JUDGMENT DIPAK MISRA, J. ( 1 ) IN this batch of writ petition, the centroidal issue that has been sought to be assiduously pyramided with immense gloss is that the amendments brought into force in the M. P. Municipal Corporation Act, 1956 (in short 'the 1956 Act')and the M. P. Municipalities Act, 1961 by the M. P. Nagar Palika Vidhi (Sanshodhan)Adhiniyam, 2007 as a consequence of which the reservation in favour of women has increased from 33% to 50%. in Municipal Corporations and Municipalities in the State of m. P. is unsustainable being violative of Arts. 14 and 15 ( 1) of the Constitution and as a sequitur thereof, Rule 3 of the Madhya Pradesh municipalities (Reservation of Wards for scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, Other backward Classes and Women) Rules, 1994 (for brevity 'the 1994 Rules') as amended vide notification dated 3-9-2007 is also unconstitutional. The aforesaid structure of the edifice has led to the prayer declaring the statutory provisions as ultra vires and quashment of the consequent notifications and orders. In spite of various range of asseverations of facts in the writ petitions, the learned counsel for the petitioners restricted the relief to the constitutional validity of the provisions pertaining to reservation for women and, therefore, the factual matrix as regards the said spectrum shall only be expo sited. For the sake of clarity and convenience, the facts in W. P. No. 8122/2009 are uncurtained and unfurled herein. ( 2 ) IN the petition, the contents of Section 11 of the 1956 Act have been narrated and special reference has been made to sub-sections (3) and (4) indicating that prior to the amendment Act No. 16 of 2007, the said subsections provided reservation of one-third of total number of seats for women belonging to each category. It is set forth that Section 11 provides compartmentalised reservation for Scheduled Castes. Scheduled Tribes, other Backward Classes and Women. The reservation made in favour of the women candidates is vertical inasmuch as the same is dependent on the final number of elected candidates in the election. In order to make special provisions for women, the Legislature had earlier provided reservation of one-third seats for candidates belonging to women category which was sufficient and adequate. Apart from the seats reserved for women, women also contest election from unreserved seats and succeed. In order to make special provisions for women, the Legislature had earlier provided reservation of one-third seats for candidates belonging to women category which was sufficient and adequate. Apart from the seats reserved for women, women also contest election from unreserved seats and succeed. There are instances where in the elections of local bodies, women candidates conteste d in unreserved seats and got elected against male candidates which goes a long way to show that reservation made prior to the amendment ensured proper and adequate representation of women in the municipal corporation. It is pleaded that in spite of the aforesaid, in subsections (3) and (4), in place of the words "not less than 1/3rd", the words ''as nearly as possible 50%" have been substituted. In view of the amendments carried out by the notification dated 3-9-2007, the Rules have been amended. ( 3 ) IT is contended that the amendment in sub-section 11 (3) and (4) and the corresponding amendment carried out in the rules creates a discrimination on the ground of sex which is impermissible under Arts. 14 and 15 (1) of the Constitution of India. Though art. 15 (3), empowers the State to make special provisions for women, yet the said provision cannot be stretched to such an extent that it discriminates other classes in an arbitrary manner. It is put forth that the increase of reservation from one-third to 50% operates as discrimination as such a reservation is vertical and when counted along with the reservation meant for other classes, the total percentage of reservation would come to 75% which is contrary to the law laid down in indra Sawhney and others v. Union of India and others, 1992 Supp (3) SCC 212. It is urged that the success of women candidates in elections reflects in a crystallized manner that the women candidates do not suffer any disparity which requires the further crutches of reservation. The increase of reservation from 1/3rd to half is not founded on any scientific or systematic study and there is no material to show that women need reservation to that extent for ensuring adequate representation in local self government. Such a reservation, it is contended, is irrational, arbitrary and smacks of total discrimination violating the basic facet of Article 14 of the constitution. Such a reservation, it is contended, is irrational, arbitrary and smacks of total discrimination violating the basic facet of Article 14 of the constitution. ( 4 ) IT is averred that the concept of reservation is only to make provisions for upliftment of those classes who suffered disadvantage over centuries. Reference has been made to Art. 334 of the Constitution which mandates reservation to continue only till such categories or classes attain the status of equality with other citizens. It is put forth that though there has been prescription of period for reservations for other classes, yet no period has been provided for reservation for women and, therefore, such a reservation would continue in perpetuity. It is set forth that women in India have already achieved the status of equality and. consequently, there is no necessity for further reservation. The reservation is exclusively based on sex which is prohibited under Arts. 14 and 15 (1) of the constitution of India but the State Legist ture has provided such a reservation in absolute transgression of the said constitutional mandate. It is urged that the impugned amendment has no nexus with the object sought to be achieved and also does not get any support from Art. 334 of the Constitution and, therefore, the said provision deserves to be declared as unconstitutional. ( 5 ) A counter-affidavit has been filed by the respondents contending, inter alia, that article 243t (2) of the Constitution provides for reservation for women candidates which should not be less than one-third of the total number of seats. The maximum number relating to reservation fixed as 50% as has been laid down in Indra Sawhney (supra) is not applicable to election matters as has been held by this Court in Tulsiram Jatav v. Union of India and others, 2001 (4) MPLJ 132. It is pleaded that the process of election has already commenced and the preparation of the electoral roll is being done as per the order dated 7-7-2009 and the final publication of the electoral rolls would be done by 11-11-2009. It is put forth that as per Article 243zg of the Constitution, there is bar to interfere in the electoral matters. It is put forth that as per Article 243zg of the Constitution, there is bar to interfere in the electoral matters. It is the stand in the return that the plea of excessive reservation and that it is beyond the permissible limit of 50% is unsustainable inasmuch as the provisions, if appositely read, would show that the reservation is up to the extent of 50% and not beyond the said percentage. It is urged that under Art. 243t of the Constitution, there is a mandate for reserving seats for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in every municipality in the proportion to the total number of seats and the total population. As per sub-clause (2) of Article 243t, there is clear warrant to reserve not less than one-third seats for women belonging to the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. It is also set forth that the reservation for women can be more than 1/3rd of the total seats and the same would be well within the permissible limit of 50%. The State Legislature, keeping in view the above aspects, has amended subsections (3) and (4) of Section II of the 1956 act which provide as nearly as possible 50% reservation of the total number of seats. The intention of the Legislature is to provide reservation up to 50% but there is remotely no intention to create any contingencies for providing reservation beyond 50%. The Rules are in consonance with the Act and in accord with the Constitution and cannot be found to be playing foul with any constitutional provision. It is contended that under art. 15 (3), the State is empowered to make special provisions for women and children and hence, the action taken by the State Legislature is well within the constitutional frame. The methodology adopted by the respondents is quite clear and there is an errneous assumption by the petitioners that the reservation is vertical. The respondents have prescribed reservation for each category separately, and thereafter, equal horizontal reservation is provided for women. As regards the unreserved seats, the same methodology has been adopted so as to ensure total reservation as nearly as possible 50% for women candidates and further unreserved seats are open for all categories of women candidates, i. e. . Scheduled Castes, Scheduled tribes and Other Backward Classes. As regards the unreserved seats, the same methodology has been adopted so as to ensure total reservation as nearly as possible 50% for women candidates and further unreserved seats are open for all categories of women candidates, i. e. . Scheduled Castes, Scheduled tribes and Other Backward Classes. Thus, the methodology adopted by the answering respondents clearly reveals that horizontal reservation has been provided for women candidates. A comparative chart has been produced pertaining to the Bhopal Municipal Corporation in respect of the year 2004 and the year 2009 to highlight that the reservation granted to women is well within the permissible limit of 50%. The allegation that there is reservation of 75% is absolutely misconceived and the same has been put forth in a fallacious manner, ( 6 ) IT is asseverated in the return that there are 14 municipal corporations and 96 municipalities in the State of M. P. In addition to that, there are 248 Nagar Panchayats (transitional areas) spread in 50 districts of the state of M. P. The petitioners have not submitted in the writ petitions that the process of reservation in respect of almost 50 districts has been completed. It is submitted that in respect of 43 districts, notification has already been published as contemplated under rule 7 of the 1994 Rules. In essence, the stand is that the election process has commenced to a concrete extent and the petitioners have challenged the validity at a belated stage. It is put forth that the State Legislature has provided horizontal reservation for the women within the permissible limit and hence, no fault can be found with it. It is worth noting that a stand has been taken in some of the writ petitions that reservation of 50% seats for women would result in total lack of control over the officers and administration of the corporations and municipalities. The said stand has been strongly refuted in the return. An explanation has been preferred how the reservation does not exceed 50% in entirely. It is contended that the provisions neither play foul with Articles 14 and 15 (1) of the Constitution of India nor do they run counter to any decision rendered by the apex Court. The said stand has been strongly refuted in the return. An explanation has been preferred how the reservation does not exceed 50% in entirely. It is contended that the provisions neither play foul with Articles 14 and 15 (1) of the Constitution of India nor do they run counter to any decision rendered by the apex Court. ( 7 ) A rejoinder affidavit has been filed to the return filed by the respondents No. ] and 3 contending, inter alia, that the reliance placed by the respondents on Article 243t of the Constitution of India as a source of power is absolutely untenable as the constitutional benchmark prescribed for reservation of seats for women is only 1/3 rd and, therefore, the State Legislature even though has the power to make provision for reservation of seats for women candidates in excess of the constitutional benchmark of 1/3rd, yet such provision has to be based on sound and cogent reasons. It is putforth that respondents have not given any justification for providing reservation for women in excess of 1/3rd. No scientific or systematic study was conducted before enhancing the percentage for women from 1/3rd to 50%. No material has been brought on record to demonstrate that women in the State of M. P. need reservation in excess of the prescribed constitutional benchmark of 1/3rd. The Constitution does not contemplate proportionate reservation for women and. therefore, there has to be a scientific base for providing 50% reservation for women. A classification has been made but in the absence of any cogent and germane reasons, solely on the base of sex, such classification is impermissible as that ex facie invites the frown of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. In the past election, women have got adequate representation in the local bodies and large number of women candidates were elected from unreserved wards and hence, there is no warrant or justification for providing further reservation. The reservation of 50% for women is in excess of their promotion to the total population in the State if the sex ratio of the 2001 census is taken note of. The sex ratio in the State of Madhya Pradesh was 919 females against 1000 males. The total percentage of women population in the State of M. P. is slightly over 45%. Thus, the reservation is in excess of the percentage of population. The sex ratio in the State of Madhya Pradesh was 919 females against 1000 males. The total percentage of women population in the State of M. P. is slightly over 45%. Thus, the reservation is in excess of the percentage of population. The women residing within the Municipal Corporation area are highly educated and they are well aware of their rights and, consequently, they need no protection in the form of reservation. In the city of Bhopal, as per the 2001 census, there were 898 women against 1000 men. Likewise, in Gwalior the ratio is 848, in Indore 912 and in Jabalpur, it is 908. Hence, the concept of proportionality has been thrown to the winds while determining the factum of reservation. The women candidates being educated can contest the election of ward members on the basis of their own merit. It is urged that during the pendency of the writ petition, the rule has been amended stipulating, inter alia, that reservation for women is horizontal and not vertical which means that the respondents are not at all aware about the concept of horizontal reservation. In horizontal reservation, the provision for reservation contemplates adjustment of seats/posts for reserved category candidates as against such candidates selected/elected on the basis of their own merit. The Municipal Corporation Act does not contain any such provision for the adjustment of seats. The total number of women candidates would exceed 50%. as women from any category can also be elected from any unreserved ward. Thus, the impugned provision, in fact, seeks to provide vertical reservation for women, which, when added with the reservation provided for the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Other backward Classes candidates, would amount to 75%. ( 8 ) BE it noted, on 25th September, 2009, in rule 5. sub-rule (6) was inserted in the madhya Pradesh Municipalities (Reservation of Office of Mayor and President) Rules, 1999. The said amendment reads as follows : " (6) In the context of Section 11-A of the madhya Pradesh Municipal Corporations act, 1956 (No. 23 of 1956) and Section 29-B of the Madhya Pradesh Municipalities act, 1961 (No. 37 of 1961), it is further clarified that the provisions of fifty per cent reservation for women shall be done horizontally in all categories, so that the overall reservation shall not exceed fifty per cent. " ( 9 ) IN Rule 3, after sub-rule (6) of the madhya Pradesh Municipalities (Reservation of Wards for Scheduled Castes, Scheduled tribes, Other Backward Classes and Women)Rules, 1994, the following sub-rule was added : " (7) In the context of Section 11 of the madhya Pradesh Municipal Corporation Act, 1956 (No. 25 of 1956) and Section 29-A of the Madhya Pradesh Municipalities Act, 1961 (No. 37 of 1961), it is further clarified that the provision of fifty per cent reservation for women shall be done horizontally in all categories, so that the overall reservation shall not exceed fifty per cent. " ( 10 ) AT this juncture, it is apposite to note that on behalf of the respondents-State, an affidavit has been filed in the course of hearing. We think it apt to produce paragraphs 1 to 3 of the affidavit. They read as follows : " 1. That, on the basis of information collected from various local bodies accompanying chart relating to the results of 60 local bodies in which besides the reserved seats only 1. 53% of women could win the election in the last elections of Local Bodies held in the year 2004. It would be proper to state that extraordinary Gazette Notification on 20 december, 2004 was issued in respect of candidates who won the said elections of local bodies. Copy of chart is enclosed herewith as Annexure-A. 2. That, in the last election of Parliament there were 29 seats out of which only 6 won the election and percentage of women category mla who could win the election was 20. 69%. Copy of the list of Members of Parliament, who won the election is Annexure-B. 3. That, in the last election, out of 230 members of Legislative Assembly only 25 women could win the election. Copy of the total candidates who won the election is filed as Annexure-C in which 25 women members were elected which comes to 10. 87%. " The said affidavit has been filed to emphasise how the participation of women in the governance of the body polity is really marginal and is of no signification. ( 11 ) WE have heard Mr. Sanjay Agrawal, mr. Sanjay K. Agrawal, Mr. Pankaj Dixit and mr. A. P. Shroti, learned counsel for the petitioners; Mr. R. D. Jain, learned Advocate general and Mr. ( 11 ) WE have heard Mr. Sanjay Agrawal, mr. Sanjay K. Agrawal, Mr. Pankaj Dixit and mr. A. P. Shroti, learned counsel for the petitioners; Mr. R. D. Jain, learned Advocate general and Mr. Prashant Singh, learned additional Advocate General for the respondents; State; and Mr. A. K. Mishra, learned senior Counsel along with Mrs. Divyakeerti bohre, learned counsel for the respondent/municipal Corporation. ( 12 ) MR. Sanjay K. Agrawal, learned counsel for the petitioners; has raised the following submissions : (a) The impugned amendment by increasing the reservation for women from 1/3rd to 50% ex-facie violates the equality clause enshrined under Art. 14 of the Constitution and seeks to discriminate on the ground of sex which is violative of Art. 15 (1) of the constitution of India. (b) Prior to coming into force of the amended provision, 1/3rd of the seats were already reserved for women and thus, adequate representation was already provided to women in the local self government and there was absolutely no justification or warrant for increasing the percentage of reservation to 50% and further there is no nexus with the object sought to be achieved. (c) The increase of percentage for women would result in reverse discrimination against the rest of the citizens: (d) No systematic and scientific study has been undertaken before increasing the percentage of reservation for women and no identifiable, quantitative and qualitative data has been placed on record to demonstrate that the reservation of 50% wards for women is necessitous in the public interest or in the interest of the society at large. (e) The total percentage of women in the state of M. P. is about 47. 9% and, therefore, the reservation of 50% wards for women is disproportionate to their population in the state. That apart, women have been contesting in elections at various levels and they do not need the cratches of reservation. (f) The presence of majority of women councillors in the Corporation would weaken the unit of local self governance and would only strengthen the bureaucracy which would be counter to the constitutional mandate incorporated in Chapter IX-A. Quite apart from the above, the duties and functions of the councillors are extremely onerous which cannot be effectively discharged by women and thereby it would retard the development at the level of local self government. (g) The legislature has not kept in view the effect and impact of such increase on the society and while scrutinising the constitutional validity of the law, it is the duty of the court to see the direct and inevitable impact of the same, regard being had to the realistic background. (h) The legislation is contrary to the decision rendered by the Apex Court in Indra sawhney (supra) and other decisions and is, therefore, liable to be struck down as ultra vires. The learned counsel has placed reliance on the decisions rendered in Indra Sawhney (supra ). He has commended us to paragraphs 250 to 258, 261, 291, 804 to 812 and 842 of the said decision. Reliance has also been placed on the decisions rendered in Dr. Preeti shrivastava v. State of Madhya Pradesh. AIR 1999 SC 2894 and Than Singh v. State of madhya Pradesh, AIR 2005 MP 170 , From the decision in M. Nagraj and others v. Union of India and others (2006) 8 SCC 212 : ( AIR 2007 SC 71 ) emphasis has been laid on paragraphs 46 to 49, 102, 106 and 117. Inspiration has been drawn from the decisions in anuj Garg and another v. Hotel Association of India and others (2008) 3 SCC 1 : ( AIR 2008 SC 663 ) and DCM Financial Services limited v. J. N. Sareen and another (2008) 8 scc 1 : ( AIR 2008 SC 2255 ). ( 13 ) MR. Sanjay Agrawal learned counsel for the petitioner in W. P. No. 8942/2009, has raised the following contentions : (a) Articles 330 and 332 of the Constitution provide for reservation of seats for scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in the House of the People and the Legislative assembly of the State respectively in proportion to their population in the State and the Union Territory but there is no provision in the Constitution providing for proportionate reservation for women except the provision made under Article 243t and, therefore, the reservation as engrafted under Section 11 (3) and (4) of the Act runs counter to the constitutional philosophy. (b) The terms used "not less than one-third" in Article 243t should be understood as "not more than one-third" in the context in which the language is employed. (b) The terms used "not less than one-third" in Article 243t should be understood as "not more than one-third" in the context in which the language is employed. No discretion has been provided to the State Legislature than what has been stated in the said article and the Parliament did not want to leave anything to the discretion of the State legislature and fixed the percentage of reservation for women at one-third by using the phraseology ''not less than one-third". (c) Providing proportionate reservation for women would amount to adding another class or category in addition to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and Other Backward classes. Such reservation has no constitutional sanction and the State Legislature cannot provide 50% reservation to women in each and every category as that squarely offends the rule of equality provided under arts. 14 and 15 (1) of the Constitution. (d) The provision made by the State Legislature providing reservation is sans relevant consideration and when no data is provided, the concept of judicial review to examine the issue on the anvil of power under Art. 15 (3)of the Constitution is attracted. (e) By virtue of reservation for women in respect of seats in the Municipal council, classes have been created but there