ANIL KUMAR, J. IA Nos.14511/2007 1. This is an application by the defendant Nos.1 seeking rejection of the plaint. The applicant/defendant No.1 has contended that this Court does not have territorial jurisdiction to entertain the suit as whole of the cause of action regarding termination of the services of the plaintiff has arisen at NOIDA where defendant No.1 is having its headquarter and principal office. According to the defendant No.1/applicant the service of plaintiff was terminated from NOIDA and the Secretary General of defendant No.1 sits in NOIDA and all the notices to plaintiff were issued from NOIDA including termination letter dated 6th August, 2001. 2. The defendant No.1/applicant has contended various facts in the application for rejection of plaint in support of his plea that cause of action has not arisen at Delhi. The defendant No.1/applicant has pleaded that the meeting dated 1st April, 2006 of the Governing Body was held at its headquarters in NOIDA where it was resolved to engage the services of plaintiff as Executive Director. The plaintiff was posted at the headquarters of defendant no.1 at NOIDA and he was receiving salary from NOIDA office only. It is also alleged that the General Executive of defendant No.1 sits in NOIDA and principal place of business of defendant is in NOIDA and the service of the plaintiff was also terminated by letter dated 6th August, 2007 from NOIDA office. 3. For rejection of plaint defendant No.1/applicant has also relied on the order dated 21st May, 2007 passed by the learned CJM, Gautam Budh Nagar, NOIDA in FIR No.586/2007 registered at P.S.Sector 20, NOIDA against the unlawful and illegal activities of the plaintiff during his tenure with defendant No.1 at NOIDA office. The applicant/defendant No.1 has further contended that the plaintiff had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Courts at U.P by filing a writ petition in the Hon’ble High Court of Allahabad for quashing the FIR and that in the said writ petition he had not raised the objection that he was not posted at the NOIDA office. It is further contended that the plaintiff has not disclosed about the filing of the writ petition. In the circumstances, it is contended that the Courts at Delhi have no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. 4. It is further contended that the plaintiff has not disclosed about the filing of the writ petition. In the circumstances, it is contended that the Courts at Delhi have no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. 4. Rejection of the plaint is also sought on the ground that a suit seeking a declaration that an order of termination is null and void is not maintainable. The rejection of plaint is also sought on the ground of suppression of materials facts, some of which facts have been detailed in the application. The rejection of plaint is also sought on the ground that the plaintiff cannot seek specific performance of agreement for personal service. 5. The application is contested by the plaintiff/non-applicant contending that the application and the reply has been signed only by defendant No.2 and it has not been signed on behalf of defendant No.1. The facts alleged in the application are also allegedly sworn by defendant No.2 in his personal name though affirming facts relating to defendant No.1. The plaintiff/non-applicant has also alleged that certain facts pertaining to defendant No.1 has been withheld by defendant No.2 to mislead this Hon’ble Court. The plaintiff/non- applicant has also pointed out various patent defects in the averments made in the application and affidavits. 6. It is asserted that the plaintiff is an Executive Director of defendant No.1 appointed by a valid Governing body at its meeting dated 1st April, 2006 which had not acceded to defendant No.2’s volition to be the Secretary General. It is contended that defendant No.2 was terminated from service by defendant No.1 on 17th January, 2008. The plaintiff has denied that his job was restricted to NOIDA/U.P and it is contended that his job is spread all over the world including Delhi. It is contended by the plaintiff that in the suit he has only sought a declaration that the special auditors report dated 1st June, 2007 is null and void and a direction for payment of salaries and other dues. It is contended that at this stage the plaintiff is only required to contend that there has been a fraud and that the necessary ingredients of fraud namely the person involved; the motive; the manner and the back up to keep the fraudulent gain thriving have all been stated in detail and nothing more is required by the code at this stage. 7. 