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Madhya Pradesh High Court · body

2009 DIGILAW 1174 (MP)

PRAMOD KUMAR AGRAWAL v. STATE OF M. P.

2009-10-07

SANJAY YADAV

body2009
Judgment Sanjay Yadav, J. ( 1. ) The petitioner in the present writ petition seeks quashment of charge sheet dated 9.7.1996. ( 2. ) The facts briefly are that in the year 1995 the State Government detected a defalcation of Government Fund in the Narmada Valley Development Authority (referred to as NVDA) to the tune of Rs.1770 lacs and the petitioner who. was Assistant Director of Agriculture posted on deputation to NVDA between January 1990 to October 1998, was found involved along with 11 other persons. The matter was dealt with by the economic offences wing of the State Government. The petitioner was however, dealt with in a departmental enquiry and a charge sheet under Rule 14 M.P. Civil Services (Classification,, Control and Appeals) Rules , 1966 was issued on 9.7.1996. Nine charges were levelled against the petitioner of which charge No. 1,8 and 9 related to said defalcation of the Government Fund and remaining charges related to the dereliction of duties displayed by the petitioner during said period which was prima facie treated as a conduct unbecoming of Government servant. ( 3. ) After receiving the charge sheet the petitioner vide his application dated 17.7.1996 demanded the documents. While demanding the documents, the petitioner vide said representation requested for stay of further proceedings till documents were supplied. Subsequently, thereof the petitioner vide his letter dated 28.10.1999 raised the protest regarding appointment of an enquiry officer which was by order dated 6.7.1999 and requested for staying further proceedings till entire documents were supplied. However, before appointing the enquiry officer on 6.7.1999, the petitioner, vide letter No. 1770/24/95/1 dated 31.3.1999 issued by the Madhya Pradesh Narmada Valley Development, was informed that 10 vouchers were made available for inspection and the petitioner was directed to file reply within ten days. ( 4. ) That on 24.1.2001 one Shri K.C.Paliwal, Divisional Soil Conservation Officer was appointed as the enquiry officer in place of Shri P.R. Pathak who was earlier appointed as enquiry officer on 13.3.2002, the enquiry officer directed the presenting officer to make available the records and the enquiry was fixed on 6.9.2002, whereon the petitioner again repeated the request for the relevant documents. ( 5. ) Thereafter one Shri Gyan Singh Thakur, Division Soil Conservation Officer, NVDA Indore, was appointed as Enquiry Officer by order dated 28.9.2002 and Shri L.S.Sharma, Assistant Soil Conservation, Officer Maheshwar was appointed as the presenting officer. ( 5. ) Thereafter one Shri Gyan Singh Thakur, Division Soil Conservation Officer, NVDA Indore, was appointed as Enquiry Officer by order dated 28.9.2002 and Shri L.S.Sharma, Assistant Soil Conservation, Officer Maheshwar was appointed as the presenting officer. ( 6. ) That the petitioner, on 26.2.2004, had the opportunity to inspect certain documents and thereafter the petitioner, complaining non-availability of relevant documents furnished the detail reply of the charges on 28.3.2004. The enquiry officer on 28.7.2004 submitted the enquiry report holding the petitioner guilty of charges and one charge was found partially proved. This report was served on the petitioner on 28.7.2004. The petitioner thereafter submitted his reply, AnnexureP/7. ( 7. ) After receiving reply the enquiry officer issued a letter on 26.2.2005, AnnexureP/8, for resolving the objections in the enquiry report regarding prosecution witnesses; accordingly, these witnesses were summoned and petitioner was informed of the date of 3.3.2005 to put forth his defence. ( 8. ) On 3.3.2005, the petitioner appeared before the enquiry officer and the note sheet of the said date (AnnexureR/9A) reveals that the petitioner raised the objection regarding the procedure adhered to for examination of prosecution witnesses. The petitioner left the enquiry without cross examining the prosecution witnesses. ( 9. ) That the procedure adhered to by the enquiry officer was found objectionable as is evident from letter NVDA/ Krishi/DE/2004/1221 dated 30.12.2004. Consequent whereof by order dated 1.6.2005, a new enquiry officer Shri K.C.Paliwal, Joint Director, NVDA was appointed who submitted the enquiry report on 18.1.2006. The State Government did not agree with the finding, and therefore, appointed another enquiry officer Shri R.S. Manral, Director (Agriculture) vide order dated 4.1.2007. ( 10. ) The petitioner vide letter dated 8.10.2007 raised the objection against fresh enquiry; whereupon, he was informed by the enquiry officer vide his letter dated 30.10.2007 that no fresh enquiry is being held and it is only on certain issues, further enquiry is conducted. Thereafter , as letter dated 30.10.2007 reveals, that the petitioner did not participate in the enquiry oh 8.10.2007. On 