JUDGMENT:- This is an Appeal filed by the Insurance Company-orig. respondent no.2 in M.A.C.P. No.04/2006 challenging the Judgment and Award dated 12.12.2006 passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Ambajogai by which the appellant insurance company along with owner of the vehicle who is respondent no.2 herein, are directed to pay jointly and severally, an amount of Rs.2,75,000/ - inclusive of no fault liability, to the respondent no.1-claimant, together with interest at the rate of 7.5% p.a. from the date of Petition, till its realisation. The Tribunal has recorded the findings that the respondent no.1-claimant has sustained 40% permanent disability in motor accident involving Jeep bearing No.MH-24-C-1006 on 10.05.2005 at about 7 p.m. near Neelkamal Hotel Dhaba, Shirsala due to rash and negligent driving of the said Jeep by its driver one Uttam Dagadu Pawar, who gave dash to the motor cycle No.MH-23-K-2210 of the respondent No.1-claimant. The owner of the vehicle who is respondent No.2 herein has been held vicariously liable for the act of rash and negligent driving of the driver, whereas the appellant insurance company has been held liable to indemnify the owner for compensation. 2. Notice before admission in this Appeal, was issued on 12.11.2008, which was made returnable on 17.12.2008. By the same order, the parties were informed that the appeal is likely to be disposed of finally at the stage of admission. By an order dated 11.02.2009, the record and proceedings were called. On 07.05.2009, this Court was observed that the respondent nos.1 and 2, though served, are absent and the order dated 12.11.2008 indicates that the matter was to be finally heard. It was further noted that the appellant Insurance company has deposited the entire amount. The matter was therefore fixed for final hearing at the stage of admission on 14th September, 2009. Accordingly, the matter is taken up for hearing. Admit. None for Respondents. With the consent of the learned Counsel appearing for the appellant, the matter is heard for final disposal. 3. The matter was therefore fixed for final hearing at the stage of admission on 14th September, 2009. Accordingly, the matter is taken up for hearing. Admit. None for Respondents. With the consent of the learned Counsel appearing for the appellant, the matter is heard for final disposal. 3. The appellant insurance company challenged the aforesaid judgment and award only on 2 grounds i.e. (i) the driver of the vehicle i.e Jeep bearing No.MH-24-C-1006 was necessary party in claim petition filed under section 166 of the Motor Vehicle Act and in his absence no findings regarding the rash and negligent driving can be arrived at, (ii) the disability certificate at Exhibit-22, produced by the claimant showing permanent ortho disability to the extent of 40%, has not been proved because the Doctor, who has issued the said certificate, has not been examined. In support of 1st contentions, the learned Counsel for the appellant relied upon the decisions of the Apex Court reported in A.I.R. 2007 SC 1609 (Oriental Insurance Company Vs. Meena Varial) and 2007 A.I.R. S.C.W. 3591 (Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Premlata N. Shukla and ors). In support of second point the learned Counsel for the appellant has relied upon the decision of the Apex Court reported in 2008(6) Mh.L.J.21 : [2008 ALL SCR 1661] (Rajesh Kumar Vs. Yudhvir Singh and another). 4. With the assistance of the learned Counsel for the appellant, I have gone through the record and proceedings of the Tribunal. The Tribunal by its order dated 05.12.2006 below Exhibit-30 granted permission to the Insurance company to contest the claim on the point of negligence of the driver. The vehicle involved in the accident was Jeep bearing No.MH-24-C-1006. The owner of the vehicle was one Vaijanath S/o. Uttamrao Chaude, who was joined as party Respondent no.1 in the claim petition. The driver of the vehicle was one Uttam Dagdu Pawar resident of Sonkhed Tanda, Tq.-Sonpeth, Dist.-Parbhani and was not joined as party to claim petition. The vehicle was insured with the appellant insurance company and the insurance policy was placed on record at Exhibit-n. The owner of the vehicle, although was served with the summons, he did not file his written statement and hence, the Tribunal has passed order on 06.07.2006 to proceed without written statement of the owner of the vehicle. The vehicle was insured with the appellant insurance company and the insurance policy was placed on record at Exhibit-n. The owner of the vehicle, although was served with the summons, he did not file his written statement and hence, the Tribunal has passed order on 06.07.2006 to proceed without written statement of the owner of the vehicle. The Insurance company filed its Written statement at Exhibit-12/B. Perusal of the written statement filed by the Insurance company shows that, the objection regarding the non-joinder of driver of the offending vehicle being the necessary party to the proceedings has not been raised. The objection regarding the non-joinder of owner of the motorcycle, which was being driven by the claimant, has been specifically raised. There is no issue framed by the Tribunal as to whether, the driver of the offending vehicle was necessary party and the claim petition was liable to be dismissed for non-joinder of the necessary party. The insurance company took the stand in the written statement that, the driver of the offending vehicle was not possessing the valid driving licence on the date and time of the accident. The Exhibit-25 is the driving licence of the driver of the offending vehicle. 