B. P. DHARMADHIKARI, J. ( 1 ) CHALLENGE in this Letters Patent Appeal is to the judgment dated 29-7-2009 delivered by the learned Single Judge of this High Court in Writ Petition No. 2819/2009 dismissing it. In that Writ Petition, present Appellant had challenged order dated 1-7-2009 passed by respondent no. 1 Divisional Commissioner, Nagpur disqualifying him as a Councillor of the zilla Parishad, Chandrapur under section 16 (1) (i) of the Maharashtra Zilla parishad and Panchayat Samitis Act, 1961, (hereinafter referred to as "the 1961 act" for short ). The challenge raised can be briefly stated here for convenience. According to Appellant when work was already executed and he was only to receive amount therefor from the Zilla Parishad, the fact that such amount due prior to election was paid after election without anything more, was not sufficient to hold that he was having any interest in work done to bar him from continuing as a Councillor. It is further urged in the alternative that such ground of disqualification may at the most be relevant in election petition, but same cannot in these circumstances be viewed as incurred during term of his office as councillor. Lastly locus of Respondent No. 3 to move for declaration of disqualification under section 40, is also assailed. ( 2 ) IN view of the challenge narrated above, we find it appropriate to mention relevant legal provisions before adverting to facts of the matter. "16. Disqualifications (1) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (2), a person shall be disqualified for being chosen as, and for being, a Councillor (a ). . . . . . . . . . . (b ). . . . . . . . . . . (c ). . . . . . . . . . . (d ). . . . . . . . . . . (e ). . . . . . . . . . . . (f ). . . . . . . . . . . . (g ). . . . . . . . . . . (h ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (e ). . . . . . . . . . . . (f ). . . . . . . . . . . . (g ). . . . . . . . . . . (h ). . . . . . . . . . . (i) if he has directly or indirectly by himself or his partner any share or interest in any work done by order of the Zilla Parishad or in any contract with, by or on behalf of, the Zilla Parishad or;" "40. Disqualification of Councillor during term of office - (1) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (2) of section 62, if any councillor during the term of his office a) becomes disqualified under sub-section (1) of section 16, or. . . . . . . (2) If any question whether a vacancy has occurred under this section is raised either by the Commissioner suo motu or on an application made to him by any person in that behalf, the Commissioner shall decide. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . shall be final. Until the Commissioner. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . from containing to be Councillor: provided that,. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . of being heard. " Section 27 insofar as relevant for present purposes, reads as under :-"27. Determination of validity of elections; inquiry by Judge: procedure :- (1) If the validity of any election of the Councillor or the legality of any order made or proceedings held under section 26 is brought in question by any candidate at such election or by any person qualified to vote at the election to which such question refers such candidate or person may, at any time within 15 days after the date of the declaration of the result of the election or the date of the order or proceedings apply to the District Judge of the district within which the election has been held, for the determination of such question. (2) to (8)not reproduced. (2) to (8)not reproduced. " ( 3 ) APPELLANT has been declared elected on 12-3-2007 as Councillor from 36 kelzar Chinchala constituency of Respondent No. 2 the Zilla Parishad in election held on 12-3-2007. He has been further elected as President of said the Zilla parishad on 21-3-2007. Earlier he was awarded contract of road asphalting by the zilla Parishad on 27-9-2005 and 17-3-2005 and though the contract work was over, payment was not received by him because of lack of funds with Zilla parishad. It is admitted position that, these amounts have been paid to him on 30-3-2007, 31-3-2007 12-6-2007. One Subhash Bukkawar had objected to his nomination on 26-2-2007 on this ground, but, that was rejected by Election officer. Thereafter on 5-4-2007, present Respondent No. 3 approached respondent No. 1 Commissioner seeking declaration of disqualification of appellant on very same ground. His application was rejected on 29-3-2008 and a writ Petition No. 2016/2008 was then filed before this Court. It was dismissed on 16-1-2009 but then Respondent No. 3 was given liberty to file fresh application with direction to Respondent No. 1 to decide the same within 90 days. Fresh application was then moved on 19-1-2009 and in it present Appellant raised preliminary objection and then filed Writ Petition No. 2452/2009 seeking direction to Respondent No. 1 to decide it. He withdrew said writ petition on 15-6-2009. Respondent No. 1 Commissioner then passed order on 1-7-2009 rejecting preliminary objection of Appellant about the locus of Respondent No. 3 and holding Appellant disqualified because of his interest in the work done as per orders of the Zilla