Judgment ( 1. ) KEEPING in view the similitude of the factual matrix involved and the issues of law raised in these appeals, they were heard analogously and are disposed of by this composite order. Be it noted, as the facts are similar, the learned Single Judge adverted to the same in a common compartment and passed the main order in W. P. No. 5131/2005 (S) and accordingly we shall refer to the factual matrix in commonality except where specific reference is necessitous. ( 2. ) THE appellants had submitted applications in the office of District and Sessions judge, Guna seeking appointment pursuant to an advertisement issued vide annexure-A/1 for the post of Process Writer (Assistant Grade-Ill ). The recruitment was for filling up of seven posts. Out of the seven posts of Process writers, one post was reserved for scheduled caste candidate, one post for scheduled tribe, one post for OBC category and four posts for general candidates. The petitioner in W. P. No. 5131/05 (S) submitted application for appointment to a post reserved for scheduled caste candidate, the petitioner in WP. No. 5133/05 (S)sought appointment as a general category candidate and Anand Suryavanshi, the petitioner in W. P. No. 5132/05 (S), as OBC candidate. It was contended before the learned single Judge that all the petitioners had appeared in the written test and being found successful, they were called to appear in the interview held on 26. 9. 2004. Thereafter, the District and Sessions Judge, Guna instead of issuing appointment orders, despite the selection of the candidates, forwarded the selection proceeding and the select list for approval of the High Court in accordance with the administrative and executive instructions in that regard. ( 3. ) WHEN the matter came to the High Court, certain formalities were sought to be complied with but eventually, the petitioners were not appointed. ( 4. ) THE main thrust of submission before the learned Single Judge was that the district and Sessions Judge was the competent authority and, therefore, he was legally bound to issue appointment order after due process of selection and there was no requirement whatsoever in law to seek approval of the High Court and the high Court had no authority in law to withhold the appointment. In this backdrop, a prayer was made to command the District and Sessions Judge, Guna to issue letters of appointment in their favour strictly on the basis of the merit list. ( 5. ) BE it noted, the further contention that was advanced was that as per annexure-A/1, seven vacancies were notified and, therefore, the ground could not have been taken that the roaster point has not been properly determined and followed. ( 6. ) THE aforesaid stand and stance of the writ petitioners was resisted on the ground that the High Court is empowered under Article 235 of the Constitution to issue guidelines for the control and functioning of the subordinate courts and that would include the selection process and the appointment. It was urged that when the High Court scrutinized the selection process, it found that the reservation policy and the requirement of the statutory provision as per the Anusuchit Janjati Aur Anya Pichhada Varg Ke Liye Arakshan Adhiniyam, 1994 had not been followed, and as far as the petitioner, Sunil Sharma, is concerned, his case was not recommended for the selection and, therefore, he could not claim any relief. It was the further stand that only one post out of seven posts reserved for scheduled tribe was available and no post was available in the OBC and scheduled caste category and, therefore, the other two candidates could not have sought appointment as vacancies in respect of the said categories were not found to be in existence and accordingly, it was not approved. The learned single Judge adverted to the first plank of submission with regard to the jurisdiction of the High Court and referred to Article 235 and the decision rendered in R. M. Gurjar and another vs. High Court of Gujarat and others, (1992) 4 SCC 10 and came to hold that the action of the High Court is within the ambit and sweep of Article 235 of the constitution of India and hence, non approval and non-issuance of appointment letter cannot be found fault with. As far as merit is concerned, the learned Single Judge opined that so far as Sunil Sharma is concerned, he belongs to general category and there being 4 vacancies in the general category and for three posts, the names of Sumit Dwivedi, Ajay Kumar Dave and Jagdish Sharma were recommended and one post was filled up by an employee from Gwalior in the category of Assistant Grade III and hence, 4th posts was not available. In this backdrop, the learned Single Judge opined that Sunil Sharma could not have been appointed on the fourth post. As far as appointment in OBC and scheduled caste categories is concerned the learned Single Judge accepted the stand of the respondents that there was erroneous