JUDGMENT I.A. Ansari, J. 1. By this common judgment and order, I propose to dispose of this set of the writ petitions inasmuch as all these writ petitions, having raised, substantially, same questions of law, have been heard together. These cases are slightly unusual; it is unusual, because, ordinarily, the facts of a case, in a judgment, are first narrated in order to appreciate, correctly, the application of the law, which may have a bearing on the given case. In the cases at hand, however, several common questions of law have been raised and if the answers to the questions, so raised, are settled, it would become easier to determine the application of law governing the cases involved in this set of writ petitions. Keeping this end in view, let me, first, formulate the common questions of law, which have been raised in these writ petitions. The questions are: (i) Whether the Assam State Electricity Board ('the Board') has, under the law, continued to function, or can be said to have continued to function, beyond 9.6.2004, as a State Transmission Utility as well as Licensee as defined under the Electricity Act, 2003 ('2003 Act')? (ii) Whether the Board is, under the law, competent to realize the dues, which became payable by a consumer under the Indian Electricity Act, 1910 ('1910 Act') and if so, is there any limitation imposed on such a right of the Board? (iii) On Coming into force of 2003 Act, with effect from the appointed date, i.e., 10.6.2003, whether the Board's right to realize its dues, from a consumer for his consumption of electricity, can be exercised at any point of time or is there any limitation on such right of recovery, which may have, otherwise, been available, under 1910 Act, to the Board? (iv) After coming into force of the 2003 Act, whether the Board can cut off supply of electricity to a consumer for unpaid dues, if the unpaid dues are sought to be recovered by raising a bill for consumption of electricity, though no bill was raised within a period of one month from the date of consumption of electricity nor was the sum, claimed as dues, was continuously shown recoverable as arrear of charges for electricity supplied for a period of twenty five months from the date of consumption of the electrical energy? (v) If no notice of demand, notice of recovery or notice of disconnection was served, on a consumer, before coming into force of the 2003 Act, whether it would be permissible for the Board to recover such dues or cut off the supply of electricity to the consumer by taking recourse to its rights under the 1910 Act, and if so, is there any limitation on such exercise of the right of the Board? 2. I have heard Mr. N. Dutta, Mr. S.N. Sharma, Mr. G.N. Sahewalla, Ms. M. Hazarika and Mr. M.B. Choudhury, learned senior Counsel, for the petitioners, and Mr. D.K. Mishra, learned senior Counsel, assisted by Mr. B.D. Das, learned Standing counsel, ASEB, appearing on behalf of the Assam State Electricity Board. I have also heard Mr. H.K. Sharma, learned Counsel, for the Assam Industrial Development Corporation. 3. Let me, now, deal with the questions, which have been formulated above, as common questions of law. 4. The State Electricity Boards used to exist, on the strength of their formation, in terms of the provisions of Section 5(1) of the 1910 Act. It is, therefore, not in dispute that a Board, as defined in Section 2(7) of the 2003 Act, now, means a State Electricity Board constituted under the provisions of Section 5(1) of the 1910 Act. 5. There is no dispute that 2003 Act, has come into force w.e.f. 10.6.2003, which is the appointed day within the meaning of Section 2(2) of the 2003 Act. There is also no dispute that with the coming into force of the 2003 Act, on the date aforementioned, 1910 Act, stood repealed under the provisions of Section 185 of the 2003 Act, except to the extent as Section 185, otherwise, provides. 6. I may, now, turn to Section 185, which embodies the provisions with regard to repeal and saving. This Section reads as under: 185. Repeal and saving.- (1) Save as otherwise provided in this Act, the Indian Electricity Act, 1910 (9 of 1910), the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 (54 of 1948) and the Electricity Regulatory Commissions Act, 1998 (14 of 1998) are hereby repealed. This Section reads as under: 185. Repeal and saving.- (1) Save as otherwise provided in this Act, the Indian Electricity Act, 1910 (9 of 1910), the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 (54 of 1948) and the Electricity Regulatory Commissions Act, 1998 (14 of 1998) are hereby repealed. (2) Notwithstanding such repeal,- (a) anything done or any action taken or purported to have been done or taken including any rule, notification, inspection, order or notice made or issued or any appointment, confirmation or declaration made or any licence, permission, authorisation or exemption granted or any document or instrument executed or any direction given under the repealed laws shall, in so far as it is not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, be deemed to have been done or taken under the corresponding provisions of this Act; (b) the provisions contained in Sections 12 to 18 of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910 (9 of 1910) and rules made thereunder shall have effect until the rules under Sections 67 to 69 of this Act, are made; (c) the Indian Electricity Rules, 1956 made under Section 37 of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910 (9 of 1910) as it stood before such repeal shall continue to be in force till the regulations under Section 53 of this Act, are made. (d) all rules made under Sub-section (1) of Section 69 of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 (54 of 1948) shall continue to have effect until such rules are rescinded or modified, as the case may be; (e) all directives issued, before the commencement of this Act, by a State Government under the enactments specified in the Schedule shall continue to apply for the period for which such directions were issued by the State Government. (3) The provisions of the enactments specified in the Schedule, not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, shall apply to the States in which such enactments are applicable. (4) The Central Government may, as and when considered necessary, by notification, amend the Schedule. (5) Save as otherwise provided in Sub-section (2), the mention of particular matters in that section, shall not be held to prejudice or affect the genera; application of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 (10 of 1897), with regard to the effect of repeals. 7. (5) Save as otherwise provided in Sub-section (2), the mention of particular matters in that section, shall not be held to prejudice or affect the genera; application of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 (10 of 1897), with regard to the effect of repeals. 7. In order to correctly interpret the provisions of Section 185, it is necessary that the provisions of Sections 173, 174 and 175 too be kept in view. These provisions are, therefore, quoted below: 173. Inconsistency in laws.- Nothing contained in this Act, or any rule or regulation made thereunder or any instrument having effect by virtue of this Act, rule or regulation shall have effect insofar as it is inconsistent with any other provisions of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (68 of 1986) or the Atomic Energy Act, 1962 (33 of 1962) or the Railways Act, 1989 (24 of 1989). 174. Act, to have overriding effect.- Save as otherwise provided in Section173, the provisions of this Act, shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force or in any instrument having effect by virtue of any law other than this Act. 175. Provisions of this Act, to be in addition to and not in derogation of other laws.- The provisions of this Act, are in addition to and not in derogation of any other law for the time being in force. 8. A conjoint reading of the provisions of Sections 173 to 175 clearly indicates that if there is any inconsistency between the provisions of the 2003 Act, on the one hand, and the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, or Atomic Energy Act, 1962, or the Railways Act, 1989, on the other, the provisions of the 2003 Act, will not prevail over the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, Atomic Energy Act, 1962, or the Railways Act, 1989. Except, however, the provisions of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, Atomic Energy Act, 1962, or the Railways Act, 1989, as indicated hereinbefore, Section173 shows that the provisions of 2003 Act, shall have overriding effect over all other laws, though while having such overriding effect, the provisions of the 2003 Act, shall be read in addition to, and not in derogation of, any other law for the time being in force. 9. 9. Thus, when Sections 173, 174 and 175 are read together, there remains no room for doubt that so far as, at least, the 1910 Act, is concerned, the provisions contained therein will not override the provisions of the 2003 Act, except to the extent as Section 185 may have itself saved. 10. A careful reading of Section 185(a) shows that notwithstanding the repeal of the 1910 Act, Clause (a) of Section 185 protects if anything has already been done or purported to be done, or any action has already been taken or purported to be taken under the 1948 Act. In order to protect the acts done or purported to be done, or any action taken or purported to be taken, Clause (a) lays down that such acts done or purported to be done, or such action taken or purported to be taken, under the repealed laws, shall be deemed to have been done under the provisions of 2003 Act, provided that such act or action is not inconsistent with the provisions of 2003 Act. As far as Clauses (b), (c), (d) and (e) are concerned, we are not concerned with them in the present set of writ petitions. 11. What, therefore, Clause (a) of Section 185 makes clear is that this Clause cannot be taken resort to for the purpose of taking any action under the repealed law if no action has already been taken or purported to be taken under the repealed laws (i.e., under the 1910 Act) before the 2003 Act, had come into force. In short, if anything has already been done or purported to be done or any action, has already been taken or purported to be taken under the 1910 Act, such acts or actions will remain protected, notwithstanding the repeal of the 1948 Act; but if no such act had already been done or purported to be done or if no such action had already been taken or purported to be taken before the 2003 Act, came into force, then, recourse to the repealed provision of the 1948 Act, cannot be had for the purpose of doing any thing or taking any action under the repealed enactment. 12. 12. Coupled with the above, what needs to be noted, most importantly, is that under the provisions of the repealed Act, i.e., 1910 Act, even if anything has already been done or purported to be done or any action Has already been taken or purported to be taken before coming into force of the 2003 Act, the same will not be saved unless the act, which has been done or purported to be done or action, which has been taken or purported to be taken, under the repealed Act, i.e., (1910 Act), is consistent with the provisions of 2003 Act. This, in turn, signifies that after coming into force of the 2003 Act, no act, which has already been done or purported to be done and/or no action, which has already been taken or purported to be taken, under the 1910 Act, shall be continued to have their effect on coming into force of the 2003 Act, if such act or action is inconsistent with the provisions of the 2003 Act. 13. What logically follows from the above discussion is that if, for consumption of electricity, no bill was raised or no notice of demand, notice of recovery or notice of disconnection had been issued to a consumer, before coming into force of the 2003 Act, it would be impermissible for the Board to recover such dues or cut off the supply of electricity to the consumer by taking recourse to its rights under the 1910 Act, if such dues had become payable under the 1910 Act, and no step was taken or resolved to be taken by the Board, before the 2003 Act, came into force, for recovery of its dues and/or for cutting off the supply of electricity to the consumer concerned, 14. Question No. (v) shall stand answered accordingly. 15. Question No. (v) shall stand answered accordingly. 15. Before entering into the discussion on the transitional provisions contained in Section 172 of the 2003 Act, notwithstanding the repeal of the 1910 Act, it needs to be pointed out that Sections 12makes it clear that no person shall transmit electricity or distribute electricity or undertake to trade in electricity unless he is authorized to do so by a licence issued under Section 14 or is exempted under Section 13 Section 12, thus, shows that unless a person is exempted under Section 13 or granted a licence under Section 14, he cannot transmit electricity or distribute electricity or undertake trading in electricity. Section 13, I may point out, empowers the appropriate commission to exempt any local authority, panchayat institution, users association, co-operative societies, non-governmental organizations or franchisees from the operation of Section 12, through such exemption can be granted, in public interest, only on the recommendation of the appropriate Government and in accordance with the national policy formulated under Section 5. Thus, it is the appropriate commission, which has the authority to grant exemption, and not the State Government. I may point out that an appropriate commission, according to Section 2(4) of the 2003 Act, means the central Regulatory Commission referred to in Sub-section (1) of Section 76 or the State Regulatory Commission referred to in Section 82 or the Joint Commission referred to in Section 83, as the case may be, as contemplated by Section 12. 16. What is, now, necessary to note is that Section 2(38) defines a Licence to mean a licence granted under Section 14 and a Licensee, means, according to Section 2(39), a person, who has been granted a licence under Section 14. Since a licensee means a person, who has been granted licence under Section 14, let me point out that Section 14 envisages three kinds of licenses, which can be granted by the appropriate commission inasmuch as Section 14 clearly states that appropriate commission may, oh an application made to it under Section 14, grant a licence to any person (a) to transmit electricity as a transmission licensee; or (b) to distribute electricity as a distribution licensee, and (c) to undertake trading in electricity as an electricity trader, in any area as may be specified in the licence. No wonder, therefore, that a distribution licensee, according to Section 2(17), means, a licensee authorized to operate and maintain a distribution system for supplying electricity to the consumers in his area of supply. Similarly, an electricity trader, according to Section 2(26), means a person, who has been granted, under Section 14 read with Section 12, a licence to undertake trading in electricity; whereas, in the light of Section 2(73) read with Section2(74), a transmission licensee means a licensee, who is authorized to establish or operate transmission lines for the purpose of conveyance of electricity. 17. Thus, the 2003 Act, clearly establishes three distinct categories of licensees, namely, (a) to transmit electricity as a transmission licensee; or (b) to distribute electricity as a distribution licensee; and (c) to undertake trading in electricity as an electricity trader in any area as may be specified in the licence. 18. Let me, now, come to the question as to what a State Transmission Utility ('the STU') is. In this regard, it is worth noticing that according to Section 2(67), a STU means the Board or a Government Company specified as such by the State Government under Sub-section (1) of Section 39. How a STU can be formed and what can be its statutory functions are embodied in Section 39. The relevant provisions of Section 39 are, therefore, reproduced hereinbelow: 39. State Transmission Utility and functions.- (1) The State Government may notify the Board or a Government company as the State Transmission Utility: Provided that the State Transmission Utility shall not engage in the business of trading in electricity: Provided further that the State Government may transfer, and vest any property, interest in property, rights and liabilities connected with, and personnel involved in transmission of electricity, of such State Transmission Utility, to a company or companies to be incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956) to function as transmission licensee through a transfer scheme to be effected in the manner specified under Part XIII and such company or companies shall be deemed to hi transmission licensees under this Act. (2) The functions of the State Transmission Utility shall be- (a) to undertake transmission of electricity through intra State transmission system; (b) to discharge all functions of planning and co-ordination relating to intra State transmission system with- (i) Central Transmission Utility; (ii) State Governments; (iii) Generating companies; (iv) Regional Power Committees; (v) Authority; (vi) Licensees; (vii) Any other person notified by the State Government in this behalf; (c) to ensure development of an efficient, co-ordinated and economical system of intra State transmission lines for smooth flow of electricity from a generating station to the load centres; (d) to provide non-discriminatory open access to its transmission system for use by- (i) any licensee or generating company on payment of the transmission charges; or (ii) any consumer as and when such open access is provided by the State Commission under Sub-section (2) of Section 42, on payment of the transmission charges and a surcharge thereon, as may be specified by the State Commission: Provided that such surcharge shall be utilised for the purpose of meeting the requirement of current level cross-subsidy: Provided further that such surcharge and cross subsidies shall be progressively reduced and eliminated in the manner as may be specified by the State Commission: Provided also that such surcharge may be levied till such time the cross, subsidies are not eliminated: Provided also that the manner of payment and utilisation of the surcharge shall be specified by the State Commission: Provided also that such surcharge shall not be leviable in case open access is provided to a person who has established a captive generating plant for carrying the electricity to the destination of his own use. 19. From a bare reading of Section 39(1), what becomes clear, is that the State Government is competent to notify the Board or-a Government Company as the STU and after the Board has been declared as the STU, the Board shall not engage itself in the business of trading in electricity. This shows that on coming into force of the 2003 Act, the State Government may notify that its existing State Electricity Board, such as, the Assam State Electricity Board, shall function as STU and if a Board, such as, the Assam State Electricity Board, is notified as the STU, it shall cease to engage in the business of trading of electricity. The function of the STU, as indicated by Section 39(2), is limited to undertaking transmission of electricity through intra State transmission system and such other functions and duties as are provided in Section 39. 20. Coupled with the above, one may also note that the second proviso to Section 14 makes it clear that the central Transmission Utility or State Transmission Utility shall be deemed to be a transmission licensee. Thus, while it is the appropriate commission, which can, under Section 14, give licence to a person to function as transmission licensee, the State Government has the power to notify even its existing State Electricity Beard as the STU and, once the State Electricity Board is so notified, it can function as transmission licensee; but it cannot, as a STU, in the light of the proviso to Section 39(1), engage itself in the trading of electricity. What may also be pointed out is that while a STU is completely debarred from functioning as an electricity trader, it may, if granted a licence, under Section 14 read with Section 12, by the appropriate commission, function as a distribution licensee. In other words, while it is not legally permissible at all for a STU to trade in electricity, a STU may, on having received a licence under Section 14 read with Section 12, can function as a distribution licensee. What is, however, extremely important to bear in mind is that while a STU can function, by virtue of its being a STU, as a transmission licensee, it cannot, without a licence, function as a distribution licensee. 21. Bearing in mind the above fundamental aspects of the scheme of 2003 Act, let me, now, turn to Section 172, which contains the transitional provisions. This section reads: 172. 21. Bearing in mind the above fundamental aspects of the scheme of 2003 Act, let me, now, turn to Section 172, which contains the transitional provisions. This section reads: 172. Transitional provisions.- Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Act,- (a) a State Electricity Board constituted under the repealed laws shall be deemed to be the State Transmission Utility and a licensee under the provisions of this Act, for a period of one year from the appointed date or such 'earlier date as the State Government may notify, and shall perform the duties and functions of the State Transmission Utility and a licensee in accordance with the provisions of this Act, and rules and regulations made thereunder: Provided that the State Government may, by notification, authorise the State Electricity Board to continue to function as the Stat Transmission Utility or a licensee for such further period beyond the said period of one year as may be mutually decided by the central Government and the State Government. (b) all lecences, authorisations, approvals, clearances and permissions granted under the provisions of the repealed laws may, for a period not exceeding one year from the appointed date or such earlier period; as may be notified by the Appropriate Government, continue to operate as if the repealed laws were in force with respect to such licences, authorisations, approvals, clearances and permissions, as the case may be, and thereafter such licences, authorisations, approvals, clearances and permissions shall be deemed to be licences, authorisations, approvals, clearances and permission under this Act, and all provisions of this Act, shall apply accordingly to such licences authorisations approvals, clearances and permissions. (c) the undertaking of the State Electricity Boards established under Section 5 of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 (54 of 1948) may after the expiry of the period specified in Clause (a) be transferred in accordance with the provisions of Part XIII of this Act; (d) the State Government may, by notification, declare that any or all the provisions contained in this Act; shall not apply in that State for such period, not exceeding six months from the appointed date, as may be stipulated in the notification. 22. 22. A careful and cautious reading of Section 172 clearly shows that on coming into force of the 2003 Act, w.e.f. 10.6.2003, a State Electricity Board, such as, the Assam State Electricity Board, shall be deemed to be the STU as well as a licensee, under the 2003 Act, for a period of one year from the appointed date or such earlier date as the State Government may notify. Consequently, if the State Government does not specify, by way of notification, any earlier date on which the existing State Electricity Board, such as, the Assam State Electricity Board constituted under the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948, and hereinafter referred to as the 1948 Act, shall cease to act, the resultant effect would be that the State Electricity Board, such as, the Assam State Electricity Board, shall, on expiry of a period of one year from the appointed date, cease to be the STU as well as the licensee under the 2003 Act. The proviso to Clause (a) of Section 172, however, empowers the State Government to authorize its existing Electricity Board, such as, the Assam State Electricity Board, to continue to function either as a STU or as a licensee for such further period beyond the said period of one year as may be mutually decided by the central Government as well as the State Government. This power of extension can, however, be exercised by the State Government only by way of notification. 23. Thus, for a period of one year from the appointed date, Assam State Electricity Board, in the present case, could have continued, without a licence, to function as the STU as well as a licensee under the 2003 Act, but upon expiry of a period of one year from the appointed date, it could have neither functioned as a STU nor could it have functioned as a distribution licensee unless the respondents herein can show that the State Government had, before the expiry of the said period of one year, and by virtue of an appropriate notification, authorized the State Electricity Board to function either as a STU or as a licensee. 24. Pausing here for a moment, let me point out that Section 2(46) defines notification to mean, notification published in the Official Gazette and the expression "notify" shall be construed accordingly. 24. Pausing here for a moment, let me point out that Section 2(46) defines notification to mean, notification published in the Official Gazette and the expression "notify" shall be construed accordingly. This, in turn, means that when the 2003 Act, empowers the State or any other authority to do a thing by notifying the same, it would mean that such an act is possible to do only by way of notification published in the official gazette. 25. It is also worth pointing that under Clause (a) of Section 172, the, State Government may cut short the said period of one year, but cannot extend the said period of one year except as has been indicated in the proviso to Clause (a) of Section 172. The proviso to Clause (a) of Section 172shows, as already pointed out above) that a State Government can, by way of notification, authorize the State Electricity Board, constituted under the 1948 Act, to continue to function as a STU or a Licensee beyond the said period of one year provided that such extension is mutually decided by the central and the State Government and such a decision is notified in the official gazette. Hence, if no notification is published, in the Official Gazette, under the proviso to Clause (a) of Section 172, authorising a State Electricity Board to function as a STU or as a Licensee, the State Electricity Board concerned cannot, beyond the period of one year from the appointed date, function either as a Licensee or as the STU. 26. In the present case, though the Board has produced the notifications, dated 10.6.2004, 7.8.2004 and 8.10.2004, authorizing the Board to act both as the STU as well as a licensee, what needs to be noted is that no notification was published in the official gazette. That the State Government was aware of the fact that without a Gazette notification, published in this regard, the ASEB would not be able to function as STU and/or as a licensee is evident from the fact that the State Government did publish such a Gazette notification. In fact, the first gazette notification, in this regard, was published on 5.6.2006. By the time, however, this notification, dated 5.6.2006, was brought out, more than one year of the period, prescribed under Section 172(a), had already elapsed. 27. In fact, the first gazette notification, in this regard, was published on 5.6.2006. By the time, however, this notification, dated 5.6.2006, was brought out, more than one year of the period, prescribed under Section 172(a), had already elapsed. 27. What logically follows from the above discussion is that in the absence of any gazette notification extending the authority of the existing State Electricity Board to act as a STU or as a licensee under the 2003 Act, the State Electricity Board, such as, the Assam State Electricity Board, could not have functioned and cannot, now, function either as a STU or as a licensee. I may also pause here to point out that as the STU, a Board can function as a transmission licensee only. However, as a licensee, it can function not only as a transmission licensee, but also as a distribution licensee and/or as an electricity trader. 28. It has been contended by Mr. N. Dutta, learned senior Counsel, that in the present case, since the Gazette notification, enabling the Assam State Electricity Board to function either as a STU or as a Licensee under the 2003 Act, has not been published within the prescribed period of one year as envisaged by Section 172(a), the Board, in the present case, could not have functioned beyond one year from the appointed date either as a STU or as a Licensee, particularly, when the Gazette notification, published on 5.6.2006, does not mention that the said notification would come into force with retrospective effect. Thus, the Gazette notification is, according to Mr. Dutta, prospective and whatever the Board has done or whatever action the Board has taken as a licensee after a period of one year from the appointed day, the same needs to be treated as beyond the jurisdiction of the Board and non est in law. This submission of Mr. Dutta has, by and large, been supported by other learned Counsel, appearing for various writ petitioners. 29. Mr. This submission of Mr. Dutta has, by and large, been supported by other learned Counsel, appearing for various writ petitioners. 29. Mr. Mishra, learned senior Counsel, appearing on behalf of the Board, on the other hand, submits that though a State Electricity Board cannot be deemed to be the STU as well as a Licensee beyond the period of one year from the appointed date or such shorter period as the State Government may notify, it is possible for such a State Electricity Board to function, both as the STU as well as a Licensee, beyond the said period of one year, if so decided mutually by the central and the State Government. It is contended by Mr. Mishra that while reading the proviso to Clause (a) of Section172, the word occurring as "or" shall be read as "and". If so construed, a State Electricity Board can function both as the STU as well as a Licensee beyond the said period of one year as may be mutually decided by the central Government and the State Government. The argument of Mr. Mishra has a flaw. If it were the intention of the Legislature to enable a State Electricity Board to function both as a STU as well as a licensee beyond a period of one year from the appointed date, nothing could have stopped the Legislature from incorporating in the proviso to Clause (a) of Section 172that if the central as well as the State Governments mutually decide, it may, by notification, authorize the State Electricity Board to function both as a STU as well as a licensee. The Legislature, however, has not done so; rather, the Legislature has provided that with the mutual decision of the central as well as State Government, a State Electricity Board may function, beyond the said period of one year, either as a STU or as a licensee. 30. The Legislature, however, has not done so; rather, the Legislature has provided that with the mutual decision of the central as well as State Government, a State Electricity Board may function, beyond the said period of one year, either as a STU or as a licensee. 30. The legislative intent, behind the provisions of Section 172(a), appears to be that a State Electricity Board may be allowed to function both as a STU as well as a licensee for a limited period of one year from the appointed date and, if required, the State Government may even cut short the period of functioning of its existing State Electricity Board both as a STU as well as a licensee; but the State Electricity Board cannot function both as a STU as well as a licensee beyond the said period of one year. The State Government will have a choice to retain its State Electricity Board either as a STU of it may let its existing Electricity Board function as a licensee beyond the said period of one year provided that the Central as well as the State Government agree to do so and publish necessary Gazette notification in this regard. Therefore, the legislative intent was, undoubtedly, to discourage existing State Electricity Boards from functioning both as STU as well as licensee beyond the period of one year from the appointed date, i.e., on 10.6.2003. 31. It is, now, time to pause and look, once again, to Section 39. Sub-section (1) of Section 39 shows that the State Government may notify the Board or a Government company as the State Transmission Utility. Sub-section (67) of Section 2 defines STU to mean the Board or the Government Company as may have been specified by the Government in exercise of its powers under Section 39(1). 32. No specific notification has been produced before this Court to show that the State Government has, in exercise of its power under Section 39(1), notified the Board as the STU. Thus, the Board functioned, with the help of the transitional provisions, as contained in Section 172(a), for a period of one year from the date of coming into force of the 2003 Act, as the STU as well as a licensee. Thus, the Board functioned, with the help of the transitional provisions, as contained in Section 172(a), for a period of one year from the date of coming into force of the 2003 Act, as the STU as well as a licensee. It has happened only because of the fact that by creating a legal fiction, Section 172 enabled the Board to act as the STU as well as a licensee for the period of one year front the appointed date. When no notification has been published, in the official gazette, empowering the Board to act as a licensee, the Board could not have functioned as, at least, a distribution licensee or as an electricity trader. Why I conclude so is that the gazette notification, which has been published on 5.6.2006, may, at best, be construed as a notification under Section 39(1) and, if so construed, it would mean that the State Government has made the existing State Electricity Board, i.e., the ASEB, a STU and has, with the help of this notification, authorized the Board to act as the transmission licensee inasmuch as it is the State Government, which has the authority to notify the Board as the STU, and as a STU, the Board can function as a transmission licensee. But so far as the functioning of the Board as a distribution licensee is concerned or the capacity of the Board to function as an electricity trader is concerned, the same cannot be conferred by the State Government inasmuch as it is for the appropriate commission to grant a licence for the purpose of distribution enabling a person to function as distribution licensee or to function as a trader in electricity. The only way in which the State Government could have made its State Electricity Board function as a distribution licensee and/or as an electricity trader, besides being a transmission licensee, was, to have published a notification, in terms of the proviso to Clause (a) of Section 172, authorising the Board to continue to function as a licensee. 32A. Even if one assumes, for a moment, that the publication of notification, in the Official Gazette, was not imperative, it is to be borne in mind that the Board could not have, as already mentioned above, functioned both as STU as well as licensee even on the strength of a Government notification. 32A. Even if one assumes, for a moment, that the publication of notification, in the Official Gazette, was not imperative, it is to be borne in mind that the Board could not have, as already mentioned above, functioned both as STU as well as licensee even on the strength of a Government notification. The Government had a choice to either make the Board an STU or a licensee. It appears from the discussion held above that the Government chose to make the Board an STU. Thus, in its capacity as STU, the Board could have functioned as 'transmission licensee'. Once the Board had started functioning as the STU, it could not have functioned at all as an 'electricity trader'. As far as the Board's functioning as a 'distribution licensee' is concerned, the same was not permissible in law unless the Board was granted a licence by the appropriate Commission. In the context of the facts of the present case, it is, therefore, crystal clear that the Board could not have functioned as a 'distribution licensee' without a licence having been issued, in this regard, by the appropriate Commission. 33. Question No. (i) stands answered accordingly. 34. It is, now, the stage to take also note of the fact that Clause (d) of Section 172 makes it clear that unless the State Government, by notification, in the official gazette, declares any or all the provisions of the 2003 Act, shall not to apply, in that State, for such period not existing six months from the appointed date, the provisions of the 2003 Act, would become applicable. Hence, unless a State Government issues a notification under Section 172(a), the provisions of the 2003 Act, must be taken to have come into force on the appointed date. Consequently, if the provisions of the 2003 Act, have to be made non-applicable, then, the State Government must issue a notification by publishing the same in the official gazette declaring that a given provision or all the provisions of the Act, would not apply. At any rate, the applicability of the 2003 Act, cannot, however, be stopped beyond the period of six months from the appointed date. At any rate, the applicability of the 2003 Act, cannot, however, be stopped beyond the period of six months from the appointed date. Since the 2003 Act, has come into force on 10.6.2003 and there is, admittedly, no notification under Section 172(d), all the provisions of the 2003 Act, including Sections 56, 131 and 132, must be treated to have become applicable on 10.6.2003 itself. In short, Section 56 must be held to have come into force, in the absence of showing anything to the contrary, on the appointed dated, i.e., 10.6.2003. Let me, now, look into, and examine, the provisions of Section 56. This section reads: 56. Disconnection of supply in default of payment.- (1) Where any person neglects to pay any charge for electricity or any sum other than a charge for electricity due from him to a licensee, or the generating company in respect of supply, transmission or distribution or wheeling of electricity to him, the licensee or the generating company may, after giving not less than fifteen clear days' notice in writing, to such person and without prejudice to his rights to recover such charge or other sum by suit, cut off the supply of electricity and for that purpose cut or disconnect any electric supply line or other works being the property of such licensee or the generating company through which electricity may have been supplied, transmitted, distributed or wheeled and may discontinue the supply until such charge or other sum, together with any expenses incurred by him in cutting off and reconnecting the supply, are paid, but no longer: Provided that the supply of electricity shall not be cut off if such person deposits, under protest,- (a) an amount equal to the sum claimed from him, or (b) the electricity charges due from him for each month calculated on the basis of average charge for electricity paid by him during the preceding six months, whichever is less, pending disposal of any dispute between him and the licensee. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the-time being in force, no sum due from any consumer, under this section shall be recoverable after the period of two years from the date when such sum became first due unless such sum has been shown continuously as recoverable as arrear of charges for electricity supplied and the licensee shall not cut off the supply of the electricity. 35. A microscopic reading of Sub-section (2) of Section 56 shows that notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, no sum due from any consumer, under this section, shall be recoverable after the period of two years from the date; when such sum became 'first' due unless such sum has been shown continuously as recoverable as arrear of charges for electricity supplied and the licensee shall not cut off the supply of the electricity. 36. As the 2003 Act, came into force on 10.6.2003, it, in the absence of any notification having been issued under Section 172(d), becomes clear that with effect from 10.6.2003, no sum due from any consumer, in the State of Assam, can be recovered after a period of two years from the date, when the said sum became first due unless the said sum has been shown continuously as recoverable as arrear of charges. 37. Having agreed that in terms of the provisions of Section 56(2), the Board is not competent to recover any due from any consumer after a period of two years from the date, when such due became 'first' due unless such sum has been shown continuously as recoverable as arrear of charges for electricity supplied and the licensee shall not cut off the supply of the electricity, Mr. Mishra questions as to when a sum, for the purpose of Section 56(2), be said to have become 'first' due . According to Mr. Mishra, the charges for electricity shall become due only when a bill is raised by the Board for the electricity consumed and not before. 38. Thus, what Mr. Mishra contends is that irrespective of the date on which a consumer might have consumed electricity, the period of limitation of two years, as contemplated by Section 56(2), will not start running unless and until a bill is raised. In respect of this contention, Mr. 38. Thus, what Mr. Mishra contends is that irrespective of the date on which a consumer might have consumed electricity, the period of limitation of two years, as contemplated by Section 56(2), will not start running unless and until a bill is raised. In respect of this contention, Mr. Mishra places reliance on H.D. Shourie v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi AIR 1981 Del. 219 . If this argument of Mr. Mishra is acceded to, the result would be that a consumer will have to pay a bill for electricity, which he might have consumed even 50 years ago. Such cannot be the intent and purpose of placing the embargo of limitation, under Section 56(2), on a licensee's right to recover its dues from a consumer. In H.D. Shourie (supra), a bill for electricity, which had been consumed during the period from 20.3.1970 to 20.5.1974, was served on the consumer on 20.10.1977. This was challenged on the ground that the sum, mentioned in the bill, was not recoverable after expiry of the period of three years as provided under the Limitation Act, 1963. In H.D. Shourie (supra), it was Section 24 of the 1910 Act, which was under interpretation. Section 24 read: 24. Discontinuance of supply to consumer neglecting to pay charge: Where any person neglects to pay any charge for energy for any (sum, other than a charge of energy) due from him to a licensee in respect of supply of energy to him, the licensee may, after giving not less than seven clear day's notice in writing to such person and without prejudice to his right to recover such charge or other sum by suit, cut off the supply and for that purpose cut or disconnect any supply line or other works, being the property of the licensee, through which energy may be supplied, and may discontinue the supply until such charge or other sum, together with any expenses incurred by him in cutting off and reconnecting the supply are paid, but no longer. 