Parishad. Appellant then approached this Court in Writ petition No. 2819/2009 and on 9-7-2009, his Petition was directed to be heard finally at admission stage and interim stay came to be granted. Learned Single judge in this background delivered the impugned judgment on 29-7-2009 upholding the order of Commissioner and dismissing Writ Petition. In present lpa initially we have heard respective counsel on 5-8-2009 and order was reserved. However, later on it was found necessary to decide LPA itself on merits finally and accordingly we heard them again, but finally on 21-8-2009. Learned Single judge in this background delivered the impugned judgment on 29-7-2009 upholding the order of Commissioner and dismissing Writ Petition. In present lpa initially we have heard respective counsel on 5-8-2009 and order was reserved. However, later on it was found necessary to decide LPA itself on merits finally and accordingly we heard them again, but finally on 21-8-2009. ( 4 ) BY referring to relevant provisions and the case law, Senior Advocate s. P. Dharmadhikari argues that Respondent No. 3, not being a voter at appellant's election, could not have filed election petition and hence, did not possess locus to move application under section 40. He states that this aspect is not appropriately considered as the challenge to maintainability of such application under section 40 is itself lost sight of by learned Single Judge. According to him, in present facts, when work was already done long before the commencement of election process mere fact of receipt of payment after election of Appellant as a Councillor was not sufficient to infer that he incurred disqualification thereby "during the term of his office". Though such payment may have been of some relevance to show interest on the date of election/nomination, it can be only for determination in election petition under section 27 and not under section 40. As this facet of challenge is not considered by learned Single Judge, the question whether Appellant can be said to have incurred any disqualification because of mere receipt of payment during term of his office is also not decided. The issue of locus assumes importance in this background because Respondent No. 3 who could not have filed election petition to raise such challenge has been permitted to defeat mandate of law in this respect by enabling him to raise it under section 40. ( 5 ) ADVOCATE P. C. Madkholkar on the other hand states that learned Single judge has not overlooked any challenge and has correctly appreciated the same in the background of the law and the spirit thereof. He also states that order dated 16-1-2009 passed by this Court in Writ Petition No. 2016/2008 giving liberty to respondent No. 3 to file fresh application before Respondent No. 1 commissioner is final and determinative in the matter of locus of Respondent no. 3. He also states that order dated 16-1-2009 passed by this Court in Writ Petition No. 2016/2008 giving liberty to respondent No. 3 to file fresh application before Respondent No. 1 commissioner is final and determinative in the matter of locus of Respondent no. 3. Our attention has been invited to various judgments to point out the need and purpose of such disqualification with argument that receipt of payment is nothing but an indication of continuing interest which is sufficient to warrant order of disqualification. Learned AGP has also supported the order of commissioner and of learned Single Judge. 5a. Indumati Laxman Bhakre vs. State of Maharashtra, 2004 (3) Mh. L. J. 6 = 2004 (Supl. 2) Bom. C. R. 952 = 2004 (4) All MR 89, is the judgment of learned single Judge of this Court. Respondent No. 3 has placed heavy reliance on it while Appellant has struggled to distinguish it by contending that, it considers issue of disqualification qua, an election petition only and not after the commencement of the term as Councillor. There dismissal of two election petitions challenging election of one Chhaya Arun Patil as president of Municipal council tiled by a defeated candidate and by a voter respectively formed the subject matter of Writ Petitions under Article 227 of Constitution. Chhaya herself had filed a Writ Petition challenging declaration of her disqualification under section 16 (1) (i) of Maharashtra Municipal Councils, Nagar Panchayats and industrial Townships Act, 1965, (hereinafter referred to as "the 1965 Act" for short) Though election court found that she was disqualified, election petition was dismissed on sole ground that the validity of her nomination was not objected to before the returning officer. Said section 16 (1) (i) of 1965 Act is similar to section 16 (1) (i) of 1961 Act. Husband of Chhaya was awarded total 19 works by Municipal Council. She filed her nomination on 9-11-2001 and her husband wrote a letter to chief officer of municipal Council that he had completed the awarded works in certain cases while in other cases part of it was complete or then work was to commence. He stated that his wife intended to contest election and hence to avoid bar in her way, he declared that he was not in position to complete the work and accordingly terminated all contracts. He stated that his wife intended to contest election and hence to avoid bar in her way, he