5. In the background of these facts, the Judgment of the Apex Court relied upon by the learned Counsel for the appellant will have to be looked into. The first Judgment relied upon by the learned Counsel in Meena Varial's case, cited supra. The learned Counsel placed his reliance on para 9 of the said Judgment containing the general observations which is reproduced below: "Before we proceed to consider the main aspect arising for decision in this Appeal, we would like to make certain general observations. It may be true that the Motor Vehicles Act, insofar as it relates to claims for compensation arising out of accidents, is a beneficent piece of legislation. It may also be true that subject to the rules made in that behalf, the Tribunal may follow a summary procedure in dealing with a claim. That does not mean that a Tribunal approached with a claim for compensation under the Act should ignore all basic principles of law in determining the claim for compensation. Ordinarily, a contract of insurance is a contract of indemnity. That does not mean that a Tribunal approached with a claim for compensation under the Act should ignore all basic principles of law in determining the claim for compensation. Ordinarily, a contract of insurance is a contract of indemnity. When a car belonging to an owner is insured with the insurance company and it is being driven by a driver employed by the insured, when it meets with an accident, the primary liability under law for payment of compensation is that of the driver. Once the driver is liable, the owner of the vehicle becomes vicariously liable for payment of compensation. It is this vicarious liability of the owner that is indemnified by the insurance company. A third party for whose benefit the insurance is taken, is therefore entitled to show, when he moves under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, that the driver was negligent in driving the vehicle resulting in the accident; that the owner was vicariously liable and that the insurance company was bound to indemnify the owner and consequently, satisfy the award made. Therefore, under general principles, one would except the driver to be impleaded before an adjudication is claimed under Section 166 of the Act as to whether a claimant before the Tribunal is entitled to compensation for an accident that• has occurred due to alleged negligence of the driver. Why should not a Tribunal insist on the driver of the vehicle being impleaded when a claim is being filed? As we have noticed, the relevant provisions of the Act are not intended to jettison all principles of law relating to a claim for compensation which is still based on a tortious liability. The Tribunal ought to have, in the case on hand, directed the claimant to implead Mahmood Hasan who was allegedly driving the vehicle at the time of the accident. Here, there was also controversy whether it was Mahmood Hasan who was driving the vehicle or it was the deceased himself. Surely, such a question could have been decided only in the presence of Mahmood Hasan who would have been principally liable for any compensation that might be decreed in case he was driving the vehicle. Secondly, the deceased was employed in a limited company. Surely, such a question could have been decided only in the presence of Mahmood Hasan who would have been principally liable for any compensation that might be decreed in case he was driving the vehicle. Secondly, the deceased was employed in a limited company. It was necessary for the claimants to establish what was the monthly income and what was the dependency on the basis of which the compensation could be adjudged as payable. Should not any Tribunal trained in law ask the claimants to produce evidence in support of the monthly salary or income earned by the deceased from his employer Company ? Is there anything in the Motor Vehicles Act which stand in the way of the Tribunal asking for the best evidence, acceptable evidence? We think not. Here again, the position that the Motor Vehicles Act vis-a-vis claim for compensation arising out of an accident is a beneficent piece of legislation, cannot lead a Tribunal trained in law to forget all basic principles of establishing liability and establishing the quantum of compensation payable. The Tribunal, in this case, has chosen to merely go by the oral evidence of the widow when without any difficulty the claimants could have got the employer company to produce the relevant documents to show the income that was being derived by the deceased from his employment. Of course, in this case, the above two aspects become relevant only if we find the insurance company liable. If we find that only the owner of the vehicle, the employer of the deceased was liable, there will be no occasion to further consider these aspects since the owner has acquiesced in the award passed by the Tribunal against it." 6. Relying upon the aforesaid judgment, the learned Counsel urged that, the driver of the vehicle i.e. Jeep No.MH-24-C-l006 was necessary party when there are allegations made regarding the rash and negligent driving on the part of driver of the said vehicle. The learned Counsel has further brought to my notice, the pleadings made in the claim petition showing specific allegations that the driver of the offending vehicle was rash and negligent in driving the vehicle, as a result of which, the accident in question occurred. The learned Counsel has further brought to my notice, the pleadings made in the claim petition showing specific allegations that the driver of the offending vehicle was rash and negligent in driving the vehicle, as a result of which, the accident in question occurred. He has also pointed out that, the offences were registered against the driver of the offending vehicle under sections 279, 338, 337 and 427 of the Indian Penal Code vide crime no.46/2005 and the copy of F.I.R. was also placed on record before the Tribunal. 7. In Meena Varial's case, the facts involved were that, the deceased himself was driving the offending vehicle and because of his own negligence the accident occurred. There was no special contract to cover the liability of the owner of the vehicle and it was only an 'Act Policy'. The Apex Court has held, that the insurance company is not liable to indemnify the insured and is not obliged to satisfy the award of the Tribunal/Court. There was no finding that, Mehmud Hasan the another employee of the owner, who was not joined as party to the proceedings, was driving the vehicle. In view of this, the said judgment is not applicable. As pointed out earlier, it was not stand of the insurance company before the Tribunal in this case that the driver of the offending vehicle was necessary party and that no negligence can be proved in his absence. There was no issue framed in that respect by the Tribunal and the said point was not urged before the Tribunal. If the issue had been raised, the claimants would have been provided an opportunity to join the driver as patty to the proceedings. The owner of the offending vehicle was joined as party and he has been held vicariously liable for the act of driver. In view of this, the question whether, the driver was necessary party in the Claim Petition and in absence of him, whether, the findings recorded by the Tribunal regarding the rash and negligent driving can be sustained, does not at all arise in the present case. The appellant can not now for the first time be permitted to raise this issue in this Court. The contention is therefore rejected. 