is no intelligible data to sustain such classification and, therefore, it plays foul with the concept of equality which is the corner stone of Art. 14 of the Constitution. (f) The Constitution envisages only to provide adequate representation to women as is evident from the object and reasons of Constitution (Seventy Fourth Amendment) Act, 1992 and adequate representation cannot be understood to mean to provide proportionate reservation for women. There is a vast difference between 'adequate representation and 'proportionate reservation' and by no stretch of imagination the logic of 'adequate representation' can be equated with 'proportionate reservation'! (g) The representation of one-third in the total number of seats in every Municipal corporation and Municipality which was prevalent can be said to be adequate representation. Nothing has been brought on record to show that the same was not adequate. The objects and reasons of the amendment Act also does not so spell out. The representation which has been provided for women is more than the population ratio and the benefit of reservation has been further given by the 1994 Rules. Nothing has been brought on record to show that the same was not adequate. The objects and reasons of the amendment Act also does not so spell out. The representation which has been provided for women is more than the population ratio and the benefit of reservation has been further given by the 1994 Rules. Further, by application of the rules, i. e. , sub-rule (4) of rule 3 of the Madhya Pradesh Municipalities (Reservation of Wards for Scheduled castes, Scheduled Tribes, Other Backward classes and Women) Rules, 1994, the fraction of less than half shall be ignored and fraction of equal to half or more shall be counted as one. The benefit of reservation has further been given in favour of women. (h) It is permissible in law for women to contest election from unreserved wards and, thus, in the ultimate eventuate, the total number of women representation would exceed the maximum limit of the population ratio. (i) The maximum limit of reservation which has been provided in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) is 50%'except in very extra-ordinary situation but in the case at hand, the over all reservation comes up to 75% which is totally impermissible. (j) The law relating to vertical and horizontal reservation is not possible in respect of reservation for seats in Municipal Corporation or Municipalities and. therefore, the amendment of the Rules putting forth 50% reservation is horizontal and does not save the enactment. (k) Article 15 (3) is an enabling provision and is to be exercised in the manner so that the rules of equality provided under Article 15 (1) is not destroyed but in the case at hand the direct, real and inevitable effect of the impugned legislation is the destruction of Art. 15 (1) which is an anathema to the Constitutional philosophy. (1) The doctrine of direct, real and inevitable effect has to be applied to the case at hand and on applicability of the said principle, it would be clear that the impugned legislation provides for more than 75% reservation which the law does not countenance and, thus, the said provisions are to be declared as ultra vires. (1) The doctrine of direct, real and inevitable effect has to be applied to the case at hand and on applicability of the said principle, it would be clear that the impugned legislation provides for more than 75% reservation which the law does not countenance and, thus, the said provisions are to be declared as ultra vires. To bolster the said submissions, the learned counsel has placed reliance on the decisions rendered in Indra Sawhney (supra), miss Art) Sapru v. State of J. and K. and others, AIR 1981 SC 1009 , Swati Gupta (Ms) v. State of U. P. (1995) 2 SCC 560 . Anil Kumar gupta v. State of U. P. (1995) 5 SCC 173 , M. Nagraj (supra) and Dr. Preeti Shrivastava (supra ). Rajesh Kumar Daria v. State of U. P. , AIR 2005 SC 2540 ,. pattatraya Motiram v. State of Bombay. AIR 1953 Bom 311 and menaka Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR 1978 sc 597 . ( 14 ) MR. A. P. Shroti, learned counsel for the petitioner in Writ Petition No. 9595/2009 which pertains to the assail of the provisions contained in the Municipalities Act and the rules framed thereunder, has advanced the following proponements : (i) Sections 29-A (3) and (4) as amended by the Act-No. 16/2007 in effect prescribes for 75% reservation for women in election which exceeds the 50% limit contrary to the law laid down in Indra Sawhney (supra) and infringes the equality clause contained in arts. 14 and 15 (1) of the Constitution. (ii) The ceiling limit of 50% as prescribed cannot be confined to Art. 16 (4) only but is applicable to reservation made under Art. 15 (4) and in effect to Art. 15 (3) as well. (iii) The reservation provided under Section 29-A and Art. 243 is for women category and not to ward to which such woman belongs and. therefore, the reservation is category-wise and such prescription for reservation of wards is contrary to Art. 243 of the constitution. (iv) Rules 3 (3) and 3 (5) of the 1994 Rules speak about the reservation of wards for women whereas such terminology does not occur in Section 29-A or in any other provisions of the Municipalities Act nor docs it occur in Art. 243 of the Constitution and, therefore, the said rule transgresses the scheme of the statute as well as the constitutional provision. ( 15 ) MR. R. D. Jain, learned Advocate General and Mr. Prashant Singh, learned Additional Advocate General for the State, combating the aforesaid submissions, have advanced the following proponements; (a) The principle of reservation as laid down in Indra Sawhney (supra) and in other decisions in that time is not applicable to the present factual matrix as the said decisions were rendered in the context of service matters pertaining to appointment and promotion, and in respect of admission to educational institution. (b) The averments made in the petitions do not satisfy the requirement of the pleadings which are imperative when the constitutional validity of an enactment is called in question. (c) The percentage fixed for women in respect of wards is an affirmative and protective action, a special provision, under Article 15 (3) of the Constitution and is equally distributed amongst all categories and hence, does not exceed the ceiling limit (d) An affirmative action of the State provides level playing field and it has equalizing results. (e) Article 243-T is an enabling provision for the purpose of taking affirmative measure and the science of interpretation does not give allowance to the interpretation by the learned counsel for the petitioners. (0 The aim of the Constitution is to establish and egalitarian piece of legislation to reinforce the same in its conceptual eventuality. (g) The stand that women in the State of madhya Pradesh are highly educated and adequately represented in the Municipal corporation and Municipalities is far from the reality and the Legislature in its wisdom has prescribed the present affirmation which is constitutionally permissible. (h) The purpose of the amendment, is to give greater participation to female population in the administration of local bodies and such a step being a progressive one does hot deserve to be struck down. (i) The reservation of wards for women has not been made solely on the basis of sex but other factors such as upliftment of the conditions of women and their preparation at the grassroot level of democracy are also kept in view. (i) The reservation of wards for women has not been made solely on the basis of sex but other factors such as upliftment of the conditions of women and their preparation at the grassroot level of democracy are also kept in view. ( 16 ) TO buttress the aforesaid submissions, the learned counsel for the State have commended us to various passages from Indra sawhney (supra), Toguru Sudhakar Reddy and another v. The Government of A. P. and others, AIR 1994 SC 544, M. Nagraj (supra)and placed reliance on the decisions rendered in Govt, of A. P. v. P. B. Vijay Kumar, AIR 1995 SC 1648 , Tulsiram Jatav v, Union of india and others, 2001 (4) MPLJ 132, E. V. Chivnaih v. State (2005) 1 SCC 394 : ( AIR 2005 SC 162 ), Dr. Satish v. State of M. P. AIR 2009 MP 185 and Rajesh Kumar Gupta y. State of U. P. AIR 2005 SC 2540 . ( 17 ) BEFORE we proceed to address with regard to the constitutional validity of the provisions under assail of 1956 Act and 1961 act we think it apt to refer to certain citations in the field as regards the role of Court while exercising power of judicial review in this arena. ( 18 ) IN R. S. Joshi. Sales Tax Officer, gujarat and others v. Ajit Mills Ltd, and another, (1997) 4 SCC 98, Krishna Iyer, J. , in his inimitable style, expressed thus : "2. A prefactory caveat - When examining a legislation from the angle of its vires, the Court has to be resilient, not rigid, forward - looking, not static, liberal, not verbal- in interpreting the organic law of the nation. We must also remember the constitutional proposition enunciated by the U. S: supreme Court in Munn v. Illinois viz. , "that courts do not substitute their social and economic beliefs for the judgment of legislative bodies'. Moreover, while trespasses will not be forgiven, a presumption of constitutionality must colour judicial construction. These factors, recognised by our Court, are essential to the modus vivendi between the judicial and legislative branches of the State, both working beneath the canopy of the Constitution. " ( 19 ) IN State of Andhra Pradesh and others v. Mc Dowell and Co. Moreover, while trespasses will not be forgiven, a presumption of constitutionality must colour judicial construction. These factors, recognised by our Court, are essential to the modus vivendi between the judicial and legislative branches of the State, both working beneath the canopy of the Constitution. " ( 19 ) IN State of Andhra Pradesh and others v. Mc Dowell and Co. and others, AIR 1996 SC 1627 , their Lordships of the Apex court have expressed the view as under : "a law made by the Parliament or the legislature can be struck down by Courts on two grounds and two grounds alone, viz. (1)lack of legislative competence and (2) violation of any of the fundamental rights guaranteed in Part-Ill of the Constitution or of any other constitutional provision. There is no third ground. If an enactment is challenged as violative of Article 14, it can be struck down only if it is found that it is violative of the equality clause/equal protection clause enshrined therein. Similarly, if an enactment is challenged as violative of any of the fundamental rights guaranteed by Clauses (a) to (g) of Article 19 (1), it can be struck down only if it is found not saved by any of the clauses (2) to (6) of article 19 and so on. No enactment can be struck down by just saying that it is arbitrary or unreasonable. Some or other constitutional infirmity has to be found before invalidating an Act. An enactment cannot be struck down on the ground that Court thinks it unjustified. The Parliament and the Legislatures, composed as they are of the representatives of the people, are supposed to know and be aware of the needs of the people and what is good and bad for them. The Court cannot sit in judgment over their wisdom. An enactment cannot be struck down by applying, the principle of proportionality when its. applicability even in administrative law sphere is not fully and finally settled. It is one thing to say that a restriction imposed upon a fundamental right can be struck down if it is disproportionate, excessive or unreasonable and quite another thing to say that the Court can strike down enactment if it thinks it unreasonable, unnecessary or unwarranted. The two rules stated above for striking down of enactments are however confined to an Act made by the Legislature. The two rules stated above for striking down of enactments are however confined to an Act made by the Legislature. " ( 20 ) IT is settled law that the allegations regarding the violation of constitutional provision should be specific, clear and unambiguous and the burden is on the person who impeaches the law as violative of the constitutional guarantee to give relevant particulars and show that the particular provision is infirm for all or any of the reasons stated by him. In Gauri Shankar v. Union of India, (1994) 6 SCC 349 : (1994 AIR SCW 4059): ( AIR 1995 SC 55 ), it has beep reiterated as under- " (b) that there is always a presumption in favour of the constitutionality of an enactment and the burden is upon him who attacks it to show that there has been a clear transgression of the constitutional principles; (c) that it must be presumed that the Legislature understands and correctly appreciates the need of its own people, that its laws are directed to problems made manifest by experience and that its discriminations are based on adequate grounds;. . xxxxxx xxxxxx (e) that in order to sustain the presumption of constitutionality the Court may take into consideration matter's of common knowledge, matters of common report, the history of the times and may assume every state of facts which can be conceived existing at the time of legislation. " ( 21 ) IN State of W. B. and another v. EITA india Ltd. , (2003) 5 SCC 239 : ( AIR 2003 sc 4126 ) it has been expressed thus : "4. In examining the constitutional validity of the impugned provisions of a statute, it will be useful to bear in mind the following well-settled propositions. If a legislation is found to lack in legislative competence or is found to be in contravention of any provision of Part III or any other provision of the constitution, the impugned legislation cannot escape the vice of unconstitutionality.- -. . . . . . . . . " ' ( 22 ) AS an issue has been raised with regard to the real, direct and inevitable impact of the law and the duty of the Court, we may refer with profit to the decision rendered in menaka Gandhi (supra) wherein it has been held as under: "67. . . . . . . . . . . " ' ( 22 ) AS an issue has been raised with regard to the real, direct and inevitable impact of the law and the duty of the Court, we may refer with profit to the decision rendered in menaka Gandhi (supra) wherein it has been held as under: "67. . . . . . Here we find the germ of the doctrine of direct and inevitable effect, which necessarily must be effect intended by the legislature, or in other words, what may conveniently and appropriately be described as the doctrine of intended and real effect. So also in Sakal Paper (P) Ltd. v. The Union of India (1962) 3 SCR 842 : ( AIR 1962 SC 305 ) while considering the constitutional validity of the Newspaper (Price and Page)Act, 1956 and Daily Newspaper (Price and page) Order, 1960 this Court applied the test of direct and immediate effect. This Court, relying upon the decision in Dwarkadas shrinivas v. The Sholapur and Weaving Co. Ltd. 1954 SCR. 674 : ( AIR 1954 SC 119 )pointed out that "it is the substance and the practical result of the act of the State that should be considered rather than its purely legal aspect" and "the correct approach in such cases should be to enquire as to what in substance is the loss or injury caused to the citizen and not merely what manner and method has been adopted by the State in placing the restrictions". Since "the direct and immediate effect of the order" would be to restrain a newspaper from publishing any number of pages for carrying its news and views, which it has a fundamental right under Article 19 (1) (a) to do, unless it raises the selling price as provided in the Schedule to the Order, it was held by this Court that the order was violative of the right of the newspapers guaranteed by Article 19 (1) (a ). Here again the emphasis was on the direct and inevitable effect of the impugned action of the State rather than on its object and form or subject-matter. '' ( 23 ) IN Daya Ram and another v. State of m. P. and others, 2003 (4) MPHT 435 it has been stated thus :- "3. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . '' ( 23 ) IN Daya Ram and another v. State of m. P. and others, 2003 (4) MPHT 435 it has been stated thus :- "3. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The modus vivendi which requires a purposive and constructive ratiocination while engaged in viceration of the provision also warrants that a policy decision, a facet of the Legislature or at times a spectrum of the executive though may draw strength and stimulus in all its variation from the greatest instrument, i. e. , the Constitution in a given case and in a particular fact situation if the provisions trespass the quintessential characteristic of Organic Law or Judge made law should not be allowed to stand. " ( 24 ) KEEPING in view the aforesaid guidance, we shall presently dwell upon the controversy that has emerged. The Parliament, with the intention to organise the local bodies, inserted specific provisions in the Constitution and, ultimately, it culminated in the passing of the Constitution (Seventy-four amendment) Act, 1992. Thus, in essentiality, the local governance has been ascribed a role under the Constitution. In this context, it is apt to refer to the Statement of Objects and Reasons behind the Amendment Act. "in many States local bodies have become weak and ineffective on account of a variety of reasons, including the failure to hold regular elections, prolonged supersessions and inadequate devolution of powers and functions. As a result. Urban Local Bodies are not able to perform effectively as vibrant democratic units of self-government. 2. Having regard to these inadequacies, it is considered necessary that provisions relating to Urban Local Bodies are incorporated in the Constitution particularly for- (i) putting on a firmer footing the relationship between the State Government and the urban Local Bodies, with respect to - (a) the functions and taxation powers; and (b) arrangements for revenue sharing; (ii) Ensuring regular conduct of elections; (iii) ensuring timely elections in the case of supersession; and (iv) providing adequate representation for the weaker sections like Scheduled Castes, scheduled Tribes and women. 3. 3. Accordingly, it is proposed to add a new part relating to the Urban Local Bodies in the Constitution to provide for-xxxx xxxx xxxx (e) reservation of seats in every Municipality- (i) for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled tribes in proportion to their population of which not less than one-third shall be for less than one third of the total number of seats; (ii) for women which shall not be less than one third of the total number of seats; (iii) in favour of backward class of citizens if so provided by the Legislature of the state; (iv) for Scheduled Castes, Scheduled tribes and women in the office of Chairpersons as may be specified in the State law;" ( 25 ) ARTICLE 243t which is a consequence of the amendment is as follows : 243t. Reservation of seats. (1) Seats shall be reserved for the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes in every Municipality and the number of seats so reserved shall bear, as nearly as may be, the same proportion to the total number of seats to be filled by direct election in that Municipality as the. population of the Scheduled castes in the Municipal area or of the Scheduled Tribes in the Municipal area bears to the total population of that area and such seats may be allotted by rotation to different constituencies in a Municipality. (2) Not less than one-third of the total number of seats reserved under clause (1)shall be reserved for women belonging to the scheduled Castes or, as the case may be, the scheduled Tribes. (3) Not less than one-third (including the number of seats reserved for women belonging to the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes) of the total number of seats to be filled by direct election in every Municipality shall be reserved for women and such seats may be allotted by rotation to different constituencies in a Municipality. (4) The offices of Chairpersons in the municipalities shall be reserved for the scheduled Castes, the Scheduled Tribes and women in such manner as the Legislature of a Slate may. by law. provide. (5) The reservation of seats under clauses (1) and (2) and the reservation of offices of chairpersons (other than the reservation for women) under clause (4) shall cease to have effect on the expiration of the period specified in Article 334. by law. provide. (5) The reservation of seats under clauses (1) and (2) and the reservation of offices of chairpersons (other than the reservation for women) under clause (4) shall cease to have effect on the expiration of the period specified in Article 334. (6) Nothing in this Part shall prevent the legislature of a State from making any provision for reservation of seats in any Municipality or offices of Chairpersons in the Municipalities in favour of ward class of citizens," ( 26 ) IN pursuance of the same, the Slate legislature amended the Municipal Corporation Act, 1956 and the Municipalities Act, 1961. Initially, there was prescription that as nearly as possible 1/3rd seats shall be reserved for women. Thereafter, it has been enhanced to 50% by the impugned legislation. Presently, Section 11 of the 1956 Act reads as follows : "11. Reservation of seats. (1) Out of the total number of wards determined under subsection (1) of Section 10, such number of seats shall be reserved for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in every Municipal corporation as bears, as nearly as may be, the same proportion to the total number of seats to be filled by direct election in the municipal Corporation as the population of the Scheduled Castes or of the Scheduled tribes in the Municipal' area bears to the total population of that area and such wards shall be those in which the population of the scheduled Castes or the Scheduled Tribes, as the case may be, is most concentrated. (2) As nearly as possible twenty five per cent of the total number of wards shall be reserved for other backward classes in such municipal Corporations, where fifty per cent or less seats are reserved for Scheduled castes and Scheduled Tribes, and such seats shall be allotted by rotation to different wards in such manner as may be prescribed: provided that if from any ward so reserved no nomination paper is filed for election, as a councillor, by any member of the backward classes, then the Collector shall be competent to declare it as unreserved. (3) As nearly as possible fifty per cent of the total number of seats reserved under subsections (1) and (2) shall be reserved for women belonging to the Scheduled Castes or the Scheduled Tribes or other backward classes, as the case may be. (3) As nearly as possible fifty per cent of the total number of seats reserved under subsections (1) and (2) shall be reserved for women belonging to the Scheduled Castes or the Scheduled Tribes or other backward classes, as the case may be. (4) As nearly as possible fifty percent (including the number of seats reserved for women belonging to the Scheduled Castes, scheduled Tribes and other backward classes), of the total number of seats to be filled by direct election in every Municipal corporation shall be reserved for women and such seats shall be allotted by rotation to different wards in a Municipal Corporation in such manner as may be prescribed, (5) The reservation of seats under sub-sections (1), (2) and (3) shall cease to have effect on the expiration of the period specified in Article 334 of the Constitution of India. Explanation. In this section 'other backward classes' means category of persons belonging to backward classes as notified by the State Government. " JUDGMENT DIPAK MISRA, J. ( 1 ) IN this batch of writ petition, the centroidal issue that has been sought