17.10.2007 the petitioner was called upon to submit his defence brief . The petitioner did not furnish the defence brief. The enquiry officer therefore furnished his report on 3/5.11.2007. Again vide letter dated 20.11.2007, the petitioner was given the opportunity to submit his reply. On 17.10.2007 the petitioner was called upon to submit his defence brief . The petitioner did not furnish the defence brief. The enquiry officer therefore furnished his report on 3/5.11.2007. Again vide letter dated 20.11.2007, the petitioner was given the opportunity to submit his reply. The petitioner in response thereof submitted his reply on 28.11.2007, calling upon the respondent to set aside the enquiry report by Shri R.S. Manral and decide the matter at the earliest. ( 11. ) The petitioner in the back ground of aforesaid facts, has approached this court seeking quashment of the charge sheet on the ground that the petitioner being an employee of department of agriculture and was on deputation to the NVDA which being a borrowing department had no authority to conduct the departmental enquiry. The quashment of departmental enquiry proceedings is also sought on the ground of delay. ( 12. ) To appreciate the aforesaid submissions worth it would be to take note of Rule 20 which makes provisions regarding the disciplinary action to be taken on officers lent to the Union or any other State Government or any subordinate or local authority. It stipulates: "20.Provisions regarding officers lent to the Union or any other State Government or any subordinate or local authority, etc- (1) Where the services of a Government servant are lent by one department to another department or to the Union Government or to any other State Government or any authority subordinate thereto .. or to a local or other authority (hereinafter in this rule referred to as "the borrowing authority"), the borrowing authority shall have the powers of the appointing authority for the purpose of placing such Government servant under suspension and of the disciplinary authority for the purpose of conducting a disciplinary proceeding against him: Provided that the borrowing authority shall forthwith inform the authority which lend the services of the Government servant (hereinafter in this rule referred to as "the lending authority") of the circumstances leading to the order of suspension of such Government servant or the commencement of the disciplinary proceeding as the case may be. (2) In the light of the findings in the disciplinary proceedings conducted against the Government servant: (i) if the borrowing authority is of a opinion that any of the penalties specified in clauses (i) to (iv) of rule 10 should be imposed on the Government servant, it may, after consultation with the lending authority, make such orders on the case as it deems necessary: Provided that in the event of a difference of opinion between the borrowing authority and the lending authority, the services of the Government servant shall be replaced at the disposal of the lending authority; (ii) if the borrowing authority is of the opinion that a penalty specified in rule 11 should be imposed on any member of class IV Government servant, it may impose such penalty without consulting the lending authority; (iii) if the borrowing authority is of the opinion that any of the penalties specified in clauses (v) to (ix) of rule 10 should be imposed on the Government servant, if shall replace his services at the disposal of the lending authority and transmit to it the proceedings of the inquiry and thereupon the lending authority, may, if it is the disciplinary authority pass such orders thereon as it may deem necessary, or, if it is note the disciplinary authority submit the case to the disciplinary authority, which shall pass such orders on the case as it may deem necessary: Provided that before passing, any suck order the disciplinary authority shall comply with the provisions of sub-rules (3) and (4) of rule 15. Explanation.- The disciplinary authority may make an order under this clause on the record of the inquiry transmitted to it by the borrowing authority, or after holding such further inquiry as it may deem necessary, as far as may be, in accordance with rule 14." Thus, under sub-Rule (1) of Rule 20 of the Rules of 1966, the borrowing authority has the powers of the appointing authority for the purpose of placing such Government servant, on deputation, under suspension and of the disciplinary authority for the purpose of conducting a disciplinary proceedings. ( 13. ) In P.V. Srihivasa Sastry and others Vs. ( 13. ) In P.V. Srihivasa Sastry and others Vs. Comptroller and Auditor General and others : AIR 1993 SC1321, their Lordships of the Supreme Court while observing that although Article 311 of the Constitution does not speak as to who shall initiate the disciplinary proceedings but that can be provided and prescribed by the Rules; were pleased to observe: "6. Reliance was placed on behalf of the appellants on the