calculation of the 100 point roaster and, in fact, no vacancy in the SC and OBC category was available and merely because the advertisement stated about the availability of vacancy, that does not necessarily mean that the respondents are estopped from re-examining the matter when there is violation of the statutory provisions. The learned Single Judge further held that mere empanellment does not confer any enforceable right. To arrive at the said conclusion, he relied on the decisions rendered in All India SC and ST Employees association and another vs. A. Arthur Jean and others, 2001 (6) SCC 380 , punjab State Electricity Board and others vs. Malkiat Singh, 2004 AIR SCW 5768 and State of U. P. and others vs. Rajkumar Sharma and others, 2006 (3)SCC 330 and repelled the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners. After so holding the learned Single adverted to the qualification as regards computer education and came to hold that the candidates had not produced the proper certificates from the recognized computer institutions and accordingly, he accepted that the High Court was justified in opining that there was irregularity in the process of selection. ( 7. ) IT was put forth that 100 point roaster was not properly followed before issuing the advertisement and as the certificate with regard to fulfilling the qualification of computer education was not from an approved university or authority the selection was cancelled. ( 8. ) WE have heard Mr. A. D. Deotas, learned senior counsel, alongwith mr. R. K. Jaiswal, Advocate for the appellants, and Mr. Y. S. Shroti, learned senior counsel, alongwith Mr. Vikram Johri, Advocate for the respondents. ( 9. ( 8. ) WE have heard Mr. A. D. Deotas, learned senior counsel, alongwith mr. R. K. Jaiswal, Advocate for the appellants, and Mr. Y. S. Shroti, learned senior counsel, alongwith Mr. Vikram Johri, Advocate for the respondents. ( 9. ) TWO questions that emanate for consideration in these appeals are whether the approval sought for by the District and Sessions Judge is unwarranted because the High Court has no jurisdiction or authority to interfere with the authority of appointment by the learned District Judge; and second, whether the rejection of the candidature of the appellants for want of efficiency/expertise in computer operation from a recognized institution was justified in the obtaining factual matrix. ( 10. ) TO appreciate the first plank of the argument canvassed by the learned counsel for the parties, it is apposite to refer to Article 235 of the Constitution of India:- "235. Control over subordinate courts.- The control over district courts and courts subordinate thereto including the posting and promotion of, and the grant of leave to, persons belonging to the judicial service of a State and holding any post inferior to the post of district judge shall be vested in the high Court, but nothing in this article shall be construed as taking away from any such person any right of appeal which he may have under the law regulating the conditions of his service or as authorising the High Court to deal with him otherwise than in accordance with the conditions of his service prescribed under such law. " ( 11. ) THE submission of Mr. Deoras, learned counsel for the appellants, is that the power of the High Court is restricted and limited to the posting and promotion and other ancillary control of judicial officers which would include the District Judge also but by no stretch of imagination is the High Court allowed to interfere With the power of appointment of the employees by the District Judge for the simon pure reason that the district judiciary is required to have its own independence. It is urged by him that once the power does not flow from the provision the High court cannot arrogate the power to itself and introduce the concept of approval which is not legally valid. ( 12. ) THE submission of Mr. It is urged by him that once the power does not flow from the provision the High court cannot arrogate the power to itself and introduce the concept of approval which is not legally valid. ( 12. ) THE submission of Mr. Shroti, learned senior counsel for the respondents, is that the High Court has the power over the employees of the district courts and the said controversy has been put to rest by the Apex Court in the case of rm. Gurjar (supra ). ( 13. ) THE language employed in Article 235 is in a broad spectrum. It vests the high Court with the power of control over the subordinate courts. The words used are "control over district courts and courts subordinate thereto". Thereafter, the words used are "including the posting and promotion" and other aspects of the judicial officers, In the case of R. M. Gurjar (supra), their Lordships referred to the Full Bench decision of the Gujarat High Court in paragraph 3 which is as follows :- "3. The Full Bench of the High Court speaking through the Acting Chief Justice