39. From a careful reading of Section 24, what transpires is that under this section, it was possible for the Board to cut off the supply of electricity by giving 7 day's notice, in writing, to the person, who neglects to pay any electricity charge due from him to a licensee, in respect of supply of energy to him. 39. From a careful reading of Section 24, what transpires is that under this section, it was possible for the Board to cut off the supply of electricity by giving 7 day's notice, in writing, to the person, who neglects to pay any electricity charge due from him to a licensee, in respect of supply of energy to him. Justice B.N. Kirpal (as his lordship then was) held that the word due, according to Section 24would not refer to the date of consumption of electricity; rather, due date would commence, for the purpose of the period of limitation, only when a bill for consumption of electricity is raised. 40. What is required to be pointed out, while dealing with the case of H.D. Shourie (supra), is that it was contended, on behalf of the petitioner, in H.D. Shourie (supra), that a sum will become due on consumption of electricity and if such sum is riot paid within a period of three years from the date of consumption of electricity, such due will not be recoverable. The Delhi High Court turned down this proposition and held that a sum will cease to become recoverable only when a bill, for consumption of electricity, was raised, the same was not paid within the time frame given by the Board and the Board failed, even thereafter, to take any action for recovery of the said sum by instituting appropriate proceeding within a period of three years from the date, when the consumer ought to have, in terms of the bill raised against him, paid. It is this proposition of law, propounded in H.D. Shourie (supra), which Mr. Mishra relies upon. 41. While considering the case of H.D. Shourie (supra), it needs to be borne in mind that the decision in H.D. Shourie (supra) has come up for consideration before this High Court on a number of occasions in the past. In Babulal Jain v. ASEB and Ors. CR No. 1173, 1193, 1142, 1140, 1147, 1154 and 1192 of 1990, decided on 11.6.1996, it was held that the Assam State Electricity Board is not a State and, hence, the period of limitation for realization of the dues payable to the Board is three years. Similar view was expressed in Harishpur Tea Co. Ltd. v. ASEB CR 1608/1990 decided on 8.7.1996. Similar view was expressed in Harishpur Tea Co. Ltd. v. ASEB CR 1608/1990 decided on 8.7.1996. Even in Mokalbari Tea Estate v. ASEB WP(C) 1804/2000 decided on 5.4.2004, it was held that period of limitation for recovery of the dues of the Board, the Board not being a State, shall be three years and Section 112 of the Limitation Act, which prescribes limitation period of 30 years in respect of the State, will not be applicable. In Mokalbari Kanoi Tea Estate Ltd. (supra), the bill was raised long after three years of consumption, the sum, mentioned in the bill, was held to be not recoverable. This decision was upheld by a Division Bench of this Court in ASEB v. Mokalbari Kanoi Tea Estate Ltd., decided on 14.11.206. In the Special Leave Petition, namely, SLP(Civil) No. 1315/07, which challenged the said decision of the Division Bench, the Apex Court declined, on 2.2.2007, to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction, under Article 136 of the Constitution, and dismissed the special leave petition. 42. What is, now, worth mentioning is that the Division Bench, in Mokalbari Kanoi Tea Estate Ltd. (supra), has held that there was no time frame in raising a demand for energy charge in H.D. Shourie (supra); whereas the Terms and Conditions of Supply Act, 1988, in Assam, fixed a period of one month for raising a demand for electricity charges and when one month's period has been given for raising demand, the period of limitation will start running against the Board after a period of one month from the date of consumption of electricity by the consumer concerned. 43. Referring to the decision in H.D. Shourie (supra), and the decision of the Division Bench in ASEB (supra), Mr. Mishra points out that even in H.D. Shourie (supra), a period had been fixed, under the regulations, for raising of bills and this aspect was not noticed by the Division Bench in Mokalbari Kanoi Tea Estate Ltd. (supra). 44. It is true that even in H.D. Shourie (supra), regulations, relating to terms and conditions of supply, had fixed a period for raising of the bills for electricity charges, yet the Delhi High Court held that the sum would become due only when the bill was raised. 44. It is true that even in H.D. Shourie (supra), regulations, relating to terms and conditions of supply, had fixed a period for raising of the bills for electricity charges, yet the Delhi High Court held that the sum would become due only when the bill was raised. What, however, needs to be pointed out is that the terms and conditions of supply, the provisions of the 2003 Act, and the rules and regulations framed thereunder are all required to be read and construed as a complete scheme. Neither the provisions of the Act, can be made ineffective by taking recourse to the terms and conditions of supply of electricity nor can the terms and conditions of supply be made imbecile and ineffective by referring to some provisions of the 2003 Act, the rules and regulations framed thereunder. When the Act, rules, regulations and conditions of supply are read together as a complete scheme, it becomes clear that under the Terms and Conditions of supply, 1998, as operating in Assam, the bill was required to be raised every month and the consumer was required to be given a time frame of 15 days for payment. 45. As regards the Assam Electricity Regulatory Commission (Distribution Code) Regulations, 2004, ('the 2004 Regulations'), which has come into force on 4.2.2005, it may be pointed out that Regulation 4.22, mandates that bill shall be raised every month and the consumer shall be given 15 days' time to make payment from the date of presentation of the bill and that if there is any deviation, in this regard, reasons shall be indicated in the bill itself. Thus, the Terms and Conditions of Supply, 1998, required the bill for energy charge to be raised within one month from the date of consumption of energy and time frame of 15 days for payment by the consumer on presentation of the bill. Similarly, Regulation 4.22 of 2004 the Regulations too requires the bill to be raised, in Assam, within one month from the date of consumption and postulates payment of the bill within 15 days by the consumer from the date of presentation of the bill. Regulation 4.22 envisages that in case there is any deviation, i.e., delay in raising the bill, reasons for the delay must be assigned in the bill itself. Regulation 4.22 envisages that in case there is any deviation, i.e., delay in raising the bill, reasons for the delay must be assigned in the bill itself. Regulation 4.22 reads: 4.2.2.1 Billing Frequency and Serving of Bills Bill frequency for all categories of consumers should preferably be one month. Bills shall be served to the consumers every month giving them time of 15 days from date of presentation for payment. Any deviation from this should be recorded in the bill indicating reason thereof. The Distribution Licensee shall intimate the consumer of the due date oh which he will receive his energy bill and also the due date for payment of his bills. This will normally be the due date for all billing cycles for that Consumer. In case the due date fails on a holiday in any month, the next working day shall be the due date for that month. The bill may be either sent by cost or delivered at the premises of the consumer. The Distribution Licensee shall endeavour to take monthly Meter Reading Instrument ('MRF') downloaded for all connections where meters with MRI download facility are installed. If bills are prepared on the basis of MRI downloads or if meter reading is taken on the basis of remote meter-reading and the consumer wishes to have a record of the reading taken, he shall be allowed so by the officer personnel taking the meter reading. 46. When a Division Bench of this Court, in Mokalbari Kanoi Tea Estate Ltd. (supra), has already held that if bill is not raised for energy charge within a period of one month from the date of consumption of electricity, it would become time barred after a period of three years, this Bench, sitting singly, cannot take a contrary view, particularly, when, for the reasons, which I indicate hereinbelow, I see no reason to take a different view, though the decision of the Division Bench was rendered in the light of the provisions of Section 24 as the same existed under 1910 Act. 47. What surfaces from the discussion held above, is that Regulation 4.22 of 2004 Regulations shows that the bill should, ordinarily, be raised every month and that the bill shall be served on the consumer every month giving him a time frame of 15 days for payment from the date of presentation of the bill. 47. What surfaces from the discussion held above, is that Regulation 4.22 of 2004 Regulations shows that the bill should, ordinarily, be raised every month and that the bill shall be served on the consumer every month giving him a time frame of 15 days for payment from the date of presentation of the bill. For any deviation, in this regard, reasons, according to Regulation 4.22, should be recorded. This shows that the bill shall be served on the consumer every month and any deviation, in this regard, must be supported by reasons. Thus, if no reason has been assigned and a bill has been raised beyond the period of one month from the date of consumption of electricity, such bill would be in violation of Regulation 4.22. Consequently, if no bill is raised for a period of one month from the date of consumption of electricity, the period of limitation would start running on expiry of the period, when the bill, (had the same been raised within time), become payable. If the contention of Mr. Mishra is upheld, the result would be, as already indicated above, that the Board would be in a position to raise a bill even after 50 years of consumption of electricity, which would completely set at naught the entire scheme of the 2003 Act, Rules and Regulations framed thereunder. I may, however, hasten to add that in an extra ordinary case, a bill may be raised even after the mandated period of one month; but, if no reason has been assigned for belatedly raising such a bill, then, in such a case, the period of limitation would nevertheless start running from the date, when the sum, covered by such a bill, would have become payable if the bill had been raised within a period of one month from the date of consumption of electricity. On the other hand, if, in a given case, the reason for belatedly raising the bill is assigned, the period of limitation would start running from the date, when the due date for payment on the basis of such belated bill expires. However, in either case, if the sum due and payable has not been continuously shown as arrear in the subsequent bills, the sum, so due, become, in terms of Section 56(2), irrecoverable and the Board would not be entitled to cut off the supply of electricity. However, in either case, if the sum due and payable has not been continuously shown as arrear in the subsequent bills, the sum, so due, become, in terms of Section 56(2), irrecoverable and the Board would not be entitled to cut off the supply of electricity. Any other interpretation will enable the Board to act arbitrarily. 48. If the scheme of the 2003 Act, is carefully examined, its emphasis is clearly on ensuring efficiency of the person, who functions as a licensee. No wonder, therefore, that Section 61 of 2003 Act, which empowers the appropriate commission to specify the terms and conditions for determination of tariff, clearly lays down that for determining tariff, appropriate commission shall be guided by the consideration of, amongst other, factors, which would encourage productive efficiency, economical use of the resources, good performance and optimum investment, safeguarding of consumer's interest and, at the same time, recovery of the cost of electricity in a reasonable manner and the principle rewarding efficiency in performance. Thus, the 2003 Act aims at rewarding efficiency and discouraging inefficiency. If the principle of rewarding efficiency in performance has to be adhered to, while fixing tariff, or when the factors, which would encourage competitiveness, efficiency and help good performance are to be the guiding factors, then, the Regulation 4.2, in question, has to be interpreted in such a way as would lead too improvement in the performance level of the licensee as well as the STU. Otherwise, the entire purpose and object of the new Act, would stand frustrated. 49. From the discussions held above, what becomes inescapable to conclude is that the right of the Board to recover its dues from a consumer is exercisable subject to the limitation as indicated hereinbefore, namely, that if the dues are in respect of the period, when the Board had been functioning under the 1910 Act, the period of limitation, for the recovery of such dues, would be three years commencing from the date on which the dues would have become payable by the consumer, had the dues been raised within the time period as prescribed under the Terms and Conditions of Supply, 1998. This apart, if such a bill had already been raised before the 2003 Act, came into force, recovery is, in the light of the provisions of Section 185, legally permissible to make even after the 2003 Act, came into force. This apart, if such a bill had already been raised before the 2003 Act, came into force, recovery is, in the light of the provisions of Section 185, legally permissible to make even after the 2003 Act, came into force. However, if the dues become recoverable after the 2003 Act, has already come into force, then, the period of limitation, for the purpose of recovery of such dues, would be two years from the date, when the dues would have become recoverable, had the bill been raised by the Board within the time as prescribed by the 2003 Act, read with the 2004 Regulations and provided further that such dues have been shown in the subsequent bills continuously as recoverable. Moreover, while it was possible for the Board, under the 1910 Act, to cut off the supply of electricity for non-payment of its dues even if the dues had become barred under the law of limitation, no such right to cut off supply of electricity, now, remains, under the 2003 Act, available with a licensee if the dues become irrecoverable on account of the period of limitation, which may have, in a given case, set in, and if the dues have not been shown continuously, for a period of two years, as arrear, in the subsequent bills. 50. Question Nos. (ii), (iii) and (iv) shall stand answered accordingly. 51. In the light of the law, as discussed above, let me, now, turn to the merit of the writ petitions. WP(C) No. 2274/2004 52. The petitioner No. 1 is a public limited company, incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956, and the petitioner No. 2 is its Director. The writ petitioner owns a tea estate, which is run under the name and style of M/s. Meleng Tea Estate. The Assam State Electricity Board ('the ASEB') supplies electricity to the said tea estate enabling the petitioners to run and manage the tea estate. The petitioners' case is, briefly stated, thus: The petitioner has, all along, been paying its dues towards consumption of electricity by the said tea estate and there is no outstanding dues payable to the ASEB. The Assam State Electricity Board ('the ASEB') supplies electricity to the said tea estate enabling the petitioners to run and manage the tea estate. The petitioners' case is, briefly stated, thus: The petitioner has, all along, been paying its dues towards consumption of electricity by the said tea estate and there is no outstanding dues payable to the ASEB. In fact, the ASEB has been issuing clearance certificate, in this regard, from time to time, the last such certificate having been issued, on 26.5.2003, inasmuch as the certificate, dated 26.5.2003, clearly shows that the bills, raided against the petitioner company's said tea estate for consumption of electricity, up to 5.5.2003, have been paid. However, the petitioner has, all of a sudden, been served with a letter, dated 14.2.2004, from the Area Manager, Jorhat Industrial Revenue Collection Area, ASEB, directing the petitioner company to pay an amount of Rs.6,13,507, being arrear amount in respect of the period, as indicated in the statement of account enclosed with the said letter. The statement appended to the bill shows that the dues are for alleged consumption of electricity during the year 1994, 1996 and 1998. Thus, the bills have been raised after about ten years of the alleged consumption of electricity by the petitioner company's said tea estate. Though the petitioner had written a letter requesting the ASEB to recall the demand raised by the bill, the respondents have maintained total silence. The petitioner has no arrear whatsoever to be paid to the respondents. The said amounts, which have been shown by the respondents as recoverable, had never been reflected in any of the bills issued to the petitioners. The demands, so raised, are, thus, barred by time. The respondents cannot, therefore, force the petitioners to pay the said bills by threatening them, as they have been doing, to disconnect supply of electricity to the petitioner company's said tea estate. 53. Though the respondents have filed their affidavit-in-opposition, they have not produced any material on record to show that the amounts mentioned in the impugned bill had, at any point of time in the past, been shown as arrears. 53. Though the respondents have filed their affidavit-in-opposition, they have not produced any material on record to show that the amounts mentioned in the impugned bill had, at any point of time in the past, been shown as arrears. The respondents merely claim that the earlier billing used to be prepared and raised by Kakajan Electrical Sub-Division of the ASEB and, subsequently, the said work of billing has been handed over to the respondent No. 3, namely, Area Manager, Jorhat Industrial Revenue Collection Area, and respondent No. 3 has accordingly raised the bill. Though the respondents claim that the bill was raised within time, they have not been able to show as to when the arrear amounts, which, now, stand included in the bill bad been raised in the past. 54. As already indicated above, the statement, appended to the impugned bill, shows that the alleged dues, sought to be realized from the petitioner company, relate to the years 1994, 1996 and 1998. The amounts, which have been demanded under the impugned bill, are not shown to have ever been raised. The arrear amounts have, admittedly, not been shown continuously as outstanding at any given point of time. 55. I have already pointed out above that the 2003 Act, came into forced with effect from 10.6.2003 and in exercise of its power under Section 172(d) of the 2003 Act, the Government has not published any notification declaring that any of the provisions of the 2003 Act; shall1 not apply. In such circumstances, on the day, when the impugned bill was raised, the provisions of Section 56had already come into force. I have also held that after coming into force of the 2003 Act, the ASEB cannot demand any arrear, as dues of energy charge, payable by a consumer, after a period of 25 months from the date of consumption of electricity unless reasons for not raising the bill are assigned and, further, unless such arrear had been continuously shown as recoverable by the ASEB. In the light of the position of law, as reflected by Section 56(2), it becomes clear that the with the help of the impugned bill, the respondents cannot, now, recover the amounts, covered by the impugned Bill, after about 6 to 10 years from the date of the alleged consumption of electricity by the petitioner company's said tea estate, particularly, when the energy charges had hot been raised within the period prescribed under the Terms and Conditions of supply, 1998, and/or under the 2004 Regulations. 56. At the time of hearing of this writ petition, Mr. B.D. Das, learned Counsel, appearing on behalf of the ASEB, has submitted that notwithstanding the repeal of the 1910 Act, the provisions of the 1910 Act, have been saved with regard to recovery of the dues, which are payable by a consumer in respect of consumption of electricity during the period, when the 1948 Act, was in force. 57. While considering the submissions, so made on behalf of the ASEB, one has to, once again, refer back to the provisions of Section 185. While discussing the scope of Section 185, it has been clearly pointed out above that the 2003 Act, saves only those acts of the respondents, which had already been done or purported to be done or only those actions, which had already been taken or purported to be taken before the 2003 Act, came into force. With the coming into force of the 2003 Act, with effect from 10.6.2003, the provisions of the new Act, (i.e., the 2003 Act), in the absence of any notification having been issued under Section 172(d), have come into force. Only those actions of the ASEB have, therefore, been saved, which have already taken by the ASEB or purported to be taken under the 1910 Act. In the present case, the impugned bill had, admittedly, not been raised for more than three years from the date of consumption of electricity nor was any step taken by the ASEB, before the 2003 Act, came into force, to cut off the supply of electricity to the said tea estate. In the present case, the impugned bill had, admittedly, not been raised for more than three years from the date of consumption of electricity nor was any step taken by the ASEB, before the 2003 Act, came into force, to cut off the supply of electricity to the said tea estate. Thus, in the light of the decision, in Mokalbari Kanoi Tea Estate Ltd. (supra), the dues do not remain payable after a period of three years from the date, when the sum had, for the first time, become due nor can the ASEB cut off the supply of electricity for the said alleged unpaid dues of the consumer, when no action either for recovery of the dues or for cutting off the supply of electricity was taken, when the provisions of 1948 Act, were in force. 