( 1 ) HEARD Shri J. J. Chandurkar, Advocate, for the petitioner and Shri S. V. Sirpurkar, Advocate, for respondents. ( 2 ) BY this petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioners are challenging the order passed by the designated Member, maharashtra Revenue Tribunal, Nagpur Bench, Nagpur, in Revision No. TEN-A-47/94, dated 20th October, 1997. ( 3 ) THE brief facts can be stated thus -The petitioners are landlords of Survey No. 39 situated at village Sao, Tq. and District Buldhana. They have inherited the property from one Parvatibai w/o chintaman Bhiwande and Yamunhabai w/o Ranuji Wankhede. They had jointly owned the Field Survey No. 39. The respondents were the tenants in the said field. In June, 1991, they filed an application for declaration of tenancy as well as for fixation of purchase price, as according to them, they could purchase the said field under the provisions of section 50 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural lands (Vidarbha Region) Act. This application was filed before the Tahsildar, buldhana, bearing Revenue Case No. Ten-C-49/sao-2/199l-92. The case of the respondents was that the land in question was originally belonging to Smt. Parvatibai and Smt. Yamunabai and it was being cultivated by them under "batai agreement" since May, 1982. Initially the said agreement was for 3 years and it was in writing. After expiry of the said period, the said tenancy was renewed orally for year to year. It was their claim that they are paying the land revenue etc. , and they are in possession of the said field as per the terms and conditions of the Batai Agreement. It is claimed that there was dispute as to who are the L. Rs. , of Parvatibai and after decision, the then Defendant No. 1 was found to be L. R. of Parvatibai. The defence of the landlords was that there was execution of Batai agreement, the tenants/applicants therein had surrendered their tenancy rights. They also claimed that there was breach of terms and the execution of the agreement was not conscious. The evidence of one Nimbaji Lokhahde was adduced by the applicants. The learned Tahsildar found that the non-applicants therein i. e. landlords were changing their version and stand. They were held to be not trustworthy. They also claimed that there was breach of terms and the execution of the agreement was not conscious. The evidence of one Nimbaji Lokhahde was adduced by the applicants. The learned Tahsildar found that the non-applicants therein i. e. landlords were changing their version and stand. They were held to be not trustworthy. Tahsildar believed the applicants and held that they are the tenants, so they were declared so and by fixing the purchase price under Tenancy act, they were allowed to purchase the said land by the order dated 25th february, 1994. ( 4 ) THE matter was taken by the landlords in Revenue Appeal No. TNC-Sav-6/93-94 before the Sub Divisional Officer, Buldhana. After hearing, the learned S. D. O. , Buldhana, dismissed the said appeal. ( 5 ) THE matter was then taken before the Member, Maharashtra Revenue tribunal, Nagpur, in Revision No. TEN-A-47/94. The revision also met with the same fate i. e. it was dismissed by the order impugned in this writ petition. The main reason that was stated by the learned designated Member, M. R. T. , Nagpur, was that the limitation period prescribed under section 50 of the Tenancy Act was not applicable to the present case, inasmuch as the tenancy was continued for several years after the expiry of said Batai Agreement. It is specifically observed that, "it is thus clear that although the term of the Batai agreement executed in the year 1982 had expired in 1985, the landlords allowed the present N. As. to cultivate the suit land for several years in future and continued to accept them as their tenants. Under these circumstances, there is no substance or merit in the contention raised before me by the present N. As (tenants) on 8-7-1991 before the tenancy Tahsildar, Buldhana, was not tenable since it was barred by limitation of time as prescribed under section 50 of the Tenancy Act". It is informed that tahsildar has issued the Purchase Certificate under section 43 of the Bombay tenancy Act on 3-10-1996. ( 6 ) IT may be noted that while admitting the matter on 25-1-1999, the following order was passed by this Hon'ble Court. "rule on stay. In the meanwhile, admit. Stay in terms of prayer clause (B)". Thereafter on 21-6-1999 the following order was passed. "leave to amend. ( 6 ) IT may be noted that while admitting the matter on 25-1-1999, the following order was passed by this Hon'ble Court. "rule on stay. In the meanwhile, admit. Stay in terms of prayer clause (B)". Thereafter on 21-6-1999 the following order was passed. "leave to amend. Status quo in terms that Respondent tenant will continue to cultivate the land and furnish surety for annual rent to the satisfaction of the Addl. Registrar. " ( 7 ) LEARNED counsel for the petitioner has relied on the provisions of section 50 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Vidarbha Region) Act, to contend that the tenant has to make an application within a period of one year so as to claim a right of purchase of the leased land and this one year is from the commencement of the tenancy or as the case may be from the restoration of the tenancy. In this case, according to him, the period of tenancy has started from 1982 at any rate and therefore, the application at the most should have been preferred in 1983. Therefore, the application preferred by the respondents in 1991 would be hopelessly barred under section 50 of the said Act, and as such the same was liable to be rejected. He relies on the judgment of Division Bench of this Court reported in 2003 (1) Mh. L. J. 658, Rambhau Sitaramji Bhave vs. Nathuji Laxmanji Bhonde, to contend that the right of purchase conferred on the tenant under section 50 of Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Vidarbha region) Act cannot be enlarged merely because the period of lease was to expire after statutory period of one year as provided under section 50 of the Tenancy act. Therefore, according to him, the alleged exercise of right in the year 1991 was illegal and that right of purchase should not have been allowed by the tahsildar, consequently by S. D. O. and Member, M. R. T. , as in the instant case. Therefore, according to him, the orders of Tahsildar, S. D. O and the impugned order passed by the M. R. T. are liable to be quashed and set aside. ( 8 ) SHRI Sirpurkar, learned counsel for the respondents has submitted that the certificate to