JUDGMENT Honble Shashi Kant Gupta, J.—This writ petition has been filed for the following reliefs : (i) Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari quashing the impugned order dated 2.2.2007 as Order No. 19 of 2007 passed by S.S.P. Saharanpur against the petitioner (Annexure-2) to this writ petition. (ii) Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus commanding the respondents to appoint the petitioner on the post of Constables in the U.P. Police after completing the training successfully. By the impugned order dated 2.2.2007, Senior Superintendent of Police, Saharanpur, respondent No. 3, has terminated the services of the petitioner under U.P. Temporary Government Servants (Termination of Service) Rules, 1975 (in short, “Rules, 1975"). 2. The brief facts of the case are that in September 2005 an advertisement was published by the respondents in the newspapers for direct recruitment of constables in U.P. Police at Saharanpur, Police line. The petitioner applied for the said post and after passing physical test and interview was declared successful and was allowed to undergo the training. 3. The petitioner as per clause-10 of the advertisement was required to disclose all the details regarding his criminal antecedents, conduct, character through an affidavit. In pursuant to the same, the petitioner filed his affidavit dated 9.6.2006 and in paragraph 4 he had mentioned that Case Crime No. 588/05 under Sections 147, 148, 149, 324, 307 and 504, IPC P.S. Charthawal, district Muzaffarnagar was registered against him and the same was pending in the Court. It was further stated that in the said case, compromise was arrived at between the parties, but would be acted upon, after filing of the charge-sheet. It was also mentioned in paragraph 10 and 15 of the affidavit that the petitioner possessed good moral character and has not concealed any material facts. Further, undertaking was given by the petitioner that in case, after his selection, it is found that some material facts have been concealed, he would liable to be dismissed, without any prior notice. It was also mentioned in paragraph 10 and 15 of the affidavit that the petitioner possessed good moral character and has not concealed any material facts. Further, undertaking was given by the petitioner that in case, after his selection, it is found that some material facts have been concealed, he would liable to be dismissed, without any prior notice. For ready reference paragraphs 4, 9 and 15 of the affidavit are reproduced below : Þ4- ;g fd esjs fo:) eqdnek vijk/k la[;k&588@05 v0 /kkjk&147] 148] 149] 324] 307] 504 Hkkjrh; n.M lafgrk Fkkuk pjFkkoy ftyk eqtQjuxj esa iathÑr gqvk Fkk tks vc U;k;ky; eqtQjuxj esa fopkj/khu gSA mijksDr eq0v0 esa ,oa Lrj ij le>kSrk gks x;k gS ijUrq ekuuh; U;k;ky; esa vkjksi i= nkf[ky gksus ckn le>kSrk dk;Zokgh dh tk;sxhA 9- ;g fd esjk pfj= lkQ lqFkjk ,oa mTtoy gSA 15- ;g fd bl kiFk i= esa esjs }kjk mfYyf[kr dksbZ Hkh ckn dHkh xyr ik;h tk;s vFkok fdlh lR; dks fNik;k x;k gks rks p;fur gks tkus ds ipkr Hkh esjk p;u fcuk uksfVl ds fujLr dj fn;k tk;s ,oa lkFk gh lkFk eq>s vkj{kh] iq:"k Áfk{k.k dkslZ ls fudky fn;k tk;sAÞ 4. While when the petitioner was undergoing training, his services were dispensed with under Rules, 1975 by the respondent No. 3. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that before terminating the petitioner from the service neither any opportunity of hearing was given to the petitioner nor provisions of Para 541 of U.P. Police Regulations (in short Police Regulation) was complied with. It was further submitted that the petitioner has mentioned all true and correct facts in the affidavit. There was absolutely no concealment of facts and the termination order is illegal and arbitrary and is liable to be set aside. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner has further submitted that he has already been acquitted in the criminal case by the Court below by judgment and order dated 24.1.2007. 7. On the other hand, learned Standing Counsel has referred to paragraphs 4, 6 and 8 of the counter, which are reproduced herein below : “4. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner has further submitted that he has already been acquitted in the criminal case by the Court below by judgment and order dated 24.1.2007. 