primarily dealt with question No. 2 and came to the conclusion that the "control"under Article 235 of the Constitution of India extends to the ministerial officers and servant an the establishment of the subordinate courts also. The second question was, accordingly, answered against the petitioners. On the interpretation of Article 235 and the Rules the first question was also decided against the petitioners. This appeal by way of special leave is against the judgment of the Full Bench of the High Court. " ( 14. ) EVENTUALLY, their Lordships referred to the anatomy of the rules and came to hold that the High Court was within its jurisdiction on the administrative side to enhance the punishment of the appellants therein in exercise of powers under rule 23 of the Rules. In that context/their Lordships in paragraph 7 held as under:- "7. On the interpretation placed by us on the Rules, the answer to the first question has to be in the affirmative. We are also of the opinion that the answer to the second question as rendered by the Full Bench of the High Court is unexceptionable and does not call for any interference. The appeal consequently fails and is dismissed but with no order as to cost. " [emphasis supplied] ( 15. We are also of the opinion that the answer to the second question as rendered by the Full Bench of the High Court is unexceptionable and does not call for any interference. The appeal consequently fails and is dismissed but with no order as to cost. " [emphasis supplied] ( 15. ) TO get the complete picture, it would be apposite to refer to the decision rendered by the Gujarat High Court in R. M. Gajjar vs. State of Gujarat, AIR 1978 Gujarat 102. The Full Bench, after elaborately discussing the term "court", held as follows:- "11. Therefore, all these statutory resources lead to an inevitable conclusion as to the legislative intention being clearly to use the term "court" compendiously in Art. 235 to cover not only those judicial officers specifically included in the later part i. e. members of the judicial service, but even other administrative functionaries or ministerial staff of the Court as well. 12. What appeals to us on sound canons of construction or on principle is borne out even by the decisions as to the meaning to be given to the term "court" in Art. 235. In Bagchis case, when the question arose in the converse context when the District Judge had contended that the control being over the Courts, it could not be exercised over Judges, the categorical answer was "the Court is used compendiously to denote not only the Court proper but also the Presiding, Judge. The latter part of Art. 235 talks of the man who holds the office. " It should be borne in mind that in bagchis case ( AIR 1966 SC 447 ), the original Full Bench decision of Calcutta High Court in AIR 1961 Cal 1 had already approved in that decision the earlier decision in Mahomed Ghouse v. State of a. P. , AIR 1959 Andh. Pra. 497, holding that the word "court" occurring in Art. 235 must be interpreted as including "not only the person presiding over that Court but also all the functionaries of that court and any matter pertaining thereto. Pra. 497, holding that the word "court" occurring in Art. 235 must be interpreted as including "not only the person presiding over that Court but also all the functionaries of that court and any matter pertaining thereto. " therefore, when the Supreme Court gave this interpretation of the later part of Art. 235 on the basis that the Presiding judges were also included, it must be treated as a settled interpretation of the term "court" as being compendiously in the widest sense by not being confined only to the Presiding judge but also including other functionaries and ministerial staff. This is the view taken even by the Full Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Amar Singh vs. C. J. Punj. and Har. High Court, AIR 1976 Punj. and Har. 215, at page 220, that, "the control vested in the High Court squarely extends to the Presiding Officers and also to functionaries and ministerial staff attached to the District Courts and the Courts subordinate thereto. " The Full Bench in a well considered judgment, with which we are in complete agreement, negatived the very contention in the context of such clerical staff by holding that Art. 235 was not confined or limited only to the members of the subordinate judicial service of the State, as many other views would lead to the fault of redundancy and surplusage and would defeat the whole purpose of enactment of Art. 235. Both on principle and authority,we must, therefore, answer the second question by holding that the control vested in the High Courts under art. 235 of the Constitution is exercisable not only over members of the judicial service of the State as defined under Art. 236 (b) but even the ministerial officers and servants on the establishment of the subordinate Courts are also ultimately