to be assiduously pyramided with immense gloss is that the amendments brought into force in the M. P. Municipal Corporation Act, 1956 (in short 'the 1956 Act')and the M. P. Municipalities Act, 1961 by the M. P. Nagar Palika Vidhi (Sanshodhan)Adhiniyam, 2007 as a consequence of which the reservation in favour of women has increased from 33% to 50%. in Municipal Corporations and Municipalities in the State of m. P. is unsustainable being violative of Arts. 14 and 15 ( 1) of the Constitution and as a sequitur thereof, Rule 3 of the Madhya Pradesh municipalities (Reservation of Wards for scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, Other backward Classes and Women) Rules, 1994 (for brevity 'the 1994 Rules') as amended vide notification dated 3-9-2007 is also unconstitutional. The aforesaid structure of the edifice has led to the prayer declaring the statutory provisions as ultra vires and quashment of the consequent notifications and orders. In spite of various range of asseverations of facts in the writ petitions, the learned counsel for the petitioners restricted the relief to the constitutional validity of the provisions pertaining to reservation for women and, therefore, the factual matrix as regards the said spectrum shall only be expo sited. In spite of various range of asseverations of facts in the writ petitions, the learned counsel for the petitioners restricted the relief to the constitutional validity of the provisions pertaining to reservation for women and, therefore, the factual matrix as regards the said spectrum shall only be expo sited. For the sake of clarity and convenience, the facts in W. P. No. 8122/2009 are uncurtained and unfurled herein. ( 2 ) IN the petition, the contents of Section 11 of the 1956 Act have been narrated and special reference has been made to sub-sections (3) and (4) indicating that prior to the amendment Act No. 16 of 2007, the said subsections provided reservation of one-third of total number of seats for women belonging to each category. It is set forth that Section 11 provides compartmentalised reservation for Scheduled Castes. Scheduled Tribes, other Backward Classes and Women. The reservation made in favour of the women candidates is vertical inasmuch as the same is dependent on the final number of elected candidates in the election. In order to make special provisions for women, the Legislature had earlier provided reservation of one-third seats for candidates belonging to women category which was sufficient and adequate. Apart from the seats reserved for women, women also contest election from unreserved seats and succeed. There are instances where in the elections of local bodies, women candidates conteste d in unreserved seats and got elected against male candidates which goes a long way to show that reservation made prior to the amendment ensured proper and adequate representation of women in the municipal corporation. It is pleaded that in spite of the aforesaid, in subsections (3) and (4), in place of the words "not less than 1/3rd", the words ''as nearly as possible 50%" have been substituted. In view of the amendments carried out by the notification dated 3-9-2007, the Rules have been amended. ( 3 ) IT is contended that the amendment in sub-section 11 (3) and (4) and the corresponding amendment carried out in the rules creates a discrimination on the ground of sex which is impermissible under Arts. 14 and 15 (1) of the Constitution of India. Though art. 15 (3), empowers the State to make special provisions for women, yet the said provision cannot be stretched to such an extent that it discriminates other classes in an arbitrary manner. 14 and 15 (1) of the Constitution of India. Though art. 15 (3), empowers the State to make special provisions for women, yet the said provision cannot be stretched to such an extent that it discriminates other classes in an arbitrary manner. It is put forth that the increase of reservation from one-third to 50% operates as discrimination as such a reservation is vertical and when counted along with the reservation meant for other classes, the total percentage of reservation would come to 75% which is contrary to the law laid down in indra Sawhney and others v. Union of India and others, 1992 Supp (3) SCC 212. It is urged that the success of women candidates in elections reflects in a crystallized manner that the women candidates do not suffer any disparity which requires the further crutches of reservation. The increase of reservation from 1/3rd to half is not founded on any scientific or systematic study and there is no material to show that women need reservation to that extent for ensuring adequate representation in local self government. Such a reservation, it is contended, is irrational, arbitrary and smacks of total discrimination violating the basic facet of Article 14 of the constitution. ( 4 ) IT is averred that the concept of reservation is only to make provisions for upliftment of those classes who suffered disadvantage over centuries. Reference has been made to Art. 334 of the Constitution which mandates reservation to continue only till such categories or classes attain the status of equality with other citizens. It is put forth that though there has been prescription of period for reservations for other classes, yet no period has been provided for reservation for women and, therefore, such a reservation would continue in perpetuity. It is set forth that women in India have already achieved the status of equality and. consequently, there is no necessity for further reservation. The reservation is exclusively based on sex which is prohibited under Arts. 14 and 15 (1) of the constitution of India but the State Legist ture has provided such a reservation in absolute transgression of the said constitutional mandate. It is urged that the impugned amendment has no nexus with the object sought to be achieved and also does not get any support from Art. 334 of the Constitution and, therefore, the said provision deserves to be declared as unconstitutional. It is urged that the impugned amendment has no nexus with the object sought to be achieved and also does not get any support from Art. 334 of the Constitution and, therefore, the said provision deserves to be declared as unconstitutional. ( 5 ) A counter-affidavit has been filed by the respondents contending, inter alia, that article 243t (2) of the Constitution provides for reservation for women candidates which should not be less than one-third of the total number of seats. The maximum number relating to reservation fixed as 50% as has been laid down in Indra Sawhney (supra) is not applicable to election matters as has been held by this Court in Tulsiram Jatav v. Union of India and others, 2001 (4) MPLJ 132. It is pleaded that the process of election has already commenced and the preparation of the electoral roll is being done as per the order dated 7-7-2009 and the final publication of the electoral rolls would be done by 11-11-2009. It is put forth that as per Article 243zg of the Constitution, there is bar to interfere in the electoral matters. It is the stand in the return that the plea of excessive reservation and that it is beyond the permissible limit of 50% is unsustainable inasmuch as the provisions, if appositely read, would show that the reservation is up to the extent of 50% and not beyond the said percentage. It is urged that under Art. 243t of the Constitution, there is a mandate for reserving seats for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in every municipality in the proportion to the total number of seats and the total population. As per sub-clause (2) of Article 243t, there is clear warrant to reserve not less than one-third seats for women belonging to the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. It is also set forth that the reservation for women can be more than 1/3rd of the total seats and the same would be well within the permissible limit of 50%. The State Legislature, keeping in view the above aspects, has amended subsections (3) and (4) of Section II of the 1956 act which provide as nearly as possible 50% reservation of the total number of seats. The intention of the Legislature is to provide reservation up to 50% but there is remotely no intention to create any contingencies for providing reservation beyond 50%. The intention of the Legislature is to provide reservation up to 50% but there is remotely no intention to create any contingencies for providing reservation beyond 50%. The Rules are in consonance with the Act and in accord with the Constitution and cannot be found to be playing foul with any constitutional provision. It is contended that under art. 15 (3), the State is empowered to make special provisions for women and children and hence, the action taken by the State Legislature is well within the constitutional frame. The methodology adopted by the respondents is quite clear and there is an errneous assumption by the petitioners that the reservation is vertical. The respondents have prescribed reservation for each category separately, and thereafter, equal horizontal reservation is provided for women. As regards the unreserved seats, the same methodology has been adopted so as to ensure total reservation as nearly as possible 50% for women candidates and further unreserved seats are open for all categories of women candidates, i. e. . Scheduled Castes, Scheduled tribes and Other Backward Classes. Thus, the methodology adopted by the answering respondents clearly reveals that horizontal reservation has been provided for women candidates. A comparative chart has been produced pertaining to the Bhopal Municipal Corporation in respect of the year 2004 and the year 2009 to highlight that the reservation granted to women is well within the permissible limit of 50%. The allegation that there is reservation of 75% is absolutely misconceived and the same has been put forth in a fallacious manner, ( 6 ) IT is asseverated in the return that there are 14 municipal corporations and 96 municipalities in the State of M. P. In addition to that, there are 248 Nagar Panchayats (transitional areas) spread in 50 districts of the state of M. P. The petitioners have not submitted in the writ petitions that the process of reservation in respect of almost 50 districts has been completed. It is submitted that in respect of 43 districts, notification has already been published as contemplated under rule 7 of the 1994 Rules. In essence, the stand is that the election process has commenced to a concrete extent and the petitioners have challenged the validity at a belated stage. It is submitted that in respect of 43 districts, notification has already been published as contemplated under rule 7 of the 1994 Rules. In essence, the stand is that the election process has commenced to a concrete extent and the petitioners have challenged the validity at a belated stage. It is put forth that the State Legislature has provided horizontal reservation for the women within the permissible limit and hence, no fault can be found with it. It is worth noting that a stand has been taken in some of the writ petitions that reservation of 50% seats for women would result in total lack of control over the officers and administration of the corporations and municipalities. The said stand has been strongly refuted in the return. An explanation has been preferred how the reservation does not exceed 50% in entirely. It is contended that the provisions neither play foul with Articles 14 and 15 (1) of the Constitution of India nor do they run counter to any decision rendered by the apex Court. ( 7 ) A rejoinder affidavit has been filed to the return filed by the respondents No. ] and 3 contending, inter alia, that the reliance placed by the respondents on Article 243t of the Constitution of India as a source of power is absolutely untenable as the constitutional benchmark prescribed for reservation of seats for women is only 1/3 rd and, therefore, the State Legislature even though has the power to make provision for reservation of seats for women candidates in excess of the constitutional benchmark of 1/3rd, yet such provision has to be based on sound and cogent reasons. It is putforth that respondents have not given any justification for providing reservation for women in excess of 1/3rd. No scientific or systematic study was conducted before enhancing the percentage for women from 1/3rd to 50%. No material has been brought on record to demonstrate that women in the State of M. P. need reservation in excess of the prescribed constitutional benchmark of 1/3rd. The Constitution does not contemplate proportionate reservation for women and. therefore, there has to be a scientific base for providing 50% reservation for women. No material has been brought on record to demonstrate that women in the State of M. P. need reservation in excess of the prescribed constitutional benchmark of 1/3rd. The Constitution does not contemplate proportionate reservation for women and. therefore, there has to be a scientific base for providing 50% reservation for women. A classification has been made but in the absence of any cogent and germane reasons, solely on the base of sex, such classification is impermissible as that ex facie invites the frown of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. In the past election, women have got adequate representation in the local bodies and large number of women candidates were elected from unreserved wards and hence, there is no warrant or justification for providing further reservation. The reservation of 50% for women is in excess of their promotion to the total population in the State if the sex ratio of the 2001 census is taken note of. The sex ratio in the State of Madhya Pradesh was 919 females against 1000 males. The total percentage of women population in the State of M. P. is slightly over 45%. Thus, the reservation is in excess of the percentage of population. The women residing within the Municipal Corporation area are highly educated and they are well aware of their rights and, consequently, they need no protection in the form of reservation. In the city of Bhopal, as per the 2001 census, there were 898 women against 1000 men. Likewise, in Gwalior the ratio is 848, in Indore 912 and in Jabalpur, it is 908. Hence, the concept of proportionality has been thrown to the winds while determining the factum of reservation. The women candidates being educated can contest the election of ward members on the basis of their own merit. It is urged that during the pendency of the writ petition, the rule has been amended stipulating, inter alia, that reservation for women is horizontal and not vertical which means that the respondents are not at all aware about the concept of horizontal reservation. In horizontal reservation, the provision for reservation contemplates adjustment of seats/posts for reserved category candidates as against such candidates selected/elected on the basis of their own merit. The Municipal Corporation Act does not contain any such provision for the adjustment of seats. The total number of women candidates would exceed 50%. In horizontal reservation, the provision for reservation contemplates adjustment of seats/posts for reserved category candidates as against such candidates selected/elected on the basis of their own merit. The Municipal Corporation Act does not contain any such provision for the adjustment of seats. The total number of women candidates would exceed 50%. as women from any category can also be elected from any unreserved ward. Thus, the impugned provision, in fact, seeks to provide vertical reservation for women, which, when added with the reservation provided for the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Other backward Classes candidates, would amount to 75%. ( 8 ) BE it noted, on 25th September, 2009, in rule 5. sub-rule (6) was inserted in the madhya Pradesh Municipalities (Reservation of Office of Mayor and President) Rules, 1999. The said amendment reads as follows : " (6) In the context of Section 11-A of the madhya Pradesh Municipal Corporations act, 1956 (No. 23 of 1956) and Section 29-B of the Madhya Pradesh Municipalities act, 1961 (No. 37 of 1961), it is further clarified that the provisions of fifty per cent reservation for women shall be done horizontally in all categories, so that the overall reservation shall not exceed fifty per cent. " ( 9 ) IN Rule 3, after sub-rule (6) of the madhya Pradesh Municipalities (Reservation of Wards for Scheduled Castes, Scheduled tribes, Other Backward Classes and Women)Rules, 1994, the following sub-rule was added : " (7) In the context of Section 11 of the madhya Pradesh Municipal Corporation Act, 1956 (No. 25 of 1956) and Section 29-A of the Madhya Pradesh Municipalities Act, 1961 (No. 37 of 1961), it is further clarified that the provision of fifty per cent reservation for women shall be done horizontally in all categories, so that the overall reservation shall not exceed fifty per cent. " ( 10 ) AT this juncture, it is apposite to note that on behalf of the respondents-State, an affidavit has been filed in the course of hearing. We think it apt to produce paragraphs 1 to 3 of the affidavit. They read as follows : " 1. That, on the basis of information collected from various local bodies accompanying chart relating to the results of 60 local bodies in which besides the reserved seats only 1. 53% of women could win the election in the last elections of Local Bodies held in the year 2004. They read as follows : " 1. That, on the basis of information collected from various local bodies accompanying chart relating to the results of 60 local bodies in which besides the reserved seats only 1. 53% of women could win the election in the last elections of Local Bodies held in the year 2004. It would be proper to state that extraordinary Gazette Notification on 20 december, 2004 was issued in respect of candidates who won the said elections of local bodies. Copy of chart is enclosed herewith as Annexure-A. 2. That, in the last election of Parliament there were 29 seats out of which only 6 won the election and percentage of women category mla who could win the election was 20. 69%. Copy of the list of Members of Parliament, who won the election is Annexure-B. 3. That, in the last election, out of 230 members of Legislative Assembly only 25 women could win the election. Copy of the total candidates who won the election is filed as Annexure-C in which 25 women members were elected which comes to 10. 87%. " The said affidavit has been filed to emphasise how the participation of women in the governance of the body polity is really marginal and is of no signification. ( 11 ) WE have heard Mr. Sanjay Agrawal, mr. Sanjay K. Agrawal, Mr. Pankaj Dixit and mr. A. P. Shroti, learned counsel for the petitioners; Mr. R. D. Jain, learned Advocate general and Mr. Prashant Singh, learned additional Advocate General for the respondents; State; and Mr. A. K. Mishra, learned senior Counsel along with Mrs. Divyakeerti bohre, learned counsel for the respondent/municipal Corporation. ( 12 ) MR. Sanjay K. Agrawal, learned counsel for the petitioners; has raised the following submissions : (a) The impugned amendment by increasing the reservation for women from 1/3rd to 50% ex-facie violates the equality clause enshrined under Art. 14 of the Constitution and seeks to discriminate on the ground of sex which is violative of Art. 15 (1) of the constitution of India. (b) Prior to coming into force of the amended provision, 1/3rd of the seats were already reserved for women and thus, adequate representation was already provided to women in the local self government and there was absolutely no justification or warrant for increasing the percentage of reservation to 50% and further there is no nexus with the object sought to be achieved. (c) The increase of percentage for women would result in reverse discrimination against the rest of the citizens: (d) No systematic and scientific study has been undertaken before increasing the percentage of reservation for women and no identifiable, quantitative and qualitative data has been placed on record to demonstrate that the reservation of 50% wards for women is necessitous in the public interest or in the interest of the society at large. (e) The total percentage of women in the state of M. P. is about 47. 