judgment of this Court in the case of Scientific Adviser to the Ministry of Defence v. S. Daniel (4990) 2 SCR 440. From the aforesaid judgment it shall appear that Rule 13 of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, which was under consideration specifically provided: "13. Authority to institute proceedings (1) The President or any other authority empowered by him by general or special order may (a) institute disciplinary proceedings against any Government servant;" Although Art. 311 of the Constitution does not speak as to who shall initiate the disciplinary proceedings but, as already stated above, that can be provided and prescribed by the Rules. But if no Rules have been framed, saying as to who shall initiate the departmental proceedings, then on basis of Art. 311 of the Constitution it cannot be urged that it is only the appointing authority and no officer subordinate to such authority can initiate the departmental proceeding. In the present case, it was not brought to our notice that any Rule prescribes that the Accountant General, who is the appointing authority, alone could have initiated a departmental proceeding." ( 14. ) In the case at hand the charge sheet dated 9.7.1996 is from the "Madhya Pradesh Shasan: Narmada Ghati Vikas Vibhag, Mantralaya", which is in consonance to Rule 20 of the Rules of 1966. The first contention of the petitioner that the charge sheet has not been issued by the Competent Authority therefore fails and is hereby rejected. ( 15. ) The next ground on the basis of which the petitioner seeks quashment of the charge sheet and departmental enquiry proceedings is that the same was issued on 9.7.1996 and has continued for more than 11 years, and therefore, liable to be quashed on the ground of delay. ( 16. ( 15. ) The next ground on the basis of which the petitioner seeks quashment of the charge sheet and departmental enquiry proceedings is that the same was issued on 9.7.1996 and has continued for more than 11 years, and therefore, liable to be quashed on the ground of delay. ( 16. ) The delay, in a departmental enquiry can be one of the ground for interference; however, in the case at hand the delay cannot be attributed only to the department, when the petitioner submitted his reply on 28.3.2004. Though it is contended that the petitioner was deprived the inspection of relevant documents and its only when some of these documents were given inspection of on 26.2.2004, that the petitioner could submit his reply. Be that as it may, the fact is that till filing of this petition, the petitioner never questioned the propriety of the pendency of the enquiry even till 28.3.2004 when he filed the reply to charge sheet dated 9.7.1996. ( 17. ) The Deputy Registrar, Cooperative Societies, Faizabad V. Sachindra Nath Pandey and Others: (1995) 3 SCC134, their Lordships were pleased to observe: "7.On a perusal of charges, we find that the charges are very serious. We are, therefore, not inclined to close the matter only on the ground that about 16 years have elapsed since the date of commencement of disciplinary proceedings, more particularly when the appellant alone cannot be held responsible for this delay. So far as the merits are concerned, we regret to say that the High Court has not dealt with the submissions- and facts in support of the submission of the appellant- that in spite of being given a number of opportunities the first respondent has failed to avail of them. If the appellants allegations are true then the appellant cannot be faulted for not holding a regular inquiry (recording the evidence of witnesses and so on). The High court has assumed, even without referring to Regulation 68 aforesaid that holding of an oral inquiry was obligatory. Indeed, one of the questions in the writ petition may be the interpretation of Regulation 68. On facts, the first respondent has his own version. In the circumstances, the writ petition could not have been allowed unless it was held that the appellants version of events is not true and that the first respondents version is true. Indeed, one of the questions in the writ petition may be the interpretation of Regulation 68. On facts, the first respondent has his own version. In the circumstances, the writ petition could not have been allowed unless it was held that the appellants version of events is not true and that the first respondents version is true. In the circumstances, we have no alterative but to set aside the order under appeal and remit the matter to the High Court once again for disposal of the writ petition afresh in the light of the observations made herein. Since the matter is a very old one it is but appropriate that the matter is dealt with expeditiously. Perhaps, it would be appropriate if the Court looks into the records relating to the disciplinary proceedings also." ( 18. ) In Government of A.P. and others Vs. V. Appala Swamy: (2007) 14 SCC49 it is observed by their Lordships: "12. So far as the question of delay in concluding the departmental proceedings as against a delinquent officer is concerned, in our opinion, no hard-and-fast rule can be laid down therefor. Each case must be determined on its own facts. The principles upon which a proceeding can be directed to be quashed on the ground of delay are: (1) where by reason of the delay, the employer condoned the lapses on the part of the employee; (2) where the delay caused prejudice to the employee. Such a case of prejudice, however, is to be made out by the employee before the inquiry officer. 