declared that he was not in position to complete the work and accordingly terminated all contracts. He also recorded that he would be responsible to Municipal Council and reimburse any loss caused to it on that account. Because of this letter and willingness to compensate, Chief Officer on same day issued another letter accepting termination of all contracts. On 25th January, 2002 resolution was passed by municipal Council and it was signed by his wife, who by then had become president and Municipal Council sanctioned payment for all bills for works completed till 9-11-2001 after conducting measurement and resolved to invite fresh tenders for remaining works. The resolution further stated that if any financial loss was caused to Municipal Council, it should be recovered from said contractor husband. In paragraph 8 of the judgment, section 16 (1) (i) of 1965 Act is compared with section 9a of Representation of People Act, 1951 to conclude that said provision of 1965 Act is significantly wider in its scope and content. It is observed that under section 9a contract must be subsisting to attract disqualification and when it is fully performed, it is deemed not to subsist even if government has not performed its part of contract fully or in part. In paragraph 9, section 16 (1) (i) of 1965 Act is divided into two parts, one in relation to "work done" by the other in relation to "contract". It is also noticed that expression "any contract" would refer to subsisting contract. The use of expressions of "width and amplitude" in section 16 (1) (i) of 1965 Act is found to be deliberate and with a view to avoid conflict of interest and duty. It is found that a contractor who does the job of a Councillor cannot be expected to protect the interest of local body. Retention of an interest in receiving payment for work done is held sufficient to attract disqualification and the fact that contract does not subsist because of its termination is held to be not sufficient to avoid it. It is found that a contractor who does the job of a Councillor cannot be expected to protect the interest of local body. Retention of an interest in receiving payment for work done is held sufficient to attract disqualification and the fact that contract does not subsist because of its termination is held to be not sufficient to avoid it. After these observations in paragraph 11, in paragraph 12 the facts have been considered and it is noticed that shortly after the election of his spouse as president of Municipal Council, resolution authorising Municipal Council to make his payments was cleared and his wife was party to it. Legislature wanted to avoid such situations only. In paragraph 14, judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court reported at AIR 1954 SC 236 , chaturbhuj Vithaldas Jesani vs. Moreshwar Parashram and others, is considered and in paragraph 15 it is found that statutory provision construed by Hon'ble apex Court referred to "any share or interest in the contract for the supply of goods" and question considered there was whether such contract was terminated once goods were supplied or whether it continued till payment was made and the contract was fully discharged by performance on both sides. It was found that provisions of section 16 (1) (i) of 1965 Act were wider inasmuch as it envisaged share or interest not merely in any contract but also in any work done by order of a Council. It was found that termination of contract by husband of President rendered later part of said provision inapplicable as no contract then subsisted. But then it is noticed that contractor may continue to have a share or interest in any work done by order of a Council even after the contract has been brought to an end where the payment is still due and outstanding for such work done under the contract. Claim for payment is held to constitute an interest and Court has to effectuate the object of the legislature to prevent any kind of conflict between interest and duty. Claim for payment is held to constitute an interest and Court has to effectuate the object of the legislature to prevent any kind of conflict between interest and duty. In paragraph 16 of the judgment termination of contract because of its breach or because of acceptance of termination by department is noted not to attract disqualification under section 9a of Representation of People act, but then as section 16 (1) (i) of 1965 Act is held to be wider, and it is concluded that disqualification envisaged thereunder arises not only when there is a subsisting contract but where person has a share or interest in any work done by order of Council. In paragraph 15 it has been held that elected candidate was not qualified to become a Councillor because of section 16 (1) (i) of 1965 Act. Here it is proper to state that the words employed in section 16 (1) (i) of 1961 Act match with section 16 (1) (i) of 1965 Act. ( 6 ) WE are not concerned with later part of section 16 (1) (i) of 1961 Act i. e. with words dealing with contract and no arguments in that respect are advanced before us. We are therefore concerned with first part in relation to "work done". Again it is not in dispute that Appellant has done the work as per or by the orders of the Zilla Parishad. There is no question