9% and, therefore, the reservation of 50% wards for women is disproportionate to their population in the state. That apart, women have been contesting in elections at various levels and they do not need the cratches of reservation. (f) The presence of majority of women councillors in the Corporation would weaken the unit of local self governance and would only strengthen the bureaucracy which would be counter to the constitutional mandate incorporated in Chapter IX-A. Quite apart from the above, the duties and functions of the councillors are extremely onerous which cannot be effectively discharged by women and thereby it would retard the development at the level of local self government. (g) The legislature has not kept in view the effect and impact of such increase on the society and while scrutinising the constitutional validity of the law, it is the duty of the court to see the direct and inevitable impact of the same, regard being had to the realistic background. (h) The legislation is contrary to the decision rendered by the Apex Court in Indra sawhney (supra) and other decisions and is, therefore, liable to be struck down as ultra vires. The learned counsel has placed reliance on the decisions rendered in Indra Sawhney (supra ). He has commended us to paragraphs 250 to 258, 261, 291, 804 to 812 and 842 of the said decision. Reliance has also been placed on the decisions rendered in Dr. Preeti shrivastava v. State of Madhya Pradesh. The learned counsel has placed reliance on the decisions rendered in Indra Sawhney (supra ). He has commended us to paragraphs 250 to 258, 261, 291, 804 to 812 and 842 of the said decision. Reliance has also been placed on the decisions rendered in Dr. Preeti shrivastava v. State of Madhya Pradesh. AIR 1999 SC 2894 and Than Singh v. State of madhya Pradesh, AIR 2005 MP 170 , From the decision in M. Nagraj and others v. Union of India and others (2006) 8 SCC 212 : ( AIR 2007 SC 71 ) emphasis has been laid on paragraphs 46 to 49, 102, 106 and 117. Inspiration has been drawn from the decisions in anuj Garg and another v. Hotel Association of India and others (2008) 3 SCC 1 : ( AIR 2008 SC 663 ) and DCM Financial Services limited v. J. N. Sareen and another (2008) 8 scc 1 : ( AIR 2008 SC 2255 ). ( 13 ) MR. Sanjay Agrawal learned counsel for the petitioner in W. P. No. 8942/2009, has raised the following contentions : (a) Articles 330 and 332 of the Constitution provide for reservation of seats for scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in the House of the People and the Legislative assembly of the State respectively in proportion to their population in the State and the Union Territory but there is no provision in the Constitution providing for proportionate reservation for women except the provision made under Article 243t and, therefore, the reservation as engrafted under Section 11 (3) and (4) of the Act runs counter to the constitutional philosophy. (b) The terms used "not less than one-third" in Article 243t should be understood as "not more than one-third" in the context in which the language is employed. No discretion has been provided to the State Legislature than what has been stated in the said article and the Parliament did not want to leave anything to the discretion of the State legislature and fixed the percentage of reservation for women at one-third by using the phraseology ''not less than one-third". (c) Providing proportionate reservation for women would amount to adding another class or category in addition to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and Other Backward classes. (c) Providing proportionate reservation for women would amount to adding another class or category in addition to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and Other Backward classes. Such reservation has no constitutional sanction and the State Legislature cannot provide 50% reservation to women in each and every category as that squarely offends the rule of equality provided under arts. 14 and 15 (1) of the Constitution. (d) The provision made by the State Legislature providing reservation is sans relevant consideration and when no data is provided, the concept of judicial review to examine the issue on the anvil of power under Art. 15 (3)of the Constitution is attracted. (e) By virtue of reservation for women in respect of seats in the Municipal council, classes have been created but there is no intelligible data to sustain such classification and, therefore, it plays foul with the concept of equality which is the corner stone of Art. 14 of the Constitution. (f) The Constitution envisages only to provide adequate representation to women as is evident from the object and reasons of Constitution (Seventy Fourth Amendment) Act, 1992 and adequate representation cannot be understood to mean to provide proportionate reservation for women. There is a vast difference between 'adequate representation and 'proportionate reservation' and by no stretch of imagination the logic of 'adequate representation' can be equated with 'proportionate reservation'! (g) The representation of one-third in the total number of seats in every Municipal corporation and Municipality which was prevalent can be said to be adequate representation. Nothing has been brought on record to show that the same was not adequate. The objects and reasons of the amendment Act also does not so spell out. The representation which has been provided for women is more than the population ratio and the benefit of reservation has been further given by the 1994 Rules. Further, by application of the rules, i. e. , sub-rule (4) of rule 3 of the Madhya Pradesh Municipalities (Reservation of Wards for Scheduled castes, Scheduled Tribes, Other Backward classes and Women) Rules, 1994, the fraction of less than half shall be ignored and fraction of equal to half or more shall be counted as one. The benefit of reservation has further been given in favour of women. The benefit of reservation has further been given in favour of women. (h) It is permissible in law for women to contest election from unreserved wards and, thus, in the ultimate eventuate, the total number of women representation would exceed the maximum limit of the population ratio. (i) The maximum limit of reservation which has been provided in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) is 50%'except in very extra-ordinary situation but in the case at hand, the over all reservation comes up to 75% which is totally impermissible. (j) The law relating to vertical and horizontal reservation is not possible in respect of reservation for seats in Municipal Corporation or Municipalities and. therefore, the amendment of the Rules putting forth 50% reservation is horizontal and does not save the enactment. (k) Article 15 (3) is an enabling provision and is to be exercised in the manner so that the rules of equality provided under Article 15 (1) is not destroyed but in the case at hand the direct, real and inevitable effect of the impugned legislation is the destruction of Art. 15 (1) which is an anathema to the Constitutional philosophy. (1) The doctrine of direct, real and inevitable effect has to be applied to the case at hand and on applicability of the said principle, it would be clear that the impugned legislation provides for more than 75% reservation which the law does not countenance and, thus, the said provisions are to be declared as ultra vires. To bolster the said submissions, the learned counsel has placed reliance on the decisions rendered in Indra Sawhney (supra), miss Art) Sapru v. State of J. and K. and others, AIR 1981 SC 1009 , Swati Gupta (Ms) v. State of U. P. (1995) 2 SCC 560 . Anil Kumar gupta v. State of U. P. (1995) 5 SCC 173 , M. Nagraj (supra) and Dr. Preeti Shrivastava (supra ). Rajesh Kumar Daria v. State of U. P. , AIR 2005 SC 2540 ,. pattatraya Motiram v. State of Bombay. AIR 1953 Bom 311 and menaka Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR 1978 sc 597 . ( 14 ) MR. Preeti Shrivastava (supra ). Rajesh Kumar Daria v. State of U. P. , AIR 2005 SC 2540 ,. pattatraya Motiram v. State of Bombay. AIR 1953 Bom 311 and menaka Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR 1978 sc 597 . ( 14 ) MR. A. P. Shroti, learned counsel for the petitioner in Writ Petition No. 9595/2009 which pertains to the assail of the provisions contained in the Municipalities Act and the rules framed thereunder, has advanced the following proponements : (i) Sections 29-A (3) and (4) as amended by the Act-No. 16/2007 in effect prescribes for 75% reservation for women in election which exceeds the 50% limit contrary to the law laid down in Indra Sawhney (supra) and infringes the equality clause contained in arts. 14 and 15 (1) of the Constitution. (ii) The ceiling limit of 50% as prescribed cannot be confined to Art. 16 (4) only but is applicable to reservation made under Art. 15 (4) and in effect to Art. 15 (3) as well. (iii) The reservation provided under Section 29-A and Art. 243 is for women category and not to ward to which such woman belongs and. therefore, the reservation is category-wise and such prescription for reservation of wards is contrary to Art. 243 of the constitution. (iv) Rules 3 (3) and 3 (5) of the 1994 Rules speak about the reservation of wards for women whereas such terminology does not occur in Section 29-A or in any other provisions of the Municipalities Act nor docs it occur in Art. 243 of the Constitution and, therefore, the said rule transgresses the scheme of the statute as well as the constitutional provision. ( 15 ) MR. R. D. Jain, learned Advocate General and Mr. Prashant Singh, learned Additional Advocate General for the State, combating the aforesaid submissions, have advanced the following proponements; (a) The principle of reservation as laid down in Indra Sawhney (supra) and in other decisions in that time is not applicable to the present factual matrix as the said decisions were rendered in the context of service matters pertaining to appointment and promotion, and in respect of admission to educational institution. (b) The averments made in the petitions do not satisfy the requirement of the pleadings which are imperative when the constitutional validity of an enactment is called in question. (b) The averments made in the petitions do not satisfy the requirement of the pleadings which are imperative when the constitutional validity of an enactment is called in question. (c) The percentage fixed for women in respect of wards is an affirmative and protective action, a special provision, under Article 15 (3) of the Constitution and is equally distributed amongst all categories and hence, does not exceed the ceiling limit (d) An affirmative action of the State provides level playing field and it has equalizing results. (e) Article 243-T is an enabling provision for the purpose of taking affirmative measure and the science of interpretation does not give allowance to the interpretation by the learned counsel for the petitioners. (0 The aim of the Constitution is to establish and egalitarian piece of legislation to reinforce the same in its conceptual eventuality. (g) The stand that women in the State of madhya Pradesh are highly educated and adequately represented in the Municipal corporation and Municipalities is far from the reality and the Legislature in its wisdom has prescribed the present affirmation which is constitutionally permissible. (h) The purpose of the amendment, is to give greater participation to female population in the administration of local bodies and such a step being a progressive one does hot deserve to be struck down. (i) The reservation of wards for women has not been made solely on the basis of sex but other factors such as upliftment of the conditions of women and their preparation at the grassroot level of democracy are also kept in view. ( 16 ) TO buttress the aforesaid submissions, the learned counsel for the State have commended us to various passages from Indra sawhney (supra), Toguru Sudhakar Reddy and another v. The Government of A. P. and others, AIR 1994 SC 544, M. Nagraj (supra)and placed reliance on the decisions rendered in Govt, of A. P. v. P. B. Vijay Kumar, AIR 1995 SC 1648 , Tulsiram Jatav v, Union of india and others, 2001 (4) MPLJ 132, E. V. Chivnaih v. State (2005) 1 SCC 394 : ( AIR 2005 SC 162 ), Dr. Satish v. State of M. P. AIR 2009 MP 185 and Rajesh Kumar Gupta y. State of U. P. AIR 2005 SC 2540 . Satish v. State of M. P. AIR 2009 MP 185 and Rajesh Kumar Gupta y. State of U. P. AIR 2005 SC 2540 . ( 17 ) BEFORE we proceed to address with regard to the constitutional validity of the provisions under assail of 1956 Act and 1961 act we think it apt to refer to certain citations in the field as regards the role of Court while exercising power of judicial review in this arena. ( 18 ) IN R. S. Joshi. Sales Tax Officer, gujarat and others v. Ajit Mills Ltd, and another, (1997) 4 SCC 98, Krishna Iyer, J. , in his inimitable style, expressed thus : "2. A prefactory caveat - When examining a legislation from the angle of its vires, the Court has to be resilient, not rigid, forward - looking, not static, liberal, not verbal- in interpreting the organic law of the nation. We must also remember the constitutional proposition enunciated by the U. S: supreme Court in Munn v. Illinois viz. , "that courts do not substitute their social and economic beliefs for the judgment of legislative bodies'. Moreover, while trespasses will not be forgiven, a presumption of constitutionality must colour judicial construction. These factors, recognised by our Court, are essential to the modus vivendi between the judicial and legislative branches of the State, both working beneath the canopy of the Constitution. " ( 19 ) IN State of Andhra Pradesh and others v. Mc Dowell and Co. and others, AIR 1996 SC 1627 , their Lordships of the Apex court have expressed the view as under : "a law made by the Parliament or the legislature can be struck down by Courts on two grounds and two grounds alone, viz. (1)lack of legislative competence and (2) violation of any of the fundamental rights guaranteed in Part-Ill of the Constitution or of any other constitutional provision. There is no third ground. If an enactment is challenged as violative of Article 14, it can be struck down only if it is found that it is violative of the equality clause/equal protection clause enshrined therein. Similarly, if an enactment is challenged as violative of any of the fundamental rights guaranteed by Clauses (a) to (g) of Article 19 (1), it can be struck down only if it is found not saved by any of the clauses (2) to (6) of article 19 and so on. Similarly, if an enactment is challenged as violative of any of the fundamental rights guaranteed by Clauses (a) to (g) of Article 19 (1), it can be struck down only if it is found not saved by any of the clauses (2) to (6) of article 19 and so on. No enactment can be struck down by just saying that it is arbitrary or unreasonable. Some or other constitutional infirmity has to be found before invalidating an Act. An enactment cannot be struck down on the ground that Court thinks it unjustified. The Parliament and the Legislatures, composed as they are of the representatives of the people, are supposed to know and be aware of the needs of the people and what is good and bad for them. The Court cannot sit in judgment over their wisdom. An enactment cannot be struck down by applying, the principle of proportionality when its. applicability even in administrative law sphere is not fully and finally settled. It is one thing to say that a restriction imposed upon a fundamental right can be struck down if it is disproportionate, excessive or unreasonable and quite another thing to say that the Court can strike down enactment if it thinks it unreasonable, unnecessary or unwarranted. The two rules stated above for striking down of enactments are however confined to an Act made by the Legislature. " ( 20 ) IT is settled law that the allegations regarding the violation of constitutional provision should be specific, clear and unambiguous and the burden is on the person who impeaches the law as violative of the constitutional guarantee to give relevant particulars and show that the particular provision is infirm for all or any of the reasons stated by him. In Gauri Shankar v. Union of India, (1994) 6 SCC 349 : (1994 AIR SCW 4059): ( AIR 1995 SC 55 ), it has beep reiterated as under- " (b) that there is always a presumption in favour of the constitutionality of an enactment and the burden is upon him who attacks it to show that there has been a clear transgression of the constitutional principles; (c) that it must be presumed that the Legislature understands and correctly appreciates the need of its own people, that its laws are directed to problems made manifest by experience and that its discriminations are based on adequate grounds;. . . xxxxxx xxxxxx (e) that in order to sustain the presumption of constitutionality the Court may take into consideration matter's of common knowledge, matters of common report, the history of the times and may assume every state of facts which can be conceived existing at the time of legislation. " ( 21 ) IN State of W. B. and another v. EITA india Ltd. , (2003) 5 SCC 239 : ( AIR 2003 sc 4126 ) it has been expressed thus : "4. In examining the constitutional validity of the impugned provisions of a statute, it will be useful to bear in mind the following well-settled propositions. If a legislation is found to lack in legislative competence or is found to be in contravention of any provision of Part III or any other provision of the constitution, the impugned legislation cannot escape the vice of unconstitutionality.- -. . . . . . . . . " ' ( 22 ) AS an issue has been raised with regard to the real, direct and inevitable impact of the law and the duty of the Court, we may refer with profit to the decision rendered in menaka Gandhi (supra) wherein it has been held as under: "67. . . . . . Here we find the germ of the doctrine of direct and inevitable effect, which necessarily must be effect intended by the legislature, or in other words, what may conveniently and appropriately be described as the doctrine of intended and real effect. So also in Sakal Paper (P) Ltd. v. The Union of India (1962) 3 SCR 842 : ( AIR 1962 SC 305 ) while considering the constitutional validity of the Newspaper (Price and Page)Act, 1956 and Daily Newspaper (Price and page) Order, 1960 this Court applied the test of direct and immediate effect. This Court, relying upon the decision in Dwarkadas shrinivas v. The Sholapur and Weaving Co. Ltd. 1954 SCR. 674 : ( AIR 1954 SC 119 )pointed out that "it is the substance and the practical result of the act of the State that should be considered rather than its purely legal aspect" and "the correct approach in such cases should be to enquire as to what in substance is the loss or injury caused to the citizen and not merely what manner and method has been adopted by the State in placing the restrictions". Since "the direct and immediate effect of the order" would be to restrain a newspaper from publishing any number of pages for carrying its news and views, which it has a fundamental right under Article 19 (1) (a) to do, unless it raises the selling price as provided in the Schedule to the Order, it was held by this Court that the order was violative of the right of the newspapers guaranteed by Article 19 (1) (a ). Here again the emphasis was on the direct and inevitable effect of the impugned action of the State rather than on its object and form or subject-matter. '' ( 23 ) IN Daya Ram and another v. State of m. P. and others, 2003 (4) MPHT 435 it has been stated thus :- "3. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The modus vivendi which requires a purposive and constructive ratiocination while engaged in viceration of the provision also warrants that a policy decision, a facet of the Legislature or at times a spectrum of the executive though may draw strength and stimulus in all its variation from the greatest instrument, i. e. , the Constitution in a given case and in a particular fact situation if the provisions trespass the quintessential characteristic of Organic Law or Judge made law should not be allowed to stand. " ( 24 ) KEEPING in view the aforesaid guidance, we shall presently dwell upon the controversy that has emerged. The Parliament, with the intention to organise the local bodies, inserted specific provisions in the Constitution and, ultimately, it culminated in the passing of the Constitution (Seventy-four amendment) Act, 1992. Thus, in essentiality, the local governance has been ascribed a role under the Constitution. In this context, it is apt to refer to the Statement of Objects and Reasons behind the Amendment Act. "in many States local bodies have become weak and ineffective on account of a variety of reasons, including the failure to hold regular elections, prolonged supersessions and inadequate devolution of powers and functions. As a result. Urban Local Bodies are not able to perform effectively as vibrant democratic units of self-government. 2. "in many States local bodies have become weak and ineffective on account of a variety of reasons, including the failure to hold regular elections, prolonged supersessions and inadequate devolution of powers and functions. As a result. Urban Local Bodies are not able to perform effectively as vibrant democratic units of self-government. 2. Having regard to these inadequacies, it is considered necessary that provisions relating to Urban Local Bodies are incorporated in the Constitution particularly for- (i) putting on a firmer footing the relationship between the State Government and the urban Local Bodies, with respect to - (a) the functions and taxation powers; and (b) arrangements for revenue sharing; (ii) Ensuring regular conduct of elections; (iii) ensuring timely elections in the case of supersession; and (iv) providing adequate representation for the weaker sections like Scheduled Castes, scheduled Tribes and women. 3. Accordingly, it is proposed to add a new part relating to the Urban Local Bodies in the Constitution to provide for-xxxx xxxx xxxx (e) reservation of seats in every Municipality- (i) for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled tribes in proportion to their population of which not less than one-third shall be for less than one third of the total number of seats; (ii) for women which shall not be less than one third of the total number of seats; (iii) in favour of backward class of citizens if so provided by the Legislature of the state; (iv) for Scheduled Castes, Scheduled tribes and women in the office of Chairpersons as may be specified in the State law;" ( 25 ) ARTICLE 243t which is a consequence of the amendment is as follows : 243t. Reservation of seats. (1) Seats shall be reserved for the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes in every Municipality and the number of seats so reserved shall bear, as nearly as may be, the same proportion to the total number of seats to be filled by direct election in that Municipality as the. population of the Scheduled castes in the Municipal area or of the Scheduled Tribes in the Municipal area bears to the total population of that area and such seats may be allotted by rotation to different constituencies in a Municipality. (2) Not less than one-third of the total number of seats reserved under clause (1)shall be reserved for women belonging to the scheduled Castes or, as the case may be, the scheduled Tribes. (2) Not less than one-third of the total number of seats reserved under clause (1)shall be reserved for women belonging to the scheduled Castes or, as the case may be, the scheduled Tribes. (3) Not less than one-third (including the number of seats reserved for women belonging to the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes) of the total number of seats to be filled by direct election in every Municipality shall be reserved for women and such seats may be allotted by rotation to different constituencies in a Municipality. (4) The offices of Chairpersons in the municipalities shall be reserved for the scheduled Castes, the Scheduled Tribes and women in such manner as the Legislature of a Slate may. by law. provide. (5) The reservation of seats under clauses (1) and (2) and the reservation of offices of chairpersons (other than the reservation for women) under clause (4) shall cease to have effect on the expiration of the period specified in Article 334. (6) Nothing in this Part shall prevent the legislature of a State from making any provision for reservation of seats in any Municipality or offices of Chairpersons in the Municipalities in favour of ward class of citizens," ( 26 ) IN pursuance of the same, the Slate legislature amended the Municipal Corporation Act, 1956 and the Municipalities Act, 1961. Initially, there was prescription that as nearly as possible 1/3rd seats shall be reserved for women. Thereafter, it has been enhanced to 50% by the impugned legislation. Presently, Section 11 of the 1956 Act reads as follows : "11. Reservation of seats. (1) Out of the total number of wards determined under subsection (1) of Section 10, such number of seats shall be reserved for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in every Municipal corporation as bears, as nearly as may be, the same proportion to the total number of seats to be filled by direct election in the municipal Corporation as the population of the Scheduled Castes or of the Scheduled tribes in the Municipal' area bears to the total population of that area and such wards shall be those in which the population of the scheduled Castes or the Scheduled Tribes, as the case may be, is most concentrated. (2) As nearly as possible twenty five per cent of the total number of wards shall be reserved for other backward classes in such municipal Corporations, where fifty per cent or less seats are reserved for Scheduled castes and Scheduled Tribes, and such seats shall be allotted by rotation to different wards in such manner as may be prescribed: provided that if from any ward so reserved no nomination paper is filed for election, as a councillor, by any member of the backward classes, then the Collector shall be competent to declare it as unreserved. (3) As nearly as possible fifty per cent of the total number of seats reserved under subsections (1) and (2) shall be reserved for women belonging to the Scheduled Castes or the Scheduled Tribes or other backward classes, as the case may be. (4) As nearly as possible fifty percent (including the number of seats reserved for women belonging to the Scheduled Castes, scheduled Tribes and other backward classes), of the total number of seats to be filled by direct election in every Municipal corporation shall be reserved for women and such seats shall be allotted by rotation to different wards in a Municipal Corporation in such manner as may be prescribed, (5) The reservation of seats under sub-sections (1), (2) and (3) shall cease to have effect on the expiration of the period specified in Article 334 of the Constitution of India. Explanation. In this section 'other backward classes' means category of persons belonging to backward classes as notified by the State Government. " JUDGMENT DIPAK MISRA, J. ( 1 ) IN this batch of writ petition, the centroidal issue that has been sought to be assiduously pyramided with immense gloss is that the amendments