7. On the other hand, learned Standing Counsel has referred to paragraphs 4, 6 and 8 of the counter, which are reproduced herein below : “4. That in reply to the contents of paragraphs 3 to 5 of the writ petition, it is submitted that at the time of selection of the petitioner he was required to submit a notary affidavit regarding his criminal antecedents and as such the petitioner submitted a notary affidavit dated 9-6-2006 in which he mentioned that one criminal case being Case Crime No. 588 of 2005 was registered against the petitioner under Sections 147, 148, 149, 324, 307, 504, I.P.C. in Police Station Charthawal District Muzaffarnagar, which was pending before the Court and the matter has been compromised at village level and same will be compromised after filing of a charge-sheet. In the said affidavit the petitioner totally concealed the facts that he was arrested on 22.12.2005 and was sent to jail and after grant of bail he was released on bail on 18.1.2006. He also concealed the fact that the charge-sheet was submitted in the matter on 18.1.2006 itself. In para 15 of the said notary affidavit itself the petitioner has given an undertaking to the effect that if anything is concealed in the said affidavit or is found incorrect subsequently then his selection may be quashed and he may be removed from the training without giving any show cause notice. The petitioner has also given an undertaking that for any concealment of fact he was also ready to face any proceedings if initiated against him for the concealment. It is relevant to state here that after submission of the said notary affidavit dated 9-6-2006 the Police verification of the facts mentioned in his affidavit was done and in the said verification it was found that the petitioner has concealed the said facts in his affidavit. The Senior Superintendent of Police, Muzaffarnagar submitted the report of verification alongwith his letter dated 6-7­2006. A copy of letter dated 6-7-2006 and a copy of notary affidavit dated 9-6-2006 submitted by petitioner are being filed herewith as Annexure-CA 1 and 2 collectively to this counter affidavit. 6. The Senior Superintendent of Police, Muzaffarnagar submitted the report of verification alongwith his letter dated 6-7­2006. A copy of letter dated 6-7-2006 and a copy of notary affidavit dated 9-6-2006 submitted by petitioner are being filed herewith as Annexure-CA 1 and 2 collectively to this counter affidavit. 6. That in reply to the contents of paragraphs 8 to 10 of the writ petition it is submitted that as the petitioner concealed the facts of his arrest and thereafter grant of bail and on account of the undertaking given by the petitioner in his notary affidavit dated 9-6­2006 the order dated 2-2-2007 was passed in accordance with law. The petitioner himself has given an undertaking in his notary affidavit that if anything is found incorrect in the said affidavit then his selection may be quashed and his training may be discontinued without giving any notice or opportunity. After submission of the said undertaking the petitioner is now stopped to say that the order was passed without any notice or opportunity. The petitioner has incorrectly stated in his affidavit that the matter is under compromise as a compromise cannot be entered by party in a case under Section 307, IPC. The petitioner tried to get selection and appointment on the basis of an affidavit by concealing the material facts and by giving an undertaking that if anything is found incorrect his selection may be quashed, when the said undertaking was made operational by passing the order dated 2-2-2007 now the petitioner is complaining in another way that he was not given any opportunity of hearing. The petitioner cannot be permitted to take a somber salt and to turn about after submission of his undertaking in the said affidavit. The entire writ petition has• been filed on misconceived allegations. 8. That in reply to the contents of paragraphs 16 and 17 of the writ petition are not admitted and are denied and in its reply it is submitted that the petitioner tried to obtain employment by concealment of material facts at the time of his selection. The entire writ petition has• been filed on misconceived allegations. 8. That in reply to the contents of paragraphs 16 and 17 of the writ petition are not admitted and are denied and in its reply it is submitted that the petitioner tried to obtain employment by concealment of material facts at the time of his selection. The petitioner tried to play a fraud upon the authorities by not submitting the correct facts at the time of his selection." On the basis of aforesaid averments it has been argued by learned Standing Counsel that the petitioner had deliberately concealed material facts in his affidavit by not disclosing that charge-sheet was already filed in the matter and he also remained in jail for some period. It has been further submitted that the petitioner had tried to mislead the authorities that compromise at village level was arrived at, and the same would be acted upon after the filing of the charge sheet. It was further submitted that the case was registered for committing serious offences under Sections 324 and 307, IPC, therefore, cases of such grave nature could not have been compromised or compounded. It was further submitted that the petitioner had further tried to mislead the authorities by saying that he possessed a good moral character and gave an undertaking that if it is found that some material facts have been concealed then he would be liable to be removed from the training. 8. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 9. The services of the petitioner has been dispensed with basically on the ground that he had furnished false information and suppressed the material facts in the affidavit. At the bottom of the advertisement a note had been appended that the recruitment is of temporary nature and as and when a vacancy occurs the persons selected would be adjusted and their appointment would be considered on the said post. The petitioner was removed primarily inter-alia on the ground that he had suppressed material facts in his affidavit by not disclosing that the charge-sheet was filed and he also remained in Jail for certain period of time and as such the petitioner tried to obtain employment by concealment of material facts at the time of his selection. Consequently, when the aforesaid facts after verification came to the notice of the respondents, the service of the petitioner was terminated. Consequently, when the aforesaid facts after verification came to the notice of the respondents, the service of the petitioner was terminated. 10. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the provisions of Para 541 of U.P. Police Regulation, has not been complied with, therefore, the impugned order is bad. On the other hand, learned Standing Counsel has vehemently argued that Para 541 was not applicable as the said Para of the Regulation is applicable only to those recruits who were recruited against a clear vacancy and not on the temporary vacancy. For ready reference Para 541 of the Regulation is quoted below : “541: A recruitment will be on probation from the date he begins to officiate in a clear vacancy. The period of probation will be of two years except in the following cases : (a) Those recruited directly in the criminal investigation department or District Intelligence staff will be sent on probation for three years; and (b) Those transferred to Mounted police will be governed by the directions in Para 84 of Police Regulation, if at the end of period of probation the conduct and work have been satisfactory and the recruit has been approved by the Deputy Inspector General of Police for service in force, the Superintendent of Police will confirm him in his appointment. (2) In any case in which either during or at the end of the period of probation, the Superintendent of Police is of opinion that a recruit is unlikely to make a good police officer he my dispense with his service. Before, however, this is done the recruit must be supplied with specific complaints and grounds on which it is proposed to discharge him and then he should be called upon to show cause as to why he should not be discharged. The recruit must furnish his representation in writing and it will be duly considered by the Superintendent of Police before passing the orders of discharge. (3) Every order passed by a Superintendent under sub­paragraph (2) above shall, subject to the control of the Deputy Inspector General be final.” 11. The petitioner had applied against the advertisement for temporary recruitment as a Police constable which was to be confirmed, as and when a candidate successfully completes the training programme. (3) Every order passed by a Superintendent under sub­paragraph (2) above shall, subject to the control of the Deputy Inspector General be final.” 11. The petitioner had applied against the advertisement for temporary recruitment as a Police constable which was to be confirmed, as and when a candidate successfully completes the training programme. Para 541 (1) clearly shows that recruitment was to be made on probation from the date he begins to officiate in a clear vacancy and admittedly as per terms and conditions as provided in the advertisement neither was he selected on a clear vacancy or on probation or was officiating on the clear vacancy. In view of the above, it is clearly established on record that the petitioner was not recruited against a clear vacancy, therefore, Para 541 of the Regulations was not applicable and the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner, that provisions of Para 541 of the Regulations has been violated, is totally misconceived. The same view has also been taken by this Court in the case of Jitendra Pratap v. State of U.P. and others, 2008(1) LBESR 611 (All). 12. The second ground which has been raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the petitioner has not been given any opportunity of hearing before passing the impugned order whereas the learned Standing Counsel for the respondent has submitted that the petitioner was merely a temporary employee, therefore, he was terminated in accordance with the provision of Rules 1975 and was not required to give any opportunity of hearing. He has further submitted that the petitioner was required to give true and correct facts about the pendency of the Criminal case in the affidavit but he tried to mislead the authorities. In support of his contention he has relied upon Nepal Singh v. State of U.P. and others, AIR 1980 SC 1459 and Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan v. Ram Ratan Yadav, (2003) 3 SCC 437 . 