7. The learned counsel for the applicant/defendant No.1 has relied on M/s.Patel Roadways Ltd v. M/s.Prasad Trading Company AIR 1992 SC 1514 , and M/s.Lakshmi Kant Vijayvargiya v. Bharat Heavy Electrials Limited, LPA No.5/2008 decided on 4th January, 2008 to contend that there is no cause of action at Delhi even if the registered office of defendant No.1 is at Delhi. Regarding the suit being not maintainable it is contended that as the plaintiff is not entitled for enforcement of contract for personal service therefore, the plaint does not disclose a cause of action and therefore the plaint should be rejected. The learned counsel for the defendant No.1 has also relied on Pearlite Liners (P) Ltd v. Manormana Sirsi, (2004) 3 SCC 172 and Integrated Rural Development Agency v. Ram Pyare Pandey, JT 1995 (3) SC 119 in support of his contention for rejection of the plaint. .8. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties in detail and have perused the application and reply to the application filed on behalf of plaintiff. In Patel Roadways Ltd (Supra) relied on by the applicant, a carrier having its principal office at Mumbai and branch offices at various other places had been transporting goods on hire. A dealer had entrusted a consignment of 850 kgs of cardamom to the carrier at its subordinate office in Bodinayakanur in Tamil Nadu to be delivered at Delhi. The goods were kept in a godown by the carrier at Delhi where they got destroyed and damaged as a result of which a suit was filed in the Court of Periakulam where the subordinate office of the carrier was situated for recovery of damages on the ground that the fire was due to negligence and carelessness on the part of the staff of the carrier. In these circumstances, the question which had arisen .was whether in view of the relevant clause in the contract between the parties, the Courts at Mumbai alone had jurisdiction and the jurisdiction of the Courts at Madras where suits were instituted was barred. The Apex Court after considering other decisions had held that since the consignment was handed over within the jurisdiction of Courts at Madras and the goods were damaged at Delhi, therefore, merely because the principal office of the Corporation was at Mumbai, it could not be held that a part of cause of action had arisen at Mumbai. The Apex Court after considering other decisions had held that since the consignment was handed over within the jurisdiction of Courts at Madras and the goods were damaged at Delhi, therefore, merely because the principal office of the Corporation was at Mumbai, it could not be held that a part of cause of action had arisen at Mumbai. Before the Apex Court it was not urged on behalf of the carrier that the cause of action wholly or in part arose in Mumbai but what had been urged with the aid of explanation to Section 20 of the Code was that since the appellant had its principal office in Mumbai it shall be deemed to carry on business at Mumbai and consequently the Courts at Mumbai will have jurisdiction. In these circumstances the Supreme Court had held that on the basis of the explanation to Section 20, the cause of action had not arisen at Mumbai. In contradistinction to the judgment relied on by the defendant No.1/applicant, the plaintiff is seeking a declaration that the special audit report dated 1st June, 2007 is a nullity and another declaration that the show cause notice dated 20th July, 2007 and termination letter dated 6th August, 2007 are illegal and invalid. The plaintiff has also sought a decree of mandatory injunction seeking direction to the defendants to release his salary from March, 2007 in terms of the decision of the newly constituted Governing body of defendant No.1 held on 1st April, 2006 and for a decree of permanent injunction restraining the defendants from obstructing and interfering with the plaintiff in any manner in discharging all or any of the duties and obligations as an Executive Director in the office of defendant No.1. In the plaint, the plaintiff has also categorically asserted that the registered office of defendant No.1 is at Laxmi Nagar, Delhi. .9. From the perusal of the averments made in the plaint it cannot be inferred that the special auditor report dated 1st June, 2007 has not been issued from the registered office at Delhi or that the notice dated 20th July, 2007 and letter of termination dated 6th August, 2007 have nothing to do with the registered office at Delhi. .9. From the perusal of the averments made in the plaint it cannot be inferred that the special auditor report dated 1st June, 2007 has not been issued from the registered office at Delhi or that the notice dated 20th July, 2007 and letter of termination dated 6th August, 2007 have nothing to do with the registered office at Delhi. The facts and situation of the present case are entirely different from the suit for damages filed by the owner of the goods who had handed over the goods to the carrier at Madras. In Laxmikant