JUDGMENT Hon’ble Tarun Agarwala, J.—Students indulging in arson, defacing and destroying public property has become a fashion in modern times. Taking the law in their own hands has become a status symbol to the students and this mal practice adopted by the students at large needs to be curbed. Any kind of legislation, regulations framed from time to time becomes inadequate in comparison to the brutal lethal student force that is unleashed when things go wrong and violence erupts in the campus on account of an insignificant or a trivial incident. Whatever may be the reason, it does not give any right to the students to take the law into their own hands and destroy public property. Such acts needs to be condemned. A student who indulge in these activities needs to be punished. This is precisely what has happened in the present case in an incident which occurred in the campus of the Aligarh Muslim University in the night of 16.9.2007. 2. The petitioner, is a Post Graduate student in the Aligarh Muslim University, doing a course in Master of Social Work (MSW), was suspended and, after issuing a show cause notice and, providing an opportunity of hearing, was expelled for three academic sessions with a further rider that he would not be given any further admission in any other course in the University. The facts leading to the petitioner’s suspension and thereafter his expulsion, which led to the filing of the present writ petition is, that a student of the University was assassinated on the night of 16.9.2007. This news spread like wild fire and, agitated the students and an unlawful assembly of several hundred students gathered outside the JNMC Casualty Ward where the body was kept. It is alleged that the petitioner along with several other students barged into the chamber of the Chief Medical Officer where the Vice-Chancellor, Proctor and other authorities and officials of the University along with the police administration were present. A heated argument erupted between the students and the authorities of the University, which eventually transgressed the barriers of decency and discipline. The Vice-Chancellor and the other officials had to escape the wrath of the students. It is alleged that the petitioner along with other named students instigated the mob to vandalise and ransack the public property. A heated argument erupted between the students and the authorities of the University, which eventually transgressed the barriers of decency and discipline. The Vice-Chancellor and the other officials had to escape the wrath of the students. It is alleged that the petitioner along with other named students instigated the mob to vandalise and ransack the public property. The mob marched towards the Vice-Chancellor lodge and, whatever came in their way, was ransacked and destroyed. The Vice-Chancellor’s residence was not only ransacked but valuables, including the furniture, fittings, personal belongings of the Vice-Chancellor, etc. was destroyed and was put on fire. The Proctor’s Office and Provost Office was also ransacked and a similar treatment was also given at these places. 3. On the basis of this incident, a named F.I.R. against the petitioner and 16 other students was lodged. The petitioner along with other named students were suspended by an order dated 24.9.2007. This suspension order indicated the reasons/charges for their suspension. On 7.10.2007, a show cause notice was issued to the petitioner, to show cause, why disciplinary action should not be taken against him under the rules framed by the University. The petitioner submitted a reply dated 10.10.2007 totally denying his involvement in the incident. A notice dated 24.11.2007 was issued directing the petitioner to appear before the Disciplinary Committee. The petitioner alleges that he appeared before the committee and that the committee only asked one question to which he replied and that he had submitted two certificates of the Circle Officer of the Police Station where the F.I.R. was lodged, in which it was indicated that the petitioner was not involved in the destruction of the property of the University, and that, the petitioner, in fact, was helping in maintaining peace amongst the students. Inspite of these certificates being filed, the Disciplinary Committee submitted its recommendation on 9.12.2007 holding that the petitioner admitted his presence outside the Casualty Ward, on the night in question, and that he had admitted going to the canteen after leaving the Casualty Ward. The Disciplinary Committee found that the contention of the petitioner that he went to his room and remained there till sunrise was incorrect and that the petitioner had made contradictory statements and therefore, his statement was unreliable. The Disciplinary Committee also found that the certificate relied upon by the petitioner was unreliable. The Disciplinary Committee found that the contention of the petitioner that he went to his room and remained there till sunrise was incorrect and that the petitioner had made contradictory statements and therefore, his statement was unreliable. The Disciplinary Committee also found that the certificate relied upon by the petitioner was unreliable. The Disciplinary Committee, on the basis of the intelligence report, found that the petitioner had gone to various hostels, namely, A.I. Hall, M.M.Hall, V.M. Hall, Habib Hall and mobilised and instigated the students to go to the Vice-Chancellor lodge to ransack and