16. The High Court did not consider any of the aforementioned aspects. 17. For the reasons aforementioned, the impugned judgment of the High Court cannot be sustained and it is set aside accordingly. We, however, direct the appellants to conclude the departmental proceeding at an early date but not later than six months from the date of communication of this order. It is open to the respondent herein to file additional representation before the appropriate authority within a period of four weeks from date." ( 19. ) In view of above, the second submissions of the petitioner that the charge sheet and departmental enquiry deserves to be quashed on the ground of delay, also fails. ( 20. ) The petitioner further questions the propriety of the respondents in effecting changes of the enquiry officers. ) In view of above, the second submissions of the petitioner that the charge sheet and departmental enquiry deserves to be quashed on the ground of delay, also fails. ( 20. ) The petitioner further questions the propriety of the respondents in effecting changes of the enquiry officers. From the material which is brought on record, the change of the enquiry officer viz, Shri P.K. Agrawal, who was appointed on 6.7.1999 to that of Shri K.C.Paliwal by order dated 24.1.2001 and of Shri Gyan Singh Thakur by order dated 28.9.2002 has been in usual course and there is no allegation of mala fide imputed nor is it shown that the same has caused any prejudice to the petitioner. ( 21. ) In P.D.Agrwal V. State Bank of India and others: AIR 2006 SC2064, their Lordships were pleased to observe that unless a real prejudice is shown to have been caused to the delinquent that an enquiry can be said to have been vitiated. "16. The validity of the disciplinary proceeding and/or justifiability thereof on the ground of delay or otherwise had never been raised by the Appellant before any forum. It was not his case either before the Appellate Authority or before the High Court that by reason of any delay in initiating the disciplinary proceeding he had been prejudiced in any manner whatsoever. It may be true that delay itself may be a ground for arriving at a finding that enquiry proceeding was vitiated in the event it is shown that by reason thereof the delinquent officer has been prejudiced, but no such case was made out. 17. Mr. Rao urged that the Respondents must have condoned the misconduct on the part of the Appellant herein as they have not taken any action and initiated disciplinary proceeding after he was placed under suspension. Reliance in this behalf has been placed on State of M.P. and Ors. v. R.N. Mishra and Anr. [(1997) 7 SCC644]. 25. In State of M.P v. Bani Singh and Anr. [(1990) Supp SCC738], whereupon Mr. Rao placed strong reliance, this Court opined that by reason of delay of 12 years in initiating the disciplinary proceeding, the delinquent officer could not defend himself properly. In that case there was no satisfactory explanation such a long delay. There was also doubt as regards the involvement of the delinquent officer. 26. In State of Punjab and Ors. Rao placed strong reliance, this Court opined that by reason of delay of 12 years in initiating the disciplinary proceeding, the delinquent officer could not defend himself properly. In that case there was no satisfactory explanation such a long delay. There was also doubt as regards the involvement of the delinquent officer. 26. In State of Punjab and Ors. v. Chaman Lal Goyal [(1995) 2 SCC570], however, this Court refused to set aside those disciplinary proceeding which had been initiated after a delay of 51/2 years. Distinguishing the decision of this Court in Bani Singh and Anr. -(supra), it was stated: "Now remains the question of delay. There is undoubtedly a delay of five and a half years in serving the charges. The question is whether the said delay warranted the quashing of charges in this case. It is trite to say that such disciplinary proceeding must be conducted soon after the irregularities are committed or soon after discovering the irregularities. They cannot be initiated after lapse of considerable time. It would not be fair to the delinquent officer. Such delay also makes the task of proving the charges difficult and is thus not also in the interest of administration. Delayed initiation of proceedings is bound to give room for allegations of bias, mala fides and misuse of power. If the delay is too long and is unexplained, the court may well interfere and quash the charges. But how long a delay is too long always depends upon the facts of the given case. Moreover, if such delay is likely to cause prejudice to the delinquent officer in defending himself, the enquiry has to be interdicted. Wherever such a plea is raised, the court has to weigh the factors appearing for and against the said plea and take a decision on the totality of circumstances. In other words, the court has to indulge in a process of balancing". 