Vijayvargiya (supra) relied on by the applicant, a writ petition was filed seeking directions to the respondent to test the petitioner on the measurement system and to judge his performance in correct perspective and for a direction to implement the roaster in respect of persons with disabilities .and for quashing the promotional policy. Under the reservation policy the sole responsibility for implementation of the same was on the local authority at Bhopal and not with the corporate office which had already issued the promotional policy and in the circumstances it was held that the corporate office in no manner was connected with and or responsible for not giving promotion to the writ petitioner to a higher grade and in the circumstances it was held that the writ petition was not maintainable at Delhi and the order of the Single Judge was sustained in the writ petition. Apparently the cases relied on by the defendant No.1/applicant are distinguishable. 10. A decision is only an authority for what it actually decides. What is of the essence in a decision is its ratio and not every observation found therein nor what logically follows from the various observations made in it. The ratio of any decision must be understood in the background of the facts of that case. It is well settled that a little difference in facts or additional facts may make a lot of difference in the precedential value of a decision. In P.S.Rao v. State, JT 2002 (3) SC 1, the Supreme Court had held as under: ``. There is always a peril in treating the words of judgment as though they are words in a legislative enactment and it is to be remembered that judicial utterances are made in setting of the facts of a particular case. In P.S.Rao v. State, JT 2002 (3) SC 1, the Supreme Court had held as under: ``. There is always a peril in treating the words of judgment as though they are words in a legislative enactment and it is to be remembered that judicial utterances are made in setting of the facts of a particular case. Circumstantial flexibility, one additional or different fact may make a world of difference between conclusions in two cases. In Rafiq v. State, 1980 SCC (Crl) 946 it was observed as under: ‘The ratio of one case cannot be mechanically applied to another case without having regard to the fact situation and circumstances obtaining in two cases.’ 11. Aplaint can be rejected where the plaint does not disclose a cause of action or where the relief claimed is undervalued or where the relief claimed is properly valued but the plaint is written upon an insufficiently stamped paper or where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any law under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Rejection of plaint is a serious matter as it non suits the plaintiff and kills the cause of action and consequently it cannot be ordered cursorily without satisfying the requirements of the said provision. .12. Cause of action is the bundle of material facts which are required to be stated. Whether a plaint discloses a cause of action or not is essentially a question of fact. But whether it does or does not must be found from a reading of the plaint itself. For the said purpose the averments made in the plaint in their entirety must be held to be correct. The test is as to whether if the averments made in the plaint are taken to be correct in their entirety, a decree would be passed. It is only material facts that constitute the cause of action which must be proved by the plaintiff before he can obtain a decree. Facts which the plaintiff may allege incidentally and the facts which may be brought in evidence as res gestae would not necessarily constitute a part of the cause of action. It is only material facts that constitute the cause of action which must be proved by the plaintiff before he can obtain a decree. Facts which the plaintiff may allege incidentally and the facts which may be brought in evidence as res gestae would not necessarily constitute a part of the cause of action. The distinction between facts which are relevant and material and those that are incidental and immaterial is sometimes not easy to be drawn but the said distinction is nevertheless important for the purpose of deciding which facts constitute the cause of action and which are not included in it. 13. So long as the plaint discloses some cause of action or raises some questions fit to be decided by a judge, the mere fact that the case is weak and not likely to succeed is no ground for striking it out or inferring that the plaint does not disclose any cause of action. The purported failure of the pleadings to disclose a cause of action is distinct from the absence of full particulars. The court has not to see whether the claim made by the plaintiff is likely to succeed: it has merely to satisfy