13. The learned counsel for the petitioner has further submitted that even though his services were temporary in nature, could not have been terminated without giving any opportunity or showing cause. 14. In the present case, the authorities had made inquiry on the basis of affidavit furnished by the petitioner to find out the genuineness and truthfulness of the facts mentioned by him. 14. In the present case, the authorities had made inquiry on the basis of affidavit furnished by the petitioner to find out the genuineness and truthfulness of the facts mentioned by him. Thus no opportunity was required to be given, especially, when the petitioner had tried to conceal certain vital facts, inter-alia, regarding submission of the charge-sheet and being jailed for some period of time. The petitioner in the affidavit had given an undertaking that in case he is found to have concealed certain material facts, he will be liable to be removed. The Apex Court in the case of K.K. Shukla (supra) has held that the order of termination would be punitive, if it indicts the employee for any misconduct and not when the authority proceeds to terminate the services by an innocuous order in accordance with the contract of service and the rules. The relevant observations made by the Apex Court in the above noted case are as follows : "The respondent being a temporary Government servant had no right to hold the post and the competent authority terminated his services by an innocuous order of termination without casting any stigma on him. The termination order does not indict the respondent for any misconduct. The inquiry which was held against the respondent was preliminary in nature to ascertain the respondent’s suitability and continuance in service. There was no element of punitive proceedings as no charges had been framed, no inquiry officer was appointed, no findings were recorded, instead a preliminary inquiry was held and on the report of the preliminary inquiry the competent authority terminated the respondent’s services by an innocuous order in accordance with the terms and conditions of his service. Mere fact that prior to the issue of order of termination, an inquiry against the respondent in regard to the allegations of unauthorised audit of Boys Fund was held, does not change the nature of the order of termination into that of punishment as after the preliminary inquiry the competent authority took no steps to punish the respondent, instead it exercised its power to terminate the respondent’s services in accordance with the contract of service and the Rules." 15. A Division Bench of this Court in Ramesh Prasad Patel v. Union of India and others, 2006(3) ESC 1669 , also observed that the antecedents, conduct and character of the candidate to be appointed are of paramount consideration and not the result of the criminal case in which he was involved. As the petitioner herein had obtained employment by misrepresentation, i.e. by suppression of material information sought by the appointing authority, neither the result of the prosecution or the nature of the offence in which he was involved was relevant or the principles of natural justice were attracted. 16. Rule 3 of Rules 1975 clearly provides that service of the Government servant in temporary service shall be liable to termination at any time by notice in writing either given by the Government servant to the appointing authority or by the appointing authority to the Government servant. 17. The impugned order is clearly in conformity with the provisions of Rule 3 of Rules 1975 and in Iight of the decision of the Apex Court, referred to above the order of termination cannot be said to be by way of punishment. It was an order simplicitor in accordance with the Rule and no opportunity was required to be given to the petitioner before terminating his services. The petitioner was admittedly recruited as a temporary constable and as per conditions mentioned in the advertisement he was not selected against the clear vacancy as para 14(4) of the advertisement clearly provides that the recruitment is temporary and in the event of any vacancy the appointment will be considered. For ready reference such clause is being reproduced : Þvkj{kh dh ;g HkrhZ vLFkk;h gS fjDr gksus ij gh fu;qfDr ij fokpj fd;k tk;sxkAÞ 18. Supreme Court in the case of R. Radhakrishnan v. Director General of Police and others, (2008) 1 SCC 660 , has observed as follows : "Indisputably the appellant intended to obtain appointment in a uniformed service. The standard expected of a person intended to serve in such a service is different from the one of a person who intended to serve in other services. Application for appointment and the verification roll were both in Hindi as also in English. He, therefore, knew and understood the implication of his statement or omission to disclose a vital information. The standard expected of a person intended to serve in such a service is different from the one of a person who intended to serve in other services. Application for appointment and the verification roll were both in Hindi as also in English. He, therefore, knew and understood the implication of his statement or omission to disclose a vital information. The fact that in the event such a disclosure had been made, the authority could have verified his character as also suitability of the appointment is not in dispute. It is also not in dispute that the persons who had not made such disclosures and were, thus, similarly situated had not been appointed." 