JUDGMENT 1. - Heard learned counsel for the parties. 2. This writ petition has been filed by petitioner challenging the order dated 22.9.1998 by which the District Supply Officer, Ajmer has cancelled his license as fair price shop dealer on allegations contained in show cause notice dated 22.6.1998. 3. Petitioner filed appeal under Clause 22 of Rajasthan Food Grains and Other Essential Articles (Regulation of Distribution) Order, 1976, (for short "Order of 1976") which the District Collector, Ajmer dismissed vide order dated 5.3.1999. He thereafter filed revision petition before the Additional Food Commissioner, which was dismissed by order dated 11.8.2000. Both the orders are under challenge. 4. Apart from raising arguments about correctness of findings recorded by DSO on the charges contained in show cause notice as confirmed by Appellate and Revisional Authority, Shri Suresh Goya[, learned counsel for the petitioner has raised one significant argument that when the inspection of the shop of petitioner was carried out by Inspector of Supply Department, he had no authority to make entry, search and seizure of his report (record ?). In this connection, learned counsel relied on Essential Commodities (Amendment) Ordinance, 1998, which has been promulgated by President of India on 25.4.1998. Learned counsel submitted that when this argument was raised by petitioner before the Re visional Authority the same was rejected observing that although the ordinance was promulgated on 25.4.1998, but it elapsed in July, 1998 because it was never passed as a law by the Parliament and there was no saving clause and, therefore, provisions contained in Ordinance would not have the force of law. Learned counsel cited Article 123 of Constitution of India and submitted that ordinance promulgated by the President of India shall have the same force and effect as the law enacted by Parliament and that though it is liable to be laid before both Houses of Parliament and shall cease to operate at the expiration of six weeks from the reassembly of Parliament, or, if before the expiration of that period resolutions disapproving it are passed by both Houses, upon the passing of the second of those resolution. Learned counsel submitted that in the first place, the finding that Ordinance expired in July, 1998 is bad and secondly even if it elapsed, the other reasoning given by Additional Food Commissioner that it would not have the force of law is equally perverse.Shri Zakir Hussain, learned Additional Government Counsel opposed the writ petition and submitted that there were serious charges against the petitioner of not keeping the license at the shop and not displaying the price list and stock register, charging rate of kerosene, not properly maintaining the disposal register and discharge register etc. The DSO gave show cause notice to petitioner on all charges and he was afforded full opportunity of hearing and thereafter the impugned order was passed. Both Appellate Authority and Revisional Authority have given cogent and valid reason while agreeing with view taken by DSO. The matter does not require interference by this Court. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner has rejoined and submitted that even as per the Rule 8 of Order of 1976, the matter cannot be decided on the mere seriousness of charges and howsoever grave the charges may be, the respondent No.3 was required to give a reasonable opportunity of hearing to petitioner to state his case against the proposed cancellation. He in this connection referred to Clause 8 (2) of Order of 1976 and submitted that all the records of petitioner were seized by respondents without authority of law. Moreover none of the reports were provided to petitioner when he was asked to give his reply to show cause notice. There was thus complete violation of principles of natural justice. 6. I have given my anxious consideration to rival submissions and perused the material on record. 7. Moreover none of the reports were provided to petitioner when he was asked to give his reply to show cause notice. There was thus complete violation of principles of natural justice. 6. I have given my anxious consideration to rival submissions and perused the material on record. 7. Section 3 of Ordinance inserted a proviso in subsection (2) to Clause (i) of Essential Commodities Act in the following terms : "Provided that where a person authorised under an order issued under this section to make the entry, search examination of seizure is below the rank of a Magistrate of the first call or its equivalent, he shall obtain prior permission of an officer not below the rank of a Magistrate of the first class or its equivalent before making such entry, search, examination or seizure." The only argument that has appealed to this Court is that Essential Commodities (Amendment) Ordinance, 1998 promulgated by President of India dated 25.4.1998 was in force when search, inspection and seizure was made by Enforcement Inspector on 9.6.1998. This argument has been though dealt with by Revisional Authority, but in a wholly unsatisfactory manner. The view expressed by him that Ordinance since it ultimately elapsed, would not have the force of law cannot be sustained in the face of clear provisions contained in Article 123 of Constitution of India, which inter-alia in sub-Article (2) provides that an Ordinance promulgated under this article shall have the same force and effect as an Act of Parliament. The further conclusion arrived at by the Revisional Authority that Ordinance would elapse in July is also not sufficiently substantiated on facts. It is not mentioned whether either of the Houses of Parliament was in session of July or thereabout. The further conclusion arrived at by the Revisional Authority that Ordinance would elapse in July is also not sufficiently substantiated on facts. It is not mentioned whether either of the Houses of Parliament was in session of July or thereabout. In this regard, Article 123 (1) provides that : "(1) If at any time, except when both Houses of Parliament are in session, the President is satisfied that circumstances exist which render it necessary for him to take immediate action, he may promulgate such Ordinances as the circumstances appear to him to require." Sub-article (2) thereafter provides that : "An Ordinance promulgated under this article shall have the same force and effect as an Act of Parliament, but every such Ordinance (a) shall be laid before both Houses of Parliament and shall cease to operate at the expiration of six weeks from the reassembly of Parliament, or, if before the expiration of that period resolutions disapproving it are passed by both Houses, upon the passing of the second of those resolutions, and (b) may be withdrawn at any time by the President." In the event where Houses of Parliament are summoned to reassemble on different dates, the period of six weeks shall be reckoned from the later of those dates for the purposes of this clause.Article 85 of Constitution of India provides that : The President shall from time to time summon each House of Parliament to meet at such time and place as he thinks fit, but six months shall not intervene between its last sitting in one session and the date appointed for its first sitting in the next session." It is not now clear as to on what basis the Revisional Authority in the present case has mentioned that Ordinance elapsed in July, but the fact is that Ordinance was in force at the time when the search, inspection and seizure at the fair price shop was carried out by Enforcement Inspector on 9.6.1998. Reasonings given by Revisional Authority that since the Ordinance ultimately elapsed, it would not have the force of law, cannot be countenanced. This contention of petitioner would ultimately go to the root of the case because if it is upheld, all proceedings that were carried out against him would stand nullified.In the result, this writ petition is allowed. Reasonings given by Revisional Authority that since the Ordinance ultimately elapsed, it would not have the force of law, cannot be countenanced. This contention of petitioner would ultimately go to the root of the case because if it is upheld, all proceedings that were carried out against him would stand nullified.In the result, this writ petition is allowed. The impugned order dated 22.9.1998 (Annex.2), order dated 5.3.1999 (Annex.4) and order dated 11.8.2000 (Annex.6) are quashed and set aside. The matter is remanded back to District Supply Officer, Ajmer, who shall examine this as a question of fact whether the Enforcement Inspector, who in the present matter made entry, search, examination or seizure had the authority or permission under order issued by Magistrate of first class or its equivalent for doing so and decide the matter afresh in the light of discussions made above within a period of three months from the date copy of this order is produced before him.No order as to costs.Writ Petition Allowed. *******