JUDGMENT (ORAL) 1. An award was passed by the sole Arbitrator in the disputes between the parties. The petitioner is the supplier and was the claimant before the Arbitrator. The Municipal Corporation of Delhi, and now represented by the Delhi Jal Board, was the respondent before the Arbitrator and the non-objectors in this case. In the present case, suit No.65A/1996 contains the objections in detail to the award and have therefore been treated as objections under Sections 30 and 33 of the Arbitration Act, 1940. Issues in this case were framed on 18.3.1998. The only issue with respect to which the objector would seek to get the decision in its favour is issue No.1 and which is whether the award is liable to be set aside or remitted to another Arbitrator. Rest of the issues pertain to whether the petition was properly instituted or that the Court had jurisdiction or not or whether the petition was barred by limitation. These later issues have not been pressed by the non-objector and therefore I am only called upon to decide whether the award is to be set aside on the ground as stated in objections being suit No.65A/1996. 2. The facts of the case are that a contract was entered into between the parties for supply by the objector to the respondent of Alumina Ferric for the period 1.7.1991 to 31.3.1993. The basic price of the Alumina Ferric was fixed at Rs.1550/- per metric ton(pmt) and to which was added the excise duty, central sales tax and freight charges to make the price at Rs.2100/- per metric ton. The contract in question contained a price variation clause ( though titled as price escalation) and the same reads as under: “ Price Escalation: The basic rate of Rs.1500/-PMT is based on the (Jan-March, 1991) Sulphur price for non-fertilizers use on Ex. Settee basis, which was Rs.3125/- PMT as announced by MMTC, for every increase/decrease in the suphur price for non fertilizers use, a variation of 20% will be allowed on Ex. Jetty basis in the basic rate of Alumina furric, as announced by MPTC from time to time.” 3. The entire disputes between the parties centres around this clause. Settee basis, which was Rs.3125/- PMT as announced by MMTC, for every increase/decrease in the suphur price for non fertilizers use, a variation of 20% will be allowed on Ex. Jetty basis in the basic rate of Alumina furric, as announced by MPTC from time to time.” 3. The entire disputes between the parties centres around this clause. Whereas the objector claims that even if the price falls below Rs.1550 pmt even then it is entitled to at least the basic rate of Rs.1550/-pmt, on the other hand, the stand of the respondent was that the clause in question clearly contemplates both increase and decrease in the price on account of the ingredient of sulphur in the product being Alumina Ferric. 4. A plain and literal reading of the clause makes it more than abundantly clear that what is contemplated is not only increase but also decrease. It would be absurd if the plain language is interpreted so as to remove the word decrease therefrom. In fact, there is a variation, both positive and negative, that is an increase and a decrease, becomes further clear because there is an immediately subsequent clause for both increase and decrease of the freight charges on account of the variation of the diesel price. 5. The Arbitrator has passed a detailed and reasoned award after having duly considered the arguments of the parties and interpreting the clause. The Arbitrator consequently has held that the clause in question entitles the respondents to seek decrease in the price as per the price variation clause. Though the Arbitrator has also gone on the issue that the respondent vide letter dated 9.9.1993 had intimated to the objector of refusal to delete the price variation clause, I am not putting any importance to the same because independent of such finding the conclusion which is arrived at by the Arbitrator is sound in law and in the facts of the case. 6. The scope for objection to an award under Sections 30 and 33 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 is well settled now. The award can only be set aside if the Arbitrator has misconducted himself or the proceedings. 6. The scope for objection to an award under Sections 30 and 33 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 is well settled now. The award can only be set aside if the Arbitrator has misconducted himself or the proceedings. This proposition has been interpreted to mean that unless and until the view of the Arbitrator is a view of a wholly unreasonable man or the interpretation is so perverse which shocks the judicial conscience or that the Arbitrator has acted beyond the terms of the contract and the law as applicable, it is not permissible for the Court to go into the reasonableness of the reasons as given by the Arbitrator. 7. Applying these well settled principles as aforesaid, it is quite clear that the Arbitrator was indeed justified in accepting the literal interpretation of the clause. 8. What has been canvassed emphatically by the counsel for the objector is the reliance on a decision of a Learned Single Judge (S. Mukherjee, J.) dated 3.1.2003 with regard to a similar clause which was interpreted by another Arbitrator holding that the clause will not apply if the import of sulphur is decanalised and MMTC does not announce the price of sulphur. There are two reasons why I am unable to accept the decision in the aforesaid case of Pokhram Alum and Chemicals Ltd Vs.MCD, Suit No.165/1996 decided on 3.1.2003. The first reason is that in the present case, the award shows that no grounds were canvassed that the clause became inoperative on account of decanalisation of the import of sulphur and further it is not the case of the objector that since MMTC failed to announce the price, the clause in question became inapplicable. A reference to the decision in the aforesaid Suit No.165/1996 shows that the Learned Single Judge proceeded by accepting these two contentions which are not found in the present case. Also, the decision was in light of the scope of objections to an award in which if two views are possible, the Court does not necessarily interfere if the Arbitrator is of one view and the Court may be of another view. Also, the decision was in light of the scope of objections to an award in which if two views are possible, the Court does not necessarily interfere if the Arbitrator is of one view and the Court may be of another view. The second reason for which I feel that the said judgment would not apply is because in this particular case a literal interpretation is clearly a more plausible view because if a contractor seeks to claim benefit and compensation on account of increase in the price, then it does not seem understandable as to why it should in any manner get unjust benefit if prices have in fact decreased, because, surely it is not the case of the objector that it continued to purchase sulphur at a very high price and therefore was forced to sell at a higher price to the non-objector. I may finally add that the issue with regard to interpretation of a clause of a contract is in the realm of the jurisdiction of the Arbitrator and the Court would not interfere with such interpretation unless such interpretation is extremely perverse. Surely, accepting the literal interpretation which is both logical and rational cannot be said to be a perversity. I am also taking into consideration the fact that one of the reasons why a person makes a claim is on account of loss which is suffered by him. A price variation clause is basically meant to compensate and not to cause an unjust enrichment and extra profit to the contractor. That being so, a literal interpretation of the clause in the present case is surely the order of the day. 9. In this view of the matter, I do not find any reason to interfere with the award. The objections are dismissed with costs of Rs.15,000/-. The Award dated 5.12.1995 is made rule of the Court and the objection petition being the suit No.65A/1996 is dismissed.