Judgment ( 1. ) THIS appeal has been preferred by the defendant against a decree for injunction as well as removal of construction granted by the courts below, in concurrent manner. ( 2. ) FACTS relevant for the purpose of the present appeal are that the plaintiff/respondent instituted a suit for perpetual injunction with allegations that he had purchased 2870 sq. ft. of land out of 14 biswa comprised in Survey No. 115 Min II, situated at Village Shivpuri vide registered sale-deed dated 14/5/96 from one Darpan Kumar Agrawal through power of attorney Smt. Sumati Agrawal. Adjacent to it, there situates Survey No. 114 which belongs to the Municipal Council, Shivpuri. Demarcation of the said land was being made by the defendants/appellants. On being asked, they informed the plaintiff that the demarcation was being made for construction of a park on Municipal land. Plaintiff opposed the processing of demarcation on the ground that the disputed piece of land belonged to him. Defendants/appellants threatened him that they will make construction for the municipal Council on the said land. Accordingly, plaintiff was compelled to sue for permanent injunction to restrain defendants/appellants from making any construction on the area 2870 sq. ft. comprised in Survey No. 115 Min II. ( 3. ) DEFENDANTS/appellants submitted their written statement denying thereby claim of the plaintiff. They, inter alia, stated that the plaintiff after making purchase in his favour had sold out 930 sq. ft. of land to Shri Shantilal Jain and 480 sq. ft. of land to Smt. Mithilesh Jain. Accordingly, it was stated in the written statement that the plaintiff ceased to be the owner of the entire land in area 2870 sq. ft. and the suit is therefore liable to dismissal. Moreover, the municipal park was being constructed on Survey No. 114 which was Govt. land. This apart, it was pleaded that the suit of the plaintiff is not maintainable for want of notice under Section 319 of the M. P. Municipalities Act, 1961. ( 4. ) LEARNED trial judge after recording the evidence found that the plaintiff had already sold out two pieces of land in area 480 sq. ft. and 930 sq. ft. out of the suit land. Accordingly, it was held that the plaintiff continued to remain owner and occupant of merely 1460 sq. ft. of land. Defendants/appellants were further directed to remove construction of park made on 606. ft. and 930 sq. ft. out of the suit land. Accordingly, it was held that the plaintiff continued to remain owner and occupant of merely 1460 sq. ft. of land. Defendants/appellants were further directed to remove construction of park made on 606. 38 sq. ft. of Survey No. 115. ( 5. ) IT is not out of place to mention here that during pendency of the suit, the plaintiff submitted an application for amendment before the trial court with an averment that the defendants have forcibly occupied the suit land and have made construction on it. In view of the aforesaid, prayer for restoration of possession was also made which was accepted on 26/8/08. Judgment was rendered on 27/8/08 and the suit was decreed in favour of the plaintiff. It was found that the plaintiff was owner of 1460 sq. ft. of the suit land. Defendants No. 1 and 2 were directed to remove construction from 606. 38 sq. ft. of the aforesaid. ( 6. ) AGGRIEVED by it,the defendants/appellants submitted Civil appeal No. 32a/08 which having been dismissed by the lower appellate court, present appeal has been preferred which is admitted and heard on the following substantial questions of law:- "1. In view of the suit being for 2870 sq. ft. land whether a decree for part of an area (i. e. 1460 sq. ft.) land could have been granted without specific demarcation or pleadings requisite for identification of such land ? 2. Whether the suit as filed is bad in law for want of notice under Section 319 of MP. Municipalities Act, 1961 ?" ( 7. ) SHRI J. D. Suryavanshi and Shri Rahul Dandotiya, learned counsel for the parties, made their exhaustive submissions which have been considered in the light of the material on record as well as the law governing the situation. Substantial question of law No. 1:- ( 8. ) IT is contended by Shri Suryavanshi learned counsel for the appellant that the plaint is silent about the sale of part of suit land reducing it to the extent of merely 1460 sq. ft. Since two pieces of land in area 480 sq. ft. and 930 sq. ft. Substantial question of law No. 1:- ( 8. ) IT is contended by Shri Suryavanshi learned counsel for the appellant that the plaint is silent about the sale of part of suit land reducing it to the extent of merely 1460 sq. ft. Since two pieces of land in area 480 sq. ft. and 930 sq. ft. were sold out by the plaintiff in the year 1996, i. e. prior to the institution of the suit, purchasers ought to have been impleaded and the plaintiff has no right to seek relief in respect of the land so sold out by him. Moreover, it is not revealed in the plaint that which portion was retained by the plaintiff. Thus, according to the learned counsel, there is a dispute about identity