19. The Division Bench of this Court in Raj Kumar Yadav v. State of U.P. and others, 2008(2) LBESR 616 (All), has held that in service jurisprudence temporary employee has no right to hold the post and his services is liable to be terminated in accordance with the terms of the contract. This Court has further observed in paragraphs 22, 23, 24, 25 and 26 as follows : “22. In the instant case, the order impugned dated 14-9-1998 by which the services of the petitioner-appellant had been terminated, reveal that the petitioner- appellant had been appointed on temporary basis under the provisions of U.P. Government Servants (Termination of Service) Rules, 1975. This case is squarely covered by the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kaushal Kishore Shukla (supra)“. 23. So far as the second issue is concerned, the appellant has not placed the order of appointment and even if it is assumed that he was appointed on probation, he cannot be deemed to have been confirmed after the period of probation was over in the absence of any order of confirmation is passed. 24. The law on the issue is well-settled that the question of deemed confirmation would arise provided there is a complete embargo to extend the period of probation. If an employee is not confirmed by specific order of confirmation, he shall not be deemed to have been confirmed automatically. This law has been laid down by a Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Punjab v. Dharam Singh, AIR 1968 SC 1210 . 25. If an employee is not confirmed by specific order of confirmation, he shall not be deemed to have been confirmed automatically. This law has been laid down by a Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Punjab v. Dharam Singh, AIR 1968 SC 1210 . 25. Similar view has been reiterated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Dhanjibhai Ramjibhai v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1985 SC 603 ; Om Prakash Maurya v. U.P. Co-operative Sugar Factories Federation, Lucknow, AIR 1986 SC 1844 ; M.K. Agrawal v. Gurgaon Gramin Bank and others, AIR 1988 SC 286 ; Mool Chand v. U.P. Food Corporation and another, 1996 FLR 258; Sri Chandra v. U.P. Financial Corporation, 1994 Lab IC 859; Jai Kishan v. Commissioner of Police and another, 1995 Suppl(3) SCC 364; Satya Narayan Athya v. High Court of Madhya Pradesh and another, AIR 1996 SC 750 and State of Punjab v. Baldev Singh Khosla, AIR 1996 SC 2093 . 26. In Dayaram Dayal v. State of M.P. and another, (1997) 7 SCC 443 , a similar view has been reiterated observing that the deemed confirmation of a probationer depends on the order of appointment and the rules applicable in the case of said employee. Mere continuance in service of an employee beyond the maximum period up to which the probation period could be extended, shall not give entitlement to him to have been deemed confirmed. While deciding the said case, the Honble Supreme Court considered its earlier judgment in Sukhbans Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1962 SC 1711 , wherein it was held as under : "A probationer cannot automatically acquire the status of a permanent member of a service, unless of course the rules under which he is appointed expressly provide for such a result. The rules governing the Provincial Civil Services of Punjab do not contain any provision whereby a probation at the end of the probationary period is automatically absorbed as a permanent member of the Civil service." 20. The petitioner has relied upon a decision of this Court in the case of Qamrul Hoda v. Chief Security, Commissioner, NE Railway, Gorakhpur, 1997 (3) ESC 2999 (All). The petitioner has relied upon a decision of this Court in the case of Qamrul Hoda v. Chief Security, Commissioner, NE Railway, Gorakhpur, 1997 (3) ESC 2999 (All). This decision has no bearing in the facts of the present case because in that case the petitioner who was selected was not called for training, since he was involved in a criminal case which was committed at the age of 15 years wherein he had taken part as a student in a procession protesting against the raising of fees. The Court took a lenient view of the matter after taking into consideration that he was only amongst thousand of students who were demonstrating and further held that the approach should be an attempt to rehabilitate rather than destroying the individual life in the incident which he had committed at such a young age. Therefore the facts of the said case are quite distinguishable. 