brought into force in the M. P. Municipal Corporation Act, 1956 (in short 'the 1956 Act')and the M. P. Municipalities Act, 1961 by the M. P. Nagar Palika Vidhi (Sanshodhan)Adhiniyam, 2007 as a consequence of which the reservation in favour of women has increased from 33% to 50%. in Municipal Corporations and Municipalities in the State of m. P. is unsustainable being violative of Arts. in Municipal Corporations and Municipalities in the State of m. P. is unsustainable being violative of Arts. 14 and 15 ( 1) of the Constitution and as a sequitur thereof, Rule 3 of the Madhya Pradesh municipalities (Reservation of Wards for scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, Other backward Classes and Women) Rules, 1994 (for brevity 'the 1994 Rules') as amended vide notification dated 3-9-2007 is also unconstitutional. The aforesaid structure of the edifice has led to the prayer declaring the statutory provisions as ultra vires and quashment of the consequent notifications and orders. In spite of various range of asseverations of facts in the writ petitions, the learned counsel for the petitioners restricted the relief to the constitutional validity of the provisions pertaining to reservation for women and, therefore, the factual matrix as regards the said spectrum shall only be expo sited. For the sake of clarity and convenience, the facts in W. P. No. 8122/2009 are uncurtained and unfurled herein. ( 2 ) IN the petition, the contents of Section 11 of the 1956 Act have been narrated and special reference has been made to sub-sections (3) and (4) indicating that prior to the amendment Act No. 16 of 2007, the said subsections provided reservation of one-third of total number of seats for women belonging to each category. It is set forth that Section 11 provides compartmentalised reservation for Scheduled Castes. Scheduled Tribes, other Backward Classes and Women. The reservation made in favour of the women candidates is vertical inasmuch as the same is dependent on the final number of elected candidates in the election. In order to make special provisions for women, the Legislature had earlier provided reservation of one-third seats for candidates belonging to women category which was sufficient and adequate. Apart from the seats reserved for women, women also contest election from unreserved seats and succeed. There are instances where in the elections of local bodies, women candidates conteste d in unreserved seats and got elected against male candidates which goes a long way to show that reservation made prior to the amendment ensured proper and adequate representation of women in the municipal corporation. It is pleaded that in spite of the aforesaid, in subsections (3) and (4), in place of the words "not less than 1/3rd", the words ''as nearly as possible 50%" have been substituted. It is pleaded that in spite of the aforesaid, in subsections (3) and (4), in place of the words "not less than 1/3rd", the words ''as nearly as possible 50%" have been substituted. In view of the amendments carried out by the notification dated 3-9-2007, the Rules have been amended. ( 3 ) IT is contended that the amendment in sub-section 11 (3) and (4) and the corresponding amendment carried out in the rules creates a discrimination on the ground of sex which is impermissible under Arts. 14 and 15 (1) of the Constitution of India. Though art. 15 (3), empowers the State to make special provisions for women, yet the said provision cannot be stretched to such an extent that it discriminates other classes in an arbitrary manner. It is put forth that the increase of reservation from one-third to 50% operates as discrimination as such a reservation is vertical and when counted along with the reservation meant for other classes, the total percentage of reservation would come to 75% which is contrary to the law laid down in indra Sawhney and others v. Union of India and others, 1992 Supp (3) SCC 212. It is urged that the success of women candidates in elections reflects in a crystallized manner that the women candidates do not suffer any disparity which requires the further crutches of reservation. The increase of reservation from 1/3rd to half is not founded on any scientific or systematic study and there is no material to show that women need reservation to that extent for ensuring adequate representation in local self government. Such a reservation, it is contended, is irrational, arbitrary and smacks of total discrimination violating the basic facet of Article 14 of the constitution. ( 4 ) IT is averred that the concept of reservation is only to make provisions for upliftment of those classes who suffered disadvantage over centuries. Reference has been made to Art. 334 of the Constitution which mandates reservation to continue only till such categories or classes attain the status of equality with other citizens. It is put forth that though there has been prescription of period for reservations for other classes, yet no period has been provided for reservation for women and, therefore, such a reservation would continue in perpetuity. It is set forth that women in India have already achieved the status of equality and. It is put forth that though there has been prescription of period for reservations for other classes, yet no period has been provided for reservation for women and, therefore, such a reservation would continue in perpetuity. It is set forth that women in India have already achieved the status of equality and. consequently, there is no necessity for further reservation. The reservation is exclusively based on sex which is prohibited under Arts. 14 and 15 (1) of the constitution of India but the State Legist ture has provided such a reservation in absolute transgression of the said constitutional mandate. It is urged that the impugned amendment has no nexus with the object sought to be achieved and also does not get any support from Art. 334 of the Constitution and, therefore, the said provision deserves to be declared as unconstitutional. ( 5 ) A counter-affidavit has been filed by the respondents contending, inter alia, that article 243t (2) of the Constitution provides for reservation for women candidates which should not be less than one-third of the total number of seats. The maximum number relating to reservation fixed as 50% as has been laid down in Indra Sawhney (supra) is not applicable to election matters as has been held by this Court in Tulsiram Jatav v. Union of India and others, 2001 (4) MPLJ 132. It is pleaded that the process of election has already commenced and the preparation of the electoral roll is being done as per the order dated 7-7-2009 and the final publication of the electoral rolls would be done by 11-11-2009. It is put forth that as per Article 243zg of the Constitution, there is bar to interfere in the electoral matters. It is the stand in the return that the plea of excessive reservation and that it is beyond the permissible limit of 50% is unsustainable inasmuch as the provisions, if appositely read, would show that the reservation is up to the extent of 50% and not beyond the said percentage. It is urged that under Art. 243t of the Constitution, there is a mandate for reserving seats for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in every municipality in the proportion to the total number of seats and the total population. It is urged that under Art. 243t of the Constitution, there is a mandate for reserving seats for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in every municipality in the proportion to the total number of seats and the total population. As per sub-clause (2) of Article 243t, there is clear warrant to reserve not less than one-third seats for women belonging to the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. It is also set forth that the reservation for women can be more than 1/3rd of the total seats and the same would be well within the permissible limit of 50%. The State Legislature, keeping in view the above aspects, has amended subsections (3) and (4) of Section II of the 1956 act which provide as nearly as possible 50% reservation of the total number of seats. The intention of the Legislature is to provide reservation up to 50% but there is remotely no intention to create any contingencies for providing reservation beyond 50%. The Rules are in consonance with the Act and in accord with the Constitution and cannot be found to be playing foul with any constitutional provision. It is contended that under art. 15 (3), the State is empowered to make special provisions for women and children and hence, the action taken by the State Legislature is well within the constitutional frame. The methodology adopted by the respondents is quite clear and there is an errneous assumption by the petitioners that the reservation is vertical. The respondents have prescribed reservation for each category separately, and thereafter, equal horizontal reservation is provided for women. As regards the unreserved seats, the same methodology has been adopted so as to ensure total reservation as nearly as possible 50% for women candidates and further unreserved seats are open for all categories of women candidates, i. e. . Scheduled Castes, Scheduled tribes and Other Backward Classes. Thus, the methodology adopted by the answering respondents clearly reveals that horizontal reservation has been provided for women candidates. A comparative chart has been produced pertaining to the Bhopal Municipal Corporation in respect of the year 2004 and the year 2009 to highlight that the reservation granted to women is well within the permissible limit of 50%. Thus, the methodology adopted by the answering respondents clearly reveals that horizontal reservation has been provided for women candidates. A comparative chart has been produced pertaining to the Bhopal Municipal Corporation in respect of the year 2004 and the year 2009 to highlight that the reservation granted to women is well within the permissible limit of 50%. The allegation that there is reservation of 75% is absolutely misconceived and the same has been put forth in a fallacious manner, ( 6 ) IT is asseverated in the return that there are 14 municipal corporations and 96 municipalities in the State of M. P. In addition to that, there are 248 Nagar Panchayats (transitional areas) spread in 50 districts of the state of M. P. The petitioners have not submitted in the writ petitions that the process of reservation in respect of almost 50 districts has been completed. It is submitted that in respect of 43 districts, notification has already been published as contemplated under rule 7 of the 1994 Rules. In essence, the stand is that the election process has commenced to a concrete extent and the petitioners have challenged the validity at a belated stage. It is put forth that the State Legislature has provided horizontal reservation for the women within the permissible limit and hence, no fault can be found with it. It is worth noting that a stand has been taken in some of the writ petitions that reservation of 50% seats for women would result in total lack of control over the officers and administration of the corporations and municipalities. The said stand has been strongly refuted in the return. An explanation has been preferred how the reservation does not exceed 50% in entirely. It is contended that the provisions neither play foul with Articles 14 and 15 (1) of the Constitution of India nor do they run counter to any decision rendered by the apex Court. The said stand has been strongly refuted in the return. An explanation has been preferred how the reservation does not exceed 50% in entirely. It is contended that the provisions neither play foul with Articles 14 and 15 (1) of the Constitution of India nor do they run counter to any decision rendered by the apex Court. ( 7 ) A rejoinder affidavit has been filed to the return filed by the respondents No. ] and 3 contending, inter alia, that the reliance placed by the respondents on Article 243t of the Constitution of India as a source of power is absolutely untenable as the constitutional benchmark prescribed for reservation of seats for women is only 1/3 rd and, therefore, the State Legislature even though has the power to make provision for reservation of seats for women candidates in excess of the constitutional benchmark of 1/3rd, yet such provision has to be based on sound and cogent reasons. It is putforth that respondents have not given any justification for providing reservation for women in excess of 1/3rd. No scientific or systematic study was conducted before enhancing the percentage for women from 1/3rd to 50%. No material has been brought on record to demonstrate that women in the State of M. P. need reservation in excess of the prescribed constitutional benchmark of 1/3rd. The Constitution does not contemplate proportionate reservation for women and. therefore, there has to be a scientific base for providing 50% reservation for women. A classification has been made but in the absence of any cogent and germane reasons, solely on the base of sex, such classification is impermissible as that ex facie invites the frown of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. In the past election, women have got adequate representation in the local bodies and large number of women candidates were elected from unreserved wards and hence, there is no warrant or justification for providing further reservation. The reservation of 50% for women is in excess of their promotion to the total population in the State if the sex ratio of the 2001 census is taken note of. The sex ratio in the State of Madhya Pradesh was 919 females against 1000 males. The total percentage of women population in the State of M. P. is slightly over 45%. Thus, the reservation is in excess of the percentage of population. The sex ratio in the State of Madhya Pradesh was 919 females against 1000 males. The total percentage of women population in the State of M. P. is slightly over 45%. Thus, the reservation is in excess of the percentage of population. The women residing within the Municipal Corporation area are highly educated and they are well aware of their rights and, consequently, they need no protection in the form of reservation. In the city of Bhopal, as per the 2001 census, there were 898 women against 1000 men. Likewise, in Gwalior the ratio is 848, in Indore 912 and in Jabalpur, it is 908. Hence, the concept of proportionality has been thrown to the winds while determining the factum of reservation. The women candidates being educated can contest the election of ward members on the basis of their own merit. It is urged that during the pendency of the writ petition, the rule has been amended stipulating, inter alia, that reservation for women is horizontal and not vertical which means that the respondents are not at all aware about the concept of horizontal reservation. In horizontal reservation, the provision for reservation contemplates adjustment of seats/posts for reserved category candidates as against such candidates selected/elected on the basis of their own merit. The Municipal Corporation Act does not contain any such provision for the adjustment of seats. The total number of women candidates would exceed 50%. as women from any category can also be elected from any unreserved ward. Thus, the impugned provision, in fact, seeks to provide vertical reservation for women, which, when added with the reservation provided for the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Other backward Classes candidates, would amount to 75%. ( 8 ) BE it noted, on 25th September, 2009, in rule 5. sub-rule (6) was inserted in the madhya Pradesh Municipalities (Reservation of Office of Mayor and President) Rules, 1999. The said amendment reads as follows : " (6) In the context of Section 11-A of the madhya Pradesh Municipal Corporations act, 1956 (No. 23 of 1956) and Section 29-B of the Madhya Pradesh Municipalities act, 1961 (No. 37 of 1961), it is further clarified that the provisions of fifty per cent reservation for women shall be done horizontally in all categories, so that the overall reservation shall not exceed fifty per cent. " ( 9 ) IN Rule 3, after sub-rule (6) of the madhya Pradesh Municipalities (Reservation of Wards for Scheduled Castes, Scheduled tribes, Other Backward Classes and Women)Rules, 1994, the following sub-rule was added : " (7) In the context of Section 11 of the madhya Pradesh Municipal Corporation Act, 1956 (No. 25 of 1956) and Section 29-A of the Madhya Pradesh Municipalities Act, 1961 (No. 37 of 1961), it is further clarified that the provision of fifty per cent reservation for women shall be done horizontally in all categories, so that the overall reservation shall not exceed fifty per cent. " ( 10 ) AT this juncture, it is apposite to note that on behalf of the respondents-State, an affidavit has been filed in the course of hearing. We think it apt to produce paragraphs 1 to 3 of the affidavit. They read as follows : " 1. That, on the basis of information collected from various local bodies accompanying chart relating to the results of 60 local bodies in which besides the reserved seats only 1. 53% of women could win the election in the last elections of Local Bodies held in the year 2004. It would be proper to state that extraordinary Gazette Notification on 20 december, 2004 was issued in respect of candidates who won the said elections of local bodies. Copy of chart is enclosed herewith as Annexure-A. 2. That, in the last election of Parliament there were 29 seats out of which only 6 won the election and percentage of women category mla who could win the election was 20. 69%. Copy of the list of Members of Parliament, who won the election is Annexure-B. 3. That, in the last election, out of 230 members of Legislative Assembly only 25 women could win the election. Copy of the total candidates who won the election is filed as Annexure-C in which 25 women members were elected which comes to 10. 87%. " The said affidavit has been filed to emphasise how the participation of women in the governance of the body polity is really marginal and is of no signification. ( 11 ) WE have heard Mr. Sanjay Agrawal, mr. Sanjay K. Agrawal, Mr. Pankaj Dixit and mr. A. P. Shroti, learned counsel for the petitioners; Mr. R. D. Jain, learned Advocate general and Mr. ( 11 ) WE have heard Mr. Sanjay Agrawal, mr. Sanjay K. Agrawal, Mr. Pankaj Dixit and mr. A. P. Shroti, learned counsel for the petitioners; Mr. R. D. Jain, learned Advocate general and Mr. Prashant Singh, learned additional Advocate General for the respondents; State; and Mr. A. K. Mishra, learned senior Counsel along with Mrs. Divyakeerti bohre, learned counsel for the respondent/municipal Corporation. ( 12 ) MR. Sanjay K. Agrawal, learned counsel for the petitioners; has raised the following submissions : (a) The impugned amendment by increasing the reservation for women from 1/3rd to 50% ex-facie violates the equality clause enshrined under Art. 14 of the Constitution and seeks to discriminate on the ground of sex which is violative of Art. 15 (1) of the constitution of India. (b) Prior to coming into force of the amended provision, 1/3rd of the seats were already reserved for women and thus, adequate representation was already provided to women in the local self government and there was absolutely no justification or warrant for increasing the percentage of reservation to 50% and further there is no nexus with the object sought to be achieved. (c) The increase of percentage for women would result in reverse discrimination against the rest of the citizens: (d) No systematic and scientific study has been undertaken before increasing the percentage of reservation for women and no identifiable, quantitative and qualitative data has been placed on record to demonstrate that the reservation of 50% wards for women is necessitous in the public interest or in the interest of the society at large. (e) The total percentage of women in the state of M. P. is about 47. 9% and, therefore, the reservation of 50% wards for women is disproportionate to their population in the state. That apart, women have been contesting in elections at various levels and they do not need the cratches of reservation. (f) The presence of majority of women councillors in the Corporation would weaken the unit of local self governance and would only strengthen the bureaucracy which would be counter to the constitutional mandate incorporated in Chapter IX-A. Quite apart from the above, the duties and functions of the councillors are extremely onerous which cannot be effectively discharged by women and thereby it would retard the development at the level of local self government. (g) The legislature has not kept in view the effect and impact of such increase on the society and while scrutinising the constitutional validity of the law, it is the duty of the court to see the direct and inevitable impact of the same, regard being had to the realistic background. (h) The legislation is contrary to the decision rendered by the Apex Court in Indra sawhney (supra) and other decisions and is, therefore, liable to be struck down as ultra vires. The learned counsel has placed reliance on the decisions rendered in Indra Sawhney (supra ). He has commended us to paragraphs 250 to 258, 261, 291, 804 to 812 and 842 of the said decision. Reliance has also been placed on the decisions rendered in Dr. Preeti shrivastava v. State of Madhya Pradesh. AIR 1999 SC 2894 and Than Singh v. State of madhya Pradesh, AIR 2005 MP 170 , From the decision in M. Nagraj and others v. Union of India and others (2006) 8 SCC 212 : ( AIR 2007 SC 71 ) emphasis has been laid on paragraphs 46 to 49, 102, 106 and 117. Inspiration has been drawn from the decisions in anuj Garg and another v. Hotel Association of India and others (2008) 3 SCC 1 : ( AIR 2008 SC 663 ) and DCM Financial Services limited v. J. N. Sareen and another (2008) 8 scc 1 : ( AIR 2008 SC 2255 ). ( 13 ) MR. Sanjay Agrawal learned counsel for the petitioner in W. P. No. 8942/2009, has raised the following contentions : (a) Articles 330 and 332 of the Constitution provide for reservation of seats for scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in the House of the People and the Legislative assembly of the State respectively in proportion to their population in the State and the Union Territory but there is no provision in the Constitution providing for proportionate reservation for women except the provision made under Article 243t and, therefore, the reservation as engrafted under Section 11 (3) and (4) of the Act runs counter to the constitutional philosophy. (b) The terms used "not less than one-third" in Article 243t should be understood as "not more than one-third" in the context in which the language is employed. (b) The terms used "not less than one-third" in Article 243t should be understood as "not more than one-third" in the context in which the language is employed. No discretion has been provided to the State Legislature than what has been stated in the said article and the Parliament did not want to leave anything to the discretion of the State legislature and fixed the percentage of reservation for women at one-third by using the phraseology ''not less than one-third". (c) Providing proportionate reservation for women would amount to adding another class or category in addition to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and Other Backward classes. Such reservation has no constitutional sanction and the State Legislature cannot provide 50% reservation to women in each and every category as that squarely offends the rule of equality provided under arts. 14 and 15 (1) of the Constitution. (d) The provision made by the State Legislature providing reservation is sans relevant consideration and when no data is provided, the concept of judicial review to examine the issue on the anvil of power