and for want of particulars requisite under Order 7 Rule 3 C. P. C. , the suit could not have been decreed. It is contended that for want of compliance of mandatory provisions contained in Order 7 Rule 3 c. P. C. , the suit in the absence of such particulars ought to have been dismissed. Further contention of Shri Suryavanshi is that no notice under Section 319 of the M. P. Municipalities Act, 1961 was issued by the plaintiff before filing of the suit. Thus, according to him, the suit is hit by the provisions contained in Section 319 (supra) and the courts below ought to have dismissed the suit due to noncompliance of mandatory provisions of law. ( 9. ) AS regards first contention, it is true that Order 7 Rule 3 C. P. C. requires the plaintiff to provide description in the plaint of the suit property sufficient to identify it, and, in case such property is identified by boundaries and particulars numbers in the record of settlement of survey. ptaintiff shall specify such boundaries and particulars in the plaint. Plaintiff has clearly mentioned that 2870 sq. ft. of land comprised in Survey No. 115 Min II situated at village Shivpuri was purchased by him vide registered sale-deed dated 14/5/96. Thus, particulars requisite for identification of the land in dispute, were provided in the plaint as per requirement of Order 7 Rule 3 C. P. C. Defendants/appellants in the written-statement did not raise any dispute about the identity of the land in question. Thus, particulars requisite for identification of the land in dispute, were provided in the plaint as per requirement of Order 7 Rule 3 C. P. C. Defendants/appellants in the written-statement did not raise any dispute about the identity of the land in question. On the contrary, it has been specifically stated that out of the land purchased by the plaintiff, two pieces of land in area 930 sq. ft. and 480 sq. ft. were sold by the plaintiff to Shri Shantilal Jain and Smt. Mithilesh Jain, respectively. It is further expressly and specifically pleaded in paragraph 2 of the written statement that the purchasers namely, Shri Shantilal Jain and Smt. Mithilesh Jain have constructed their houses on the plots purchased by them and are residing therein. In this view of the matter, it cannot be said that the disputed land in area 1460 sq. ft. is not identifiable for any reason, whatsoever. ( 10. ) SUPREME Court of India in the case of Pratibha Singh Vs. Shanti Devi Prasad ( AIR 2003 SC 643 ) has observed:- "when the suit as to immovable property has been decreed and the property is not definitely identified, the defect in the Court record caused by overlooking of provisions contained in 0,7, R. 3 and 0. 20 R. 3 of the C. P. C. Is capable of being cured. After all a successful plaintiff should not be deprived of the fruits of decree. Resort can be had to S. 152 or S. 47 of the C. P. C. depending on the facts and circumstances of the each case -which of the two provisions would be more appropriate, just and convenient to invoke. Being an inadvertent error, not affecting the merits of the case, it may be corrected under S. 152 of the C. P. C. by the Court which passed the decree by supplying the omission. Alternatively, the exact description of decretal property may be ascertained by the Executing Court as a question relating to execution, discharge or satisfaction of decree within the meaning of S. 47, C. P. C. A decree of a competent Court should not as far as practicable, be allowed to be defeated on account of an accidental slip or omission. In the facts and circumstances of the present case we think it would be more appropriate to invoke s. 47 of the C. P. C. " ( 11. In the facts and circumstances of the present case we think it would be more appropriate to invoke s. 47 of the C. P. C. " ( 11. ) IT may further be seen that a commission was issued in the suit at later stage which was executed by the Revenue Inspector in the presence of the parties to the litigation which included Asstt. Revenue Inspector of the Municipal council, Shivpuri. In the map prepared during the process of execution of commission (Ex. P/18) it has been clearly shown that the Municipal park has been constructed on the part of Survey No. 115. This is so revealed also in the Panchnama and report marked as Fx. P/16 and Ex. P/17, respectively. Thus, there remains no dispute with regard to identity of the piece of land in respect of which the suit has been decreed by the courts below in concurrent manner and the decree is not found to have suffered from any kind of infirmity. Accordingly, substantial question of law No. 1 is answered against the appellant. Substantial question of law No. 2:- ( 12. ) AS regards substantial question of law No. 2, it is apposite to reproduce subsection (1) of Section 319 of the Municipalities Act, 1961 which reads as follows: - 319. Bar of suit in absence of notice- (1) No suit shall be instituted against any Council or any Councillor, officer or servant thereof or any person acting under the direction of any such Council, councillor, officer or servant