21. The petitioner has further relied upon a decision in the case of Chandra Prakash Shahi v. State of U.P. and others, 2000 (2) LBESR 308 (SC). This case also does not help the petitioner since the petitioner in that case was under probation and was selected on a clear vacancy and the Apex Court was of the view that procedure before termination of services of a probationer under Para 541 should have been followed. But in this case, as has already held above, Para 541 of the Regulation are not applicable. Therefore, this case also does not support the petitioner. 22. This Court in the case of Ajay Kumar v. Officer in charge, Samyukta Karyalaya Firozabad and others, 2005(3) ESC 2044 (AII) has observed as follows : "9. If no lien is held on the posts i.e. if the appointment is not permanent, irrespective of whether the posts are permanent or not, then and in that event, the Government servant has no right to an enquiry in law before termination. In our case the writ petition was serving out a probationary period, of which he succeeded in serving out only two days. He was not entitled to an enquiry at that stage, and if one is not entitled to observance of the rules of natural justice either. The hearing before termination of employment of the writ petitioner was not a legal requirement because none of his legal rights were being interfered with. He was not entitled to an enquiry at that stage, and if one is not entitled to observance of the rules of natural justice either. The hearing before termination of employment of the writ petitioner was not a legal requirement because none of his legal rights were being interfered with. As such the point about natural justice does not survive. 13. In this case the respondents cannot be visited with any such adverse decision or finding. They had no their hands a probationer who was under trial on a very serious criminal charge; it was not within their power to decide the criminal case or to have it decided within any reasonable time. They had to make a choice in 1991; whether that choice was right or wrong, would never be before the writ Court, the only point before the writ Court would be whether that choice was reasonable. No body can today doubt that the choice was reasonable. It was quite open to the respondents as it would be open to any public respondents at any time, not to make a probationer a permanent employee when it becomes known that he is facing a very serious criminal charge, from which he might or might not be acquitted." 23. Learned Standing Counsel has also relied upon the decision in Writ Petition No. 43813 of 2006, Parmanand Rai v. State of U.P. and others, wherein it has been held in the matter relating to a police constable where deliberately wrong declaration has been given qua character then authority are not at fault in cancelling the appointment. 24. This Court in Roshan Singh lndaulia v. State of U.P. and others, 2006 (3) ESC 1839 (AII) (DB), has held that if the order ex-facie, did not show any stigma, Court cannot travel beyond the order to find some ground to make it penal. It is always open to the employer to terminate its employees by an order of termination simplicitor, when employee was temporary, instead of proceeding to hold departmental enquiry. Therefore, termination of the petitioner was simplicitor, in exercise of its statutory powers under Rules 1975. 25. Temporary employees has no right to post, as has been held by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of K.K. Shukla v. State of U.P. and others, 1991 (1) SCC 691 and Ram Chandra Tripathi v. U.P. Public Services Tribunal, (1994) 5 SCC 180 . 25. Temporary employees has no right to post, as has been held by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of K.K. Shukla v. State of U.P. and others, 1991 (1) SCC 691 and Ram Chandra Tripathi v. U.P. Public Services Tribunal, (1994) 5 SCC 180 . 26. Supreme Court in the case of Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan and others v. Ram Ratan Yadav, (2003) 3 SCC 437 , examined the controversy where the candidate mentioned No in the column which required the candidate to indicate whether any case was pending against him in any Court of law at the time of filling up of attestation form and the Apex Court made the following observations : "The requirement of filing columns 12 and 13 of the attestation form was for the purpose of verification of character and antecedents of the respondent as on the date of filing and attestation of the form. Suppression of material information and making a false statement has a clear bearing on the character and antecedents of the respondent in relation to his continuance in service. The object of requiring information in columns 12 and 13 of the attestation form and certification thereafter by the candidate was to ascertain and verify the character and antecedents to judge