JUDGMENT : By filing a supplementary affidavit, the petitioner has informed that substituted service of notice on respondent no.2 has been made by publication of the notice in the local daily news papers, Prabhat Khabar, a copy of which has been filed with the affidavit. Inspite of notice, the respondent no.2 has not appeared even today either in person or through Advocate. The petitioner in this writ petition has prayed for quashing the order dated 30.11.2006 ( annexure 1) passed by the Regional Deputy Director of Education, North Chotanagpur Division, Hazaribagh, whereby it was declared that the petitioner had failed to furnish the requisite information on the application filed by the respondent no. 2 in respect of certain queries, within a period of thirty days as stipulated under section 7 of the Right to Information Act and that the petitioner did not show the requisite amount of responsibility and seriousness in complying with the requirement of law. The petitioner has further prayed for quashing the order dated 22.3.2007 ( Annexure 1/A) passed by the Information Commissioner Jharkhand in Appeal No.9 of 2007 whereby penalty of Rs. 250/-per day, has been imposed against the petitioner after allowing the appeal filed by the respondent no. 2 State of Jharkhand (Respondent no.1 ) has appeared and filed counter affidavit. Though notice upon respondent no.2 was issued by way of substituted service through paper publication, he has failed to appear either in person or through lawyer. Accordingly, this application is taking up ex parte against respondent no. 2. Assailing the impugned order, the main contention of the petitioner is that the concerned authority has erred in failing to consider the fact that the petitioner had depended upon the another officer who was conversant with the matter related to the information sought and the petitioner could submit information only on 4.11.2006 after receipt of information from concerned officer. The petitioner had supplied information nevertheless within thirty days from the receipt of the application of respondent no.2. It is further explained that as regards information pertaining to question no. 6, the petitioner could not possibly furnish any information, inasmuch as, it had called for opinion of the petitioner as to whether there was any lapses in furnishing requisite information before the selection committee concerning the appointment of Block Reserve Person ( BRP) and if so, who are responsible for the same. 6, the petitioner could not possibly furnish any information, inasmuch as, it had called for opinion of the petitioner as to whether there was any lapses in furnishing requisite information before the selection committee concerning the appointment of Block Reserve Person ( BRP) and if so, who are responsible for the same. The petitioner could not therefore furnish any information in regard to question no. 6. Learned counsel adds that nevertheless, the information sought for was supplied by the petitioner at the stage of first appeal preferred by the respondent no. 2. The dispute thereafter as raised by the respondent no. 2 was in respect of merits of the information claiming that the same was misleading and incorrect. Learned counsel adds that the information was supplied on the basis of the materials made available to him by the concerned officer of the Department and as such, there was no scope under the Right to Information Act to agitate the point with regard to the merits of the information furnished. Learned counsel adds further that even otherwise, if it is considered that the petitioner had not supplied the requisite information within stipulated period of thirty days, the concerned authority before imposing any penalty, ought to have recorded a finding as to whether such lapses was intentional or bona fide. No such finding was recorded by the 1st or the 2nd appellate authority and therefore penalty imposed against the petitioner is perverse and bad in law. Learned counsel for the respondent State submits by reference to the counter affidavit that the respondent no.1 has wrongly been made a party to this case inasmuch as the respondent no. 1 has nothing to do with the grievance either of the petitioner or the respondent no.2. I have gone through the impugned orders and find that the first appellate authority has taken into account that although the petitioner had furnished information in respect of question no.1 to 5 as demanded by the respondent no.2, but no information whatsoever was furnished in respect of question no. 6. This is an undisputed fact and as per the provisions of section 7 of the Act, failure on the part of the concerned officer to furnish information within the period stipulated under the law, in itself would invite penal consensuses. 6. This is an undisputed fact and as per the provisions of section 7 of the Act, failure on the part of the concerned officer to furnish information within the period stipulated under the law, in itself would invite penal consensuses. In the impugned order passed by the 1st and the2nd appellate authority, it appears that detailed discussion on the entire aspects, including the explanation offered by the petitioner was considered and finding was recorded declaring that the petitioner was found to have defaulted in furnishing information within the time stipulated and that such default was deliberate and intentional. I do not find any impropriety in such finding which is based on the materials available on record. However, from the impugned order of the appellate authority, I find that though a detailed discussion of facts of the case has been made, but the appellate authority appears to have failed to consider that the requisite information in respect of question no. 6 was furnished by the petitioner albeit belatedly on 2.11.2006. The dispute raised thereafter by the respondent no. 2 on the correctness and merits of the information could not possibly be entertained within the scope of the provisions of section 7 of the Act. It also appears that having failed to consider this aspect of the matter, that the petitioner had furnished information on question no. 6 on 2.11.2006, even though such fact appears in the impugned order of the 1st appellate authority, the second appellate authority has committed an error by calculating the period of delay as 240 days whereas, as explained by the learned counsel for the petitioner, the period of delay could at best be counted from 5.10.2006 to 2.11.2006. In the light of the above facts and circumstances, I do not find any material to interfere with the findings recorded in the impugned order of the 1st appellate court. However, as regards the impugned order of the 2nd appellate authority, the order relating to penalty is modified to the extent that the petitioner shall pay penalty at the rate of Rs. 250/-per day calculated from 06.10.2006 to 01.11.2006. With the above modification, this application is disposed of.