subject to such control. " ( 16. ) IN this regard, we may refer with profit to the decision in State of Assam v. S. N. Sen, AIR 1972 SC 1028 wherein their Lordships have opined that wide ambit of power conferred under Article 235 in the opening part is not to be curtailed down even by the last portion of the said Article except to the extent therein specified. ( 17. ( 17. ) FROM the aforesaid enunciation of law, it is plain as day that the High Court has control over the ministerial and official services of the subordinate courts on the basis of the language employed in Article 235 of the Constitution. ( 18. ) ONCE it is held that it is well within the jurisdiction of the High Court to scrutinize the list of selected candidates furnished by the District Judge, the question that emerges is whether because of the empanellment of the names any legal right is created in favour of the appellants. The learned Single Judge referred to the decisions rendered in A. Arthur Jean (supra), Malkiat Singh (supra) and Rajkumar Sharma (supra) and rightly concluded that no right had accrued. ( 19. ) THE controversy can be looked from another angle. The advertisement populated that a candidate must have knowledge as regards computer operation. The submission of Mr. Deoras is that the High Court has interfered by stating that the candidates had not produced certificates from any recognized or registered institution in respect of efficiency in computer application. It is worth noting here that no test was conducted by the District and Sessions Judge as to whether the candidates had any efficiency or experience in computer operation. Certain certificates were produced from institutions that they had computer training. Some of the candidates had produced certificates from recognized institutions. Regard being had to the posts in question, a criteria was evolved by the High Court to have trained hands to have the requisite efficiency in computer operation. The said principle was uniformly adhered to. In this context, it is apposite to refer to the Full Bench decision rendered in Qmprakash vs. State of M. P. , 1978 MPLJ 136 wherein it has been held as under: -"once the Public Service Commission is asked by the government to make a selection it is entirely in the wisdom and discretion of the Commission what mode or method it would adopt. This is subject to statutory previsions, if any Where minimum qualification eligibility are prescribed by a statute or by the Government, the Public Service Commission cannot select a candidate who does not possess those qualifications. This is subject to statutory previsions, if any Where minimum qualification eligibility are prescribed by a statute or by the Government, the Public Service Commission cannot select a candidate who does not possess those qualifications. However, the Public Service Commission is free to screen the applicants, classify them in various categories according to their plus qualifications and/or experience and call for interview only those candidates who fall within those categories, eliminating others who do not satisfy those criteria. Such classification does not tantamount to any hostile discrimination. Practicability may also require such -categorisation. For instance, if for three posts there are 3000 applicants, all eligible, the Commission cannot afford to spend months together in selecting three out of 3000. " ( 20. ) THE said principle was reiterated in Jayant Kumar Chavan vs. Public Service Commission, M. P, 1978 MPLJ 784 wherein their Lordships have stated that the Public Service Commission is free in exercise of its duty of making selection and from the point of view of practicability it can lay down criteria for preliminary selection. We have referred to the aforesaid decision to show the concept of uniform applicability and the role played by the High Court. As is evincible from the advertisement, computer operation was an essential condition apart from eligibility. But according to the selection list, most of the candidates did hot possess qualification in computer operation. No test was conducted in that regard. The district Judge had conducted written and typing test and interview. True it is, as is evincible from the record, one candidate had produced a certificate from a registered institution with regard to his knowledge and operation in computer. However, it was thought proper by the High Court not to select one candidate but to go for re-advertisement in respect of the vacant posts. In our considered opinion, the decision taken by the respondents is absolutely correct and the stamp of approval given by the learned Single Judge cannot be found fault with. Thus, we respectfully treat the order passed by the learned Single Judge to be absolutely flawless and accordingly, we concur with the same. ( 21. ) CONSEQUENTLY, the writ appeals, being sans merit, stand dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.