances on certain plots and properties situated in the mohalla Doshipura in the city of Varanasi but the respondent, the State of U. P. , was interfering with the performance of those religious rites, practices and observances on the plots and properties and sought a declaration that 9 plots of land and the building structures thereon belong to Shia Waqf of mohalla Doshipura and also a declaration that the members of Shia community of that mohalla have a right to perform their religious functions and practices on these plots and in the structures standing thereon. The supreme Court held that ordinarily adjudication of questions of title and granting declaratory relief consequent upon such adjudication are not undertaken in a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution, but as the title and ownership of the plots of land and the structures thereon are distinct from the customary rights of the Shia community to perform their religious ceremonies and functions on the plots and in the structures thereon, the relief sought by the Shia community for enforcement of their customary rights has to be considered on merits and whatever relief they may be found legally and properly entitled to may have to be granted to them. ( 16 ) IN the present case, the claim of the civil residents of Mhow is that their constitutional right to property under Article 300-A of the Constitution is in jeopardy, and they have filed this writ petition through their association seeking a declaration that the lands and bungalows in Mhow under the occupation of the civilian residents do not belong to Union of India, but to the State of M. P. and the High Court can decide whether the declaration can be granted or not on an interpretation of Article 295 of the constitution and the provisions of the Cantonments act, 1924, and on the facts which are not disputed in exercise of its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. Rather, the High court should decide the disputes raised in the writ petition to avoid multiplicity of litigations and conflicting opinions of different courts on the interpretation of very important provisions of the Constitution relating to the properties of the Union of India and the States constituting the Union and the provisions of the Cantonments Act, 1924 vis-a-vis the right to property of the residents of the Mhow Cantonment. ( 17 ) MR. Pavecha next submitted that the main dispute raised in this writ petition is whether the land and bungalows occupied by the civilian residents of Mhow belong to the union of India or the State of Madhya pradesh and this dispute can only be decided by the Supreme Court because under Article 131 of the Constitution, the Supreme Court has the exclusive original jurisdiction to decide a dispute between the Government of india and a State. Mr, Mathur, in reply, submitted that Article 131 of the Constitution will not apply where one of the parties to the dispute is a private party and the Government of India and the Stale are other parties. In support of his submission, he relied upon state of Bihar v. Union of India and another, air 1970 SC 1446 and Tashi Delek Gaming solutions Ltd. and another v. State of karnataka and others, (2006) 1 SCC 442 : ( AIR 2006 SC 661 ). ( 18 ) WE find that in State of Bihar v. Union of India and another (supra ). the Supreme court has held that the most important feature of Article 131 is that it makes no mention of any party other than the Government of India or any one or more of the States who can be arrayed as a disputant and there is no scope for suggesting that a private citizen, a firm or a corporation can be arrayed as a party on one side and one or more States including the Government of India or the other nor is there anything in the Article which suggests claim being made by a private party jointly or in the alternative with a State or the Government of India. In Tashi Delek gaming Solutions Ltd. and another v. State of Karnataka and others (supra), the Supreme court has observed that it is now well settled by various decisions that Article 131 will not be applicable where citizens or private bodies are parties either jointly or in the alternative with the State or the Government of India. Thus, the contention of Mr. Pavecha that the present dispute filed by the petitioner association is within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Constitution is misconceived. ( 19 ) MR. Pavecha submitted that Article 363 of the Constitution creates a constitutional bar to interference by Courts in disputes arising out of certain treaties, agreements, etc. with Rulers of Indian States. He submitted that since the present dispute arises out of the Treaty of Mandsaur, 1818, entered into by Maharaja Holkar, a Ruler of Indian state, and by the predecessor of the Government of the Dominion of India the jurisdiction of the High Court was barred under Article 363 of the Constitution. with Rulers of Indian States. He submitted that since the present dispute arises out of the Treaty of Mandsaur, 1818, entered into by Maharaja Holkar, a Ruler of Indian state, and by the predecessor of the Government of the Dominion of India the jurisdiction of the High Court was barred under Article 363 of the Constitution. In support of this contention, he relied upon State of seraikella and others v. Union of India and another, AIR 1951 SC 253 . Mr. Mathur, on the other hand, submitted that the Treaty of mandsaur entered into by Maharaja Holkar is only the origin of how British forces came to occupy Mhow but the dispute raised by the petitioner Association in this case does not arise out of the Treaty of Mandsaur and article 363 of the Constitution therefore was not attracted to the facts of the present case. In support of this submission he cited the decisions of the Supreme Court in Jagannath bchera and others v. Raja Harihar Singh maharaj Bhramarbara Roy, AIR 1958 SC 239 and Madhav Rao Jivaji Rao Scindia Bahadur of Gwalior and others v. Union of India and another, 1971 (1) SCC 85 : AIR 1970 SC 530. ( 20 ) ARTICLE 363 of the Constitution is quoted herein below: "363. Bar to interference by Courts in disputes arising out of certain treaties, agreements etc.- (1) Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution but subject to the provisions of Article 143, neither the Supreme Court nor any other Court shall have jurisdiction in any dispute arising out of any provision of a creaty, agreement covenant, engagement, sanad or other similar instrument which was entered into or executed before the commencement of this Constitution by any Ruler of an Indian State and to which the Government of the Dominion of India or any of its predecessor Governments was a party and which has or has been continued in operation after such commencement, or in any dispute in respect of any right accruing under or any liability or obligation arising out of any of the provisions of this Constitution relating to any such treaty, agreement, covenant, engagement, sanad or other similar instrument. (2) In this article- (a) "indian State" means any territory recognised before the commencement of this constitution by His Majesty or the Government of the Dominion of India as being such a State; and (b) "ruler" includes the Prince, Chief or other person recognised before such commencement by His Majesty or the Government of the Dominion of India as the Ruler of any Indian State. " A plain reading of Article 363 of the Constitution would show that the first limb of this article will apply where the treaty, agreement, covenant, engagement, sanad or other similar instrument in question has or has been continued in operation after the commencement of the Constitution. This is the view of the Supreme Court in State of Seraikella and others v. Union of India and another (supra)as will be clear from the following passage of the judgment in the case :"if therefore the dispute arises in respect of a document of that description and if such document had been executed before the Constitution by a Ruler and which was or had continued in operation after such commencement, this Court has no jurisdiction to determine such issue. It was argued that as the agreement had to be in operation after the commencement of the Constitution, no dispute can arise in respect of such document before the commencement of the Constitution and therefore as the dispute in the present case had arisen before the commencement of the Constitution, Article 363 had no operation. In my opinion, this is not a correct reading of Article 363 (1), The time factor is related only to the document in question and not the dispute. It is provided that-such document should have been executed before the constitution came into force and has to be in operation after the Constitution, but the dispute, which is the subject matter of the litigation, may arise before or after. " In the present case, nothing has been shown to us by the respondents to establish that the Treaty of Mandsaur entered into in 1818 by Maharaja Holkar has or has been continued in operation after the commencement of the Constitution. Hence the first limb of Article 363 of the Constitution is not applicable to the facts of the present case.