58. In short, the sums, which have been shown as dues in the bill, are neither recoverable nor can the respondents cut off supply of electricity to the petitioner company's said tea estate on the ground of nonpayment of arrear amounts by the petitioner company. 59. Because of what have been discussed and pointed out above, I am of the view that the impugned bill is not enforceable against the petitioner company and that the respondents cannot cut off supply of electricity to the petitioner's said tea estate on the ground of nonpayment of impugned arrear electricity bill by the petitioner company. 60. In the result and for the reasons discussed above, this writ petition m allowed. The impugned bill, dated 13.2.2004 (Annexure-C to the writ petition), is hereby set aside and quashed. WP(C) No. 3178/2007 61. The petitioner herein has a commercial complex, which has been receiving, as a consumer, supply of electricity from the ASEB. The petitioners have challenged the supplementary bill, dated 15.5.2007, which the respondents have raised on the basis of an inspection report, prepared pursuant to an inspection conducted at the petitioners' premises on 24.6.2004, which alleges that the meter, installed at the petitioners' premises, had been running slow by 39.6%. On 23.7.2004, the respondents installed a new static meter, with new cables, at the petitioners' premises. In the meanwhile, respondents had raised the pi, dated 9.7.2004, for the period from 7.6.2004 to 7.7.2004, for an amount of Rs.1,36,109.39. The said amount, according to the petitioners, included consumption charges for the alleged 39.6% slow running of the meter. On 23.7.2004, the respondents installed a new static meter, with new cables, at the petitioners' premises. In the meanwhile, respondents had raised the pi, dated 9.7.2004, for the period from 7.6.2004 to 7.7.2004, for an amount of Rs.1,36,109.39. The said amount, according to the petitioners, included consumption charges for the alleged 39.6% slow running of the meter. There is no dispute that the said amount of Rs.1,36,109.39 included consumption charges for the alleged 39.6% slow running of the meter. The petitioners accordingly paid the said bill. Thereafter, regular bills have raised by the respondents on the basis of the said new static meter and, thus, the bills have accordingly been paid by the petitioners. Thereafter, sometime in December; 2004, the petitioner was served with a bill, dated 10.12.2004, amounting to Rs.2,17,571, for a period of 180 days prior to 23.7.2004 (i.e., the date of the MTI inspection) for "less claim due to meter accuracy found inconsistent on inspection by an MTI wing of the Board dated 23.7.2004". 62. The petitioners, on being served with the bill, dated 10.12.2004, informed the respondents that the respondents could not have raised the bill on the basis of the average consumption, when the MTI inspection had clearly recorded that the meter was running slow by 39.6%. The respondents, according to the petitioners, accepted the petitioners' contention and asked the petitioners to give an application so that the bill, dated 10.12.2004, could be rectified. The petitioners accordingly issued a letter on 23.12.2004 and the same was received by the respondents. Thereafter, the respondent authorities did not issue any fresh bill and the matter was never reopened. However, the respondents have, now, raised the impugned bill, dated 15.5.2007, against the bill, dated 10.12.2004, aforementioned. The bill, dated 15.5.2007, stands challenged by the respondents on the ground that the same was not recoverable under Section 156(2) of the 2003 Act, read with Regulation 4.22 of the 2004 Regulations. 63. The respondents have filed their affidavit-in-opposition. The case of the respondents is, in brief, thus: The EM meter was found defective on 23.7.2004 and the same was replaced by a correct static (electronic) meter on 23.7.2004 itself. 63. The respondents have filed their affidavit-in-opposition. The case of the respondents is, in brief, thus: The EM meter was found defective on 23.7.2004 and the same was replaced by a correct static (electronic) meter on 23.7.2004 itself. To raise a supplementary bill in respect of correct reading and consumption, three months' period, after the installation of the correct electronic meter, was required and, hence, the supplementary bill, dated 10.12.2004, was issued, though the meter was found defective on 23.7.2004. A reminder was accordingly issued, on 13.12.2004, by the respondents asking the petitioners to pay the supplementary bill, dated 10.12.2004, for a sum of Rs.2,15,418. The petitioners, however, have not paid the same. The respondents contend that by a letter, dated 14.5.2007, the respondents had rejected the petitioner's representation, dated 23.12.2004, aforementioned. 64. Thus, it is the admitted case of the respondents that they responded to the petitioner's letter, dated 23.12.2004, as late as on 14.5.2007, 65. What emerges from the above discussion is that even according to the respondents, they had raised the bill for the alleged arrear amount on 10.12.2004, i.e., after the 2003 Act, had already come into force. Since the 2003 Act, has come into force with the object of improving tin performance level of the persons, who function as transmission licensees or distribution licensees or electricity traders, the provisions of Section 56(2) need to be strictly construed. So construed, Section 56(2) will mean that if a sum, according to the distribution licensee or electricity trader, falls due and payable by a consumer, the bill must be raised, and if it is not paid in time, the arrear must be shown continuously, for a period of two years, as recoverable dues. It is an admitted position that on receipt of the bill, dated 10.12.2004, when the petitioners gave their letter, dated 23.12.2004, the respondents did not include, in the bills, which were subsequently served on the petitioners, the amount of Rs.2,15,418. It is only on 14.5.2007 that the respondents are shown to have rejected the petitioners' representation, dated 23.12.2004, i.e., the petitioners' said representation was rejected by the respondents after more than two years from the date of its receipt. This apart, the impugned sum of money has not been reflected in the bills in terms of the provisions of Section56(2). It is only on 14.5.2007 that the respondents are shown to have rejected the petitioners' representation, dated 23.12.2004, i.e., the petitioners' said representation was rejected by the respondents after more than two years from the date of its receipt. This apart, the impugned sum of money has not been reflected in the bills in terms of the provisions of Section56(2). Even in the light of the decision in H.D. Shourie (supra), when the respondents had raised the bill, dated 10.12.2004, demanding a sum of Rs.2, 15,418 and, thereafter, since the petitioners had not paid the said sum of Rs.2,15,418 and the respondents had not, according to what the respondents themselves contend, withdrawn the demand, the alleged arrear dues, in the light of the scheme of the 2003 Act, ought to have been reflected continuously in the bills, which had been raised by the respondents from time to time and, served on the petitioners, but, having not done so, the respondents, in the light of the clear provisions in Section 56(2), cannot, now, recover the said sum nor can they cut off supply of electricity to the petitioner's commercial complex on the basis of the impugned bill and/or the notice of disconnection, dated 22.6.2007, which has been issued by the respondents. To put it a little differently, since the petitioners have not paid the said sum of Rs.2,15,418, the respondents have served on them a disconnection notice, dated 22.6.2007; but when the impugned bill, dated 15.5.2007, has, in the light of the provisions of law, been held to be not recoverable, the disconnection notice too cannot, under Section 56(2), be sustained. 66. In the result and for the foregoing reasons, the impugned bill, dated 15.5.2007, and the demand notice, dated 26.12.2007, are hereby set aside and quashed. The respondents are directed not to realize the amount demanded by the impugned bill, dated 15.5.2007, and not to disconnect the power supply to the petitioner's premises. WP(C) No. 2117/2000 67. The petitioner herein is a private limited company and owns a tea factory in the district of Dibrugarh, the tea factory being a consumer of electricity supplied by the ASEB. 68. The petitioner's case is, briefly stated, thus: An electricity bill, dated 11.2.2000, for a sum of Rs.85,122.30, for the period, from 5.4.1994 to 16.2.1995, was served on the petitioner by the respondents herein. 68. The petitioner's case is, briefly stated, thus: An electricity bill, dated 11.2.2000, for a sum of Rs.85,122.30, for the period, from 5.4.1994 to 16.2.1995, was served on the petitioner by the respondents herein. Upon enquiry, the petitioner was informed that the said bill had been raised as a result of an audit objection for less billing on the ground that the power factor (PF) was found to be 0.7, which is below the required level of 0.85. In response to the bill, the petitioner submitted an appeal to the respondents stating therein that capacitor had, as required, been installed at the petitioner's factory in the year 1994, that on the date of inspection, i.e., on 6.10.1994, the said capacitor was found to be in order, that surcharge can be levied only when capacitor is not installed, and that there was no lower PF recorded and, therefore, the said bill was illegal and the same should be cancelled. The respondent No. 3, namely, Superintending Engineer, ASEB, accordingly called for a report, on 9.3.2000, from the Area Manager, Tinsukia IRC Area, whereupon a consolidated bill of the capacitor charge along with current consumption charges was served on the petitioner on 7.3.2000. The petitioner raised objection regarding the consolidated bill and requested issuance of separate bill so as to enable the petitioner to pay the current consumption charges, whereupon the petitioner was allowed to pay the current consumption charges, and the petitioner accordingly paid the current consumption charges. While the matter so rested, the respondent No. 4, namely, Assistant Executive Engineer, Tinsukia (Higher) Collection Areas, ASEB, issued a disconnection notice, dated 11.4.2000, to the petitioner demanding payment of Rs.86,824. The raising of the bill for the capacitor charge for the period from 5.4.1994 to 16.9.1995 is, according to the petitioner, illegal, when the capacitor, installed at their factory, was found to be in order on the date of inspection held on 6.10.1994. This apart, the petitioner contends that the dues, if any, in respect of the period, from 5.4.1994 to 6.9.1995, cannot be recovered by the respondents by raising a bill on 11.4.2000 inasmuch as more than three years had elapsed since the time, when the said sum of Rs.86,824 had fallen due. 69. This apart, the petitioner contends that the dues, if any, in respect of the period, from 5.4.1994 to 6.9.1995, cannot be recovered by the respondents by raising a bill on 11.4.2000 inasmuch as more than three years had elapsed since the time, when the said sum of Rs.86,824 had fallen due. 69. While resisting the writ petition, the respondents contend that the bills have been correctly raised inasmuch as the PF was, at the time of inspection, found to be 0.07, though the PF ought to have been at the level of 0.85. As far as the delay in raising the bill is concerned, the respondents have assigned no cogent reason. 70. The question as to whether the amount was, on 16.10.1994, payable or not, is a disputed question of fact inasmuch as the petitioner contends that on the date of inspection, which was carried out on 16.10.1994, the capacitor was found to be functioning properly; whereas the respondents claim that the PF of the capacitor was found to be running at the level of 0.07, though the PF level ought to have been 0.85. 71. In the present case, since the impugned bill, dated 11.2.2000, was raised in respect of a period as far back as 5.4.1994 to 16.2.1995, it is, in the light of the Division Bench decision, in Mokalbari Kanoi Tea Estate (P.) Ltd. (supra), clear that the amount, mentioned in the impugned bill, is not recoverable inasmuch as the dues, if any, became time-barred after a lapse of three years from the date, when it had fallen due. 72. As far as the notice of disconnection, dated 11.4.2000, is concerned, it may be pointed out that under the 1910 Act, though a sum, due, might have become barred by period of limitation, it was still permissible to cut off supply of electricity if the payment was not made. This could be done on the strength of the provisions of Section 24 of the 1910 Act, which read as under: 24. This could be done on the strength of the provisions of Section 24 of the 1910 Act, which read as under: 24. Discontinuance of supply to consumer neglecting to pay charge.- Where any person neglects to pay any charge for energy for any (sum, other than a charge of energy) due from him to a licensee in respect of supply of energy to him, the licensee may, after giving not less than seven clear day's notice in writing to such person and without prejudice to his right to recover such charge or other sum by suit, cut off the supply and for that purpose cut or disconnect any supply line or other works, being the property of the licensee, through which energy may be supplied, and may discontinue the supply until such charge or other sum, together with any expenses incurred by him in cutting off and reconnecting the supply are paid, but no longer. 73. In the case of Swastic Industries v. Maharashtra State Electricity Board (1997) 9 SCC 465 , while dealing with a case under Section 24 of the Electricity Act, 1910, the Apex Court has made it clear that the right to recover the dues of an Electricity Board, as a licensee, is different from, and independent of, its right to discontinue supply of electrical energy to the consumer, who neglects to pay the charges. The right to file a suit, points out the Supreme Court, in Swastic Industries (supra), is a matter of option given to the licensee and, hence, the mere fact that there is a right given to the licensee to file suit for recovery of its dues and the suit, which could have been filed, has become barred by the prescribed period of limitation, such a bar of limitation would not take away the licensee's right to make demand for payment of charges and, on neglecting to pay the same, to discontinue or cut off the supply of electrical energy to the consumer. 74. 74. Unlike Section 56(2), which prohibits a licensee from cutting off supply of electricity in respect of time-barred dues, there was no such restriction in the provisions contained in Section 24 of the 1948 Act, and, hence, notwithstanding the fact that a sum might have become irrecoverable from the consumer due to bar of limitation, the ASEB still had the power to cut off supply of electricity for non-payment of such time-barred dues; whereas, under Section 56(2), when a sum becomes irrecoverable, non-payment of such a sum cannot be made a ground for cutting off supply of electricity to the consumer concerned. 75. With regard to the above, a reference may also be made to the case of Khadi Gram Udyog Trust v. Ram Chandrdji Virajman Mandir, Sarasiyaghat, Kanpur (1978) 1 SCC 44 , wherein the question, which fell for determination, was that since the amount claimed, as rent, had become time-barred, whether the fact that the rent had not been paid could have become a ground for eviction of a tenant treating the tenant as a defaulter. The Apex Court answered the question in affirmative folding that though a debt may become time-barred, the debt does not extinguish and that any other relief, which the creditor has, under the law, can be availed of by the creditor. 76. In view of what have been discussed above, while the respondents are hereby directed not to recover the sum, mentioned in the bill, dated 11.4.2000, the respondents are left with liberty to cut off the Supply of electricity to the premises of the petitioner, if the sum, as claimed by the respondents, is still due. The question, as to whether the said sum is due or not, is a question, which can be decided only by a civil court of competent jurisdiction. The respondents shall, therefore, remain at liberty to disconnect the supply of electricity to the premises of the petitioner if the petitioner does not pay the said amount provided that the said sum has remained unpaid by the petitioner. This liberty is subject to any order(s), which may be passed by a civil court of competent jurisdiction if the petitioner chooses to approach a civil court of competent jurisdiction for determination of the question as to whether the sum, in question, has remained unpaid, though barred by limitation so far as its recovery is concerned. WP(C) No. 6460/1999 77. This liberty is subject to any order(s), which may be passed by a civil court of competent jurisdiction if the petitioner chooses to approach a civil court of competent jurisdiction for determination of the question as to whether the sum, in question, has remained unpaid, though barred by limitation so far as its recovery is concerned. WP(C) No. 6460/1999 77. The petitioner herein is a unit of Assam Ashok Hotels Corporation Ltd., a joint venture hotel of Indian Tourism Development Corporation, and the State of Assam, having its registered office at Hotel Brahmaputra Ashok, Guwahati. The petitioner has been a consumer of electricity, which it had been receiving from the respondents. The case of the petitioner is as under: As the petitioner is an industrial unit, it ought to have been charged by the respondents on the basis of the tariff meant for industrial units, but the respondents have been charging the petitioner on the basis of the tariff, which is meant for consumers of commercial activities. In the year 1987, the ASEB enhanced the tariff, for commercial establishments from Rs.0.70 to Rs.1.30 per unit. Though the petitioner raised objection to the enhancement of tariff, the ASEB declined to treat the petitioner as an industrial consumer. The petitioner, then, filed a writ petition, which gave rise to Civil Rule No. 606/1988. In the said writ petition, a miscellaneous application was also made, which gave rise to Misc. Case No. 582/1988, whereby the writ petitioner sought for setting aside the enhanced tariff. By order, dated 25.3.1988, passed in Misc. Case No. 582/1988 aforementioned, the petitioner was directed to pay minimum tariff plus Rs.0.90 per unit. The ASEB accordingly raised bill and the petitioner paid the said amount as well as the due arrear amount payable by the petitioner. The said writ petition was dismissed, on 11.6.1993, for default. The petitioner, however, remained unaware as regards the dismissal of the writ petition and, in course of time, the period for making application of restoration of the writ petition expired. Thereafter, the ASEB issued, vide letter, dated 25.3.1994, an arrear bill, dated 22.3.1994, demanding payment of an amount of Rs.15,92,299.24 including surcharge on the arrear amount from 29.2.1988 to 18.6.1993. The ASEB also offered rebate to the petitioner if the said amount of Rs.15,92,299.24 inclusive of surcharge was paid within due date. Thereafter, the ASEB issued, vide letter, dated 25.3.1994, an arrear bill, dated 22.3.1994, demanding payment of an amount of Rs.15,92,299.24 including surcharge on the arrear amount from 29.2.1988 to 18.6.1993. The ASEB also offered rebate to the petitioner if the said amount of Rs.15,92,299.24 inclusive of surcharge was paid within due date. On the request of the petitioner, the ASEB, vide letter 13.6.1993, allowed the petitioner to pay the arrear amount, in thirteen equal monthly installments, subject to the condition that if the installments were paid timely, no further surcharge would be leviable. The petitioner accordingly cleared the whole amount. However, after about four years, the ASEB, vide letter, dated 12.1.1998, raised a bill for a sum of Rs.28,78,270 as surcharge on the arrear bill amount, covering the period from 29.2.1988 to 18.6.1993. In their letter, while forwarding the said bill to the petitioner, the ASEB mentioned therein that the said bill has been raised in terms of the order, dated 11.6.1993, passed, in Misc. Case No. 582/1988 in Civil Rule No. 606/1988. The ASEB has raised the bill in respect of the surcharge, which it ought not to have done inasmuch as the payment had already been made, as indicated hereinbefore, in terms of the ASEB's letter, dated 13.6.1994, aforementioned. Aggrieved by the demand, so made, the petitioner preferred an appeal, in accordance with the Terms and Conditions of Supply, 1998. The appeal, however, yielded no favourable result to the petitioner inasmuch as the appellate authority held that even if rebate was allowed for payment in due time, surcharge could still be claimed thereafter and further that the ASEB had suffered financial loss for not being able to recover its arrear from 29.2.1988 to 18.6.1993. The respondents have assigned, however, no reason as to how the surcharge can be levied twice. By letter, dated 19.11.1999, the fact that the appeal having been allowed was communicated to the petitioner. This was followed by a letter, dated 17.12.1999, issued by the ASEB, thereby serving, on the petitioner, a notice of disconnection requiring the petitioner to either pay the amount within a period of seven days or else suffer disconnection of supply of electricity. The demand raised by the ASEB is, according to the petitioner, against its own assurance and, hence, the same is illegal. The demand raised by the ASEB is, according to the petitioner, against its own assurance and, hence, the same is illegal. This apart, the demand raised by the ASEB is barred by limitation and, hence, the respondents may be restrained from recovering the said amount of surcharge from the petitioner and also from cutting off the supply of electricity to the premises of the petitioner. 