8. The appellant can not now for the first time be permitted to raise this issue in this Court. The contention is therefore rejected. 8. The second point urged is that, the disability certificate at Exhibit-22, produced by the claimant showing permanent ortho disability to the extent of 40%, has not been proved as the doctor who issued the said certificate has not been examined. It is the fact that, the doctor who issued the certificate at Exhibit-22 has not been examined. The learned Counsel relied upon the decision of the Apex Court reported in Rajesh Kumar's case [2008 ALL SCR 1661], cited supra wherein it has been held that, unless the author of the certificate is examined, the certificate of disability was not admissible in the evidence. In this case of Apex Court, the appellant relied upon a certificate purported to have been issued by the Civil Surgeon, Faridabad on 11.11.2003 stating that, the appellant had suffered 60% disability and had awarded the compensation. In the appeal, the High Court relied upon another disability certificate showing 30% disability and this was challenged before the Apex Court urging that, the High Court was wrong in ignoring certificate dated 11.11.2003 showing disability to the extent of 60%. In the back ground of these facts, it was held that the author of the certificate was not examined and hence the said certificate was inadmissible in evidence. Thus the certificate issued by the doctor was not proved and thus, the judgment is distinguishable. 9. In another Judgment of the Apex Court relied upon by the learned Counsel for the appellant, in Premlata Shukla's case, it has been held in para no.15 as under: "15. A party objecting to the admissibility of a document must raise its objection at the appropriate time. If the objection is not raised and the document is allowed to be marked and that too at the instance of a party which had proved the same and where-for consent of the other party has been obtained, the former in our opinion cannot be permitted to turn round and raise a contention that, the contents of the documents had not been proved and, thus, should not be relied upon. In Hukam Singh, the law was correctly been laid down by the Punjab and Haryana High Court stating; "8. Mr. In Hukam Singh, the law was correctly been laid down by the Punjab and Haryana High Court stating; "8. Mr. G. C. Mittal, learned counsel for the respondent contended that Ram Pratap had produced only his former deposition and gave no evidence in Court which could be considered by the Additional District Judge. I am afraid there is no merit in this contention. The Trial Court had discussed the evidence of Ram Pratap in the light of the report Exhibit D-1 produced by him. The Additional District Judge while hearing the appeal could have commented on that evidence and held it to be inadmissible if law so permitted. But he did not at all have this evidence before his mind. It was not a case of inadmissible evidence either. No doubt the procedure adopted by the trial Court in letting in a certified copy of the previous deposition of Ram Pratap made in the criminal proceedings and allowing the same to be proved by Ram Pratap himself was not correct and he should have been examined again in regard to all that he had stated ear1ier in the statement the parties in order to save time did not object to the previous deposition being proved by Ram Pratap himself who was only cross-examined. It is not a case where irrelevant evidence had been Jet in with the consent of the parties but the only objection is that the procedure followed in the matter of giving evidence in Court was not correct. When the parties themselves have allowed certain statements to be placed on record as a part of their evidence, it is not open to them to urge later either in the same Court or in a court of appeal that the evidence produced was inadmissible. To allow them to do so would indeed be permitting them both to approbate and reprobate." 10. Reading of both the aforesaid judgments together make it apparent that, the issue regarding the admissibility of the document has to be raised before the Tribunal. I have gone through the evidence of the claimant and he has proved the certificate in question which is at Exhibit-n. While admitting the said document in evidence no objection has been raised by the appellant insurance company and the document is admitted in the evidence without any objection. I have gone through the evidence of the claimant and he has proved the certificate in question which is at Exhibit-n. While admitting the said document in evidence no objection has been raised by the appellant insurance company and the document is admitted in the evidence without any objection. Not only that but the claimant has also been cross examined by the appellant insurance company on the said certificate. There was even no suggestion that such certificate was not issued by the concerned Medical Officer. In view of this, the appellant can not be permitted to turn round and raise contentions that, the document at Exhibit-22 has not been proved. 11. In view of the aforesaid findings, I do not find any substance in the instant Appeal and same is therefore dismissed without any order as to costs. The amount, if any has been deposited by the appellant insurance company, shall immediately be remitted to the Tribunal for further appropriate orders in accordance with law. Appeal dismissed.