of any "share", because Appellant individually was a contractor to whom work of asphalting the roads was given. As payment for said work was not made, it is clear that Appellant was interested in receiving that payment and therefore, though work was done his interest survived. This is also contemplated by section 16 (1) (i) inasmuch as though it uses the past tense by employing verb "done" to qualify the "work", it has used present tense by employing "has" to govern "share or interest". Legislature therefore itself envisaged the situation in which work would already be over much before elections but interest therein would continue not only at the time of election but also thereafter. Hence by merely pointing out that work was already over long back and because of its financial constraints the Zilla Parishad could not make payment to him, Appellant cannot defeat the mandate of this provision. Hence by merely pointing out that work was already over long back and because of its financial constraints the Zilla Parishad could not make payment to him, Appellant cannot defeat the mandate of this provision. Section 16 (1) (i) operates on "interest" or "share" and not on work done or contract. If there is no subsisting interest or share in work done, the disqualification does not spring into existence. It qualifies the word "interest" with "has" to emphasize that interest has to be present at that stage i. e. at the nomination or then during term as Councillor. It does not require that subject matter of such interest i. e. "work" should be then going on. Words "work done" cannot be read to mean as "work being done" to imply work in progress. The language itself is very clear and aimed at avoiding conflict of interest and duty in such person possessing interest either seeking election as Councillor or then continuing as Councillor. Section 16 (1) itself disqualifies him for being chosen as and for being a Councillor. The language is intelligible and its literal interpretation does not lead to any absurdity but advances the object with which it is enacted. We find that effort to defeat it by contending that such interest must accrue after election and then only section 40 of 1961 Act stands attracted is clearly misconceived. Continuation of interest after election is also subject to disqualification as holder thereof "has interest" in work done. The disqualification for continuation as a Councillor is prescribed in section 16 (1)itself and one need not go to section 40 which only provides a procedure for declaration thereof. Section 40 does not in any way introduce any discordant element with legislative mandate apparent in section 16 (1 ). ( 7 ) SENIOR Advocate Shri Dharmadhikari, contended that Appellant could have been certainly declared disqualified in election petition under section 27 and urged that disqualification prevailing on the eve of election cannot be treated as incurred during term of office. We fail to see any such distinction drawn by legislature insofar as scheme of 1961 Act is concerned. Disqualifications for the purposes of contesting election are also the disqualifications for continuing as councillor after election. We fail to see any such distinction drawn by legislature insofar as scheme of 1961 Act is concerned. Disqualifications for the purposes of contesting election are also the disqualifications for continuing as councillor after election. Thus mere event of election cannot be used to wipe out the disqualification previous to it so as to enable Appellant to contend that he must be shown to have incurred fresh disqualification after election. There is no such breakpoint in scheme of section 16 in respect of disqualifications suffered prior to election which continue even after it. The candidate like present appellant admittedly disqualified for election does not lose that disqualification and it continues to operate to his prejudice despite his election. Any other reading of section 16 will result in defeating the legislative mandate. Section 40 is only procedural part which prescribes machinery for removal of such disqualified candidate. ( 8 ) QUESTION whether action for removal on account of such continuing disqualification must be sought only under section 27 through election petition and, it cannot be done via section 40 also calls for scrutiny. Order dated 16-1-2009 passed by this Court in Writ Petition 2016/2008 gave liberty to Respondent no. 3 to file fresh application under section 40 before Respondent No. 1 commissioner. That Writ Petition was filed by present Respondent No. 3 challenging order of Commissioner rejecting his earlier application under section 40 on the ground that contract was already completed by present appellant and only because the payment was delayed for want of funds, receipt thereof by Appellant after his election would not be a ground for disqualification under section 16 (1) (i ). In that writ petition, present Appellant contended that because of provisions of Article 243-O (b) of the Constitution of India, his election could not have been set aside except through election petition under section 27. He contended that section 40 was therefore not available. These arguments are considered by this Court and it found that Commissioner can declare