27. In Additional Supdt. of Police v. T. Natarajan [1999 SCC(LandS) 646], this Court held: "In regard to the allegation that the initiation of the disciplinary proceedings was belated, we may state that it is settled law that mere delay in initiating proceedings would not vitiate the enquiry unless the delay results in prejudice to the delinquent officer. In this case, such a stage as to examine that aspect has not arisen." 28. In this case, such a stage as to examine that aspect has not arisen." 28. In this case, as noticed hereinbefore, the Appellant did not raise the question of delay before any forum whatsoever. He did not raise such a question even before the Disciplinary Authority. He not only took part therein without any demur whatsoever, but, as noticed hereinbefore, cross- examined the witnesses and entered into the defence. 29. The Principles of natural justice cannot be put in a strait- jacket formula. It must be seen in circumstantial flexibility. It has separate facets. It has in recent time also undergone a sea-change." ( 22. ) The change of Shri Gyan Singh Thakur as enquiry officer and his replacement by Shri K.C.Paliwal by order dated 1.6.2005 was because the procedure adhered to by the previous enquiry officer was not in consonance with the principle of natural justice. The reasons finds mention in note sheet F-17- 70/95/27-1 dated 19.10.2004 and the same being reproduced in toto to show that the enquiry officer while submitting the enquiry report has ignored the provisions of Rule 14 (6) to 14 (23) of the Rule of 1966. "The carcinal point that has be borne in mind in every case, is whether the person concerned should have a reasonable opportunity of presenting his case and the authority should act fairly, justly, reasonably and impartially. It is not so much to act judicially but is to act fairly, namely the procedure adopted must be just, fair and reasonable in the particular circumstances of the case. In other words application of the principles of natural justice that no man should be condemmed unheard intenda to prevent the authority from acting arbitrarily affecting the rights of the concerned person." It is fundamental rule to law that no decision must be taken which will affect the right of any person without first being informed of the case and giving him/her an opportunity of putting forward his/her case. An order involving civil consequences must be made, consistently with the rule of natural justice. The person concerned must be informed the case, the evidence in support thereof supplied and must be given a fair opportunity to meet the case before an adverse decision is taken. ( 23. ) Consequently, by order dated 1.6.2005 the said Shri K.C. Paliwal appointed as the enquiry officer. The person concerned must be informed the case, the evidence in support thereof supplied and must be given a fair opportunity to meet the case before an adverse decision is taken. ( 23. ) Consequently, by order dated 1.6.2005 the said Shri K.C. Paliwal appointed as the enquiry officer. This Court do not find any illegality in the action of the respondents. ( 24. ) Furthermore, the enquiry report furnished by Shri K.C. Paliwal on 18.1.2006. The State Government found the enquiry report lacking in certain particulars therefore by order dated 4.1.2007 appointed one Shri R.S. Manral, Director (Agriculture) for further enquiry, who vide his letter dated 30.10.2007 clarified to the petitioner that he was not holding a fresh enquiry but further enquiry and in the said proceedings the petitioner was afforded an opportunity to participate , the petitioner though appeared but did not participate; this fact is evident from the enquiry report dated 3/5.11.2007 furnished by Shri R.S. Manral, AnnexureP/17. ( 25. ) It is the procedural fairness which is required to be observed in the departmental enquiry. As has been observed in State of Orissa and others vs. Bidyabhushan Mohapatra: AIR 1963 SC779, the reasonable opportunity contemplated by Article 311 (2) has manifestly to be in accordance with the rules framed under Article 309 of the Constitution. It was observed by their Lordships: "There is no substantial difference between the procedure prescribed for the two forms of enquiry. The enquiry in its true nature in quasi- judicial. It is manifest from the very nature of the enquiry that the approach to the materials placed before the enquiring body should be judicial. It is true that by Regulation 490, the oral evidence is to be direct, but even under R. 8 of the Tribunal Rules, the Tribunal is to be guided by rules