itself that the allegations made in the plaint, if accepted as true, would entitle the plaintiff to the relief he claims. If accepting those allegations as true, no case is made out for granting relief, no cause of action would be shown and the plaint must be rejected. But in ascertaining whether the plaint shows a cause of action the court does not enter upon a trial of the issues affecting the merits of the claim made by the plaintiff. It cannot take into consideration the defenses which the defendant may raise upon the merits; nor is the court competent to make an elaborate enquiry into doubtful or complicated questions of law or fact .14. The applicant has pleaded that the meeting dated 1st April, 2006 of the Governing Body was held at its headquarters in NOIDA where it was resolved to engage the services of plaintiff as Executive Director; plaintiff was posted at the headquarters of defendant no.1 at NOIDA and he was receiving salary from NOIDA office only. It is also alleged that the General Executive of defendant No.1 sits in NOIDA and the principal place of business of defendant no. It is also alleged that the General Executive of defendant No.1 sits in NOIDA and the principal place of business of defendant no. 1 is in NOIDA and the service of the plaintiff was also terminated by letter dated 6th August, 2007 from NOIDA office. It is also alleged that an order dated 21st May, 2007 was passed by the learned CJM, Gautam Budh Nagar, NOIDA in FIR No.586/2007 registered at P.S.Sector 20, NOIDA against the alleged unlawful and illegal activities of the plaintiff during his tenure. On these pleas the applicant wants that the plaint should be rejected as the Court at Delhi does not have territorial jurisdiction. 15. The plaintiff has alleged that the substantial cause of action has arisen at Delhi as the registered office of the defendant no.1 is located at Delhi and defendant no.2 is residing at Delhi and working for gain at Delhi. The plaintiff has contended in detail about cause of action based on his appointment, payment of salary/perks, issuance of memo to the plaintiff by the defendant no.2 without authority; issuance of memorandum and Article of Association without authority and without formulation of valid rules; withholding of released dues of the plaintiff on various dates; submission of report by the special auditors and the illegal action of the defendant no.2 of acting on the report which is not conclusive; termination of the service of the plaintiff and non presentation of the special auditor report. The plea of the applicant is that all these causes of action have not arisen at New Delhi. This defense or plea of the applicant that these causes of action have not arisen at New Delhi cannot be considered at this stage nor on the basis of allegations made by the applicant the plaint can be rejected. All the pleas raised by applicant cannot be adjudicated without detailed evidence. The plaintiff may not succeed ultimately, however, at this stage on the basis of these pleas the plaint cannot be rejected. The cause of action has not arisen only on the basis of the registered office of applicant being at Delhi but also on account of various other facts, part of cause of action, having their nexus at Delhi. The precedent, M/s Patel Roadways Ltd. (supra) relied on by the applicant is clearly distinguishable. 16. The cause of action has not arisen only on the basis of the registered office of applicant being at Delhi but also on account of various other facts, part of cause of action, having their nexus at Delhi. The precedent, M/s Patel Roadways Ltd. (supra) relied on by the applicant is clearly distinguishable. 16. The effect of dismissal of suit is altogether different and distinct from the effect of rejection of the plaint. In case plaint is rejected under Order 7 Rule 11, CPC, filing of a fresh plaint in respect of the same cause of action is specifically, permitted under Order VII Rule 13, CPC. Altogether different consequence follows in the event of dismissal of suit, which has the effect of precluding the plaintiff from filing a fresh suit on the same cause of action. 