78. While resisting the writ petition, the respondent have contended as under: As per Clause 18(c) of the Terms and Conditions of Supply, 1988, surcharge at the rate of 5%, for non-payment of bill within time, can be raised against a consumer. The petitioner was charged tariff at the rate of Rs.1,30 per unit. The petitioner, did not, however, agree to pay on the ground that it is an industrial unit, and filed the writ petition and, on the strength of the order of the court, paid at the rate of 90 paise per unit in addition to the minimum charge. In the bill, dated 22.3.1994, which covered the period from 29.2.1988 to 18.6.1993, the actual amount claimed was Rs.16,97,912.35; but, on giving rebate, it came to Rs.15,92,299.24. The surcharge amount of Rs.38,239.95 was billed only for non-payment of energy bill at the rate of 90 paise within due date and the same did not include the surcharge bill for the differential amount between Rs.1.30 and 0.90. On 8.4.1997, Writ Appeal No. 235/1990, which had been preferred by another hotel management, seeking same kind of relief, as had been claimed by the present petitioner, was disposed of allowing the ASEB to charge surcharge at the rate of 18% per annum. Similar orders were passed in other writ appeals too. The ASEB, then, filed a special leave petition and, by order, dated 31.10.2001, passed, in SLP No. 3489-3608/1989, the ASEB was allowed to raise surcharge at the rate of 28% per annum and, it was after the order, dated 31.10.2001, was passed, the impugned bill was raised and the same includes surcharge at the rate of 16% per annum covering the period from 29.2.1988 to 18.6.1993. 79. While considering the present writ petition, what needs to be noted is that the averments made by the writ petitioner, in paragraph 6 of the writ petition, is to the effect that before the bill, dated 22.3.1994, the ASEB had demanded an amount of Rs.15,92,299.24 including surcharge. 79. While considering the present writ petition, what needs to be noted is that the averments made by the writ petitioner, in paragraph 6 of the writ petition, is to the effect that before the bill, dated 22.3.1994, the ASEB had demanded an amount of Rs.15,92,299.24 including surcharge. Pointing out as to how the said amount of Rs.15,92,299.24 had been demanded from the petitioner, the petitioner has averred, in paragraph 6 of the writ petition, that the total amount of surcharge, claimed by the ASEB, was Rs.38,259.95, and the surcharge was claimed for the arrear amount from 29.2.1988 to 18.6.1993. The total bill was raised for Rs.16,97,912.35 and a rebate of Rs.1,05,613.11 was offered as per the provisions of Clause 18(c) of the Terms and Conditions of Supply, 1988. The averments, so made, in paragraph 6, have been denied and disputed by the respondents. This apart, the bill, in question, mentions that the total surcharge is Rs.38,239.95. Thus, in the bill, dated 25.3.1994, the total surcharge mentioned was Rs.38,239.95. This had been issued to the petitioner after the petitioner's writ petition stood already dismissed for default. There was, thus, no impediment, on the part of the ASEB, to claim the amount, which was leviable as surcharge. Having negotiated with the petitioner, the respondents allowed the petitioner, as contended by the petitioner, to pay the arrear, in thirteen equal monthly installments, with the condition that if the installments were paid in time, no further surcharge would be leviable. The letter, dated, 13.6.1994, issued by the ASEB, which contained the above relief, read as under: In consideration of the application of the above consumer, installments relief towards realization of the amount of Rs.14,52,299.00 (Rupees fourteen lakhs fifty-two thousand two hundred ninety-nine) only is hereby granted under the following terms and conditions: 1. First installment amounting to Rs.1,52,000 (Rupees one lakh fifty-two thousand) only is to be paid by the consumer on or before 25th June, 1994. 2. The balance amount is to be cleared in 13(thirteen) number of equal monthly installments of Rs.1,00,000 to be paid by the consumer every consecutive month before 13th of each month. 3. For timely payment of installment so granted, no further surcharge on arrear amount as on the date of granting installment will be levied, failure to clear any installment in time will attract levying of surcharge as per Board's rule. 80. 3. For timely payment of installment so granted, no further surcharge on arrear amount as on the date of granting installment will be levied, failure to clear any installment in time will attract levying of surcharge as per Board's rule. 80. From Clause 3, as quoted above, it becomes clear that the ASEB had entered into an agreement with the petitioner not to levy any further surcharge, though it had no impediment, under the law, to raise such charge, 81. Having so entered into a contract with the petitioner, the ASEB cannot, now, in the light of the fact that subsequent to the said agreement, which it had entered into with the present petitioner, the ASEB has been allowed, by the order of the Supreme Court, to raise surcharge up to 28%. As far as the parties to the letter, dated 13.6.1994, are concerned, the issue with regard the surcharge stood finally closed, when, the petitioner, in terms of the offer given to the petitioner by the respondents, did pay, admittedly, the arrear amount, within time, which had been agreed to by both the parties. When the payment was so made, no further amount, in respect of surcharge, can be charged nor can the supply of electricity to the petitioner be cut off for non-payment of such amount of surcharge. 82. In the circumstances, as indicated above, the respondents cannot, now, be allowed to claim any further surcharge and/or allowed to cut off electricity supply on the strength of the impugned bill of surcharge. The writ petition is, therefore, allowed. Consequently, the impugned bill, dated 6.1.1998, the forwarding letter, dated 12.1.1998, and the impugned notice, dated 17.12.1999, are hereby directed not to be enforced against the petitioners. WP(C) No. 5632/2005 83. The case of the writ petitioner herein is, briefly set out, as under: (i) The petitioner's house, which is located at Guwahati, had electricity connection as a domestic consumer, the sanctioned connected load for the house being 2 KW. The petitioner had been paying the bills, raised by the ASEB, from time to time. In the year 1998, the petitioner's husband decided to run an Atta Chakki (flour) mill at the compound of his house and started, with the consent of the petitioner, the process accordingly by making an application for a licence, in this regard, to the Government of Assam, Department of Supply. In the year 1998, the petitioner's husband decided to run an Atta Chakki (flour) mill at the compound of his house and started, with the consent of the petitioner, the process accordingly by making an application for a licence, in this regard, to the Government of Assam, Department of Supply. In anticipation of receiving the permission, the petitioner applied to the ASEB to enhance the load of power supply to her premises from 2 KW to 8 KW with three-phase connection so as to enable them to run the mill if and when the required permission was obtained from the authorities concerned. In anticipation of receiving a licence, as had been sought for by him, the petitioner's husband installed a mini Atta Chakki mill at the compound of the said house, but the licence was, eventually, not granted and, therefore, the petitioner's husband abandoned the project. (ii) In the meanwhile, however, the petitioner had already deposited the requisite amount of Rs.8,582 for conversion of her domestic electricity line to commercial electricity line with connected load of 8 KW. As the mill could not be started, the petitioner's husband sold the mill in the month of October, 2002. The petitioners did not, however, informed the ASEB that they had not abandoned their project nor did they make any request to the ASEB to the effect that the domestic connection to her house should not be converted to commercial connection, which they had applied for. The petitioner, however, claims that the respondents too never informed her that her domestic line had already been converted into commercial line. In fact, the ASEB continued, according to the petitioner, to raise electricity bill to the petitioner at the rate applicable to a domestic consumer and not a commercial consumer, though the charges for providing sanctioned load of 8 KW was raised. As the writ petitioner was paying high tariff of electricity of 8 KW, though, (although as a domestic consumer), the petitioner informed the ASEB, by letter, dated 24.10.2002, to change the commercial connection to domestic connection. The petitioner repeated her request, by letter, dated 13.6.2004, as the respondents had not taken any action on her earlier letter, dated 24.10.2002. The petitioner was, then, served, in the month of February, 2005, with an adjustment bill, dated nil, whereby an amount of Rs.98,324.60 was raised for the period from 30.12.1998 to 18.2.2005. The petitioner repeated her request, by letter, dated 13.6.2004, as the respondents had not taken any action on her earlier letter, dated 24.10.2002. The petitioner was, then, served, in the month of February, 2005, with an adjustment bill, dated nil, whereby an amount of Rs.98,324.60 was raised for the period from 30.12.1998 to 18.2.2005. The petitioner, then, preferred an appeal, and the appellate authority directed, on 22.7.2005, the ASEB to revise the bill treating the petitioner, during the period from 30.12.1998 to 24.10.2002, as a commercial consumer and, with effect from 24.10.2002 till date, as a domestic consumer. Thereafter, a bill was raised, on 28.7.2005, by the ASEB for an amount of Rs.81,723. This new bill, dated 28.7.2005, was for the period from 30.12.1998 to 22.10.2002 and it is this bill, the legality whereof stands challenged in this writ petition. 84. The ASEB has filed affidavit and has contended, inter alia, that the petitioner's case, that the mill was never been run, is not correct. Be that as it may, there is no dispute that the petitioner was served with an adjustment bill, which covered the period from 30.12.1998 to 18.2.2005; The date of issuance of the adjustment bill was not given, but the due date mentioned therein was 21.3.2005. When the bill, so made payable on 21.3.2005, was served on the petitioner, the 2003 Act, had already come into force. With the coming into force of the 2003 Act, all the provisions of the 2003 Act, as already discussed above, including the provisions of Section 56(2), had come into force on 26.10.2003. As no action for recovery of the dues for the period from 30.12.1998 to 10.6.2003 had been taken by the ASEB under the 1948 Act, whatever dues were payable by the petitioner to the ASEB, on the coming into force of the 2003 Act, on 10.6.2003, became liable to be recovered in terms of the provisions of Section 56 of the 2003 Act. Since no bill had been raised against the petitioner by the ASEB, on or before 10.6.2003, demanding payment at a rate, which is meant for a commercial consumer, the period of limitation had already started running against the ASEB in terms of Section 56 of the 2003 Act. Since no bill had been raised against the petitioner by the ASEB, on or before 10.6.2003, demanding payment at a rate, which is meant for a commercial consumer, the period of limitation had already started running against the ASEB in terms of Section 56 of the 2003 Act. For the first time, when the ASEB raised the bill, covering the period from 30.12.1998 to 18.2.2005, a substantial amount of the bill had already become time-barred in terms of Section 56(2). 85. What emerges from the above discussion is that according to the direction of the appellate authority, which the ASEB has acted upon, the petitioner has to be treated as a commercial consumer for the period from 30.12.1998 to 24.10.2002. Thus, with the coming into force of the 2003 Act, the amount, which was due on 24.10.2002, became non-recoverable with effect from 23.10.2004, i.e., on completion of a period of two years from the date of the bill, even if, for a moment, it is assumed that it is the date of the bill, which is required to be counted for the purpose of Section 56(2). Thus, under the provisions of Section 56(2) of the 2003 Act, the ASEB lost its right, with effect from 23.10.2004, to recover the dues covering the period from 30.12.1998 to 24.10.2002, which it could have claimed and recovered, if the bill had been raised before 10.6.2003, i.e., before coming into force of the 2003 Act. It, therefore, logically follows that the ASEB cannot, on the basis of such a demand, cut off the supply of electricity to the petitioner's premises. 86. In the result and for the reasons discussed above, the impugned bill, dated 28.7.2005, which covers the period from 30.12.1998 to 22.10.2002, is hereby set aside and quashed and the respondents are directed not to enforce the amount, which stands time-barred as aforesaid,, and, on the ground of non-payment of the said time-barred dues, the ASEB shall not cut off the supply of electricity, which the petitioner has been receiving. The ASEB shall, however, remain at liberty to recover the dues, which are not time-barred, and the ASEB may, for non-payment of such dues, which are not time-barred, even cut off supply of electricity in accordance with the procedure prescribed in that behalf. WP(C) Nos. 3153/04, 3154/04, 3173/04, 3174/04, 3175/04, 3176/04, 3177/04, 3179/04, 3180/04, 3181/04, 3182/04, 3508/04 and 3178/07 87. The ASEB shall, however, remain at liberty to recover the dues, which are not time-barred, and the ASEB may, for non-payment of such dues, which are not time-barred, even cut off supply of electricity in accordance with the procedure prescribed in that behalf. WP(C) Nos. 3153/04, 3154/04, 3173/04, 3174/04, 3175/04, 3176/04, 3177/04, 3179/04, 3180/04, 3181/04, 3182/04, 3508/04 and 3178/07 87. I, now, turn to WP(C) Nos. 3153/04, 3154/04, 3173/04, 3174/04, 3175/04, 3176/04, 3177/04, 3178/04, 3179/04, 3180/04, 3181/04, 3182/04 and 3508/04. 88. Before coming to the individual facts of each of these writ petitions, some facts, which are common to all these writ petitions, may be taken note of. The Government of India announced, in the month of December, 1997, a separate Industrial Policy for the Northeastern Region, with its package of incentives specially designed to stimulate industrialization, in the North Eastern Region, so that the region overcomes its continued backwardness. Pursuant to the said industrial policy, a number of notifications were issued by the concerned Ministries providing major incentives in the form of various subsidies, arrangement of finance, etc. 89. In consonance with the said policy of industrialization, respondent No. 4, in these writ petitions, namely, Assam Industrial Development Corporation ('the AIDC') established, in the year 2000, Export Promotion Industrial Package OEPIP) at Amingaon, Guwahati, wherein several sheds and plots of land were made available to those units, which were interested in starting manufacturing activities, within the State of Assam, so as to avail the benefits promised to the investors under the said industrial policy. In order to set up the said EPIP, the AIDC provided various common facilities within the zone of EPIP, such as, street light, water supply, security guard, etc. The AIDC also entered into an agreement, dated 10.10.2000, with the Board for installation of 33/11 KV sub-station for the purpose of making available, electricity to the individual consumers, whose units were located or were to be located within the EPIP. 90. Pursuant to the agreement, dated 10.10.2000, aforementioned, the said 33/11 KV sub-station came to be set up in the name of respondent No. 4 (i.e., the AIDC), as a bulk consumer. 90. Pursuant to the agreement, dated 10.10.2000, aforementioned, the said 33/11 KV sub-station came to be set up in the name of respondent No. 4 (i.e., the AIDC), as a bulk consumer. From the said sub-station, individual transmission line has been provided to different units, located within the EPIP, and, as each of these units has a separate meter the consumption of electricity by each of these industrial units is recorded in the electronic meter of the respective industrial units. 91. The AIDC, unlike other bulk consumers, did not, under the said agreement, dated 10.10.2000, take any responsibility to collect electricity charges from its tenants, i.e., various industrial units located within the area of EPIP; rather, it is the Board, which agreed to collect the electricity bills from the industrial units on the basis of individual consumption of electric energy by the industrial units concerned. As there was difference between the meter reading,, recorded at the receiving end of the AIDC, at the said sub-station, and the total meter reading, recorded on the basis of the energy meters of the various industrial units within area of EPIP, Clause 14 of the said agreement, dated 10.10.2000, stipulated that the difference of meter reading, recorded at the main 33 KV meter at entry point, and the computer reading, recorded at the individual meter, shall be distributed amongst the industrial units, existing within the area of the EPIP, proportionate to their energy consumption. The relevant clauses, in this regard, in the agreement, dated 10.10.2000, were Clauses 10 and 14, which read as follows: Clause 10. The agreement shall remain in force for 6 months and shall not terminate before that date except by mutual consent of the parties hereinto. Even after the expiry of the agreement, the right of the parties for settlement of accounts and arbitration as provided under Clause 12 of this agreement shall remain in force in respect of a claim arising during the currency of this agreement so far as the operation and maintenance charge is concerned and the/claim may be revised if any revision of - above be made by the Board. Clause 14. The difference of meter reading recorded at the receiving end consumer's premises at 33 KV and computed energy recorded at the individual consumer's metering system should be distributed to each of the consumers proportionate to their energy consumption. 92. Clause 14. The difference of meter reading recorded at the receiving end consumer's premises at 33 KV and computed energy recorded at the individual consumer's metering system should be distributed to each of the consumers proportionate to their energy consumption. 92. Thus, the difference in the meter reading, as indicated hereinbefore, were to be borne by the industrial units on pro rata basis. By separate agreements, individually entered into by the industrial units with the AIDC, the industrial units undertook to abide by the terms and conditions of the agreement made between the AIDC, on the one hand, and the Board, on the other. As no agreement, other than the agreement, dated 10.10.2000, aforementioned, had been entered into by the AIDC and the Board at the relevant point of time, it logically follows that each of the said industrial units, in turn, entered into agreement, on various dates, with the AIDC, undertaking to abide by the terms and conditions of the agreement, dated 10.10.2000, aforementioned, which had been entered into by and between the Board and the AIDC. In fact, the No Objection Certificate, which each of the industrial units had to obtain from the AIDC in order to submit to the Board for the purpose of obtaining electricity connection, required that Clause 14 of the agreement, dated 10.10.2000, shall be agreed to, and be abided by, the industrial unit concerned. 93. Thus, every industrial unit, within the area of EPIP, was required, in the light of the agreement, dated 10.10.2000, to pay for the difference of meter reading, recorded in the energy meter, located at the premises of each of the industrial unit concerned, and the meter reading, (recorded at the main 33 KV sub-station), on pro rata basis. 94. At a latter stage, and to be precise, on 31.3.2004, a fresh agreement was entered into between the Board and the AIDC stipulating the conditions of payment electricity by the various industrial units. The Clauses 10, 11 and 12 of the agreement, dated 31.3.2004, which are relevant for our purpose, read under: 10. The difference of meter reading recorded at the receiving end at 33/11 KV sub-station of EPIP complex and computed energy recorded at the individual consumer's metering system shall be distributed to each of the consumers proportionate to the energy consumption. 11. The difference of meter reading recorded at the receiving end at 33/11 KV sub-station of EPIP complex and computed energy recorded at the individual consumer's metering system shall be distributed to each of the consumers proportionate to the energy consumption. 