under Art. 15 (3)of the Constitution is attracted. (e) By virtue of reservation for women in respect of seats in the Municipal council, classes have been created but there is no intelligible data to sustain such classification and, therefore, it plays foul with the concept of equality which is the corner stone of Art. 14 of the Constitution. (f) The Constitution envisages only to provide adequate representation to women as is evident from the object and reasons of Constitution (Seventy Fourth Amendment) Act, 1992 and adequate representation cannot be understood to mean to provide proportionate reservation for women. There is a vast difference between 'adequate representation and 'proportionate reservation' and by no stretch of imagination the logic of 'adequate representation' can be equated with 'proportionate reservation'! (g) The representation of one-third in the total number of seats in every Municipal corporation and Municipality which was prevalent can be said to be adequate representation. Nothing has been brought on record to show that the same was not adequate. The objects and reasons of the amendment Act also does not so spell out. The representation which has been provided for women is more than the population ratio and the benefit of reservation has been further given by the 1994 Rules. Nothing has been brought on record to show that the same was not adequate. The objects and reasons of the amendment Act also does not so spell out. The representation which has been provided for women is more than the population ratio and the benefit of reservation has been further given by the 1994 Rules. Further, by application of the rules, i. e. , sub-rule (4) of rule 3 of the Madhya Pradesh Municipalities (Reservation of Wards for Scheduled castes, Scheduled Tribes, Other Backward classes and Women) Rules, 1994, the fraction of less than half shall be ignored and fraction of equal to half or more shall be counted as one. The benefit of reservation has further been given in favour of women. (h) It is permissible in law for women to contest election from unreserved wards and, thus, in the ultimate eventuate, the total number of women representation would exceed the maximum limit of the population ratio. (i) The maximum limit of reservation which has been provided in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) is 50%'except in very extra-ordinary situation but in the case at hand, the over all reservation comes up to 75% which is totally impermissible. (j) The law relating to vertical and horizontal reservation is not possible in respect of reservation for seats in Municipal Corporation or Municipalities and. therefore, the amendment of the Rules putting forth 50% reservation is horizontal and does not save the enactment. (k) Article 15 (3) is an enabling provision and is to be exercised in the manner so that the rules of equality provided under Article 15 (1) is not destroyed but in the case at hand the direct, real and inevitable effect of the impugned legislation is the destruction of Art. 15 (1) which is an anathema to the Constitutional philosophy. (1) The doctrine of direct, real and inevitable effect has to be applied to the case at hand and on applicability of the said principle, it would be clear that the impugned legislation provides for more than 75% reservation which the law does not countenance and, thus, the said provisions are to be declared as ultra vires. (1) The doctrine of direct, real and inevitable effect has to be applied to the case at hand and on applicability of the said principle, it would be clear that the impugned legislation provides for more than 75% reservation which the law does not countenance and, thus, the said provisions are to be declared as ultra vires. To bolster the said submissions, the learned counsel has placed reliance on the decisions rendered in Indra Sawhney (supra), miss Art) Sapru v. State of J. and K. and others, AIR 1981 SC 1009 , Swati Gupta (Ms) v. State of U. P. (1995) 2 SCC 560 . Anil Kumar gupta v. State of U. P. (1995) 5 SCC 173 , M. Nagraj (supra) and Dr. Preeti Shrivastava (supra ). Rajesh Kumar Daria v. State of U. P. , AIR 2005 SC 2540 ,. pattatraya Motiram v. State of Bombay. AIR 1953 Bom 311 and menaka Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR 1978 sc 597 . ( 14 ) MR. A. P. Shroti, learned counsel for the petitioner in Writ Petition No. 9595/2009 which pertains to the assail of the provisions contained in the Municipalities Act and the rules framed thereunder, has advanced the following proponements : (i) Sections 29-A (3) and (4) as amended by the Act-No. 16/2007 in effect prescribes for 75% reservation for women in election which exceeds the 50% limit contrary to the law laid down in Indra Sawhney (supra) and infringes the equality clause contained in arts. 14 and 15 (1) of the Constitution. (ii) The ceiling limit of 50% as prescribed cannot be confined to Art. 16 (4) only but is applicable to reservation made under Art. 15 (4) and in effect to Art. 15 (3) as well. (iii) The reservation provided under Section 29-A and Art. 243 is for women category and not to ward to which such woman belongs and. therefore, the reservation is category-wise and such prescription for reservation of wards is contrary to Art. 243 of the constitution. (iv) Rules 3 (3) and 3 (5) of the 1994 Rules speak about the reservation of wards for women whereas such terminology does not occur in Section 29-A or in any other provisions of the Municipalities Act nor docs it occur in Art. 243 of the Constitution and, therefore, the said rule transgresses the scheme of the statute as well as the constitutional provision. ( 15 ) MR. R. D. Jain, learned Advocate General and Mr. Prashant Singh, learned Additional Advocate General for the State, combating the aforesaid submissions, have advanced the following proponements; (a) The principle of reservation as laid down in Indra Sawhney (supra) and in other decisions in that time is not applicable to the present factual matrix as the said decisions were rendered in the context of service matters pertaining to appointment and promotion, and in respect of admission to educational institution. (b) The averments made in the petitions do not satisfy the requirement of the pleadings which are imperative when the constitutional validity of an enactment is called in question. (c) The percentage fixed for women in respect of wards is an affirmative and protective action, a special provision, under Article 15 (3) of the Constitution and is equally distributed amongst all categories and hence, does not exceed the ceiling limit (d) An affirmative action of the State provides level playing field and it has equalizing results. (e) Article 243-T is an enabling provision for the purpose of taking affirmative measure and the science of interpretation does not give allowance to the interpretation by the learned counsel for the petitioners. (0 The aim of the Constitution is to establish and egalitarian piece of legislation to reinforce the same in its conceptual eventuality. (g) The stand that women in the State of madhya Pradesh are highly educated and adequately represented in the Municipal corporation and Municipalities is far from the reality and the Legislature in its wisdom has prescribed the present affirmation which is constitutionally permissible. (h) The purpose of the amendment, is to give greater participation to female population in the administration of local bodies and such a step being a progressive one does hot deserve to be struck down. (i) The reservation of wards for women has not been made solely on the basis of sex but other factors such as upliftment of the conditions of women and their preparation at the grassroot level of democracy are also kept in view. (i) The reservation of wards for women has not been made solely on the basis of sex but other factors such as upliftment of the conditions of women and their preparation at the grassroot level of democracy are also kept in view. ( 16 ) TO buttress the aforesaid submissions, the learned counsel for the State have commended us to various passages from Indra sawhney (supra), Toguru Sudhakar Reddy and another v. The Government of A. P. and others, AIR 1994 SC 544, M. Nagraj (supra)and placed reliance on the decisions rendered in Govt, of A. P. v. P. B. Vijay Kumar, AIR 1995 SC 1648 , Tulsiram Jatav v, Union of india and others, 2001 (4) MPLJ 132, E. V. Chivnaih v. State (2005) 1 SCC 394 : ( AIR 2005 SC 162 ), Dr. Satish v. State of M. P. AIR 2009 MP 185 and Rajesh Kumar Gupta y. State of U. P. AIR 2005 SC 2540 . ( 17 ) BEFORE we proceed to address with regard to the constitutional validity of the provisions under assail of 1956 Act and 1961 act we think it apt to refer to certain citations in the field as regards the role of Court while exercising power of judicial review in this arena. ( 18 ) IN R. S. Joshi. Sales Tax Officer, gujarat and others v. Ajit Mills Ltd, and another, (1997) 4 SCC 98, Krishna Iyer, J. , in his inimitable style, expressed thus : "2. A prefactory caveat - When examining a legislation from the angle of its vires, the Court has to be resilient, not rigid, forward - looking, not static, liberal, not verbal- in interpreting the organic law of the nation. We must also remember the constitutional proposition enunciated by the U. S: supreme Court in Munn v. Illinois viz. , "that courts do not substitute their social and economic beliefs for the judgment of legislative bodies'. Moreover, while trespasses will not be forgiven, a presumption of constitutionality must colour judicial construction. These factors, recognised by our Court, are essential to the modus vivendi between the judicial and legislative branches of the State, both working beneath the canopy of the Constitution. " ( 19 ) IN State of Andhra Pradesh and others v. Mc Dowell and Co. Moreover, while trespasses will not be forgiven, a presumption of constitutionality must colour judicial construction. These factors, recognised by our Court, are essential to the modus vivendi between the judicial and legislative branches of the State, both working beneath the canopy of the Constitution. " ( 19 ) IN State of Andhra Pradesh and others v. Mc Dowell and Co. and others, AIR 1996 SC 1627 , their Lordships of the Apex court have expressed the view as under : "a law made by the Parliament or the legislature can be struck down by Courts on two grounds and two grounds alone, viz. (1)lack of legislative competence and (2) violation of any of the fundamental rights guaranteed in Part-Ill of the Constitution or of any other constitutional provision. There is no third ground. If an enactment is challenged as violative of Article 14, it can be struck down only if it is found that it is violative of the equality clause/equal protection clause enshrined therein. Similarly, if an enactment is challenged as violative of any of the fundamental rights guaranteed by Clauses (a) to (g) of Article 19 (1), it can be struck down only if it is found not saved by any of the clauses (2) to (6) of article 19 and so on. No enactment can be struck down by just saying that it is arbitrary or unreasonable. Some or other constitutional infirmity has to be found before invalidating an Act. An enactment cannot be struck down on the ground that Court thinks it unjustified. The Parliament and the Legislatures, composed as they are of the representatives of the people, are supposed to know and be aware of the needs of the people and what is good and bad for them. The Court cannot sit in judgment over their wisdom. An enactment cannot be struck down by applying, the principle of proportionality when its. applicability even in administrative law sphere is not fully and finally settled. It is one thing to say that a restriction imposed upon a fundamental right can be struck down if it is disproportionate, excessive or unreasonable and quite another thing to say that the Court can strike down enactment if it thinks it unreasonable, unnecessary or unwarranted. The two rules stated above for striking down of enactments are however confined to an Act made by the Legislature. The two rules stated above for striking down of enactments are however confined to an Act made by the Legislature. " ( 20 ) IT is settled law that the allegations regarding the violation of constitutional provision should be specific, clear and unambiguous and the burden is on the person who impeaches the law as violative of the constitutional guarantee to give relevant particulars and show that the particular provision is infirm for all or any of the reasons stated by him. In Gauri Shankar v. Union of India, (1994) 6 SCC 349 : (1994 AIR SCW 4059): ( AIR 1995 SC 55 ), it has beep reiterated as under- " (b) that there is always a presumption in favour of the constitutionality of an enactment and the burden is upon him who attacks it to show that there has been a clear transgression of the constitutional principles; (c) that it must be presumed that the Legislature understands and correctly appreciates the need of its own people, that its laws are directed to problems made manifest by experience and that its discriminations are based on adequate grounds;. . xxxxxx xxxxxx (e) that in order to sustain the presumption of constitutionality the Court may take into consideration matter's of common knowledge, matters of common report, the history of the times and may assume every state of facts which can be conceived existing at the time of legislation. " ( 21 ) IN State of W. B. and another v. EITA india Ltd. , (2003) 5 SCC 239 : ( AIR 2003 sc 4126 ) it has been expressed thus : "4. In examining the constitutional validity of the impugned provisions of a statute, it will be useful to bear in mind the following well-settled propositions. If a legislation is found to lack in legislative competence or is found to be in contravention of any provision of Part III or any other provision of the constitution, the impugned legislation cannot escape the vice of unconstitutionality.- -. . . . . . . . . " ' ( 22 ) AS an issue has been raised with regard to the real, direct and inevitable impact of the law and the duty of the Court, we may refer with profit to the decision rendered in menaka Gandhi (supra) wherein it has been held as under: "67. . . . . . . . . . . " ' ( 22 ) AS an issue has been raised with regard to the real, direct and inevitable impact of the law and the duty of the Court, we may refer with profit to the decision rendered in menaka Gandhi (supra) wherein it has been held as under: "67. . . . . . Here we find the germ of the doctrine of direct and inevitable effect, which necessarily must be effect intended by the legislature, or in other words, what may conveniently and appropriately be described as the doctrine of intended and real effect. So also in Sakal Paper (P) Ltd. v. The Union of India (1962) 3 SCR 842 : ( AIR 1962 SC 305 ) while considering the constitutional validity of the Newspaper (Price and Page)Act, 1956 and Daily Newspaper (Price and page) Order, 1960 this Court applied the test of direct and immediate effect. This Court, relying upon the decision in Dwarkadas shrinivas v. The Sholapur and Weaving Co. Ltd. 1954 SCR. 674 : ( AIR 1954 SC 119 )pointed out that "it is the substance and the practical result of the act of the State that should be considered rather than its purely legal aspect" and "the correct approach in such cases should be to enquire as to what in substance is the loss or injury caused to the citizen and not merely what manner and method has been adopted by the State in placing the restrictions". Since "the direct and immediate effect of the order" would be to restrain a newspaper from publishing any number of pages for carrying its news and views, which it has a fundamental right under Article 19 (1) (a) to do, unless it raises the selling price as provided in the Schedule to the Order, it was held by this Court that the order was violative of the right of the newspapers guaranteed by Article 19 (1) (a ). Here again the emphasis was on the direct and inevitable effect of the impugned action of the State rather than on its object and form or subject-matter. '' ( 23 ) IN Daya Ram and another v. State of m. P. and others, 2003 (4) MPHT 435 it has been stated thus :- "3. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . '' ( 23 ) IN Daya Ram and another v. State of m. P. and others, 2003 (4) MPHT 435 it has been stated thus :- "3. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The modus vivendi which requires a purposive and constructive ratiocination while engaged in viceration of the provision also warrants that a policy decision, a facet of the Legislature or at times a spectrum of the executive though may draw strength and stimulus in all its variation from the greatest instrument, i. e. , the Constitution in a given case and in a particular fact situation if the provisions trespass the quintessential characteristic of Organic Law or Judge made law should not be allowed to stand. " ( 24 ) KEEPING in view the aforesaid guidance, we shall presently dwell upon the controversy that has emerged. The Parliament, with the intention to organise the local bodies, inserted specific provisions in the Constitution and, ultimately, it culminated in the passing of the Constitution (Seventy-four amendment) Act, 1992. Thus, in essentiality, the local governance has been ascribed a role under the Constitution. In this context, it is apt to refer to the Statement of Objects and Reasons behind the Amendment Act. "in many States local bodies have become weak and ineffective on account of a variety of reasons, including the failure to hold regular elections, prolonged supersessions and inadequate devolution of powers and functions. As a result. Urban Local Bodies are not able to perform effectively as vibrant democratic units of self-government. 2. Having regard to these inadequacies, it is considered necessary that provisions relating to Urban Local Bodies are incorporated in the Constitution particularly for- (i) putting on a firmer footing the relationship between the State Government and the urban Local Bodies, with respect to - (a) the functions and taxation powers; and (b) arrangements for revenue sharing; (ii) Ensuring regular conduct of elections; (iii) ensuring timely elections in the case of supersession; and (iv) providing adequate representation for the weaker sections like Scheduled Castes, scheduled Tribes and women. 3. 3. Accordingly, it is proposed to add a new part relating to the Urban Local Bodies in the Constitution to provide for-xxxx xxxx xxxx (e) reservation of seats in every Municipality- (i) for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled tribes in proportion to their population of which not less than one-third shall be for less than one third of the total number of seats; (ii) for women which shall not be less than one third of the total number of seats; (iii) in favour of backward class of citizens if so provided by the Legislature of the state; (iv) for Scheduled Castes, Scheduled tribes and women in the office of Chairpersons as may be specified in the State law;" ( 25 ) ARTICLE 243t which is a consequence of the amendment is as follows : 243t. Reservation of seats. (1) Seats shall be reserved for the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes in every Municipality and the number of seats so reserved shall bear, as nearly as may be, the same proportion to the total number of seats to be filled by direct election in that Municipality as the. population of the Scheduled castes in the Municipal area or of the Scheduled Tribes in the Municipal area bears to the total population of that area and such seats may be allotted by rotation to different constituencies in a Municipality. (2) Not less than one-third of the total number of seats reserved under clause (1)shall be reserved for women belonging to the scheduled Castes or, as the case may be, the scheduled Tribes. (3) Not less than one-third (including the number of seats reserved for women belonging to the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes) of the total number of seats to be filled by direct election in every Municipality shall be reserved for women and such seats may be allotted by rotation to different constituencies in a Municipality. (4) The offices of Chairpersons in the municipalities shall be reserved for the scheduled Castes, the Scheduled Tribes and women in such manner as the Legislature of a Slate may. by law. provide. (5) The reservation of seats under clauses (1) and (2) and the reservation of offices of chairpersons (other than the reservation for women) under clause (4) shall cease to have effect on the expiration of the period specified in Article 334. by law. provide. (5) The reservation of seats under clauses (1) and (2) and the reservation of offices of chairpersons (other than the reservation for women) under clause (4) shall cease to have effect on the expiration of the period specified in Article 334. (6) Nothing in this Part shall prevent the legislature of a State from making any provision for reservation of seats in any Municipality or offices of Chairpersons in the Municipalities in favour of ward class of citizens," ( 26 ) IN pursuance of the same, the Slate legislature amended the Municipal Corporation Act, 1956 and the Municipalities Act, 1961. Initially, there was prescription that as nearly as possible 1/3rd seats shall be reserved for women. Thereafter, it has been enhanced to 50% by the impugned legislation. Presently, Section 11 of the 1956 Act reads as follows : "11. Reservation of seats. (1) Out of the total number of wards determined under subsection (1) of Section 10, such number of seats shall be reserved for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in every Municipal corporation as bears, as nearly as may be, the same proportion to the total number of seats to be filled by direct election in the municipal Corporation as the population of the Scheduled Castes or of the Scheduled tribes in the Municipal' area bears to the total population of that area and such wards shall be those in which the population of the scheduled Castes or the Scheduled Tribes, as the case may be, is most concentrated. (2) As nearly as possible twenty five per cent of the total number of wards shall be reserved for other backward classes in such municipal Corporations, where fifty per cent or less seats are reserved for Scheduled castes and Scheduled Tribes, and such seats shall be allotted by rotation to different wards in such manner as may be prescribed: provided that if from any ward so reserved no nomination paper is filed for election, as a councillor, by any member of the backward classes, then the Collector shall be competent to declare it as unreserved. (3) As nearly as possible fifty per cent of the total number of seats reserved under subsections (1) and (2) shall be reserved for women belonging to the Scheduled Castes or the Scheduled Tribes or other backward classes, as the case may be. (3) As nearly as possible fifty per cent of the total number of seats reserved under subsections (1) and (2) shall be reserved for women belonging to the Scheduled Castes or the Scheduled Tribes or other backward classes, as the case may be. (4) As nearly as possible fifty percent (including the number of seats reserved for women belonging to the Scheduled Castes, scheduled Tribes and other backward classes), of the total number of seats to be filled by direct election in every Municipal corporation shall be reserved for women and such seats shall be allotted by rotation to different wards in a Municipal Corporation in such manner as may be prescribed, (5) The reservation of seats under sub-sections (1), (2) and (3) shall cease to have effect on the expiration of the period specified in Article 334 of the Constitution of India. Explanation. In this section 'other backward classes' means category of persons