17. Rejection of plaint takes away the very basis of the suit rendering as if there was no suit at all or that no suit was instituted. Order of dismissal of suit while recognizing the existence of a suit indicates its termination. In D. Ramachandran v. R.V. Shanker Raman and Others, (1999) 3 SCC 267 , the Apex Court had held that the effect of dismissal of a suit is altogether different and distinct from the effect of rejection of the plaint. For considering whether the plaint discloses cause of action or not, the pleas and documents of the defendants are not to be considered. The apex court had held as under:- ‘Learned Single Judge fell in error in placing reliance upon the material supplied by the defendant, which alone is sufficient to set aside the impugned order. Learned Single Judge instead of proceeding to reject the plaint dismissed the suit, which approach is also erroneous. The effect of dismissal of suit is altogether different and distinct from the effect of rejection of the plaint. In case plaint is rejected under Order 7 Rule 11, CPC, filing of a fresh plaint in respect of the same cause of action is specifically, permitted under Rule 13 of Order 7, CPC. Altogether different consequence follows in the event of dismissal of suit, which has the effect of precluding the plaintiff to file a fresh suit on the same cause of action. Altogether different consequence follows in the event of dismissal of suit, which has the effect of precluding the plaintiff to file a fresh suit on the same cause of action. Rejection of plaint takes away the very basis of the suit rendering as if there was no suit at all or that no suit was instituted. Order of dismissal of suit while recognising the existence of a suit indicates its termination. While deciding the application under Order 7 Rule 11, CPC, learned Single Judge ought not and could not have dismissed the suit. Even in the decision of the Supreme Court in T.Arvindandams case (Supra), relied upon by learned Counsel for the appellant, it was held that if on a meaningful- not formal-reading of the plaint it is manifestly vexatious and merit-less, in the sense of not disclosing a clear right to sue, the Trial Court should exercise his power under Order 7 Rule 11, CPC taking care to see that the ground mentioned therein is fulfilled. In order to fulfill that ground bare allegation made in the plaint and documents filed therewith were required to be looked into, which in the instant case clearly disclosed at least a cause of action against the defendant that defendant was liable for damages for its acts of omission and commission. It would be an altogether different situation that the plaintiff might not ultimately succeed in obtaining a decree against the defendant or that Court might come to the conclusion that suit would not be maintainable against the defendant and that plaintiff had a cause of action only against defendants principal and its parent until in Hong Kong, but such aspect could not have been gone into at this stage. Three paragraphs of the plaint quoted above in our view do clearly disclose cause of action for the plaintiff to claim damages.’ In Vijay Pratap Singh v. Dukh Haran Nath Singh, AIR 1962 SC 941 , the Supreme Court had held at pages 943-44 as under:- ‘By the express terms of Rule 11 clause (a), the court is concerned to ascertain whether the allegations made in the petition show a cause of action. The court has not to see whether the claim made by the petitioner is likely to succeed: it has merely to satisfy itself that the allegations made in the petition, if accepted as true, would entitle the petitioner to the relief he claims. If accepting those allegations as true no case is made out for granting relief no cause of action would be shown and the petition must be rejected. But in ascertaining whether the petition shows a cause of action the court does not enter upon a trial of the issues affecting the merits of the claim made by the petitioner. It cannot take into consideration the defences which the defendant may raise upon the merits; nor is the court competent to make an elaborate enquiry into doubtful or complicated questions of law or fact. If the allegations in the petition, prima facie, show a cause of action, the court cannot embark upon an enquiry whether the allegations are true in fact, or whether the petitioner will succeed in the claims made by him.’ 18. The applicant has also contended that the plaintiff had filed a writ petition at Allahabad and had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Courts at Uttar Pradesh and therefore, the suit at Delhi is not maintainable. The plea is without any legal basis. Merely filing a writ petition at Allahabad will not oust the jurisdiction of the Court at Delhi nor on the basis of this it can be held that the Courts at Delhi does not have jurisdiction and the plaint can be rejected. The applicant has also contended that the plaintiff has not disclosed about the filing of the writ petition and has suppressed other material facts. Whether the relevant facts have been suppressed and whether such suppression will have bearing on this case, is yet to be determined, which is based on the plea of the defendant and on the plea of the defendant, in the facts and circumstances, it is not possible to reject the plaint. 19. The applicant has also sought rejection of the plaint on the ground that the decree of Mandatory and Permanent injunction which is sought by the plaintiff cannot be granted because the plaintiff is not entitled for specific performance of contract of personal service. .20. 