vandalise the public property. The intelligence report indicated that the petitioner was seen on the road instigating the students. The Disciplinary Committee, on the basis of this intelligence report found that the petitioner was not involved personally in ransacking the property of the University but was found guilty in mobilising the students and instigating them to vandalise the property of the University. The Disciplinary Committee also took into consideration the past conduct of the petitioner wherein, he was found to be involved in previous acts of arson and destruction of the University property and, taking all these facts into consideration, the disciplinary authority found that the petitioner had misconducted himself and committed acts of indiscipline which amounted to misconduct under Part-II of Rule 4(i), (ii), (iii), (iv) and (vii) of the Aligarh Muslim University Students’ Conduct and Discipline Rules, 1985. 4. On the basis of the recommendation given by the Disciplinary Committee, the Vice-Chancellor, by its order dated 22.1.2008 expelled the petitioner, from the rolls of the University, for three academic sessions from 2007-08 onwards and, further debarring the petitioner from seeking any admission in any class or course in the University in future. The petitioner, being aggrieved, filed an appeal before the Executive Council under Section 36-B of the Aligarh Muslim University Act. The Executive Council, by its resolution dated 17.1.2008, referred the matter to the Grievance Committee to give an opportunity of a personal hearing to the petitioner which was provided and, thereafter the Grievance Committee submitted its report dated 4.4.2008, which was considered by the Executive Council in its meeting held on 5.7.2008 and, after considering the matter, the Executive Council passed an unanimous resolution affirming the order of expulsion passed by the Vice-Chancellor and, consequently dismissing the appeal of the petitioner. The petitioner, being aggrieved by the aforesaid orders, has filed the present writ petition challenging the same on various grounds. 5. Heard Sri Diwakar Rai Sharma, the learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri Shashi Nandan, the learned Senior Counsel, assisted by Smt. Sunita Agarwal, the learned counsel for the Aligarh Muslim University and its authorities. 6. The learned counsel for the petitioner raised several issues and contended that the principles of natural justice was violated with impunity which caused prejudice to the petitioner and therefore, the impugned orders stood vitiated. The learned counsel submitted that a show cause notice was issued for the incident which occurred on 16.9.2007, whereas, the petitioner has been expelled, taking into account his previous conduct and taking into account the intelligence report for which the petitioner was not put to notice nor an opportunity to rebut the allegations made in intelligence report was given. The non-supply of the intelligence report and by not providing an opportunity to rebut these documents seriously prejudiced the petitioner which was in gross violation of the principles of audi alteram partem. The learned counsel further submitted that the intelligence report which was relied upon by the Disciplinary Committee was not signed by any person and had been prepared subsequently and therefore, no cognizance on this report could be taken into consideration by the Disciplinary Committee. The learned counsel further submitted that the Circle Officer had certified that the petitioner was not involved in the destruction of the University and that the petitioner was given a clean chit and was absolved from the incident which unfortunately had been discarded by the Disciplinary Committee without assigning any valid reason. The learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that the resolution of the Executive Council was also liable to be quashed as it suffered from various infirmities. The learned counsel submitted that the quorum of the Executive Council was incomplete and therefore, the resolution of the Executive Council stood vitiated on account of the mandatory non-compliance of having a proper quorum for holding a meeting. Further, the Vice-Chancellor not only chaired the meeting of the Executive Council, but also participated in the deliberations and voted for the resolution, which action, of the Vice-Chancellor, was totally illegal since it was his own order which was challenged in the appeal. Further, the Vice-Chancellor not only chaired the meeting of the Executive Council, but also participated in the deliberations and voted for the resolution, which action, of the Vice-Chancellor, was totally illegal since it was his own order which was challenged in the appeal. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the Vice-Chancellor could not be a judge of his own cause and therefore, the resolution of the Executive Council stood vitiated on account of this fatal error. In support of his submission, the learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance upon a decision of this Court in Dr. Bishambhar Dayal Gupta v. Aligarh Muslim University Aligarh and others, 1993(3)UPLBEC 2114. 