of equity and natural justice and is not bound by formal rules of procedure relating to evidence. It was urged that whereas the Tribunal may admit on record evidence which is hearsay, the oral evidence under the Police Regulations must be direct evidence and hearsay is excluded. We do not think that any such distinction was intended. It was urged that whereas the Tribunal may admit on record evidence which is hearsay, the oral evidence under the Police Regulations must be direct evidence and hearsay is excluded. We do not think that any such distinction was intended. Even though the Tribunal is not bound by formal rules relating to procedure and evidence, it cannot rely on evidence which is purely hearsay, because to do so in an enquiry of this nature would be contrary to rules of equity and natural justice. The provisions for maintaining the record and calling upon the delinquent public servant to submit his explanation are substantially the same under Regulation 490 of the Police Regulations and Rule 8 of the Tribunal Rules. It is urged that under the Tribunal Rules, there is a departure in respect of important matters from the Police Regulations which render the Tribunal Rules prejudicial to the person against whom enquiry is held under those rules. Firstly, it is submitted that there is no right of appeal under the Tribunal Rules as is given under the Police Regulations; secondly, that the Governor is bound to act according to the recommendations of the Tribunal and thirdly, that under the Tribunal Rules, even if the complexity of a case under enquiry justifies engagement of counsel to assist the person charged, assistance by counsel may not be permitted at the enquiry. These three variations, it is urged, make the Tribunal Rules not only discriminatory but prejudicial as well to the person against whom enquiry is held under these Rules. In our view, this plea cannot be sustained. The Tribunal Rules and the Police Regulations in so far as they deal with enquiries against police officers are promulgated under S. 7 of the Police Act, and neither the Tribunal Rules nor the Police Regulations provide an appeal against an order of dismissal or reduction in rank which the Governor may pass. The fact that an order made by a police authority is made appealable whereas the order passed by the Governor is not made appealable is not a ground on which the validity of the Tribunal Rules can be challenged. In either case, the final order rests with the Governor who has to decide the matter himself. Equal protection of the laws does not postulate equal treatment of all persons without discrimination to all persons similarly situated. In either case, the final order rests with the Governor who has to decide the matter himself. Equal protection of the laws does not postulate equal treatment of all persons without discrimination to all persons similarly situated. The power of the Legislature to make a distinction between persons or transactions based on a real differentia is not taken away by the equal protection clause. Therefore by providing a right of appeal against the order of police authorities acting under the Police Regulations imposing penalties upon a member of the police force, and by providing no such right of appeal when the order passed is by the Governor, no discrimination inviting the application of Art. 14 is practised." The plea that there was discrimination because there was a right of appeal against an order imposing penalty under one set of rules, and no such right under the other, was rejected in AIR 1961 SC1245. It must therefore be held that the existence of a right of appeal against the order of an administrative head imposing penalty and absence of such a right of appeal against the order of the Governor under the Tribunal Rules does not result in discrimination contrary to Art. 14 of the Constitution. 9. The High Court has held that there was evidence to support the findings on heads (c) and (d) of Charge (1) and on Charge (2). In respect of charge 1 (b) the respondent was acquitted by the Tribunal and it did not fall to be considered by the Governor In respect of charges 1(a) and 1(e) in the view of the High Court "the rules of natural justice had not been observed." The recommendation of the Tribunal was undoubtedly founded on its findings on charges 1(a), 1(e), 1(c), 1(d) and Charge (2). The High Court was of the opinion that the findings on two of the heads under Charge (1) could not be sustained, because in arriving at the findings the Tribunal had violated rules of natural justice. The High Court was of the opinion that the findings on two of the heads under Charge (1) could not be sustained, because in arriving at the findings the Tribunal had violated rules of natural justice. The High Court therefore directed that the Government of the State of Orissa should decide whether "on the basis of those charges, the punishment of dismissal should be maintained or else whether a lesser punishment would suffice." It is not