19. The applicant has also sought rejection of the plaint on the ground that the decree of Mandatory and Permanent injunction which is sought by the plaintiff cannot be granted because the plaintiff is not entitled for specific performance of contract of personal service. .20. In Integrated Rural Development Agency (Supra) the Apex Court had held that Integrated Rural Development Agency being neither a statutory body nor controlled by the Government, the relationship between an employee and the said organization would be purely that of a master and servant based on contract and that there could not be specific performance of contract of service in such a case. In the circumstances it was held that the relief of reinstatement and back wages was improper and unjustified in law. The plaintiff in the present case is seeking a declaration that the audit report dated 1st June, 2007 is a nullity being result of malice, collusion and fraud. Apparently this relief cannot be rejected merely on the allegations made by the defendant No.1/applicant. The relief of declaration that the show cause notice dated 20th July, 2007 and letter of termination dated 6th August, 2007 .is invalid and null also cannot be rejected on the basis of the allegations made by the defendant No.1. The learned counsel for the defendant No.1/applicant has also relied on Pearlite Liners (P) Ltd (Supra) holding that the contract of personal service cannot be enforced and an employer cannot be forced to take an employee with whom the relations have reached a point of complete loss of faith between the two. The Supreme Court, however, had carved out three exceptions - where a public servant is sought to be removed from service in contravention of the provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution; where a worker is sought to be reinstated on being dismissed under the industrial law and where a statutory body acts in breach of violation of the mandatory provisions of the statute. 21. If one of the relief sought by the plaintiff cannot be granted on account of allegations of the applicant, then whether that relief is to be rejected and the suit should continue for the other relief or the relief which cannot be granted for some reasons, should be ignored as surplusage at his stage. A Division Bench of this Court in State Bank of India v. Sanjeev Malik and Ors. A Division Bench of this Court in State Bank of India v. Sanjeev Malik and Ors. 1996 (36) DRJ 484 , had held in a suit for mortgage in respect of a property which was not situated within the jurisdiction of the Court and in which suit a personal remedy was also sought that the entire plaint was not be rejected or returned and the suit was ordered to be proceeded to the extent of considering the personal claim for a personal decree and the relief on the basis of mortgage of the property situated outside the jurisdiction of the Court was ordered to be ignored as a surplusage. The plaintiff is seeking a declaration about the special report of the auditor being a nullity which cannot be rejected on the allegations made by the defendant no.1/applicant. Similarly the relief of declaration regarding the show cause notice and letter of termination being nullity and illegal cannot also be rejected on the basis of pleas raised by the applicant at this stage nor can the other relief regarding personal services be rejected. Even if the relief regarding mandatory and permanent injunction regarding personal services of the plaintiff cannot be granted on account of allegations made by the applicant, even then the entire plaint is not to be rejected nor can the relief for personal service be rejected at this stage on the basis of allegations made by the applicant. The two reliefs of mandatory and permanent injunction may be surplusage and at this stage it will not be appropriate to decide the same. The plaint in the facts and circumstances cannot be rejected. .22. Considering the entirety of facts and circumstances it will also be not appropriate to reject the plaint in respect of prayers (iii) and (iv) and .continue the suit in respect of prayers (i) and (ii) specially since the evidence in respect of all the four reliefs claimed by the plaintiff shall be similar. In the circumstances, the plaint cannot be rejected on the ground that the Courts do not have territorial jurisdiction or that the plaintiff is concealing the material facts or that some of the reliefs claimed by the plaintiff cannot be granted in view of certain provisions of Specific Relief Act. In the circumstances, the plaint cannot be rejected on the ground that the Courts do not have territorial jurisdiction or that the plaintiff is concealing the material facts or that some of the reliefs claimed by the plaintiff cannot be granted in view of certain provisions of Specific Relief Act. The application IA 14511/2007 under Order VII Rule 11 read with section 151 of Code of Civil Procedure is therefore, without any merit and is liable to be dismissed. The application is, therefore, dismissed. IA 1902 of 2008 by Defendant no.3. 