7. On the other hand, Sri Shashi Nandan, the learned senior counsel submitted that the petitioner raised no grievance against the intelligence report before the appellate authority and therefore, it was too late for the petitioner to raise such technical infirmities which, in any case, was removed and that full opportunity was given by the Grievance Committee to the petitioner to dispute the correctness of the intelligence report. The learned counsel submitted that inspite of an opportunity being granted, the petitioner could not point out any error in the intelligence report, and that, in fact, most of the allegations made in the intelligence report was admitted by the petitioner. The learned counsel submitted that even though the intelligence report was not supplied to the petitioner by the Disciplinary Committee, nonetheless, the contents of the report had been supplied and that the petitioner was cross-examined on this aspect and therefore, the learned counsel submitted that the principles of natural justice was duly complied with. The learned counsel further submitted that the intelligence report was duly signed by the officers who had prepared the report but for the reasons of security, the names were not disclosed when a copy of the intelligence report was given to the petitioner. The learned counsel has placed the original intelligence report before the Court which the Court has perused and finds that the said report has been signed by the persons, who had prepared it. 8. The learned counsel has placed the original intelligence report before the Court which the Court has perused and finds that the said report has been signed by the persons, who had prepared it. 8. In the light of the aforesaid facts, which has been culled out from the record, and in view of the submissions made by the parties at some length and before dealing with each of the issues raised, it would be appropriate to deal with the certain provisions of the Act and its Statutes. 9. Statute 35 of the Statutes of the University provides a provision for the maintenance of discipline amongst the students of the University. Statute 35(1) gives all powers relating to discipline and disciplinary action to the Vice-Chancellor. Statute 35.2 provides that the Vice-Chancellor could delegate any or all of his powers to any such officers as he may specify on his behalf. Statute 35.5 provides framing of the Rules relating to discipline and proper conduct. Based on this provision, the Aligarh Muslim University Students’ Conduct and Discipline Rules, 1985 has been framed which has been approved by the Academic Council. Rule 4(i), (ii), (iii), (iv) and (vii) under which the petitioner has been expelled is quoted herein for ready reference : “Acts of Indiscipline and Misconduct : Any act of misconduct committed by a student inside or outside the campus shall be an act of violation of discipline of the University. Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing provision, violations of the discipline shall include : (i) Disruption of teaching, student examination, research or administrative work, curricular or extra-curricular activity or residential life of the members of the University, including any attempt to prevent any member of the University or its staff from carrying on his or her work : and any act reasonable likely to cause such disruption. (ii) Damaging or defacing University or any other property or the property of members of the University or any other property inside or outside the University campus. (iii) Engaging in any attempt at wrongful confinement of teachers, offices, employees and students of the University or camping inside or creating nuisance inside the boundaries of houses of teachers, officers and other members of the University. (iv) Use of abusive and derogatory slogans or intimidatory language or incitement of hatred and violence or any act calculated to further the same. (v) ................................. (vi) ................................. (iv) Use of abusive and derogatory slogans or intimidatory language or incitement of hatred and violence or any act calculated to further the same. (v) ................................. (vi) ................................. (vii) An assault upon, or intimidation of, or insulting behaviour towards a teacher, officer, employee or student or any other person. The penalties are provided in Rule 7. Rule 7(xiii) and (xiv), being relevant to the issue in question, provides : (xiii) Expulsion from the University for a specified period. (xiv) Disqualifying from further studies, or prohibition of further admission or re-admission. Rule 9 of the Rules provides : “No penalty, provided in Clauses (x), (xi), (xii), (xiii) and (xiv) of Rule 7 shall be imposed without giving the students a reasonable opportunity of being heard.” 10. Sections 36-A and 36-B of the Aligarh Muslim University Act provides an appeal before the Executive Council and the procedure for such an appeal. Statute 3 provides that the Vice-Chancellor would be the Chairman of the Executive Council. Statute 16(3) provides for the quorum of the Executive Council, which reads as under: “Fifteen members of the Executive Council shall form a quorum for a meeting of the Executive Council.” 11. Under Statute 28, the Disciplinary Committee and the Grievance Committee has been constituted. Rule 9 of the Rules of 1985 provides that no penalty with regard to expulsion and disqualification from further admission in the University could be imposed without giving the student a reasonable opportunity of being heard. 