belonging to backward classes as notified by the State Government. " JUDGMENT DIPAK MISRA, J. ( 1 ) IN this batch of writ petition, the centroidal issue that has been sought to be assiduously pyramided with immense gloss is that the amendments brought into force in the M. P. Municipal Corporation Act, 1956 (in short 'the 1956 Act')and the M. P. Municipalities Act, 1961 by the M. P. Nagar Palika Vidhi (Sanshodhan)Adhiniyam, 2007 as a consequence of which the reservation in favour of women has increased from 33% to 50%. in Municipal Corporations and Municipalities in the State of m. P. is unsustainable being violative of Arts. 14 and 15 ( 1) of the Constitution and as a sequitur thereof, Rule 3 of the Madhya Pradesh municipalities (Reservation of Wards for scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, Other backward Classes and Women) Rules, 1994 (for brevity 'the 1994 Rules') as amended vide notification dated 3-9-2007 is also unconstitutional. The aforesaid structure of the edifice has led to the prayer declaring the statutory provisions as ultra vires and quashment of the consequent notifications and orders. In spite of various range of asseverations of facts in the writ petitions, the learned counsel for the petitioners restricted the relief to the constitutional validity of the provisions pertaining to reservation for women and, therefore, the factual matrix as regards the said spectrum shall only be expo sited. In spite of various range of asseverations of facts in the writ petitions, the learned counsel for the petitioners restricted the relief to the constitutional validity of the provisions pertaining to reservation for women and, therefore, the factual matrix as regards the said spectrum shall only be expo sited. For the sake of clarity and convenience, the facts in W. P. No. 8122/2009 are uncurtained and unfurled herein. ( 2 ) IN the petition, the contents of Section 11 of the 1956 Act have been narrated and special reference has been made to sub-sections (3) and (4) indicating that prior to the amendment Act No. 16 of 2007, the said subsections provided reservation of one-third of total number of seats for women belonging to each category. It is set forth that Section 11 provides compartmentalised reservation for Scheduled Castes. Scheduled Tribes, other Backward Classes and Women. The reservation made in favour of the women candidates is vertical inasmuch as the same is dependent on the final number of elected candidates in the election. In order to make special provisions for women, the Legislature had earlier provided reservation of one-third seats for candidates belonging to women category which was sufficient and adequate. Apart from the seats reserved for women, women also contest election from unreserved seats and succeed. There are instances where in the elections of local bodies, women candidates conteste d in unreserved seats and got elected against male candidates which goes a long way to show that reservation made prior to the amendment ensured proper and adequate representation of women in the municipal corporation. It is pleaded that in spite of the aforesaid, in subsections (3) and (4), in place of the words "not less than 1/3rd", the words ''as nearly as possible 50%" have been substituted. In view of the amendments carried out by the notification dated 3-9-2007, the Rules have been amended. ( 3 ) IT is contended that the amendment in sub-section 11 (3) and (4) and the corresponding amendment carried out in the rules creates a discrimination on the ground of sex which is impermissible under Arts. 14 and 15 (1) of the Constitution of India. Though art. 15 (3), empowers the State to make special provisions for women, yet the said provision cannot be stretched to such an extent that it discriminates other classes in an arbitrary manner. 14 and 15 (1) of the Constitution of India. Though art. 15 (3), empowers the State to make special provisions for women, yet the said provision cannot be stretched to such an extent that it discriminates other classes in an arbitrary manner. It is put forth that the increase of reservation from one-third to 50% operates as discrimination as such a reservation is vertical and when counted along with the reservation meant for other classes, the total percentage of reservation would come to 75% which is contrary to the law laid down in indra Sawhney and others v. Union of India and others, 1992 Supp (3) SCC 212. It is urged that the success of women candidates in elections reflects in a crystallized manner that the women candidates do not suffer any disparity which requires the further crutches of reservation. The increase of reservation from 1/3rd to half is not founded on any scientific or systematic study and there is no material to show that women need reservation to that extent for ensuring adequate representation in local self government. Such a reservation, it is contended, is irrational, arbitrary and smacks of total discrimination violating the basic facet of Article 14 of the constitution. ( 4 ) IT is averred that the concept of reservation is only to make provisions for upliftment of those classes who suffered disadvantage over centuries. Reference has been made to Art. 334 of the Constitution which mandates reservation to continue only till such categories or classes attain the status of equality with other citizens. It is put forth that though there has been prescription of period for reservations for other classes, yet no period has been provided for reservation for women and, therefore, such a reservation would continue in perpetuity. It is set forth that women in India have already achieved the status of equality and. consequently, there is no necessity for further reservation. The reservation is exclusively based on sex which is prohibited under Arts. 14 and 15 (1) of the constitution of India but the State Legist ture has provided such a reservation in absolute transgression of the said constitutional mandate. It is urged that the impugned amendment has no nexus with the object sought to be achieved and also does not get any support from Art. 334 of the Constitution and, therefore, the said provision deserves to be declared as unconstitutional. It is urged that the impugned amendment has no nexus with the object sought to be achieved and also does not get any support from Art. 334 of the Constitution and, therefore, the said provision deserves to be declared as unconstitutional. ( 5 ) A counter-affidavit has been filed by the respondents contending, inter alia, that article 243t (2) of the Constitution provides for reservation for women candidates which should not be less than one-third of the total number of seats. The maximum number relating to reservation fixed as 50% as has been laid down in Indra Sawhney (supra) is not applicable to election matters as has been held by this Court in Tulsiram Jatav v. Union of India and others, 2001 (4) MPLJ 132. It is pleaded that the process of election has already commenced and the preparation of the electoral roll is being done as per the order dated 7-7-2009 and the final publication of the electoral rolls would be done by 11-11-2009. It is put forth that as per Article 243zg of the Constitution, there is bar to interfere in the electoral matters. It is the stand in the return that the plea of excessive reservation and that it is beyond the permissible limit of 50% is unsustainable inasmuch as the provisions, if appositely read, would show that the reservation is up to the extent of 50% and not beyond the said percentage. It is urged that under Art. 243t of the Constitution, there is a mandate for reserving seats for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in every municipality in the proportion to the total number of seats and the total population. As per sub-clause (2) of Article 243t, there is clear warrant to reserve not less than one-third seats for women belonging to the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. It is also set forth that the reservation for women can be more than 1/3rd of the total seats and the same would be well within the permissible limit of 50%. The State Legislature, keeping in view the above aspects, has amended subsections (3) and (4) of Section II of the 1956 act which provide as nearly as possible 50% reservation of the total number of seats. The intention of the Legislature is to provide reservation up to 50% but there is remotely no intention to create any contingencies for providing reservation beyond 50%. The intention of the Legislature is to provide reservation up to 50% but there is remotely no intention to create any contingencies for providing reservation beyond 50%. The Rules are in consonance with the Act and in accord with the Constitution and cannot be found to be playing foul with any constitutional provision. It is contended that under art. 15 (3), the State is empowered to make special provisions for women and children and hence, the action taken by the State Legislature is well within the constitutional frame. The methodology adopted by the respondents is quite clear and there is an errneous assumption by the petitioners that the reservation is vertical. The respondents have prescribed reservation for each category separately, and thereafter, equal horizontal reservation is provided for women. As regards the unreserved seats, the same methodology has been adopted so as to ensure total reservation as nearly as possible 50% for women candidates and further unreserved seats are open for all categories of women candidates, i. e. . Scheduled Castes, Scheduled tribes and Other Backward Classes. Thus, the methodology adopted by the answering respondents clearly reveals that horizontal reservation has been provided for women candidates. A comparative chart has been produced pertaining to the Bhopal Municipal Corporation in respect of the year 2004 and the year 2009 to highlight that the reservation granted to women is well within the permissible limit of 50%. The allegation that there is reservation of 75% is absolutely misconceived and the same has been put forth in a fallacious manner, ( 6 ) IT is asseverated in the return that there are 14 municipal corporations and 96 municipalities in the State of M. P. In addition to that, there are 248 Nagar Panchayats (transitional areas) spread in 50 districts of the state of M. P. The petitioners have not submitted in the writ petitions that the process of reservation in respect of almost 50 districts has been completed. It is submitted that in respect of 43 districts, notification has already been published as contemplated under rule 7 of the 1994 Rules. In essence, the stand is that the election process has commenced to a concrete extent and the petitioners have challenged the validity at a belated stage. It is submitted that in respect of 43 districts, notification has already been published as contemplated under rule 7 of the 1994 Rules. In essence, the stand is that the election process has commenced to a concrete extent and the petitioners have challenged the validity at a belated stage. It is put forth that the State Legislature has provided horizontal reservation for the women within the permissible limit and hence, no fault can be found with it. It is worth noting that a stand has been taken in some of the writ petitions that reservation of 50% seats for women would result in total lack of control over the officers and administration of the corporations and municipalities. The said stand has been strongly refuted in the return. An explanation has been preferred how the reservation does not exceed 50% in entirely. It is contended that the provisions neither play foul with Articles 14 and 15 (1) of the Constitution of India nor do they run counter to any decision rendered by the apex Court. ( 7 ) A rejoinder affidavit has been filed to the return filed by the respondents No. ] and 3 contending, inter alia, that the reliance placed by the respondents on Article 243t of the Constitution of India as a source of power is absolutely untenable as the constitutional benchmark prescribed for reservation of seats for women is only 1/3 rd and, therefore, the State Legislature even though has the power to make provision for reservation of seats for women candidates in excess of the constitutional benchmark of 1/3rd, yet such provision has to be based on sound and cogent reasons. It is putforth that respondents have not given any justification for providing reservation for women in excess of 1/3rd. No scientific or systematic study was conducted before enhancing the percentage for women from 1/3rd to 50%. No material has been brought on record to demonstrate that women in the State of M. P. need reservation in excess of the prescribed constitutional benchmark of 1/3rd. The Constitution does not contemplate proportionate reservation for women and. therefore, there has to be a scientific base for providing 50% reservation for women. No material has been brought on record to demonstrate that women in the State of M. P. need reservation in excess of the prescribed constitutional benchmark of 1/3rd. The Constitution does not contemplate proportionate reservation for women and. therefore, there has to be a scientific base for providing 50% reservation for women. A classification has been made but in the absence of any cogent and germane reasons, solely on the base of sex, such classification is impermissible as that ex facie invites the frown of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. In the past election, women have got adequate representation in the local bodies and large number of women candidates were elected from unreserved wards and hence, there is no warrant or justification for providing further reservation. The reservation of 50% for women is in excess of their promotion to the total population in the State if the sex ratio of the 2001 census is taken note of. The sex ratio in the State of Madhya Pradesh was 919 females against 1000 males. The total percentage of women population in the State of M. P. is slightly over 45%. Thus, the reservation is in excess of the percentage of population. The women residing within the Municipal Corporation area are highly educated and they are well aware of their rights and, consequently, they need no protection in the form of reservation. In the city of Bhopal, as per the 2001 census, there were 898 women against 1000 men. Likewise, in Gwalior the ratio is 848, in Indore 912 and in Jabalpur, it is 908. Hence, the concept of proportionality has been thrown to the winds while determining the factum of reservation. The women candidates being educated can contest the election of ward members on the basis of their own merit. It is urged that during the pendency of the writ petition, the rule has been amended stipulating, inter alia, that reservation for women is horizontal and not vertical which means that the respondents are not at all aware about the concept of horizontal reservation. In horizontal reservation, the provision for reservation contemplates adjustment of seats/posts for reserved category candidates as against such candidates selected/elected on the basis of their own merit. The Municipal Corporation Act does not contain any such provision for the adjustment of seats. The total number of women candidates would exceed 50%. In horizontal reservation, the provision for reservation contemplates adjustment of seats/posts for reserved category candidates as against such candidates selected/elected on the basis of their own merit. The Municipal Corporation Act does not contain any such provision for the adjustment of seats. The total number of women candidates would exceed 50%. as women from any category can also be elected from any unreserved ward. Thus, the impugned provision, in fact, seeks to provide vertical reservation for women, which, when added with the reservation provided for the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Other backward Classes candidates, would amount to 75%. ( 8 ) BE it noted, on 25th September, 2009, in rule 5. sub-rule (6) was inserted in the madhya Pradesh Municipalities (Reservation of Office of Mayor and President) Rules, 1999. The said amendment reads as follows : " (6) In the context of Section 11-A of the madhya Pradesh Municipal Corporations act, 1956 (No. 23 of 1956) and Section 29-B of the Madhya Pradesh Municipalities act, 1961 (No. 37 of 1961), it is further clarified that the provisions of fifty per cent reservation for women shall be done horizontally in all categories, so that the overall reservation shall not exceed fifty per cent. " ( 9 ) IN Rule 3, after sub-rule (6) of the madhya Pradesh Municipalities (Reservation of Wards for Scheduled Castes, Scheduled tribes, Other Backward Classes and Women)Rules, 1994, the following sub-rule was added : " (7) In the context of Section 11 of the madhya Pradesh Municipal Corporation Act, 1956 (No. 25 of 1956) and Section 29-A of the Madhya Pradesh Municipalities Act, 1961 (No. 37 of 1961), it is further clarified that the provision of fifty per cent reservation for women shall be done horizontally in all categories, so that the overall reservation shall not exceed fifty per cent. " ( 10 ) AT this juncture, it is apposite to note that on behalf of the respondents-State, an affidavit has been filed in the course of hearing. We think it apt to produce paragraphs 1 to 3 of the affidavit. They read as follows : " 1. That, on the basis of information collected from various local bodies accompanying chart relating to the results of 60 local bodies in which besides the reserved seats only 1. 53% of women could win the election in the last elections of Local Bodies held in the year 2004. They read as follows : " 1. That, on the basis of information collected from various local bodies accompanying chart relating to the results of 60 local bodies in which besides the reserved seats only 1. 53% of women could win the election in the last elections of Local Bodies held in the year 2004. It would be proper to state that extraordinary Gazette Notification on 20 december, 2004 was issued in respect of candidates who won the said elections of local bodies. Copy of chart is enclosed herewith as Annexure-A. 2. That, in the last election of Parliament there were 29 seats out of which only 6 won the election and percentage of women category mla who could win the election was 20. 69%. Copy of the list of Members of Parliament, who won the election is Annexure-B. 3. That, in the last election, out of 230 members of Legislative Assembly only 25 women could win the election. Copy of the total candidates who won the election is filed as Annexure-C in which 25 women members were elected which comes to 10. 87%. " The said affidavit has been filed to emphasise how the participation of women in the governance of the body polity is really marginal and is of no signification. ( 11 ) WE have heard Mr. Sanjay Agrawal, mr. Sanjay K. Agrawal, Mr. Pankaj Dixit and mr. A. P. Shroti, learned counsel for the petitioners; Mr. R. D. Jain, learned Advocate general and Mr. Prashant Singh, learned additional Advocate General for the respondents; State; and Mr. A. K. Mishra, learned senior Counsel along with Mrs. Divyakeerti bohre, learned counsel for the respondent/municipal Corporation. ( 12 ) MR. Sanjay K. Agrawal, learned counsel for the petitioners; has raised the following submissions : (a) The impugned amendment by increasing the reservation for women from 1/3rd to 50% ex-facie violates the equality clause enshrined under Art. 14 of the Constitution and seeks to discriminate on the ground of sex which is violative of Art. 15 (1) of the constitution of India. (b) Prior to coming into force of the amended provision, 1/3rd of the seats were already reserved for women and thus, adequate representation was already provided to women in the local self government and there was absolutely no justification or warrant for increasing the percentage of reservation to 50% and further there is no nexus with the object sought to be achieved. (c) The increase of percentage for women would result in reverse discrimination against the rest of the citizens: (d) No systematic and scientific study has been undertaken before increasing the percentage of reservation for women and no identifiable, quantitative and qualitative data has been placed on record to demonstrate that the reservation of 50% wards for women is necessitous in the public interest or in the interest of the society at large. (e) The total percentage of women in the state of M. P. is about 47. 