11. ASEB will submit outstanding bill with effect from 7.12.2000 to 3.3.2004 based on difference of reading recorded under Clause 10 to all Units of EPIP Complex (individual consumers). The outstanding bill in respect of the already disconnected consumers will be settled by AIDC with the new Industry or old consumers of the occupied site. But for any dues of ASEB, which may become due after the date of execution of others' agreement shall be the dues of the unit, which will be recovered by the ASEB from the unit itself and the AIDC shall have no responsibility to pay such dues. 12. From 3.3.2004 onward, the bill on the difference of reading will be distributed to the constituent Units of EPIP on pro rata consumption basis along with the current energy bill, for which ASEB will raise bills on individual units. In the event of non-payment of the bill by individual units, ASEB shall be free to resort to any action deemed fit including disconnection of service and AIDC in any way shall not be responsible for realization of the same. 95. A careful reading of what have been quoted above shows that according to Clause 10 of the agreement, dated 31.3.2004, the difference of meter reading, recorded at the receiving end at 33/11KV sub-station of EPIP complex, and computed energy, recorded at the individual consumer's metering system, shall be distributed amongst the consumers proportionate to their respective energy consumption. As far as Clause 11 is concerned, it permitted the Board (i.e., the ASEB) to serve outstanding bill, for the period from 7.12.2000 to 3.3.2004, based on difference of reading recorded under Clause 10 to all Units of EPIP Complex (individual consumers). Clause 11 further stipulated, inter alia, that the outstanding bill in respect of the already disconnected consumers would be settled by AIDC with the new industrial unit or old consumers of the occupied site. Clause 11 further stipulated, inter alia, that the outstanding bill in respect of the already disconnected consumers would be settled by AIDC with the new industrial unit or old consumers of the occupied site. Clause 12 of the agreement, dated 3L3.2004, stipulated that from 3.3.2004 onward, the bill on the difference of meter reading would be distributed amongst the constituent units of EPIP on pro rata consumption basis along with the current energy bill and, in this regard, ASEB will raise bills on individual units and, in the event of non-payment of the bill by individual units, the ASEB shall be free to resort to any action deemed fit including ,disconnection of service and AIDC, in any way, shall not be responsible for realization of the dues, if any, of the individual industrial units. 96. On the strength of the agreement, dated 31.3.2004, the Board, on 9.4.2004, issued, to the industrial units, notices of demand asking them to make payment of diverse sums of money, as their respective dues, assessed by the ASEB, on pro rata basis, for the period from 7.12.2000 to 3.3.2004. These bills were followed by disconnection notices, dated 24.4.2004 and 30.4.2004. These bills and also the disconnection notices stand impugned, in these writ petitions, on the ground that these bills and the notices are untenable in law and in the attending facts and circumstances of the present cases. The writ petitioners have accordingly sought for setting aside and quashing the impugned bills and also the demand notices. The petitioners have also sought for directions to be issued to the respondents not to realize any amount or amounts from the petitioners on the basis of the agreements, dated 10.10.2000, and 31.3.2004, aforementioned. 97. Before proceeding further, it is important to note that in terms of Clause 10 of the agreement, dated 10.10.2000, which had been entered into between the Board, on the one hand, and the AIDC, on the other, the said agreement was to remain in force, for a period of six months, if not terminated earlier by mutual consent. As the said agreement, dated 10.10.2000, had, admittedly, not been terminated earlier than six months by the parties concerned, namely, the Board and the AIDC, it clearly follows that the said agreement stood expired, by efflux of time, on 9.4.2001. As the said agreement, dated 10.10.2000, had, admittedly, not been terminated earlier than six months by the parties concerned, namely, the Board and the AIDC, it clearly follows that the said agreement stood expired, by efflux of time, on 9.4.2001. The next agreement between the Board and the AIDC was entered into, as already indicated above, on 31.3.2004. Thus, between 9.4.2001, i.e., the date of expiry of the agreement, dated 10.10.2000, and the date of coming into force of the agreement, dated 31.4.2004, there was no written agreement, between the Board and the AIDC, on the one hand, and the petitioners, on the other, undertaking to abide by the terms and conditions incorporated in the deed of agreement, dated 10.10.2000. Between the date of expiry of the agreement, dated 10.10.2000, and the date of coming into force of the agreement, dated 31.3,2004, there was nothing in the conduct of the respondent Board and the AIDC to show, nor is it even contended, on behalf of the respondents, that their course of conduct indicated, that notwithstanding the expiry of the term of agreement, dated 10.10.2000, the Board and the AIDC had agreed to abide by the terms and conditions, which stood incorporated in the agreement, dated 10.10.2000. It is an admitted position that neither in the agreement, dated 10.10.2000, nor in the agreement, dated 31.3.2004, any of the writ petitioners was a party. They are sought to be made privy to the said agreement, dated 10.10.2000, and/or the agreement, dated 31.3.2004, on the strength of the letters of no objection which had been issued, in favour of the industrial units of the petitioners herein, by the AIDC so as to enable the petitioners obtain supply of electricity from the Board. 98. There is nothing in any of the Clauses to the agreement, dated 31.3.2004, to show that the conditions, agreed therein, were to be applied with retrospective effect. Clause 10 of the agreement, dated 31.3.2004, cannot, therefore, be taken resort to by the respondents, particularly, the Board, to realize the difference of meter reading between 9.4.2001 and 31.3.2004. Since the petitioners were not privy to the agreement, dated 31.3.2004, the agreement, which has been entered into, on 31.3.2004, between the Board and the AIDC, cannot be enforced against the petitioners. Since the petitioners were not privy to the agreement, dated 31.3.2004, the agreement, which has been entered into, on 31.3.2004, between the Board and the AIDC, cannot be enforced against the petitioners. In fact, there is nothing in the agreement, dated 31.3.2004, to indicate that this agreement is an extension of the agreement, dated 10.10.2000, which had expired on 9.4.2001. 99. Though in terms of Clause 11 of the agreement, dated 31.3.2004, the Board had been authorized by the AIDC to submit outstanding bills w.e.f. 7.12.2000 to 3.3.2004, based on the difference of reading, to all Units of the EPIP complex, the fact remains that this Clause (i.e., Clause 11) of the agreement, dated 31.3.2004, cannot be applied to the petitioners inasmuch as the agreement, dated 10.10.2000, expired on 9.4.2001 and the petitioners never became privy to the agreement, dated 31.3.2004. This apart, and more importantly, the agreement, dated 10.10.2000, did not stipulate that even after the expiry of the said agreement, dated 10.10.2000, the parties to the said agreement would necessarily continue to be governed by the terms and conditions of the said agreement. 100. So far as Clause 12 of the agreement, dated 31.3.2004, is concerned, it has been made applicable w.e.f. 3.3.2004 and what Clause 12 does is that it allows the Board to raise bills on pro rata basis. Obviously, Clause 12 cannot have retrospective effect and must be construed as a prospective agreement. Since none of the petitioners is a party to the agreement, dated 31.3.2004, even Clause 12 does not apply to the case of the writ petitioners when the industrial omits had not been made aware, at the stage, when they had obtained no objection letter from the AIDC, of the fact that even after expiry of the agreement, dated 10.10.2000, they would receive supply of electricity only in terms of the agreement, dated 10.10.2000, which enabled the Board to realize the difference in the meter reading, recorded at the receiving end at the said sub-station, and the computer energy, recorded at the individual consumer's metering system, on pro rata basis of total energy Consumption. 101. It is the case of the respondents that the difference in the meter reading at the two ends is on account of the fact that the AIDC uses electricity for the purpose of street lighting, illumination of the area of the security guard, water supply, etc. 101. It is the case of the respondents that the difference in the meter reading at the two ends is on account of the fact that the AIDC uses electricity for the purpose of street lighting, illumination of the area of the security guard, water supply, etc. These assertions are disputed by the petitioners inasmuch as they contend that various common facilities, which the AIDC was supposed to provide to the industrial units are actually charged and that the industrial units separately pay to the AIDC charges for the alleged common facilities provided by the AIDC to the two different units located within the EPIP premises. Even if the question as to whether the present petitioners are required to pay, in consideration of the common facilities provided to them, such amount or amounts, which cover supply of electricity for the purpose of street lighting, etc., is assumed to be a disputed question of fact, what cannot be ignored, and I have not been able to ignore, is the fact that the agreement, dated 10.10.2000, stood expired on 9.4.2001 and, in the complete absence of anything showing to the contrary, that the petitioners, at any point of time, became privy to the agreement, dated 31.3.2004, and, particularly, when even the agreement, dated 31.3.2004, do not, seek to extend the terms and conditions of the agreement, dated 10.10.2000, or apply the terms and conditions of the agreement, dated 31.3.2004, retrospectively and when the course of conduct of the Board and the AIDC does not indicate that with effect from 9.4,2001 until 31.3.2004, they (i.e., the Board and the AIDC) were willing to follow the terms and conditions incorporated in the agreement, dated 10.10.2000, the respondents cannot compel the petitioners to pay for electricity charges except what they are shown to have consumed in terms of the computerized metering system of the petitioner concerned. 102. What crystallizes from the above discussion is that the petitioners were not parties to the deed of agreement, dated 10.10.2000, aforementioned, whereby it had been agreed between the Board and the AIDC that the Board shall, until 9.4.2001, realize the difference in the meter reading, as indicated hereinabove, from the various industrial units, located within the zone of EPIP, on pro rata basis. Clause 10 of this agreement, dated 10.10.2000, made it clear that this agreement will remain in force, at the most, for a period of six months. Thus, this agreement expired on 9.4.2001 by efflux of time. No new agreement, in this regard, was entered into between the Board and the AIDC until 31.3.2004, whereby the Board, once again, agreed to realize the difference in the meter reading, as pointed out above, from the industrial units aforementioned on pro rata basis. 103. What is, however, of immense importance to note is that between the date of expiry of the agreement, dated 10.10.2000, and reaching of the agreement, dated 31.3.2004, neither the Board raised any bill on the industrial units aforementioned for the difference, in the meter readings, on pro rata basis, nor did the AIDC insist upon the Board to realize or upon the industrial units concerned to pay the difference in the meter reading as aforementioned. 104. Thus, the course of conduct of the Board and the AIDC from 9.4.2001 until 31.3.2004 does not reflect that the terms and conditions incorporated in the agreement, dated 10.10.2000, particularly, Clause 14 thereof, which dealt with the question of realization of the difference in the meter reading on pro rata basis, were either adhered to or intended to be adhered to. The agreement, dated 10.10.2000, as is explicit, was wholly temporary in nature with no renewal clause. None of the present petitioners was party to the said agreement, dated, 10.10.2000. They were sought to be made parties to the agreement aforementioned with the help of the No Objection Certificate ('the NOC'), which had been issued by the AIDC in favour of various industrial units in order to enable them receive supply of electricity from the Board. I will, in a moment, deal with the legal effect of the NOCs, which were issued, in this regard, by the AIDC. Suffice it to point out, at this stage, that the said NOCs read, in general, as follows: No Objection Certificate With reference to the above, I am directed to say that the corporation has no objection for having power connection to your unit by Assam State Electricity Board subject to fulfillment of the following condition. 1. Suffice it to point out, at this stage, that the said NOCs read, in general, as follows: No Objection Certificate With reference to the above, I am directed to say that the corporation has no objection for having power connection to your unit by Assam State Electricity Board subject to fulfillment of the following condition. 1. Total connection load is presently restricted to 509 KW in the 1st phase and the balance load of 211 KW shall be considered for release on future augmentation of power supply system at EPIP, Amingaon. 2. Clause No. 14 of the agreement, dated 10.10.2000 (Copy enclosed) should be agreed by the intending consumers. 3. Cost of any modification that may be required in AIDC power supply system of giving power is to be borne by the consumer, if necessary. 4. Individual consumers should be agreeable to pay the common utility service consumption Bill to be raised by Assam Industrial Development Corporation Limited from time to time. 105. What is, however, of greatest importance to note, with regard to the above, is that under the NOCs, the petitioners were required to abide by Clause 14 of the agreement, dated 10.10.2000. Since the agreement, dated 10.10.2000, had no renewal clause, it follows that unless the petitioners chose to agree to the terms and conditions, which had been entered into by the Board with the AIDC on 31,3.2004, the petitioners could not have been saddled with the subsequent agreement, dated 31.3.2004, even if the latter agreement stipulates the same very condition, which stood incorporated in the agreement, dated 10.10.2000, unless it can be shown that the petitioners had, knowingly and consciously, agreed to abide by the terms and. conditions incorporated in the agreement, dated 10.10.2000, even after the said agreement stood expired. 106. Coupled with the above, what also needs to be pointed out is that in the individual agreement, which each of the writ petitioners had entered into with the AIDC at the time of obtaining their respective NOCs, what was stipulated in the NOC was that "Clause 14 of the agreement, dated 10.10.2000, should be agreed by the intending consumers". There was nothing in the NOCa to show that even after the agreement, dated 10.10.2000, expired, the petitioners would remain bound by the terms and conditions incorporated in Clause 14 of the said-agreement. 107. There was nothing in the NOCa to show that even after the agreement, dated 10.10.2000, expired, the petitioners would remain bound by the terms and conditions incorporated in Clause 14 of the said-agreement. 107. Let me, now, revert to the question as to how far the terms and conditions of the agreement, dated 10.10.2000, particularly, Clause 14 thereof, which dealt with the question of difference in the meter-reading, could be legally binding on the petitioners and/or be tenable in law. In this regard, it is of utmost importance to note that specific averments have been made, in each of the writ petitions, by the writ petitioner(s) that having taken possession of the allocated space within the zone of EPIP, the petitioners had made huge investments in setting up their respective-industries and when they approached the Board for the purpose of obtaining supply of electrical energy to their respective units, the petitioners were informed that they would have to obtain NOC from the AIDC in order to avail supply of electrical energy and, in accordance with the demand, which the Board had so raised, when the petitioners approached the AIDC seeking NOC, they were informed that NOC would be issued subject to the condition that the petitioners must undertake to abide by Clause 14 of the agreement, dated 10.10.2000, aforementioned. 108. I have already discussed above that Clause 14 of the agreement, dated 10.10.2000, is the clause, which dealt with the question of realization of the difference in the meter reading, recorded at the receiving end at the said sub-station, and computed energy recorded at the individual consumer's metering system, by distributing the same among the consumers proportionate to their energy consumption. This apart, it is the specific averment, in each of the writ petitions, at para 9, that the condition that the petitioners were to abide by Clause 14 of the agreement, dated 10.10.2000, had not been made known to the petitioners at the time, when they had taken over possession of their respective allocated spaces, and, thus, the petitioners were kept completely in the dark as regards the onerous condition, which Clause 14 in the agreement, dated 10.10.2000, were to impose on the petitioners. The petitioners also aver, in para 9 of their respective writ petitions, that as the petitioners had not only taken possession of their respective allocated spaces, but had, in the meanwhile, made huge investments and were keen to start production activities at the earliest, they were compelled to accept such onerous and burdensome condition as Clause 14 had imposed. 109. In short, thus, what the petitioners aver, in the writ petitions, is that they were forced to agree to abide by the conditions of Clause 14. The question, now, is as to how the respondents have dealt with the averments so made in the writ petitions. In this regard, it may be pointed out that as far as the Board (i.e., the ASEB) is concerned, it has chosen-not to specifically deny the allegations that the petitioners had been kept in the dark about the existence of Clause 14 of the agreement, dated 10.10.2000, at the time, when they were allocated space within the zone of EPIP and that they, having made huge investment, had been left with no other alternative, but to agree to obtain supply of electricity subject to the granting of NOC by the AIDC, whereunder they (i.e., the petitioners) had to undertake to abide by Clause 14 aforementioned. Coming to the AIDC, I notice that the AIDC claims, in their counter affidavit, that the petitioners did not, at the time of obtaining NOCs, register their protest in respect of the condition imposed on them to abide by Clause 14. 110. I must pause and point out here that raising of objection is not same as registration of protest. To register protest means to place on record a protest. This does not mean that if no protest has not been registered, no protest can be said to have been raised. It is one thing to say that the petitioners did not object to abide by Clause 14, but it is quite another to say that they did not register their protest on the question of Clause 14. Thus, the denial by the AIDC is not specific; rather, it is vague and evasive. It is one thing to say that the petitioners did not object to abide by Clause 14, but it is quite another to say that they did not register their protest on the question of Clause 14. Thus, the denial by the AIDC is not specific; rather, it is vague and evasive. Coupled with this fact, when one also considers the fact that even the Board does not claim that the petitioners had all along known about the existence of Clause 14, it would be wholly unreasonable to confidently conclude, and/or boldly hold, that the petitioners knew about the existence of Clause 14 or that the respondents had, before allocating spaces within the zone of EPIP, made it known to the petitioners that they were required to abide by the conditions incorporated in Clause 14 of the agreement, dated 10.10.2000, and even after having known the conditions incorporated in Clause 14, the petitioners had chosen to abide by the conditions incorporated in the said clause. 111. What is, now, imperative to note is that the inequality of bargaining powers, in the realm of contract, is a question, which has always tilted balance in favour of the person, who has entered into a contract on such terms and conditions, which are unfair and unreasonable to him, but has accepted such terms and conditions for reasons of his inequality in the bargaining strength. Irrespective of the fact whether such unfair and unreasonable terms and conditions are entered into between two unequally placed private individuals or between the State and its instrumentalities, on the one hand, and a private individual, on the other, the court would, indeed, interfere so long as such terms and conditions have been agreed to, because of unequal bargaining strength. In fact, if a citizen accepts the unfair and unreasonable terms of contract merely because of the fact that the State is strong and the citizen is weak, this weakness, having arisen out of unequal economic strength, the High Court, as a conscious keeper of the Constitution, would have, no option but to interfere. 