him disqualified if he is incurred such disqualification during the term of the office i. e. after he entered the office. The Commissioner is held not to have power to declare his election illegal or invalid or to quash that election. It is therefore found that application then filed seeking to set aside election of appellant was not tenable. The Commissioner is held not to have power to declare his election illegal or invalid or to quash that election. It is therefore found that application then filed seeking to set aside election of appellant was not tenable. Then it was pointed out to this Court that as receipt of payment after election revealed his interest, Appellant could have been disqualified even suo motu by Commissioner. The then learned Single Judge applied his mind to various authorities like Chaturbhuj Vithaldas Jesani vs. Moreshwar Parashram and others (supra), Dattatraya Narhar Oitale vs. Vibhakar Dinkar Gokhale and another, 1975 Mh. L. J. 701, Dinkar Ananda Deore vs. Shantaram Punaji and others, 1981 Mh. L. J. 673 and Indumati Laxman bhakre vs. State of Maharashtra (supra) in paragraph 9 and concluded - "all these authorities support the contention of the Petitioner in respect of the interest by way of contract even if work is completed, when payment is yet to be made by Municipal Council or the Zilla Parishad or by the concerned Government or government body". Present Respondent No. 3 was the Petitioner in Writ Petition no. 2016/2008. In paragraph 10, it is also noticed that objection by present appellant to earlier application under section 40 was because of its form. In paragraph 11, leave was given to said Petitioner to file fresh application under section 40 with direction to Commissioner to dispose it off within 90 days. All the objections /contentions of the parties have been left open for consideration by commissioner. Thus, finding that an interest in work though completed subsisted if payment was not made is recorded in paragraph 9 and then liberty has been given. Hence, as liberty is given after hearing both sides and after recording of finding, present Appellant cannot in subsequent proceedings contend that even such application under section 40 not touching his election in any way, is not maintainable. It may be pointed out here that in fresh application filed by present respondent No. 3, Appellant raised preliminary objection about this locus and then approached this Court in Writ Petition No. 2952/2008 and sought direction to Commissioner to decide it. That writ petition was withdrawn on 15-6-2009. Appellant has already filed the Writ Petition No. 3783/2008 challenging constitutionality of section 40 (2) as it enables any person to seek disqualification. This Court has issued notice before admission in said matter on 15-1-2009. That writ petition was withdrawn on 15-6-2009. Appellant has already filed the Writ Petition No. 3783/2008 challenging constitutionality of section 40 (2) as it enables any person to seek disqualification. This Court has issued notice before admission in said matter on 15-1-2009. In any case, as the interest in work done survives during the term of office of Appellant, section 16 (1) (i) is clearly attracted and hence, remedy under section 40 of 1961 Act is rightly availed by Respondent No. 3. Section 40 does not prescribe any new disqualification but it lays down the procedure once disqualification under section 16 (1) (i) is found to be incurred or continued or available during the term of office. The words "and for being" in opening part of section 16 (1) stipulate existence of very same interest which disqualifies its holder for election also as bar for continuing as Councillor after the election. It is continuation of that interest which operates as disqualification and it does not require accrual of such interest again after the election. Continuing possession of such interest after election is sufficient without anything more. Interest which disqualifies at threshold cannot cease automatically because of a successful election. Section 16 does not specify the work as disqualification but it is interest in it and if interest continues even after the election is over, the legislature has made provision in section 40 for removal of its holder to avoid conflict in interest and duty. By providing disqualifications for getting elected and even for continuing in the same section and then by providing separate remedies for removal of such hostile Councillors from the Zilla Parishad, legislature has provided a complete scheme which needs to be preserved and protected. Difference in nature of remedy under section 27 and section 40 cannot be used to defeat the otherwise clear legislative mandate so as to enable Appellant to continue as Councillor. ( 9 ) JAVED s/o Sheikh Mustaque Patel vs. State of Maharashtra, 2009 (2)Mh. L. J. 925 = 2009 (3) All MR 40 is the Division Bench judgment of this Court which considers provisions of section 44 (1) (e) of abovementioned 1965 Act. In 1965 Act, legislature has provided disqualifications separately for becoming a councillor and for continuing as a Councillor. Section 16 deals with disqualifications for becoming Councillor i. e. for getting elected or nominated as councillor. In 1965 Act, legislature