his suitability to continue in service. A candidate having suppressed material information and/or giving false information cannot claim right for continue in service. The employer having regard to the nature of the employment and all other aspects had the discretion to terminate his services, which is made expressly clear in para 9 of the offer of appointment. The purpose of seeking information as per columns 12 and 13 was not to find out either the nature or gravity of the offence of the result of a criminal case ultimately. The information in the said columns was sought with a view to judge the character and antecedents of the respondent to continue in service or not. The High Court, in our view, has railed to see this aspect of the matter. It went wrong in saying that the criminal case had been subsequently withdrawn and that the offences in which the respondent was alleged to have been involved, were also not of serious nature." 27. The High Court, in our view, has railed to see this aspect of the matter. It went wrong in saying that the criminal case had been subsequently withdrawn and that the offences in which the respondent was alleged to have been involved, were also not of serious nature." 27. The aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court in Kendriya Vidyalaya (supra) was followed subsequently by the Supreme Court in A.P. Public Service Commission v. Koneti Venkateswarulu and others, (2005) 7 SCC 177 and it was observed : "In our view, the appellant was justified in relying upon the ratio of Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan and contending that a person who indulges in such suppressio veri and suggestio falsi and obtains employment by false pretence does not deserve any public employment. We completely endorse this view.” 28. The above noted decision of Supreme Court in Kendriya Vidyalaya (supra) was followed subsequently in A.P. Public Service Commission v. Koneti Venkateswarulu and others, (2005) 7 SCC 177 . 29. In Special Appeal No. 1616 of 2004, Inspector General of Police and another v. Santosh Chaube (decided on 5.2.2009), this Court after referring to various decisions of the Apex Court as well as of this Court has held as follows : "Rule 5(1) of the CCS (Temporary Service) Rules clearly provides that the service of the temporary Government servant can be terminated at any time by the notice in writing and the period of such notice shall be one month provided that the service of such a government servant can also be terminated forthwith and on such termination the Government servant shall be entitled to claim a sum equivalent to the amount of his pay plus allowances for the period of the notice at the same rates at which he was drawing them immediately before the termination of his services or, as the case may be, for the period by which such notice falls short of one month. The termination order is clearly in conformity with the provisions of Rule 5(1) of the CCS (Temporary Service) Rules. It cannot be said, in the light of the decisions of the Honble Supreme Court referred to above, that the order of termination was by way of punishment. It was an order simplicitor in accordance with the aforesaid rules and no opportunity was required to be given to the respondent before terminating his services." 30. It cannot be said, in the light of the decisions of the Honble Supreme Court referred to above, that the order of termination was by way of punishment. It was an order simplicitor in accordance with the aforesaid rules and no opportunity was required to be given to the respondent before terminating his services." 30. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also submitted that although in the termination order no reasons have been assigned however, in the counter affidavit, reasons have been assigned for proceedings against the petitioner. Therefore, it should be taken that the order was punitive in nature. This contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner cannot be accepted, in view of the decision in the case of K.K. Shukla (supra), wherein it has been held that the allegation made against the employee in the counter affidavit by way of defence, do not change the nature and character of the order of termination. It was further submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that ultimately the petitioner was acquitted in the criminal case, it will be deemed that he was not involved in the criminal case, does not hold good. Supreme Court in Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan and others (supra) has held that subsequent withdrawal of criminal case, has no relevance. 31. In view of the above it is quite clear that the petitioner was recruited temporarily, therefore, he has no lien to the post and his services have been rightly terminated under the provision of Rules 1975. 32. I do not find any illegality or infirmity in the impugned order. In the result the present writ petition is accordingly dismissed. ————