for anything done or purporting to be done under this Act, until the expiration of two months next after a notice, in writing, stating the cause of action, the name and place of abode of the intending plaintiff and the relief which he claims, has been in the case of council delivered or left at its office, and, in the case of any such member, officer, servant or person as aforesaid, delivered to him or usual place of abode: and the plaint shall contain a statement that such notice has been so delivered or left. (2) xxx xxx xxx (3) xxx xxx xxx ( 13. (2) xxx xxx xxx (3) xxx xxx xxx ( 13. ) BAR contained in this provision may be invoked if impugned action of the municipal Council is proved to be in pursuance of any direction of the Municipal council, Councillor, officer or servant Stand of the defendants/appellants is that the park was constructed on Survey No. 114 and not on Survey No. 115. Thus, obviously there was no direction of the Council or Councillor to construct Municipal park on the part of Survey No. 115. This being so, the bar contained in Section 319 of the M. P. Municipalities Act, 1961 cannot be invoked by the appellant. ( 14. ) THIS apart, it may further be seen that sub-section (3) of Section 319 of the said Act, 1961 clearly envisages that nothing in Section 319 shall be deemed to apply to any suit instituted under Section 54 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877. This section was substituted in the Specific Relief Act, 1963 by section 38, which enables to seek perpetual injunction. Instant suit of the plaintiff being for permanent injunction, is saved by virtue of sub-section (3) (supra ). ( 15. ) THOUGH, no substantial question of law was formulated on the question of relief with regard to removal of construction, Shri Suryavanshi, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the amendment though shown to have been attested by the learned trial judge in the order dated 26/8/08, it was in fact not incorporated in the plaint, therefore, relief regarding removal of construction is liable to be set aside. Faced with the situation, Shri Rahul Dandotiya, learned counsel for the plaintiff/respondent after perusal of the record immediately submitted an application under Order 6 Rule 18 C. P. C. , seeking leave to incorporate the amendment, which was allowed to be incorporated by the learned trial judge. ( 16. ) LEARNED trial judge in the order dated 26/6/08 had clearly observed that the municipal Council, Shivpuri in its w/itten statement had clearly mentioned that no construction of the park was made on Survey No. 115. Construction of park on survey No. 115 is found by the trial court to have been made during pendency of the suit and this being a subsequent event, the amendment was allowed. Construction of park on survey No. 115 is found by the trial court to have been made during pendency of the suit and this being a subsequent event, the amendment was allowed. In this view of the matter, there is no propriety in not allowing the incorporation of amendment at this stage, by invoking powers under Order 6 Rule 18 C. P. C. Accordingly, I. A. No. 16167/09 is hereby allowed. ( 17. ) DURING pendency of the suit, the plaintiff submitted an application for temporary injunction under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 C. P. C. (I. A. No. 1) on 1/2/08 with an allegation that the defendant/appellant was collecting material on the suit land comprised in Survey No. 115 with intent to construct municipal park. This application was dismissed on 1/3/08 by the trial court on the defendants representing that the construction was being made on Survey No. 114 and not on Survey No. 115. Ultimately, after recording evidence Jearned trial judge found that the municipal park has been illegally and unauthorized constructed on 606. 38 sq. ft of ui. ,. :. it land comprised in Survey No. 115. Plaintiff had taken requisite steps by submitting application for temporary injunction which was decided in the light of the specific averment of the defendant/appellant that no construction was being made on the suit land. Obviously, the defendant/appellant cannot be permitted to make a misstatement and derive undue benefit thereby. In such a situation, court has ample power to restore the position as it existed on the date of the suit because no one can be permitted to take undue advantage of the court proceedings by making wrong submissions. ( 18. ) RECENTLY, this court in Second Appeal No. 237/2000 [gyani Chandra Vs. Jagdish Prasad (dead) through his L. Rs. and others] (unreported), decided on 3/9/09 has taken a view that the court even while dismissing the suit may exercise inherent power to restore position of the suit property which existed on the date of the suit. In view of this, no substantial question of law seems to have been formulated with regard to removal of the construction from the suit land. ( 19. ) SUCCINCTLY. THE appeal is hereby dismissed for reasons stated herein above, however, without order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.