23. The defendant No.3/applicant in his IA No.1902/2008 under Order VII Rule 11 read with section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure has contended that he is not a necessary party and he has been dragged into this litigation despite the fact that he has nothing to do with the action taken against the plaintiff and he being an auditor cannot be made liable for giving his opinion, on the basis of scrutiny of the documents supplied by the association. 24. It is further contended that defendant No.3/applicant has no interest in any of the parties to the present litigation and the auditor’s reports are impartial and based on the documents/information/supplied by the society. It is stated that it was for the defendant no.1 to accept or reject the same. 25. Defendant No.3 is stated to be a professional who is engaged with several departments of the Government and his name cannot be considered for empanelment, if there is pendency of any case against him and as such the present litigation is affecting the status of defendant No.3 and, therefore, it would be appropriate that his name be deleted from the litigation. It is further contended that no specific cause of action has been disclosed against the defendant No.3. 26. No reply to the application of defendant No.3 under Order 7 Rule 11 being IA No.1902/2008 has been filed by the plaintiff/applicant. .27. From the perusal of the plaint it is apparent that the allegations have been made against the defendant No.1 and defendant No.2. The only allegation against defendant No.3 is that defendant No.2, when he could not succeed in his acts of manipulating disciplinary action against the plaintiff, managed in collusion with defendant No.3 to initiate disciplinary action against the plaintiff. In Para 15 of the plaint allegation against the defendant No.3 are as .follows:- ‘15. The only allegation against defendant No.3 is that defendant No.2, when he could not succeed in his acts of manipulating disciplinary action against the plaintiff, managed in collusion with defendant No.3 to initiate disciplinary action against the plaintiff. In Para 15 of the plaint allegation against the defendant No.3 are as .follows:- ‘15. That when the defendant No.2 could not succeed further in the aforesaid act of manipulating disciplinary action against the plaintiff, he managed in collusion with defendant No.3 to initiate disciplinary action against the plaintiff. The defendant No.2, despite having knowledge that his Appointing Authority as Secretary General (Acting) as well as the Appointing Authority of the plaintiff as Executive Director is the Governing Body, still chose to initiate action by himself arbitrarily.’ 28. The plaintiff has rather himself alleged that the report dated 1st June, 2000 in respect of which a declaration is sought has not been prepared by defendant No.3 but was prepared by defendant No.2 and that defendant No.3 merely signed it. Para (L) of the grounds taken by the plaintiff in the plaint is as under:- ‘L. That the bare perusal of the special audit report shows that the report has not been prepared by Shashi K.Garg and Co.(defendant No.3) but the report has been prepared by defendant No.2 and Shashi K.Garg and Co. merely signed the report which is apparent from the language employed and adjective used for the plaintiff.’ 29. In the entire plaint there is no other allegation against defendant No.3. In para 22 of the plaint regarding cause of action it has not been disclosed that there is any cause of action against defendant No.3. Para 22 of the plaint is as under:- ‘22. In the entire plaint there is no other allegation against defendant No.3. In para 22 of the plaint regarding cause of action it has not been disclosed that there is any cause of action against defendant No.3. Para 22 of the plaint is as under:- ‘22. That the cause of action to file the present suit firstly arose on 01.04.2006 when the plaintiff was appointed as an Executive Director of the Association at the behest of the other members of the Governing Body including the defendant No.2 on the payment of salary/perks as detailed herein, the cause of action further arose on 24.03.07 when the defendant No.2 without authority issued a Memo directing the plaintiff to proceed on leave; cause of action further arose on 30.03.07 when the defendant No.2 caused issuance of Memorandum and Articles of Charges again without authority and without formulation of valid rules and