112. In fact, it was Lord Denning, who, had, for the first time, while construing an indemnity Clause in a contract, in Gillespi Brothers and Co. 112. In fact, it was Lord Denning, who, had, for the first time, while construing an indemnity Clause in a contract, in Gillespi Brothers and Co. Ltd. v. Roy Bowles Transport Ltd. (1973) I QB 400, raised the question as to whether the courts should permit a party to enforce Ms unreasonable clause, even when this Clause is so unreasonable, or applied so unreasonably, as to be unconscionable. Reacting to such a situation. Lord Denming observed, "When it gets to this point, I would say, as I said many years ago,... "there is the vigilance of the common law which, while allowing freedom of contract, watches to see that it is not abused. It will not allow a party to exempt himself from his liability at common law when it would be quite unconscionable for him to do so." 113. Lord Diplock outlined the theory of unreasonableness or unfairness to relieve a party from the contract, when the relative bargaining powers of the parties were not equal. In A. Schroeder Music Publishing Co. Ltd. v. Macaulay (1974) 1 WLR 1308, the song writer had contracted with the publisher the terms more onerous to him and favourable to the publisher. The song writer was relieved from the bargain of the contract on the theory of restraint trade opposed to public policy. The distinction was made even in respect of standard forms of the contracts emphasizing that when the parties to a commercial transaction, having equal bargaining power, have chosen to adopt the standard form of contract, it was intended to be binding on the parties. Conversely put, when the parties to a commercial transaction are not evenly situated and one of the parties has greater bargaining strength than the other and is in a position to say, "if you want these goods or services at all, these are the only terms on which they are obtainable. Take it or leave it", the court would not, if need be, refuse to relieve the party, which forces the other weaker party to enter into such a contract, and the court may, if necessary, even relieve the weaker party from the terms of such a contract. The court would not relieve any of the parties from such a contract if the contract is between the parties, whose bargaining strength is equal. 114. The court would not relieve any of the parties from such a contract if the contract is between the parties, whose bargaining strength is equal. 114. That a State, its instrumentalities or public authority, whose acts have the insignia of public element, cannot defend its action even in the field of private law on the ground that they are free to prescribe any conditions or limitations in their actions as private citizens simpliciter do in the field of private law is clear from the observations made in the LIC of India and Anr. v. Consumer Education & Research Centre AIR 1995 SC 1811 , wherein it has been observed as follows: 23. Every action of the public authority or the person acting in public interest or any act that gives rise to public element, should be guided by public interest. It is the exercise of the public power or action hedged with public element (sic that) becomes open to challenge. If it is shown that the exercise of the power is arbitrary, unjust and unfair, it should be no answer for the State, its instrumentality, public authority or person whose acts have the insignia of public element to say that their actions are in the field of private law and they are free to prescribe any conditions or limitations in their actions as private citizens, simpliciter do in the field of private law. Its actions must be based on some rational and relevant principles. It must not be guided by irrational or irrelevant considerations. 115. In Dwarkadas Marfatia & Suns v. Board of Trustees of the Port of Bombay AIR 1989 SC 1642 , it was held that the Corporation must act in accordance with certain constitutional conscience and whether they have so acted must be discernible from the conduct of such Corporations. Every activity of public authority must be informed by reasons and guided by the public interest and that all exercises of discretion of power by public authority must be judged by that standard. Whatever be the activity of the public authority, it must meet the tests of Article 14 and judicial review strikes down an arbitrary action. 116. Every activity of public authority must be informed by reasons and guided by the public interest and that all exercises of discretion of power by public authority must be judged by that standard. Whatever be the activity of the public authority, it must meet the tests of Article 14 and judicial review strikes down an arbitrary action. 116. In the case at hand, the averments in the pleadings of the parties and the materials placed on record reveal that the petitioners had not voluntarily and willingly agreed to abide by Clause 14 of the agreement, dated 10.10.2000; rather, they were, in the circumstances as indicated above forced to obtain NOCs as regards supply of electrical energy subject to their agreeing to abide by Clause 14 aforementioned. The contracts, which was so entered into, suffered, undoubtedly, from coercion. Coercion, in contractual matters, need not be physical. When a person is forced to consent to some financial arrangement by putting him in such circumstances that he had no option, but to agree to the condition imposed on him, such consent is no consent in law inasmuch as such consent, under Section 19 of the Contract Act, having been caused by coercion, makes the contract voidable at the option of the party, whose consent was obtained. In the present case, notwithstanding the fact that the petitioners had agreed to abide by Clause 14 aforementioned, the fact remains that when the petitioners were unwilling to abide by the terms and conditions incorporated in Clause 14, they could not have been, in the facts and attending circumstances of the present cases, forced to bind themselves by the terms and conditions, which stood incorporated in Clause 14. 117. There is yet another aspect of law, which one needs to focus upon. I have already pointed out above that according to Clause 10 of the agreement, dated 10.10.2000, the agreement was to expire, at the latest, on completion of a period of six months. This period of six months having been completed on 9.4.2001, the agreement, dated 10.10.2000, stood expired on 9.4.2001; whereas, in writ petition Nos. I have already pointed out above that according to Clause 10 of the agreement, dated 10.10.2000, the agreement was to expire, at the latest, on completion of a period of six months. This period of six months having been completed on 9.4.2001, the agreement, dated 10.10.2000, stood expired on 9.4.2001; whereas, in writ petition Nos. 3154/04, 3178/04, 3182/04 and 3508/04, which I am presently considering, the NOCs were granted on 16.3.2002, 13.8.2002, 10.4.2001, and 17.4.2002, respectively and in consequence of the NOCs so granted, separate agreements were entered into between the petitioners, on the one hand, and the ASEB, on the other, on 30.3.2002, 4.5.2001, 10.4.2001 and 20.12.2002 respectively. A minute scrutiny of these NOCs and the agreements aforementioned reveal that on the day, when the agreements between the Board and the petitioners were entered into, the agreement, dated 10.10.2000, including Clause 14 thereof, stood expired by efflux of time. 118. In the circumstances, as depicted above, two different situations can be visualized. One of the two situations would be, thus: The ASEB and also the AIDC knew that their agreement, dated 10.10.2000, was no longer in force and that they could not have bound the present petitioners by the terms and conditions of the said agreement and yet they (i.e., the Board and the AIDC), without disclosing to the petitioners that the agreement, dated 10.10.2000, had already expired, and pretending as if the said agreement was still in force and having, thus, created, knowingly and dishonestly, an impression on the petitioners, that the said agreement was still alive, insisted upon the petitioners to abide by Clause 14 thereof. The other situation, which can be visualized is this: Neither the ASEB nor the AIDC had realized, or were aware of, that the agreement, which they were trying to impose on the petitioners, already stood expired. 119. If the ASEB and the AIDC, having known that the agreement, dated 10.10.2000, was no longer in force, had kept this information a closely guarded secret and yet induced the petitioners or forced the petitioners to abide by Clause 14, which was non-existent, the conduct of the ASEB and the AIDC would suffer from nothing, but fraud. Such a contract cannot, in the context of the facts and circumstances of the present case, be enforced at all. 120. Such a contract cannot, in the context of the facts and circumstances of the present case, be enforced at all. 120. I may pause here to point out that I am conscious of the fact that there is no specific pleading of fraud in the writ petitions. What needs to be, however, borne in mind is that the present one being a proceeding under Article 226, it is not wholly impermissible for the court to draw an inference on the basis of the facts and materials placed before it. If, for a moment, I give benefit of doubt to the ASEB and the AIDC, then, the inescapable inference would be that neither the ASEB nor the AIDC had known or realized that the agreement, dated 10.10.2000, stood expired by efflux of time and that they, being under a wholly incorrect impression, that the said agreement was still alive, had insisted upon the petitioners to abide by Clause 14. As far as the petitioners are concerned, they were, admittedly, not told that the agreement, dated 10.10.2000, no longer survived. Hence, the petitioners too were under the impression that the agreement, dated 10.10.2000, held the field on the day, when they had obtained their respective NOGs from the AIDC. In the latter case, the agreement suffers from mistake of fact and when a contract suffers from mistake of fact, such a contract cannot be enforced. 121. It needs to be borne in mind that according to Section 13 of the Contract Act, two or more persons are said to consent, when they agree upon the same thing in the same sense. Consent, according to Section 14, would be free, when it is not caused by coercion, undue influence, fraud, misrepresentation or mistake. 122. As per Section 20 of the contract Act, where both parties to an agreement are under a mistake as to a matter of fact essential to the agreement, the agreement is void. Section 22 states that a contract is not voidable merely because it was caused by one of the parties to it being under a mistake of fact. 123. Briefly put, there are three facts, which are essential to every agreement; (i) The identity of the parties; (ii) The identity and nature of the subject matter of the contract; and (iii) The nature and content of the promise. 124. 123. Briefly put, there are three facts, which are essential to every agreement; (i) The identity of the parties; (ii) The identity and nature of the subject matter of the contract; and (iii) The nature and content of the promise. 124. From a careful reading of Section 20, it will become evident that not all mistakes of fact make a contract void. In order to render a contract void, the mistake should pertain to such a matter of fact, which is essential to the agreement. What facts are essential to the agreement would necessarily be a question of fact and is linked with the nature of the promise made in each case. 125. I may, with regard to the above, refer to the case of Tarsem Singh v. Sukhminder Singh (1998) 3 SCC 471 , wherein the Apex Court has dealt with the question of mistake of fact essential to the agreement. The facts of the case were as follows: The petitioner, who owned 48 kanals, 11 marals of agricultural land in village Panjetha, Tehsil and District Patiala, entered into a contract for sale of that land with the respondent on 20.5.1988 at the rate of Rs.24,Q00, per acre. At the time of execution of the agreement, an amount of Rs.77,000 was paid to the petitioner as earnest money. The respondent filed the suit for specific performance against the petitioner. The suit was decreed by the trial court. The decree was modified, in appeal by the Additional District Judge who was of the opinion that the parties to the agreement, namely, the petitioner and the respondent, both suffered from mistake of fact as to the area of the. land, which was proposed to be sold as also the price (sale consideration) whether it was to be paid at the rate of "Bigha" or per "Kanal". The lower appellate court also found that the respondent was not ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. Consequently, the decree for specific performance was not passed, but a decree for refund of the earnest money of Rs.77,000 was passed against the petitioner. This was upheld by the High Court. 126. The lower appellate court also found that the respondent was not ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. Consequently, the decree for specific performance was not passed, but a decree for refund of the earnest money of Rs.77,000 was passed against the petitioner. This was upheld by the High Court. 126. It was contended before the Supreme Court, in Tarsem Singh (supra), that a mistake of fact with regard to the "price" or the "area" would not be a matter essential to the agreement, at least, in the said case, as the only dispute between the parties was with regard to the price of the land, whether the price to be paid for the area calculated in terms of "Bighas" or "Kanals." The Supreme Court concluded that both the parties were under a mistake of fact in so far as the area of the land agreed to be sold was concerned. As luck would have it, none of them was sure whether it was 48 kanals, 11 marals, or 48 bighas, 11 biswal and, hence, the Contract Act, came into play. 127. What is the effect and impact of "Mistake of Fact" on the agreement, in question, was also examined in Tarsem Singh (supra). A 'contract', points out the Supreme Court, in Tarsem Singh (supra), is a bilateral transaction between two or more than two parties. Every contract has to pass through several stages beginning with the stages of negotiation during which the parties discuss and negotiate proposals and counter proposals as also the consideration resulting finally in the acceptance of the proposal. The proposal, when accepted, gives rise to an agreement. It is at this stage that the agreement is reduced into writing and a formal document is executed on which the parties affix their signatures or thumb impressions so as to be bound by the terms of the agreement set out in that document. Such an agreement has to be lawful inasmuch as the definition of contract, as set out in Section 2(h), provides that "an agreement enforceable by law is contract." Section 2(g) sets out that "an agreement not enforceable by law is said to be void." 128. As per Section 20 of the Contract Act, where both parties to an agreement are under a mistake as to a matter of fact essential to the agreement, the contract is void. As per Section 20 of the Contract Act, where both parties to an agreement are under a mistake as to a matter of fact essential to the agreement, the contract is void. This section provides; as observed in Tarsem Singh (supra), that an agreement would be void if both the parties to the agreement were under a mistake as to a matter of fact essential to the agreement. The mistake has to be mutual and in order that the agreement be treated as void, both the parties must be shown to be suffering from mistake of fact. Unilateral mistake is outside the scope of this section. The other requirement is that the mistake, apart from being mutual, must be in respect of a matter, which is essential to the agreement. What may hasten to add is that such a mutual mistake of fact may arise as a result of the fact that the parties to an agreement were carrying totally different impressions of a fact essential to the agreement or when both the parties were carrying the same impression, but their impression was factually incorrect. In either case, the contract would suffer from mistake of fact. 129. "Bigha" and "Kanal", as pointed out by the Supreme Court, in Tarsem Singh (supra), are different units of measurement. In the northern part of the country, the land is measured in some States either in terms of "bighas" or in terms of "kanals". Both convey different impressions regarding area of the land. The finding of the lower appellate court, observed the Supreme Court, in Tarsem Singh (supra), is to the effect that the parties were not ad idem with respect to the unit of measurement. While the defendant intended to sell in terms of "kanals", the plaintiff intended to purchase it in terms of "bighas". Therefore, the dispute was not with regard to the units of measurement only. Since these units relate to the area of the land, it was really a dispute with regard to the area of the land, which was subject matter of agreement for sale, or, to put it differently, how much area of land had been agreed to be sold was in dispute between the parties and it was with regard to the area of the land that the parties were suffering from a mutual mistake. The area of the land was as much essential to the agreement as the price, which, incidentally, was to be calculated on the basis of the area. The contention that the "mistake", with which the parties were suffering from, did not relate to a matter essential to the agreement, was, therefore, held to be acceptable. 130. The Supreme Court further observed, in Tarsem Singh (supra), that even the decree for refund of earnest money could not have been passed, because the contract itself was void arid observed that a void agreement cannot be split up. None of the parties to the agreement can be permitted to seek enforcement of a part only of the contract through a court of law. If the agreement is void, all its terms are void and none of the terms, except in certain known exceptions, especially, where the Clause is treated to constitute a separate and independent agreement, severable from the main agreement, can be enforced separately and independently. 131. Since, in the case of Tarsem Singh (supra), it had been found by the court below that the agreement, in question, was void from its inception as the parties differed from mutual mistake with regard to the area and price of the plots of land agreed to be sold, the forfeiture, Clause would, for the reason, be also void and, therefore, the petitioner could not legally forfeit the amount and seek the enforcement of forfeiture clause, even by way of defence, in a suit instituted for specific performance of the contract. 132. The Apex Court points out, in Tarsem Singh (supra), that mutual consent, which should also be a free consent, as defined in Sections 13 and 14 of the Act, is the sine qua non of a valid agreement. One of the essential elements, which goes to constitute a free consent, is that a thing is understood in the same sense by a party as is understood by the other party. It may often be that the parties may realize, after having entered into an agreement or after having signed a contract, that one of the matters, which was essential to the agreement, was not understood by them in the same sense and that both of them were carrying totally different impressions of that matter at the time of entering into the agreement or executing the document! Such realization would have the effect of invalidating the agreement under Section 20 of the Act. On such realization, it can be legitimately said that the agreement was "discovered to be void". The words "discovered to be void", therefore, comprehend a situation, wherein the parties were suffering from a mistake of fact from the very beginning, but had not realized, at the time of entering into the agreement or signing of the document, that they were suffering from any such mistake and had, therefore, acted bona fide on such agreement. The agreement, in such a case, would be void from its inception, though discovered to be so at a much later stage. [(See Tarsem Singh (supra)]. 133. In Tarsem Singh (supra), a reference was also made to the decision of Privy Council in Thakurain Harnath v. Thakur Indar Bahadur Singh AIR 1922 PC 403, which, while considering the provisions of Section 65 of the Contract Act, held: The section deals with (a) agreements and (b) contracts. The distinction between them is apparent from Section 2. By Clause (e), every promise and every set of promises forming the consideration for each other is an agreement, law is a contract. Section 65, therefore, deals with (a) agreements enforceable by law and (b) with agreements not so enforceable. By Clause (g), an agreement not enforceable by law is said to be void. An agreement, therefore, discovered to be void is one discovered to be not enforceable by law, and, on the language of the section, would include an agreement that was void in that sense from its inception as distinct from a contract that becomes void. 134. The case of Thakurain Harnath (supra), relate to sale of certain villages for which some money had been paid in advance. The sale was found to be inoperative as there was a misapprehension as to the rights of the transferor in the villages, which he purported to sell, and the true nature of those rights was discovered much later. In this background, the Privy Council, in Thakurain Harnath (supra), held the agreement to have been "discovered to be void". The Privy Council, therefore, passed a decree for compensation in favour of the vendee and in assessing that compensation, the sum of money, which was advanced, was included in the amount of compensation decreed with 6% interest payable from the date of suit. 135. The Privy Council, therefore, passed a decree for compensation in favour of the vendee and in assessing that compensation, the sum of money, which was advanced, was included in the amount of compensation decreed with 6% interest payable from the date of suit. 135. Referring to the case of Ram Chandra Misra and Ors. v. Ganesh Chandra Gangopadhya and Ors. AIR 1917 Cal. 786, which is an old decision of the Calcutta High Court, the Supreme Court, in Tarsem Singh (supra), pointed out that in Ram Chandra Misra (supra), it was held that an agreement entered into under a mistake and misapprehension as to the relative and respective rights of the parties thereto is liable to be set aside as having proceeded upon a common mistake. In this case, there was an agreement for lease of the mogoli brahmatter rights of the defendants in certain plots of land. Both the parties were under the impression that the brahmatter rights carried with them the mineral rights. It was subsequently discovered that brahmatter rights did not carry mineral rights. The High Court held that the agreement became void under Section 20 of the Contract Act, as soon as the mistake was discovered and, therefore, the plaintiffs were entitled to refund of money advanced under a contract, which was subsequently discovered to be void. 136. In Ram Chandra Mishra (supra), the plaintiffs agreed to take a lease of the mogoli brahmatter rights of the defendants in certain plots of land. At the time of entering into the agreement, both the parties believed that the brahmatter rights carry with them mineral rights, but it was subsequently discovered that the brahmatter rights do not carry mineral rights. In such circumstances, the agreement was held to be void as the same suffered from mutual mistake of fact. 137. A contract may contain various stipulations, the question to be examined is whether that stipulation is material to the contract; and if so, whether the parties know exactly the subject-matter thereof. If consent is given to a stipulation, which does not exist, then, it has to be either an issue of fraud or mistake of fact from both sides. 