12. The learned counsel submitted that the Disciplinary Committee, while holding the petitioner guilty of the misconduct, took into consideration, the previous conduct of the petitioner and also took into consideration the intelligence report which could not have been taken into consideration as these facts and allegations were not part of the show cause notice nor such documents could be relied upon without giving an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. The learned counsel submitted that the findings given by the Disciplinary Committee entails civil consequences which caused serious prejudice to the petitioner. The denial of getting a copy of the intelligence report was violative of the principles of natural justice and, on this short ground, the recommendation of the Disciplinary Committee stood vitiated and, the order of the Vice-Chancellor which was based on such recommendation, was liable to be quashed. 13. The denial of getting a copy of the intelligence report was violative of the principles of natural justice and, on this short ground, the recommendation of the Disciplinary Committee stood vitiated and, the order of the Vice-Chancellor which was based on such recommendation, was liable to be quashed. 13. The principle of natural justice cannot be imprisoned within a straight jacket formula and its application is dependant upon several factors as held by the Supreme Court in Union of India v. P.K. Roy and others, 1968(2)SCR 186. Keeping this principle in mind, mere violation of the principles of natural justice is not sufficient. Something more is required to be shown by the Court to vitiate the order, namely, prejudice as held by the Supreme Court in Managing Director, ECIL,Hyderabad and others v. B. Karunakar and others, 1993(4)SCC 727 (para 31). The Supreme Court further held that the person has to show as to how the order had prejudiced him. 14. Adherence of the principles of natural justice is required under Article 14 of the Constitution of India which has also been embodied by the University, in Rule 9 of the Rules of 1985 which provides opportunity of hearing. The rule of i, namely, that no one should be condemned unheard, is required to be followed, i.e., hear the other side. Notice is the first limb of this principle. It must be precise and should apprise the party with clear facts or the charges which he has to meet. It is essential that a party is put to notice of the material relied against him before any adverse order is passed against him, which is passed on such adverse material. This, in my opinion, is one of the most important principle of natural justice and, violation of this principle, violates the principles of natural justice or fair play and, consequently, vitiates the order. 15. In the present case, this is precisely what the respondents have done. They have violated the principles of natural justice. The Disciplinary Committee has used the material, namely, the intelligence report and previous conduct of the petitioner without giving notice to the petitioner. This was in violation of the principles of natural justice, as embodied under Article 14 of the Constitution of India. They have violated the principles of natural justice. The Disciplinary Committee has used the material, namely, the intelligence report and previous conduct of the petitioner without giving notice to the petitioner. This was in violation of the principles of natural justice, as embodied under Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The recommendation of the Disciplinary Committee, relying upon the adverse material, seriously prejudiced the petitioner but, by saying so, the matter does not finally come to an end. Whenever an order is struck down as invalid, being in violation of natural justice, the matter does not come to an end and it is always open to the disciplinary authority to pass a fresh order after complying with the provisions of natural justice. This Court can strike off the order of the disciplinary authority on the short ground of violation of the principles of natural justice and consequentially remit the matter again to the authority to decide the matter afresh after supplying the necessary documents and, after giving notice to the petitioner of the adverse material relied upon and, after providing an opportunity of hearing, but, as stated earlier, the principles of natural justice cannot be confined in a rigid formula or kept in a straight jacket and, its application is dependant upon several factors and, applies to the particular facts and circumstances of each case. In my opinion, the order of the disciplinary authority can be maintained on account of the post decisional hearing given by the appellate authority wherein full opportunity was provided. The intelligence report was supplied and the petitioner was accosted with his past antecedent and he was appraised of the findings given in the intelligence report. 16. In Canara Bank v. V.K. Awasthy, AIR 2005 SC 2090 , the Supreme Court held that post decisional hearing would obliterate procedural deficiency of a pre-decisional hearing. Consequently, the defect initially incurred by the disciplinary authority stood removed and, now, there was no violation of the principles of natural justice. 