regulations to initiate and accomplish disciplinary action; cause of action further arose on 01.04.07, 01.05.07, 01.06.07 and 01.07.07 when the defendant No.2 caused the withholding the release of dues and other perks to the plaintiff; the cause of action further arose on 1.6.07 when the special auditors submitted their report despite knowledge of its dis-engagement by Monitoring Committee; cause of action has further arisen when defendant No.2 despite clear observation in the report that their observations are not conclusive has acted upon the same to initiate disciplinary action against the plaintiff; cause of action has further arisen when the defendant No.2 has issued letter dated 6.8.2007 purporting to terminate the service of the plaintiff despite having no such power and without considering that allegations does not pertain to engagement of the plaintiff as Executive Director. As such letter dated 6.8.07 is nonest and liable to be ignored as waste paper; cause of action has further arise on 9th and 10th August, 2007 when the special audit report was not presented before the meeting of the Governing Body nor was sought approval for implementation of the same; cause of action is continuing one.’ 30. Cause of action is the bundle of material facts which are required to be stated. It does not include evidence except in certain cases where the pleading relies on any misrepresentation, fraud, breach of trust, willful default, or undue influence. Cause of action is the bundle of material facts which are required to be stated. It does not include evidence except in certain cases where the pleading relies on any misrepresentation, fraud, breach of trust, willful default, or undue influence. The plaintiff is seeking a declaration that the report of defendant no.3 is a nullity being result of malice, collusion, fraud and conspiracy. However, no facts pertaining to alleged malice, collusion, fraud and conspiracy has been alleged. The paragraph 22 in the plaint regarding cause of action does not show any plea or cause of action against the defendant no.3. Material facts which must be disclosed for collusion, malice etc. have not been disclosed except using the bald averments that the defendant no.2 acted in collusion with defendant no.3 and defendant no.3 merely signed the report; no other allegations have been made. If the plaintiff himself does not say in para 22 of the plaint, which is about cause of action, that any cause of action has arisen against the defendant no.3, it cannot be inferred that any cause of action has arisen against the defendant no.3. 31. Inthe reliefs claimed against the defendants no specific relief has been claimed against defendant No.3. For the relief of declaration regarding the report dated 1st June, 2007 being a nullity it is stated that it is the report of the defendant no.2 which was signed by defendant no.3. Show cause notice dated 20th July, 2007 and letter of termination dated 6th August, 2007 had not been issued by defendant no.3 and a declaration regarding the same being illegal is not a relief claimed against defendant No.3. Regarding mandatory and permanent injunction also no cause of action has been alleged against defendant No.3 nor it has been alleged as to how he is liable for the release of salary of the plaintiff and how he is not to interfere in the functioning of defendant No.1 until the engagement of the plaintiff expires three years with effect from 1st April, 2006. Therefore, neither any cause of action has been alleged against the defendant no.3 nor any relief has been claimed against him. 32. Therefore, neither any cause of action has been alleged against the defendant no.3 nor any relief has been claimed against him. 32. In the entirety of facts and circumstances it is apparent that no cause of action has been alleged in the plaint against defendant No.3 nor any relief has been claimed because what is stated is that the report was by defendant no.2 which was signed by defendant no.3. In the circumstances, on the basis of allegations made in the plaint it is apparent that no cause of action has been alleged and therefore, the plaint is liable to be rejected against the defendant no.3. 33. Consequently, the application of defendant No.3 being IA 1902/2008 is allowed as no cause of action is disclosed in the plaint against defendant No.3/applicant. Therefore, the plaint is rejected against him and he is deleted as a party to the present suit. 34. Therefore, IA no. 14511/2007 of the defendant no.1 under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure is dismissed and the application of defendant no.3 being IA 1902/2008 for rejecting the plaint against him and deleting him as a party to the suit is allowed. Parties are however, left to bear their own costs in the facts and circumstances of the case.