has provided disqualifications separately for becoming a councillor and for continuing as a Councillor. Section 16 deals with disqualifications for becoming Councillor i. e. for getting elected or nominated as councillor. Section 44 (1) (e) thereof prescribes disqualifications for continuing as a Councillor and it states "a Councillor shall be disqualified to hold office as such, if at any time during his term of office, he. . . . . . . ". Clause (e) contemplates construction of illegal or unauthorized structure as disqualification. However it uses the words "has constructed or constructs". The words "has constructed" were found as referring to construction already completed before election i. e. before beginning of term by one learned Judge and this view was challenged in l. P. A. In the meanwhile the other learned Judge did not agree with said view and made reference to larger Bench. Division Bench decided L. P. A. and Reference together and in the context of prescription of separate and new disqualification with reference to time element relevant for its incurring, concluded that such illegal or unauthorized construction must have been made during the term of office. It found that any other interpretation would render words "if at any time during the term of his office" otiose. This is because section 16 did not prescribe such construction to be a disqualification for getting elected or nominated as a councillor. Section 44 (1) (e) thus prescribes a new disqualification not contemplated by section 16 of 1965 Act. In present case, 1961 Act does not contemplate a new type of disqualification in section 40. The disqualifications for getting elected as a Councillor and for continuing as a Councillor are same and are prescribed by section 16 (1) of 1961 Act. This judgment of Division Bench, therefore, is not relevant at all before us and attempt by Appellant to extend said ratio to section 40 of 1961 Act has to fail. ( 10 ) IN AIR 2001 SC 2524 , Tarlochan Dev Sharma vs. State of Punjab hon'ble Apex Court holds that removal of president of municipal council under section 22 of the Punjab Municipal Act (3 of 1911) is a serious matter. ( 10 ) IN AIR 2001 SC 2524 , Tarlochan Dev Sharma vs. State of Punjab hon'ble Apex Court holds that removal of president of municipal council under section 22 of the Punjab Municipal Act (3 of 1911) is a serious matter. In a democracy governed by rule of law, once elected to an office in a democratic institution, the incumbent is declared entitled to hold the office for the term for which he has been elected unless his election is set aside by a prescribed procedure known to law. That a returned candidate must hold and enjoy the office and discharge the duties related therewith during the term specified by the relevant enactment is stated to be a valuable statutory right not only of the returned candidate but also of the constituency or the electoral college which he represents. Removal curtails the statutory term of the holder of the office. A stigma is cast on the holder of the office in view of certain allegations having been held proved rendering him unworthy of holding the office which he held. Therefore, Hon'ble Court warns that a case of availability of a ground squarely falling within section 22 of the Act 3 of 1911 must be clearly made out. Single aberration in exercise of power is held not enough and plurality of aberrations and that too with dishonest intention is essential to constitute abuse of powers under section 22. Hon'ble Apex Court states that the Legislature could not have intended the occupant of an elective office, seated by popular verdict, to be shown exist for a single innocuous action or error of decision. President there was alleged to have issued instructions to withhold payment of fogging machine and thereby obstructed working of Municipality. Hon'ble Court finds that said decision to withhold payment may be erroneous or unjust but cannot constitute abuse of powers. The judgment therefore shows that an elected office bearer can be removed in accordance with procedure prescribed by law and it does not help present Appellant in any way. ( 11 ) IN Chaturbhuj Vithaldas Jesani vs. Moreshwar Parashram and others (supra), Hon'ble Apex Court states that a contract for the supply of goods does not terminate when the goods are supplied; it continues in being till it is fully discharged by performance on both sides. ( 11 ) IN Chaturbhuj Vithaldas Jesani vs. Moreshwar Parashram and others (supra), Hon'ble Apex Court states that a contract for the supply of goods does not terminate when the goods are supplied; it continues in being till it is fully discharged by performance on both sides. It cannot be said that the moment a contract is fully executed on one side and all that remains is to receive payment from the other, then the contract terminates and a new relationship of debtor and creditor takes its place. There is always a possibility of the liability being disputed before actual payment is made and the vendor may have to bring an action to establish his claim to payment. The existence of the debt depends on the contract and cannot be established without showing that payment was a term of the contract. It is true the contractor might abandon the