16. In Canara Bank v. V.K. Awasthy, AIR 2005 SC 2090 , the Supreme Court held that post decisional hearing would obliterate procedural deficiency of a pre-decisional hearing. Consequently, the defect initially incurred by the disciplinary authority stood removed and, now, there was no violation of the principles of natural justice. In Canara Bank and others v. Debasis Das and others, 2003(4)SCC 557, the Supreme Court held, that where an opportunity of post decisional hearing was granted by the appellate authority by giving a personal hearing and no prejudice had been shown by the incumbent, in such circumstances, there was no violation of the principles of natural justice and that the rule of fair play now provided obliterated the initial lacuna of not providing a pre decisional hearing. 17. In the light of the aforesaid decisions, the Court finds that the intelligence report was provided by the respondents to the petitioner pursuant to the interim order of the Court. The Grievance Committee has provided full opportunity to the petitioner and he was put to notice of his past antecedents also. The Court finds that the petitioner was questioned on all the findings given in the intelligence report. The Grievance Committee records the admission of the petitioner with regard to the past antecedents and also records his presence at various places mentioned in the intelligence report on the night of the incident in question. The Grievance Committee concluded that the petitioner had made contradictory statements and that the certificates issued by the police authorities was not reliable. The Grievance Committee found that the charges levelled against the petitioner were correct. The antecedents of the petitioner was also found to be correct. Consequently, the Court is of the opinion that the principles of natural justice stood fully complied with and the prejudice, which was initially caused to the petitioner, stood removed after the appellate authority provided an opportunity of hearing. 18. This Court has also considered the stand taken by the petitioner, namely, that he was not involved in the incident nor was present. He alleges that he was sleeping the whole night in his room but subsequently comes up with an alibi that he was helping the police authorities in maintaining peace and harmony with the students. 18. This Court has also considered the stand taken by the petitioner, namely, that he was not involved in the incident nor was present. He alleges that he was sleeping the whole night in his room but subsequently comes up with an alibi that he was helping the police authorities in maintaining peace and harmony with the students. The statements made by the petitioner from time to time is contradictory and does not support the petitioner’s case and, on this basis, the certificates issued by the police authorities becomes unreliable. On one hand, the petitioner states that he was in his room the whole night and, on the other hand, the certificate indicates that he was helping the police the whole night. These two facts are contradictory and cannot go side by side. The disciplinary authority as well as the appellate authority were justified in discarding the evidence given by the petitioner. It is incorrect to state that the evidence provided by the petitioner was not considered by the authorities. The Court finds that the disciplinary authority as well as the appellate authority has given reasons for rejecting the certificates issued by the police. 19. A feeble submission was made by the learned counsel that the police authorities has also submitted a final report absolving the petitioner from the incident. On a close scrutiny of the document and, upon placing a query upon the learned counsel for the petitioner, the Court finds that a letter written by the police authorities could not be taken into consideration, inasmuch as, the police investigation is still going on and that no final report has been submitted in the Court, as yet, nor any such report has been accepted by the Court concerned. In any case, criminal proceedings and departmental proceedings stand on different footings. In criminal proceedings, the degree of proof is different than that in a domestic proceedings. It is well settled principle of law that in a departmental inquiry, a finding can be recorded in preponderance of probabilities and it is not necessary that the charge must be proved to the hilt. The departmental proceedings and criminal proceedings are entirely different in nature. They operate in different fields and have different objectives. The evidence in a departmental proceedings may be irrelevant in a criminal proceedings. The departmental proceedings and criminal proceedings are entirely different in nature. They operate in different fields and have different objectives. The evidence in a departmental proceedings may be irrelevant in a criminal proceedings. The rules relating to the appreciation of evidence in a departmental proceeding is different than that in a criminal proceeding. Similarly, the degree of proof is different as held in Abhai Raj Singh v. Bank of Baroda and another, 2005(145) FLR121 and Ram Govind Tripathi v. U.P. Secondary Education Service Commission, Allahabad, 2005 (6) AWC 5415. 