137. A contract may contain various stipulations, the question to be examined is whether that stipulation is material to the contract; and if so, whether the parties know exactly the subject-matter thereof. If consent is given to a stipulation, which does not exist, then, it has to be either an issue of fraud or mistake of fact from both sides. In either case, if the issue is decided in affirmative, the stipulation has to be treated as void, or so to say, not enforceable in law unless it is shown that the clause, under challenge, constitutes a separate and independent agreement, severable from the main agreement and can be enforced separately and independently. As held in the case of Tarsem Singh (supra), since a contract cannot, generally, be split into parts, none of the parties to the agreement can be permitted to seek enforcement of a part only of the contract through a court of law. If the agreement is void, all its terms are void. 138. What surfaces from the discussion of Tarsem Singh (supra), Thakurain Harnath (supra) and Ram Chandra Misra (supra), is that in Tarsem Singh (supra), the parties to the agreement had different impressions as regard the area of land to be sold and also consideration (i.e., price) thereof. Thus, both the parties to the agreement, in Tarsem Singh (supra), carried different impression as regards the existence of a fact, which was essential to the agreement. In contrast, in the case of Thakurain Harnath (supra), both the parties carried an incorrect impression about the legal right of the vendor inasmuch as none of the two parties had visualized that sale would be inoperative if the sale took place. Though in this case, both the parties carried the same impression, the contract was held to be void, because the impression, so carried by the parties concerned (though the same) was nevertheless incorrect. In Ram Chandra Misra (supra), too, neither the vendor nor the vendee knew that the vendor had no mineral rights. In such circumstances too, the contract was held to suffer from mistake of fact. 139. In Ram Chandra Misra (supra), too, neither the vendor nor the vendee knew that the vendor had no mineral rights. In such circumstances too, the contract was held to suffer from mistake of fact. 139. What becomes, thus, transparent is that when two parties to an agreement carry two different impressions, there would be no valid contract inasmuch as the parties, in such a case, would not be treated to have given their consent in the same sense and, hence, an agreement, which is consented by the parties concerned in two different senses, would be void. However, even when both the parties to an agreement carry the same impression, but their impression is incorrect with regard to a fact, which is essential for the agreement, such unanimous impression would also suffer from mistake of fact. 140. I may refer to some of the important decisions of the English Courts on the subject of mistake of fact. In Couturier v. Hastie (1856) 5 HLC, corn was sold, while in transit by sea from Salonica to England. It transpired that at the time of the contract, the ship's master had, in fact, disposed off the corn at Tunis. In this case, the buyer was absolved from payment of the price on the principle that at the time, when a contract is made, if, unknown to both the parties, the subject-matter of the contract does not exist, the contract will be void. Thus, Hastie's case (supra) was a case of mistake as to the existence of the subject-matter. 141. In Galloway v. Galloway (1953) 3 WR 723 (HL), a separation deed was declared void, because the parties were not, in fact, married, but only mistakenly believed that they were married. The deed of separation afforded contractual rights to both the parties. At the time of marriage, unknown to the defendant, his wife was still alive; hence, his second marriage was void. The court held that there had been a mutual mistake of fact as to the relationship of the parties and so, separation agreement was void. 142. The deed of separation afforded contractual rights to both the parties. At the time of marriage, unknown to the defendant, his wife was still alive; hence, his second marriage was void. The court held that there had been a mutual mistake of fact as to the relationship of the parties and so, separation agreement was void. 142. The case of Galloway (supra) is, thus, another instance, where both the parties to a contract may carry a particular impression about their rights and the legality of their contract, but both of them may be mistaken as regards a fact, which was essential to the contract; hence, in such circumstances, the contract would be void on the ground of mistake of fact. 143. The case of Lever Bros v. Bell (1931) 1 KB 557, is another important case, which helped the development of the concept of contact becoming void as a result of mistake of fact. In the year 1921, Lever Bros Ltd., a limited company, acquired controlling interest to the extent of more than 99% in Niger Company, which was a limited company carrying on business of Cocoa and other commodities in West Africa. In 1923, an agreement was entered into between the plaintiffs, i.e., Lever Bros Ltd., and the defendant, i.e., Hyslop Bell. According to this agreement, Bell was to be in the service of Lever Bros Ltd. for five years and he was to act, during this period of his service, as Chairman of the Niger Company. The plaintiffs also entered into an agreement with one Walter Snelling, the other defendant, who was appointed on the same terms as Bell, but Snelling was to act as Vice-Chairman of the Niger Company. The other prominent difference between the appointment of the said two defendants was in respect of the quantum of salary. The agreements were renewed in the year 1926. In the meanwhile, in the year 1925, Niger Company entered into a pooling agreement with three other companies in Africa. This pooling agreement was renewed in the year 1928. In the following year, i.e., in the year 1929, the Niger Company and the African Companies were amalgamated. The service agreements with Bell and Snelling were terminated, in March 1926, by Lever Bros Ltd. due to the said amalgamation. This pooling agreement was renewed in the year 1928. In the following year, i.e., in the year 1929, the Niger Company and the African Companies were amalgamated. The service agreements with Bell and Snelling were terminated, in March 1926, by Lever Bros Ltd. due to the said amalgamation. However, as the termination of the service was before the completion of the term of appointments, both the defendants were paid compensation by the plaintiff, i.e., Lever Bros Ltd. In July, 1929, the plaintiff, Lever Bros Ltd., discovered that towards the end of 1927, the defendants, i.e., Bells and Snelling, had committed breaches of duty and that their acts being fraudulent, they were not entitled to receive any compensation, which they had already been paid. Lever Bros Ltd., therefore, brought, as plaintiff, an action for recovery of the compensation, which had been already paid by them to the defendants, on the ground that the said compensation had been paid to the defendants due to fraudulent misrepresentation. The case was tried before a Special Jury of the City of London. The questions of fact, determined by the Jury, were: (a) That the plaintiff Lever Bros did not know about the breaches committed by the defendants at the time of entering into compensation agreement. (b) That even the defendants did not know that because of the breaches committed by them on an earlier date, they were not entitled to any compensation and that the minds of the defendants were dwelling more on their service rather than the breaches committed by them. 144. The King's Bench Division, dealing with the appeal, held, thus: The plaintiffs were carrying the impression that termination of the services of Bell and Snelling entitled them to receive compensation from the plaintiffs. At the same time, the defendants too were under an erroneous belief that their services could not be terminated unless compensation were paid, though they knew about the breaches, which they had committed. Thus, the defendants were of the view that if their services were being terminated, they were entitled to receive compensation. At the same time, the defendants too were under an erroneous belief that their services could not be terminated unless compensation were paid, though they knew about the breaches, which they had committed. Thus, the defendants were of the view that if their services were being terminated, they were entitled to receive compensation. The King's Bench concluded that in view of the finding of the Jury that the defendants had been carrying, same as the plaintiff, an incorrect impression that they were entitled to receive compensation and, thus, when the correct position was discovered, it must be held that the agreement suffered from mistake of fact and that the agreement is void and that the plaintiffs were entitled to receive back the compensation, which they had, on the basis of the wrong impression of both the parties, paid to the defendants. 145. Sheikh Brothers Ltd. v. Arnold Julius Ocshner and Anr. (1957) 2 WLR 254, is a case, the appellant company granted to the first respondent licence and authority to cut, decorticate, process and manufacture all sisal existing or growing thereafter on certain land of which the appellant was the lessee comprising about 5,000 acres in Kenya. By one of the Clauses in the agreement, the licensee undertook, inter alia, that he would, as from first April 1951, manufacture and supply to the appellant or to its agents, for sale, sisal fibre in average minimum quantities of 50 tons per month. The cutting and manufacture of sisal under the license was carried on by the licensee until 31st January, 1952. As the licensee failed to deliver to the appellant minimum quantity of 50 tons of sisal fibre, a dispute arose. This dispute was referred to arbitration. The arbitrator held that there was only an error of judgment as to the leaf potential and error of judgment was not equivalent to mutual mistake. The respondents appealed to the Supreme Court of Kenya. The Supreme Court of Kenya held that both the parties were carrying an erroneous belief as to the leaf potential of the sisal area and since this mistake was with regard to a fact, which was essential to the agreement, it set aside the award and remitted back the arbitration proceeding. The arbitrator, then, decided that the contract suffered from mutual mistake of fact. The arbitrator, then, decided that the contract suffered from mutual mistake of fact. The appellants, then, preferred an appeal to the court of Appeal for Eastern Africa; but the court of Appeal too affirmed the decision of the Supreme Court of Kenya. The Privy Council held that having regard to the nature of the contract, which was a kind of joint adventure, it was the very basis of the contract that the sisal area should be capable of producing an average of 50 tons a month throughout the term of the licence and the mistake was as to a matter of fact essential to the agreement. As both the parties to the contract were carrying an incorrect impression that the leaf potential of the sisal area was sufficient to produce, on an average, 50 tons of sisal fibre, the contract suffered from mistake of fact inasmuch as Section 20 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, provides that where both the parties to an agreement are under a mistake as to a fact essential to the agreement, the agreement is void. 146. There is yet another latent aspect of the whole controversy, which has been raised in this series of writ petitions and which, now, needs to be dealt with. 147. Part XIII of the 2003 Act, embodies the provisions of reorganization of the said Electricity Board. Section 131 of the 2003 Act, makes it clear that the State Government is required to prepare a transfer scheme and with effect from the date on which a transfer scheme is published or for such further date, as may be stipulated by the State Government, the properties, interest in properties, rights and liabilities, belonging to State Electricity Board, shall stand vested in the State Government on such terms as may be agreed between the State Government and the Board. Section 131 also makes it clear that the properties, interest in properties, rights and liabilities, so came to be vested in a State Government, in accordance with the transfer scheme, shall be revested by the State Government, in a Government Company or in a company or companies. 148. Acting on the strength of the provisions contained in the 2003 Act, with regard to the reorganization of the Board, Assam Electricity Reform First Transfer Scheme, 2004, has been notified, in the Official Gazette, on 10.12.2004. 148. Acting on the strength of the provisions contained in the 2003 Act, with regard to the reorganization of the Board, Assam Electricity Reform First Transfer Scheme, 2004, has been notified, in the Official Gazette, on 10.12.2004. This transfer scheme, inter alia, envisages functioning of distribution licensees, namely, DISCOMS. The transfer scheme, depending upon the jurisdictional area, provides for three areas, namely, Upper DISCOMS, Central DISCOMS and Lower DISCOMS. Clause (8) of the transfer scheme, which deals with pending suits and proceedings, run as under: 8(1). All proceedings of whatever nature by or against the Board pending on the date of the transfer shall not abate or discontinue or otherwise in anyway prejudicial be affected by reason of the transfer under this scheme and the proceedings may be continued, prosecuted and enforced by or against the Transferee to whom the same are assigned in accordance with this Transfer Scheme and orders issued thereunder. (2). The proceedings referred to in Sub-clause (1) above may be continued in the same manner and to the same extent as it would or might have been continued, prosecuted and enforced by or against the Board if the transfers specified in this Scheme had not been made. 149. Reacting to the said scheme of transfer, which has come into force on 10.12.2004, it has been contended by Mr. Dutta, learned senior Counsel, that the properties, interest in properties, rights and liabilities, belonging to the Assam State Electricity Board, stood vested in the Government, which was to be revested by the State Government in a company or companies in accordance with the transfer scheme. Mr. Dutta argues that on 10.12.2004, the Assam State Electricity Board could have functioned either as a STU or as a Licensee. Since the Assam State Electricity Board was and is still functioning STU, Mr. Dutta contends that it could not have continued as a distribution Licensee beyond 10.12.2004 and the dues, if any, payable to the Assam State Electricity Board, could not have been realized by the Assam State Electricity Board, as a distribution licensee, because it was no longer a distribution licensee and had remained, at best, the STU, in Assam, with the right to transmit electricity as a transmission licensee. In fact, after 10.12.2004, according to Mr. In fact, after 10.12.2004, according to Mr. Dutta, the dues payable to the Assam State Electricity Board could not have vested in the Government and since it had not remained vested in the Government, the question of these dues being vested by the Government in any other company did not arise at all. 150. Responding to the submissions noted above, Mr. D.K. Mishra, learned senior Counsel, appearing on behalf of the Board, submits that the said transfer scheme is an exercise of power by the State Government under Section 131 of the 2003 Act, and, in terms of the said transfer scheme, distribution licensees have been formed by the Government and these distribution licensees have been correctly and legally vested with the rights, which the earlier Board, as a distribution licensee or as an electricity trader, had enjoyed. 151. While dealing with the above controversy, it needs to be pointed out that the contents of Clause 8 of the said transfer scheme reveal that whatever rights have been transferred under the scheme, the transferee shall be able to enforce such rights against a person, who could have been proceeded against by the ASEB before the said transfer scheme had come into force. In the present case, there is no dispute that if the Board has, in law and in fact, continued to raise, as a distribution licensee, bills in respect of the outstanding dues, then the Board's right to recover dues of electrical charges (which the Board had, before coming into force of the said scheme), would stand transferred to the Board as a distribution licensee, and the Board, as a distribution licensee, would be able to recover the dues, which were recoverable by it before the 2003 Act, came into force. 152. On a conjoint reading of Section 131(1) and Clause 8 of the transfer scheme, it would become apparent, as correctly contended by Mr. Dutta, that since the Board was not legally competent to function as a distribution licensee beyond 10.6.2004, the proceedings, in the form of impugxied energy bills and the issuance of the disconnection notices, could not have been continued and/or maintained by the Board or any one else, as a distribution licensee, beyond 10.6.2004. Dutta, that since the Board was not legally competent to function as a distribution licensee beyond 10.6.2004, the proceedings, in the form of impugxied energy bills and the issuance of the disconnection notices, could not have been continued and/or maintained by the Board or any one else, as a distribution licensee, beyond 10.6.2004. Consequently, the rights, if any, of the Board, in the said proceedings, which commenced with the issuance of the impugned bills culminating into the issuance of disconnection notices, could not have been transferred and continued to be enjoyed by the respondent No. 5 inasmuch as these proceedings were not pending with the Board as a distribution licensee on 10.12.2004, i.e., the date, on which the transfer scheme was notified. Extended logically, this will mean that the impugned bills as well as the disconnection notices have abated by operation of law and cannot, therefore, be enforced against the petitioners concerned. The impugned energy bills and also the disconnection notices are hereby set aside and quashed. 153. Because of the fact that I have already found that the impugned energy bills are not enforceable, in law, against the petitioners concerned, I have not entered into the question as to whether the impugned bills are barred by the law of limitation or not and what remedies, if any, were available to the parties concerned as regards non-payment of the alleged dues of the Board. 154. With the observations made, as a whole, and the directions given, this set of writ petitions shall stand disposed of. 155. No order as to costs. 156. Before parting with the records, it needs to be pointed out that initially, some of the present writ petitions were heard and became part-heard. However, before hearing on the said writ petitions could be concluded, some cases were, as per directions issued by different Benches, came to be listed along with the said batch of writ petitions after some of the writ petitions had already become part-heard. This apart, some new cases, which cams to be filed in the year 2007 and involved, broadly speaking, same questions of law, came to be listed along with the writ petitions, (where hearing was in progress), so that no prejudice was caused to those, who had filed writ petitions after some of these writ petitions had already become part-heard. This apart, some new cases, which cams to be filed in the year 2007 and involved, broadly speaking, same questions of law, came to be listed along with the writ petitions, (where hearing was in progress), so that no prejudice was caused to those, who had filed writ petitions after some of these writ petitions had already become part-heard. In course of time, pleadings in the new cases had to be completed. During the course of hearing, several adjournments were obtained by both parties even for the purpose of submitting new documents. There are altogether 17 cases in this batch and the learned Counsel, engaged in the writ petitions, are not same. Hence, all the learned Counsel for the parties had to be given opportunity to have their say in the matter. Hearing could, therefore, be completed only on 20.1.2009.