contract and sue on 'quantum meruit' but if the other side contested and relied on the terms of the contract, the decision would have to rest on that basis. This judgment considered section 7 (d) of Representation of People Act, 1951; which later came to be replaced by section 9a and this provision is considered in Indumati Bhakare vs. State (supra ). Hon'ble Apex Court considers it in AIR 2002 SC 2345 , Prakash khandre vs. Vijaya Kumar Khandre as : "62. Learned senior counsel Mr. Shanti bhushan submitted that the contract work which was given to the brother of the appellant was, as a matter of fact, performed on behalf of the appellant by Mr. Mallikarjun, his brother and, therefore, the High Court rightly held that contract was subsisting on the date of scrutiny of the nomination paper. In our view, this submission is without any substance mainly because after termination of the contract, fresh contract is executed by Mallikarjun Khandre for carrying out remaining work. Further section 7 (d) as it stood prior to its amendment in 1958 inter alia provided if the work is carried out "by himself or for any person or body of persons in trust for him or for his benefit or on his account," then such person was disqualified and in such situation, the question of benamidar or carrying out on behalf of appellant might require some consideration. After substitution of section 7 (d) by section 9a, there must be subsisting contract by the contesting candidate for execution of any works undertaken by him with the government. The essential ingredient of the section is that the contract for the execution of any works undertaken by the Government should be subsisting on the date of scrutiny of nomination. It is to be stated that because Mallikarjun khandre is brother of the contractor, it cannot be said that he was acting as a benamidar as he himself was a registered Class I contractor. Further, as stated above, the objects and reasons of section 9a provides that an unduly strict view about the Government contract should not be taken as it might lead to disqualification of large number of citizens, many of whom may prove to be able or capable Members of Parliament or State Legislature. Therefore, the amended section 9a uses the phrase that a person shall be disqualified 'so long as there subsists a contract. ' Similarly, subsequent payment by the Government for the work done which was payable at the time of termination of contract would not mean that contract between the parties was subsisting and Explanation to section 9a has made the position clear. " Thus, we find that there is material difference in scheme provided for in section 16 (1) (i) of 1961 Act and section 9a (read with its explanation) of Representation of People Act,1951. Subsisting interest in work done is enough to attract disqualification under section 16 (1) (i) of 1961 Act for continuing as a Councillor. ( 12 ) WE have considered the challenge at length independently. It is not in dispute that section 40 of 1961 Act otherwise permits present Respondent No. 3 to move for declaration of disqualification of Appellant. At least here and now the effort of Appellant to deny him that status or locus because of section 27 cannot be countenanced. Learned Single Judge has in impugned judgment accurately noticed the issue raised in this respect in paragraph 11 and has also answered it in paragraph 13. The other issue is pointed out in paragraph 14 and has also considered various precedents till paragraph 20. Learned Single Judge has in impugned judgment accurately noticed the issue raised in this respect in paragraph 11 and has also answered it in paragraph 13. The other issue is pointed out in paragraph 14 and has also considered various precedents till paragraph 20. In paragraph 21 and onwards judgment in case of Indumati Laxman Bhakare vs. State (supra) and judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in case of Chaturbhuj Vithaldas Jesani vs. Moreshwar Parashram and others (supra) are referred to at requisite length and in paragraph 24 judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in 2006 (2) Mh. L. J. (SC) 1 - AIR 2006 SC 918 , Srikant vs. Vasantrao, is rightly distinguished. Said judgment is on section 9a of Representation of People Act, 1951. It is also noticed that indumati Laxman Bhakare vs. State (supra) applied on all fours to the controversy. It cannot be said that any argument or aspect is not looked into in the impugned judgment. ( 13 ) WITH the result, We do not find any merit in this Letters Patent Appeal. The same is thus dismissed, with an order as to costs. ( 14 ) AT this stage Shri Kilor, learned counsel for appellant state that interim order already operating should be continued for a period of four weeks from today. Shri Madkholkar, learned counsel for respondent No. 3 states that, as the appellant is found to be disqualified, the appellant cannot be permitted to participate in the administration of Zilla Parishad, Chandrapur. ( 15 ) IN the circumstances, we continue interim protection, subject to the condition that the appellant shall not attend or participate in any meeting of Zilla parishad for a period of four weeks. The interim protection shall cease to operate automatically thereafter. Appeal dismissed.