20. Statute 16.3 provides for the formation of the Executive Council. The provision contemplates that 15 persons would form a quorum for a meeting of the Executive Council. The minutes of the Executive Council indicates that 18 persons were present when the business of the Executive Council started. Consequently, when the Executive Council started its business there was a quorum in accordance with Statute 16.3 of the statutes. When the issue relating to the petitioner came up for consideration before the Executive Council, certain members of the Executive Council voiced their opinion, and submitted that the Vice-Chancellor should abstain from considering this item and should abstain from participating, since the order of the Vice-Chancellor was under consideration. The Vice-Chancellor refused to leave the meeting or abstain from deliberation and submitted that it was the collective decision of the Executive Council and not a decision of an individual. A resolution to this effect was passed which is quoted herein under : “The Council’s decisions are collective decisions. When members meet as a body, decisions taken cannot be construed as the decisions of the Vice-Chancellor, but it would be that of the Executive Council. This is a unique provision provided in the University Act and Statutes. The Executive Council has no right to do anything violating the provisions. When the Vice-Chancellor is present the scope of Statute 38 of the Statutes of the University does not arise at all. The Vice-Chancellor will chair this special meeting and objections raised by Mr. Zafaryab Jilani and others stand ruled out. The meeting of the Council will continue.” 21. On the passing of the resolution, six members of the Executive Council placed their note of dissent and walked out from the meeting. The Vice-Chancellor will chair this special meeting and objections raised by Mr. Zafaryab Jilani and others stand ruled out. The meeting of the Council will continue.” 21. On the passing of the resolution, six members of the Executive Council placed their note of dissent and walked out from the meeting. The meeting was adjourned for a short while and, thereafter it was again assembled and, the agenda with regard to the appeal of the petitioner was taken into consideration by the remaining members of the Executive Council, i.e., by 9 members including the Vice-Chancellor. The Executive Council considered the minutes/report of the Grievance Committee and, after taking into all factors, unanimously passed a resolution affirming the decision of the disciplinary authority. 22. In the light of the aforesaid, the learned counsel submitted that at the time when the matter of the petitioner was considered, the quorum of the Executive Council was not there, i.e., only 9 members considered and voted for the resolution whereas, as per Statute 16.3, a minimum of 15 persons are required to be present to form a quorum. The learned counsel further submitted that the Vice-Chancellor was the disciplinary authority who had passed an order of expulsion and should not have participated in the deliberation nor could he have voted. The learned counsel submitted that the Vice-Chancellor could not have been the judge of his own cause which was another limb of violation of the rules of natural justice and therefore the appellate order stood vitiated. In my opinion, the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner is misconceived. 23. The quorum of 15 persons contemplated under the Statute 16.3 is necessary only when the Executive Council begins to transact its business. The quorum is not required to be maintained throughout the meeting. A quorum need to be present only when the meeting commences and it is immaterial that there was no quorum at the time when the vote was taken. If, at the start of a meeting, the quorum was present, and a member subsequently withdraws for the purpose of breaking a quorum, the proceedings of the meeting will not be invalidated for want of quorum. Consequently, the Court holds that the quorum was complete and there was no violation of Statute 16.3 of the Statutes. If, at the start of a meeting, the quorum was present, and a member subsequently withdraws for the purpose of breaking a quorum, the proceedings of the meeting will not be invalidated for want of quorum. Consequently, the Court holds that the quorum was complete and there was no violation of Statute 16.3 of the Statutes. Similar view was held by me in Ram Govind Tripathi v. U.P. Secondary Education Service Commission and others, 2005 (6) AWC 5415. 24. Under Statute 3 of the Statutes, the Vice-Chancellor is required to preside as Chairman of the Executive Council. This is a statutory mandate, and therefore, the presence of the Vice-Chancellor in the meeting does not vitiate the resolution. However, fair play demanded that the second limb of the principle of natural justice should have been observed, namely, the “nemo judex in causa sua” or “nemo debet esse judex in propria causa sua” that is, no man shall be a judge in his own cause. When the order of the Vice-Chancellor was being considered by the Executive Council, proprietary demanded that the Vice-Chancellor should have abstained from deliberation and should have abstained from voting, but, by not doing so, the order of the appellate authority does not become illegal for the reasons that the resolution of the Executive Council was passed unanimously. The vote of the Vice-Chancellor would not make a difference. It would have been a different matter if the vote of the Vice-Chancellor would have swayed the result of the decision of the Executive Council. Consequently, the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner on this aspect is rejected. 