purchase has already been issued and the tenancy of respondents was continued for about 10 years. ( 8 ) SHRI Sirpurkar, learned counsel for the respondents has submitted that the certificate to purchase has already been issued and the tenancy of respondents was continued for about 10 years. As there was new tenancy every year, the tenants can exercise their right of purchase in any of those years, as every time there was new tenancy. According to him, the impugned order as well as orders passed by Tahsildar and the S. D. O. are correct and consequently, the certificate of purchase issued by Tahsildar, Buldhana, cannot be quashed and set aside. ( 9 ) IN order to appreciate the rival contentions of the parties, it is necessary to closely peruse the provisions of section 50 of the Bombay Tenancy and agricultural Lands (Vidarbha Region) Act. The same read thus - "section 50 - Right of tenants holding land under tenancy [restored or] created after specified date to purchase land: [ (1)] Where a tenancy is restored under sections 7,10, 21 [52] or 128-A or is created by a landlord [ (not being a landlord within the meaning of Chapter III-A)] in any area after the date specified in [sub-section (1) of section 49- A] every tenant holding land under tenancy and cultivating it personally shall be entitled to purchase within one year from the commencement [or as the case may be, the restoration] of the tenancy so much of such land as he may be entitled to purchase under section 41 and the provisions of sections 41 to 44 (both inclusive) shall mutatis mutandis apply to such purchase. " It is necessary to note that, it has been provided that "shall be entitled to purchase within one year from the commencement or as the case may be, the restoration of the tenancy". Therefore, the right of purchase has to be exercised within a period of one year from the commencement of tenancy. ( 10 ) THE question here is whether further continuance of tenancy, if any, for year to year, make the tenants entitled to apply for purchase of the leased land. ( 11 ) THE observations of this Court in the case of Rambhau Sitaramji Bhave vs. Nathuji Laxmanji Bhonde, reported in 2003 (1) Mh. L. J. 658 in para 16 need to be seen. It has been observed thus - "16. ( 11 ) THE observations of this Court in the case of Rambhau Sitaramji Bhave vs. Nathuji Laxmanji Bhonde, reported in 2003 (1) Mh. L. J. 658 in para 16 need to be seen. It has been observed thus - "16. In our view the ratio laid down by the Apex Court in the aforesaid decision is squarely applicable so far as the case of the appellant in hand is concerned. It is no doubt true that the postponement of right of tenant to purchase the land under section 50 was sought for or insisted upon by the landlord, on the ground that the period of lease was of 10 years and therefore, the tenant could not exercise his right of purchase within one year from the date of commencement of the lease. As held by the Apex court, a right of purchase conferred on the tenant under section 50 which is applicable to a tenant whose tenancy is created after commencement of the specified date i. e. 1-4-1963, this statutory right cannot be enlarged merely because the period of lease was to expire after statutory period of one year as provided under section 50 of the tenancy Act. That is not the intention of the Legislature. As observed by the Apex Court, had it been so, the Legislature would have made provisions in section 50 itself carving out postponement of the right of the tenant to purchase the land till the continuation of the period of lease. But in the absence of that, it has to be said that the appellant/tenant was to exercise the right to purchase within one year from the commencement of the lease. The appellant/tenant having not exercised that right, the right to the landlord/respondent to apply for restoration of the land had accrued as soon as right of the appellant/tenant extinguished. In that view of the matter, the respondent landlord ought to have preferred application within 2 years. . . . . . . . . " It would be seen that the right of purchase under the relevant provisions needs to be exercised within a period of one year from the commencement of the tenancy. Here, admittedly the contention of the landlord/petitioner was that the respondent had surrendered the tenancy and their rights. Batai Agreement was only for three years. It was to end in 1985. Here, admittedly the contention of the landlord/petitioner was that the respondent had surrendered the tenancy and their rights. Batai Agreement was only for three years. It was to end in 1985. It is evident that it was not renewed in writing for several years later on. There is dispute as to whether tenancy was orally continued later on/with the agreement of both the parties i. e. landlords and tenants. When there was written agreement of Batai and the provisions of section 50 of the Act were operative, the respondents should have exercised their right of purchase within a period of one year from the commencement of the tenancy i. e. within one year from 1982. The object of the provisions is very clear. In view of the judgment of this Court in Rambhau Sitaramji Bhave vs. Nathuji Laxmanji bhonde, reported in 2003 (1) Mh. L. J. 658, it would not be possible to say that after the expiry of first Batai Agreement and lease period i. e. after 1985, the lease could continue so as to make respondents entitled for exercise of the right of purchase. ( 12 ) I may add that the decision reported in 1989 Mh. L. J. 689, Dwarkanath vishram Ghurye thr. heir and another vs. Narayan Vasudeo Dhond, referred by the learned counsel for the petitioner need not be referred as the same is not attracted on facts of the case. ( 13 ) IN this view of the matter, the view taken by the Tahsildar, Sub divisional Officer as well as the learned Member, Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal is not sustainable at law. As such, the impugned judgment is liable to be quashed and set aside, so also the judgments of S. D. O. and the Tahsildar. Accordingly the same are quashed and set aside by allowing this petition. Consequently, the prayer of the petitioner that purchase certificate issued by the learned Tahsildar needs to be quashed, is also to be accepted. The same is also, therefore, quashed. Petition is allowed and disposed of with no order as to costs. Learned counsel for the respondent seeks stay for four weeks for enabling the respondents to move the Apex Court. Accordingly four weeks stay to the effect and operation of the above judgment and order, is granted. Petition allowed.