necessary for us to consider whether the High Court was right in holding that the findings of the Tribunal on charges 1 (a) and 1 (e) were vitiated for reasons set out by it, because in our judgment the order Of the High Court directing the Government to reconsider the question of punishment cannot, for reasons we will presently set out, be sustained. If the order of dismissal was based on the findings on charges 1 (a) and 1(e) alone the Court would have jurisdiction to declare the order of dismissal illegal but when the findings of the Tribunal relating to the two out of five heads of the first charge and the second charge was found not liable to be interfered with by the High Court and those findings established that the respondent was prima facie guilty of grave delinquency, in our view the High Court had no power to direct the Governor of Orissa to reconsider the order of dismissal. The constitutional guarantee afforded to a public servant is that he shall not be dismissed or removed by an authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed, and that he shall not be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank until he has been given a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken in regard to him. The reasonable opportunity contemplated has manifestly to be in accordance with the rules framed under Art. 309 of the Constitution. But the Court in a case in which an order of dismissal of a public servant is impugned, is not concerned to decide whether the sentence imposed, provided it is justified by the rules, is appropriate having regard to the gravity of the misdemeanor established. The reasons which induce the punishing authority, if there has been an enquiry consistent with the prescribed rules, are not justiciable: nor is the penalty open to review by the Court. The reasons which induce the punishing authority, if there has been an enquiry consistent with the prescribed rules, are not justiciable: nor is the penalty open to review by the Court. If the High Court is satisfied that if some but not all of the findings of the Tribunal were "unassailable" the order of the Governor on whose powers by the rules no restrictions in determining the appropriate punishment are placed was final, and the High Court had no jurisdiction to direct the Governor to review the penalty for as we have already observed the order of dismissal passed by a competent authority on a public servant, if the conditions of the constitutional protection have been complied with, is not justiciable. Therefore if the order may be supported on any finding as to substantial misdemeanor for which the punishment can lawfully be imposed, it is not for the Court to consider whether that ground alone would have weighed with the authority in dismissing the public servant. The Court has no jurisdiction of the findings of the enquiry officer or the Tribunal prima facie make out a case of misdemeanor, to direct the authority to reconsider that order because in respect of some of the findings but not all it appears that . there had been violation of the rules of natural justice. The High Court was, in our judgment, in error in directing the Governor of Orissa to reconsider the question. 10. The appeal must therefore be allowed and the order passed by the High Court set aside. Having regard to the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs in this court and the High Court. Appeal allowed." ( 26. ) In the case at hand, Rule 14 of the Rules of 1966 which prescribes the procedure to be followed in case of a major penalty charge sheet, and the close look at the facts of present case nowhere reveals the violation thereof. Appeal allowed." ( 26. ) In the case at hand, Rule 14 of the Rules of 1966 which prescribes the procedure to be followed in case of a major penalty charge sheet, and the close look at the facts of present case nowhere reveals the violation thereof. Furthermore, Rule 15 of the Rules of 1966 stipulates action on the enquiry report, and Sub-rule (1) thereof provides for that: "(1) The disciplinary authority if it is not itself the inquiring authority may, for reasons to be recorded by it in writing, remit the case to the inquiring authority for further inquiry and report and the inquiring authority shall thereupon proceed to hold the further inquiry according to the provisions of rule 14 as far as may be." The facts of the present case adverted to discloses that the procedure laid down by the relevant Rules , viz, Rule 14 and Rule 15 has been adhered to. 26. Having thus considered, this Court do not find any substance in the challenge put forth by the petitioner, accordingly petition fails and is hereby dismissed. The disciplinary authority is however, directed to pass final orders on the enquiry report furnished by EO3/5.11.2007 after taking into consideration the defence submissions of the petitioner as expeditiously as possible, but not later than 3 months from the date of communication of this order. No costs. Petition dismissed.