9% and, therefore, the reservation of 50% wards for women is disproportionate to their population in the state. That apart, women have been contesting in elections at various levels and they do not need the cratches of reservation. (f) The presence of majority of women councillors in the Corporation would weaken the unit of local self governance and would only strengthen the bureaucracy which would be counter to the constitutional mandate incorporated in Chapter IX-A. Quite apart from the above, the duties and functions of the councillors are extremely onerous which cannot be effectively discharged by women and thereby it would retard the development at the level of local self government. (g) The legislature has not kept in view the effect and impact of such increase on the society and while scrutinising the constitutional validity of the law, it is the duty of the court to see the direct and inevitable impact of the same, regard being had to the realistic background. (h) The legislation is contrary to the decision rendered by the Apex Court in Indra sawhney (supra) and other decisions and is, therefore, liable to be struck down as ultra vires. The learned counsel has placed reliance on the decisions rendered in Indra Sawhney (supra ). He has commended us to paragraphs 250 to 258, 261, 291, 804 to 812 and 842 of the said decision. Reliance has also been placed on the decisions rendered in Dr. Preeti shrivastava v. State of Madhya Pradesh. The learned counsel has placed reliance on the decisions rendered in Indra Sawhney (supra ). He has commended us to paragraphs 250 to 258, 261, 291, 804 to 812 and 842 of the said decision. Reliance has also been placed on the decisions rendered in Dr. Preeti shrivastava v. State of Madhya Pradesh. AIR 1999 SC 2894 and Than Singh v. State of madhya Pradesh, AIR 2005 MP 170 , From the decision in M. Nagraj and others v. Union of India and others (2006) 8 SCC 212 : ( AIR 2007 SC 71 ) emphasis has been laid on paragraphs 46 to 49, 102, 106 and 117. Inspiration has been drawn from the decisions in anuj Garg and another v. Hotel Association of India and others (2008) 3 SCC 1 : ( AIR 2008 SC 663 ) and DCM Financial Services limited v. J. N. Sareen and another (2008) 8 scc 1 : ( AIR 2008 SC 2255 ). ( 13 ) MR. Sanjay Agrawal learned counsel for the petitioner in W. P. No. 8942/2009, has raised the following contentions : (a) Articles 330 and 332 of the Constitution provide for reservation of seats for scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in the House of the People and the Legislative assembly of the State respectively in proportion to their population in the State and the Union Territory but there is no provision in the Constitution providing for proportionate reservation for women except the provision made under Article 243t and, therefore, the reservation as engrafted under Section 11 (3) and (4) of the Act runs counter to the constitutional philosophy. (b) The terms used "not less than one-third" in Article 243t should be understood as "not more than one-third" in the context in which the language is employed. No discretion has been provided to the State Legislature than what has been stated in the said article and the Parliament did not want to leave anything to the discretion of the State legislature and fixed the percentage of reservation for women at one-third by using the phraseology ''not less than one-third". (c) Providing proportionate reservation for women would amount to adding another class or category in addition to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and Other Backward classes. (c) Providing proportionate reservation for women would amount to adding another class or category in addition to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and Other Backward classes. Such reservation has no constitutional sanction and the State Legislature cannot provide 50% reservation to women in each and every category as that squarely offends the rule of equality provided under arts. 14 and 15 (1) of the Constitution. (d) The provision made by the State Legislature providing reservation is sans relevant consideration and when no data is provided, the concept of judicial review to examine the issue on the anvil of power under Art. 15 (3)of the Constitution is attracted. (e) By virtue of reservation for women in respect of seats in the Municipal council, classes have been created but there is no intelligible data to sustain such classification and, therefore, it plays foul with the concept of equality which is the corner stone of Art. 14 of the Constitution. (f) The Constitution envisages only to provide adequate representation to women as is evident from the object and reasons of Constitution (Seventy Fourth Amendment) Act, 1992 and adequate representation cannot be understood to mean to provide proportionate reservation for women. There is a vast difference between 'adequate representation and 'proportionate reservation' and by no stretch of imagination the logic of 'adequate representation' can be equated with 'proportionate reservation'! (g) The representation of one-third in the total number of seats in every Municipal corporation and Municipality which was prevalent can be said to be adequate representation. Nothing has been brought on record to show that the same was not adequate. The objects and reasons of the amendment Act also does not so spell out. The representation which has been provided for women is more than the population ratio and the benefit of reservation has been further given by the 1994 Rules. Further, by application of the rules, i. e. , sub-rule (4) of rule 3 of the Madhya Pradesh Municipalities (Reservation of Wards for Scheduled castes, Scheduled Tribes, Other Backward classes and Women) Rules, 1994, the fraction of less than half shall be ignored and fraction of equal to half or more shall be counted as one. The benefit of reservation has further been given in favour of women. The benefit of reservation has further been given in favour of women. (h) It is permissible in law for women to contest election from unreserved wards and, thus, in the ultimate eventuate, the total number of women representation would exceed the maximum limit of the population ratio. (i) The maximum limit of reservation which has been provided in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) is 50%'except in very extra-ordinary situation but in the case at hand, the over all reservation comes up to 75% which is totally impermissible. (j) The law relating to vertical and horizontal reservation is not possible in respect of reservation for seats in Municipal Corporation or Municipalities and. therefore, the amendment of the Rules putting forth 50% reservation is horizontal and does not save the enactment. (k) Article 15 (3) is an enabling provision and is to be exercised in the manner so that the rules of equality provided under Article 15 (1) is not destroyed but in the case at hand the direct, real and inevitable effect of the impugned legislation is the destruction of Art. 15 (1) which is an anathema to the Constitutional philosophy. (1) The doctrine of direct, real and inevitable effect has to be applied to the case at hand and on applicability of the said principle, it would be clear that the impugned legislation provides for more than 75% reservation which the law does not countenance and, thus, the said provisions are to be declared as ultra vires. To bolster the said submissions, the learned counsel has placed reliance on the decisions rendered in Indra Sawhney (supra), miss Art) Sapru v. State of J. and K. and others, AIR 1981 SC 1009 , Swati Gupta (Ms) v. State of U. P. (1995) 2 SCC 560 . Anil Kumar gupta v. State of U. P. (1995) 5 SCC 173 , M. Nagraj (supra) and Dr. Preeti Shrivastava (supra ). Rajesh Kumar Daria v. State of U. P. , AIR 2005 SC 2540 ,. pattatraya Motiram v. State of Bombay. AIR 1953 Bom 311 and menaka Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR 1978 sc 597 . ( 14 ) MR. Preeti Shrivastava (supra ). Rajesh Kumar Daria v. State of U. P. , AIR 2005 SC 2540 ,. pattatraya Motiram v. State of Bombay. AIR 1953 Bom 311 and menaka Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR 1978 sc 597 . ( 14 ) MR. A. P. Shroti, learned counsel for the petitioner in Writ Petition No. 9595/2009 which pertains to the assail of the provisions contained in the Municipalities Act and the rules framed thereunder, has advanced the following proponements : (i) Sections 29-A (3) and (4) as amended by the Act-No. 16/2007 in effect prescribes for 75% reservation for women in election which exceeds the 50% limit contrary to the law laid down in Indra Sawhney (supra) and infringes the equality clause contained in arts. 14 and 15 (1) of the Constitution. (ii) The ceiling limit of 50% as prescribed cannot be confined to Art. 16 (4) only but is applicable to reservation made under Art. 15 (4) and in effect to Art. 15 (3) as well. (iii) The reservation provided under Section 29-A and Art. 243 is for women category and not to ward to which such woman belongs and. therefore, the reservation is category-wise and such prescription for reservation of wards is contrary to Art. 243 of the constitution. (iv) Rules 3 (3) and 3 (5) of the 1994 Rules speak about the reservation of wards for women whereas such terminology does not occur in Section 29-A or in any other provisions of the Municipalities Act nor docs it occur in Art. 243 of the Constitution and, therefore, the said rule transgresses the scheme of the statute as well as the constitutional provision. ( 15 ) MR. R. D. Jain, learned Advocate General and Mr. Prashant Singh, learned Additional Advocate General for the State, combating the aforesaid submissions, have advanced the following proponements; (a) The principle of reservation as laid down in Indra Sawhney (supra) and in other decisions in that time is not applicable to the present factual matrix as the said decisions were rendered in the context of service matters pertaining to appointment and promotion, and in respect of admission to educational institution. (b) The averments made in the petitions do not satisfy the requirement of the pleadings which are imperative when the constitutional validity of an enactment is called in question. (b) The averments made in the petitions do not satisfy the requirement of the pleadings which are imperative when the constitutional validity of an enactment is called in question. (c) The percentage fixed for women in respect of wards is an affirmative and protective action, a special provision, under Article 15 (3) of the Constitution and is equally distributed amongst all categories and hence, does not exceed the ceiling limit (d) An affirmative action of the State provides level playing field and it has equalizing results. (e) Article 243-T is an enabling provision for the purpose of taking affirmative measure and the science of interpretation does not give allowance to the interpretation by the learned counsel for the petitioners. (0 The aim of the Constitution is to establish and egalitarian piece of legislation to reinforce the same in its conceptual eventuality. (g) The stand that women in the State of madhya Pradesh are highly educated and adequately represented in the Municipal corporation and Municipalities is far from the reality and the Legislature in its wisdom has prescribed the present affirmation which is constitutionally permissible. (h) The purpose of the amendment, is to give greater participation to female population in the administration of local bodies and such a step being a progressive one does hot deserve to be struck down. (i) The reservation of wards for women has not been made solely on the basis of sex but other factors such as upliftment of the conditions of women and their preparation at the grassroot level of democracy are also kept in view. ( 16 ) TO buttress the aforesaid submissions, the learned counsel for the State have commended us to various passages from Indra sawhney (supra), Toguru Sudhakar Reddy and another v. The Government of A. P. and others, AIR 1994 SC 544, M. Nagraj (supra)and placed reliance on the decisions rendered in Govt, of A. P. v. P. B. Vijay Kumar, AIR 1995 SC 1648 , Tulsiram Jatav v, Union of india and others, 2001 (4) MPLJ 132, E. V. Chivnaih v. State (2005) 1 SCC 394 : ( AIR 2005 SC 162 ), Dr. Satish v. State of M. P. AIR 2009 MP 185 and Rajesh Kumar Gupta y. State of U. P. AIR 2005 SC 2540 . Satish v. State of M. P. AIR 2009 MP 185 and Rajesh Kumar Gupta y. State of U. P. AIR 2005 SC 2540 . ( 17 ) BEFORE we proceed to address with regard to the constitutional validity of the provisions under assail of 1956 Act and 1961 act we think it apt to refer to certain citations in the field as regards the role of Court while exercising power of judicial review in this arena. ( 18 ) IN R. S. Joshi. Sales Tax Officer, gujarat and others v. Ajit Mills Ltd, and another, (1997) 4 SCC 98, Krishna Iyer, J. , in his inimitable style, expressed thus : "2. A prefactory caveat - When examining a legislation from the angle of its vires, the Court has to be resilient, not rigid, forward - looking, not static, liberal, not verbal- in interpreting the organic law of the nation. We must also remember the constitutional proposition enunciated by the U. S: supreme Court in Munn v. Illinois viz. , "that courts do not substitute their social and economic beliefs for the judgment of legislative bodies'. Moreover, while trespasses will not be forgiven, a presumption of constitutionality must colour judicial construction. These factors, recognised by our Court, are essential to the modus vivendi between the judicial and legislative branches of the State, both working beneath the canopy of the Constitution. " ( 19 ) IN State of Andhra Pradesh and others v. Mc Dowell and Co. and others, AIR 1996 SC 1627 , their Lordships of the Apex court have expressed the view as under : "a law made by the Parliament or the legislature can be struck down by Courts on two grounds and two grounds alone, viz. (1)lack of legislative competence and (2) violation of any of the fundamental rights guaranteed in Part-Ill of the Constitution or of any other constitutional provision. There is no third ground. If an enactment is challenged as violative of Article 14, it can be struck down only if it is found that it is violative of the equality clause/equal protection clause enshrined therein. Similarly, if an enactment is challenged as violative of any of the fundamental rights guaranteed by Clauses (a) to (g) of Article 19 (1), it can be struck down only if it is found not saved by any of the clauses (2) to (6) of article 19 and so on. Similarly, if an enactment is challenged as violative of any of the fundamental rights guaranteed by Clauses (a) to (g) of Article 19 (1), it can be struck down only if it is found not saved by any of the clauses (2) to (6) of article 19 and so on. No enactment can be struck down by just saying that it is arbitrary or unreasonable. Some or other constitutional infirmity has to be found before invalidating an Act. An enactment cannot be struck down on the ground that Court thinks it unjustified. The Parliament and the Legislatures, composed as they are of the representatives of the people, are supposed to know and be aware of the needs of the people and what is good and bad for them. The Court cannot sit in judgment over their wisdom. An enactment cannot be struck down by applying, the principle of proportionality when its. applicability even in administrative law sphere is not fully and finally settled. It is one thing to say that a restriction imposed upon a fundamental right can be struck down if it is disproportionate, excessive or unreasonable and quite another thing to say that the Court can strike down enactment if it thinks it unreasonable, unnecessary or unwarranted. The two rules stated above for striking down of enactments are however confined to an Act made by the Legislature. " ( 20 ) IT is settled law that the allegations regarding the violation of constitutional provision should be specific, clear and unambiguous and the burden is on the person who impeaches the law as violative of the constitutional guarantee to give relevant particulars and show that the particular provision is infirm for all or any of the reasons stated by him. In Gauri Shankar v. Union of India, (1994) 6 SCC 349 : (1994 AIR SCW 4059): ( AIR 1995 SC 55 ), it has beep reiterated as under- " (b) that there is always a presumption in favour of the constitutionality of an enactment and the burden is upon him who attacks it to show that there has been a clear transgression of the constitutional principles; (c) that it must be presumed that the Legislature understands and correctly appreciates the need of its own people, that its laws are directed to problems made manifest by experience and that its discriminations are based on adequate grounds;. . . xxxxxx xxxxxx (e) that in order to sustain the presumption of constitutionality the Court may take into consideration matter's of common knowledge, matters of common report, the history of the times and may assume every state of facts which can be conceived existing at the time of legislation. " ( 21 ) IN State of W. B. and another v. EITA india Ltd. , (2003) 5 SCC 239 : ( AIR 2003 sc 4126 ) it has been expressed thus : "4. In examining the constitutional validity of the impugned provisions of a statute, it will be useful to bear in mind the following well-settled propositions. If a legislation is found to lack in legislative competence or is found to be in contravention of any provision of Part III or any other provision of the constitution, the impugned legislation cannot escape the vice of unconstitutionality.- -. . . . . . . . . " ' ( 22 ) AS an issue has been raised with regard to the real, direct and inevitable impact of the law and the duty of the Court, we may refer with profit to the decision rendered in menaka Gandhi (supra) wherein it has been held as under: "67. . . . . . Here we find the germ of the doctrine of direct and inevitable effect, which necessarily must be effect intended by the legislature, or in other words, what may conveniently and appropriately be described as the doctrine of intended and real effect. So also in Sakal Paper (P) Ltd. v. The Union of India (1962) 3 SCR 842 : ( AIR 1962 SC 305 ) while considering the constitutional validity of the Newspaper (Price and Page)Act, 1956 and Daily Newspaper (Price and page) Order, 1960 this Court applied the test of direct and immediate effect. This Court, relying upon the decision in Dwarkadas shrinivas v. The Sholapur and Weaving Co. Ltd. 1954 SCR. 674 : ( AIR 1954 SC 119 )pointed out that "it is the substance and the practical result of the act of the State that should be considered rather than its purely legal aspect" and "the correct approach in such cases should be to enquire as to what in substance is the loss or injury caused to the citizen and not merely what manner and method has been adopted by the State in placing the restrictions". Since "the direct and immediate effect of the order" would be to restrain a newspaper from publishing any number of pages for carrying its news and views, which it has a fundamental right under Article 19 (1) (a) to do, unless it raises the selling price as provided in the Schedule to the Order, it was held by this Court that the order was violative of the right of the newspapers guaranteed by Article 19 (1) (a ). Here again the emphasis was on the direct and inevitable effect of the impugned action of the State rather than on its object and form or subject-matter. '' ( 23 ) IN Daya Ram and another v. State of m. P. and others, 2003 (4) MPHT 435 it has been stated thus :- "3. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The modus vivendi which requires a purposive and constructive ratiocination while engaged in viceration of the provision also warrants that a policy decision, a facet of the Legislature or at times a spectrum of the executive though may draw strength and stimulus in all its variation from the greatest instrument, i. e. , the Constitution in a given case and in a particular fact situation if the provisions trespass the quintessential characteristic of Organic Law or Judge made law should not be allowed to stand. " ( 24 ) KEEPING in view the aforesaid guidance, we shall presently dwell upon the controversy that has emerged. The Parliament, with the intention to organise the local bodies, inserted specific provisions in the Constitution and, ultimately, it culminated in the passing of the Constitution (Seventy-four amendment) Act, 1992. Thus, in essentiality, the local governance has been ascribed a role under the Constitution. In this context, it is apt to refer to the Statement of Objects and Reasons behind the Amendment Act. "in many States local bodies have become weak and ineffective on account of a variety of reasons, including the failure to hold regular elections, prolonged supersessions and inadequate devolution of powers and functions. As a result. Urban Local Bodies are not able to perform effectively as vibrant democratic units of self-government. 2. "in many States local bodies have become weak and ineffective on account of a variety of reasons, including the failure to hold regular elections, prolonged supersessions and inadequate devolution of powers and functions. As a result. Urban Local Bodies are not able to perform effectively as vibrant democratic units of self-government. 2. Having regard to these inadequacies, it is considered necessary that provisions relating to Urban Local Bodies are incorporated in the Constitution particularly for- (i) putting on a firmer footing the relationship between the State Government and the urban Local Bodies, with respect to - (a) the functions and taxation powers; and (b) arrangements for revenue sharing; (ii) Ensuring regular conduct of elections; (iii) ensuring timely elections in the case of supersession; and (iv) providing adequate representation for the weaker sections like Scheduled Castes, scheduled Tribes and women. 3. Accordingly, it is proposed to add a new part relating to the Urban Local Bodies in the Constitution to provide for-xxxx xxxx xxxx (e) reservation of seats in every Municipality- (i) for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled tribes in proportion to their population of which not less than one-third shall be for less than one third of the total number of seats; (ii) for women which shall not be less than one third of the total number of seats; (iii) in favour of backward class of citizens if so provided by the Legislature of the state; (iv) for Scheduled Castes, Scheduled tribes and women in the office of Chairpersons as may be specified in the State law;" ( 25 ) ARTICLE 243t which is a consequence of the amendment is as follows : 243t. Reservation of seats. (1) Seats shall be reserved for the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes in every Municipality and the number of seats so reserved shall bear, as nearly as may be, the same proportion to the total number of seats to be filled by direct election in that Municipality as the. population of the Scheduled castes in the Municipal area or of the Scheduled Tribes in the Municipal area bears to the total population of that area and such seats may be allotted by rotation to different constituencies in a Municipality. (2) Not less than one-third of the total number of seats reserved under clause (1)shall be reserved for women belonging to the scheduled Castes or, as the case may be, the scheduled Tribes. (2) Not less than one-third of the total number of seats reserved under clause (1)shall be reserved for women belonging to the scheduled Castes or, as the case may be, the scheduled Tribes. (3) Not less than one-third (including the number of seats reserved for women belonging to the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes) of the total number of seats to be filled by direct election in every Municipality shall be reserved for women and such seats may be allotted by rotation to different constituencies in a Municipality. (4) The offices of Chairpersons in the municipalities shall be reserved for the scheduled Castes, the Scheduled Tribes and women in such manner as the Legislature of a Slate may. by law. provide. (5) The reservation of seats under clauses (1) and (2) and the reservation of offices of chairpersons (other than the reservation for women) under clause (4) shall cease to have effect on the expiration of the period specified in Article 334. (6) Nothing in this Part shall prevent the legislature of a State from making any provision for reservation of seats in any Municipality or offices of Chairpersons in the Municipalities in favour of ward class of citizens," ( 26 ) IN pursuance of the same, the Slate legislature amended the Municipal Corporation Act, 1956 and the Municipalities Act, 1961. Initially, there was prescription that as nearly as possible 1/3rd seats shall be reserved for women. Thereafter, it has been enhanced to 50% by the impugned legislation. Presently, Section 11 of the 1956 Act reads as follows : "11. Reservation of seats. (1) Out of the total number of wards determined under subsection (1) of Section 10, such number of seats shall be reserved for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in every Municipal corporation as bears, as nearly as may be, the same proportion to the total number of seats to be filled by direct election in the municipal Corporation as the population of the Scheduled Castes or of the Scheduled tribes in the Municipal' area bears to the total population of that area and such wards shall be those in which the population of the scheduled Castes or the Scheduled Tribes, as the case may be, is most concentrated. (2) As nearly as possible twenty five per cent of the total number of wards shall be reserved for other backward classes in such municipal Corporations, where fifty per cent or less seats are reserved for Scheduled castes and Scheduled Tribes, and such seats shall be allotted by rotation to different wards in such manner as may be prescribed: provided that if from any ward so reserved no nomination paper is filed for election, as a councillor, by any member of the backward classes, then the Collector shall be competent to declare it as unreserved. (3) As nearly as possible fifty per cent of the total number of seats reserved under subsections (1) and (2) shall be reserved for women belonging to the Scheduled Castes or the Scheduled Tribes or other backward classes, as the case may be. (4) As nearly as possible fifty percent (including the number of seats reserved for women belonging to the Scheduled Castes, scheduled Tribes and other backward classes), of the total number of seats to be filled by direct election in every Municipal corporation shall be reserved for women and such seats shall be allotted by rotation to different wards in a Municipal Corporation in such manner as may be prescribed, (5) The reservation of seats under sub-sections (1), (2) and (3) shall cease to have effect on the expiration of the period specified in Article 334 of the Constitution of India. Explanation. In this section 'other backward classes' means category of persons belonging to backward classes as notified by the State Government. "