25. The petitioner has been awarded expulsion for three academic years w.e.f. 2007-08 onwards. The petitioner has already lost two academic sessions 2007-08 and 2008-09. Fourteen months have gone by since the passing of the order of the Vice-Chancellor. In the matters of discipline, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the Court should be slow in interference and should leave it open to the University authorities and should not substitute its finding with the findings given by the expert bodies. In Controller of Examination and others v. G.S. Sunder and another, 1993 Supp. (3) SCC 82, the Supreme Court held as under : “We have given our careful consideration to the above submissions. In Controller of Examination and others v. G.S. Sunder and another, 1993 Supp. (3) SCC 82, the Supreme Court held as under : “We have given our careful consideration to the above submissions. One thing must be put beyond doubt, in matters of enforcement of discipline this Court must be very slow in interference. After all, the authorities in charge of education whose duty it is to conduct examination, fairly and properly, know best how to deal with situations of this character. One cannot import fine principles of law and weigh the same in golden scales. In the present system of education, the system of examinations is the best suited to assess the progress of the student so long as they are fairly conducted. Interference by Court in every case may lead to unhappy results making the system of examination a farce.” 26. Similar view was again reiterated by the Supreme Court in Chairman, J. & K. State Board of Education v. Feyaz Ahmed Malik and others, 2000(3) SCC 59 . The Supreme Court held : “In the matters concerning campus discipline of educational institutions and conduct of examinations the duty is primarily vested in the authorities in charge of the institutions. In such matters the Court should not try to substitute its own views in place of the authorities concerned nor thrust its view on them. That is not to say that the Court cannot at all interfere with the decisions of the authorities in such matters. The Court has undoubtedly the power to intervene to correct any error in complying with the provisions of the rules, regulations or notification and to remedy any manifest injustice being perpetrated on the candidates.” 27. The Court held that in the matter of campus discipline of educational institutions, the duty is primarily vested with the authorities in charge of the institution and the Court should not substitute its view or thrust its view upon the authorities. The Court held that in the matter of campus discipline of educational institutions, the duty is primarily vested with the authorities in charge of the institution and the Court should not substitute its view or thrust its view upon the authorities. As far back in the year 1965 a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in University of Mysore v. Govinda Rao and another, AIR 1965 SC 491 , the Court held : “There is no allegation about malafides against the experts who constituted the present Board; and so, we think, it would normally be wise and safe for the Courts to leave the decisions of academic matters to experts who are more familiar with the problems they face than the Courts generally can be.” 28. However, this Court is of the opinion that the Court has undoubtedly the power to intervene to correct any palpable error where the authorities have transgressed the provisions of the Rules or Regulations and to correct any manifest injustice, if perpetrated on the students. There is another aspect of the matter. The petitioner has no criminal history. The intelligence report is silent on this aspect. He is a student of Post Graduate and the whole life lies before him. He has to make a career which should not be nipped in the bud. No doubt, the petitioner has committed a mistake for which he has to be punished and punished appropriately. It must not be lost sight of the fact that the petitioner is not a history sheeter. Students commit mistakes and when they assemble collectively and form an unlawful assembly, the ruckus caused, the havoc created, the property destroyed is not by an act of an individual but has been caused collectively at the heat of the moment. The Court has gone through the intelligence report, the recommendation of the Disciplinary Committee, the minutes of the Grievance Committee and, the Court finds that the petitioner was not personally involved in the destruction of the property but was involved in the instigation of his colleagues to ransack and destroy the property. For this misdemeanour, the petitioner is equally guilty and he cannot escape the punishment. The Court also finds that the principles of natural justice was not followed in the correct perspective and that the order of the disciplinary authority was saved by the post decisional hearing provided by the appellate authority. 29. For this misdemeanour, the petitioner is equally guilty and he cannot escape the punishment. The Court also finds that the principles of natural justice was not followed in the correct perspective and that the order of the disciplinary authority was saved by the post decisional hearing provided by the appellate authority. 29. In the light of the aforesaid, the Court finds that the punishment awarded is harsh and that some latitude of compassion should be provided by awarding a lesser punishment. The academic session of 2007-08 has been lost and the academic session 2008-09 is coming to an end. The Court consequently finds that in the facts and the circumstances of the given case, which will not be treated as a precedent for other matters or similarly situated matters, the punishment awarded by the disciplinary authority is reduced to the expulsion of two academic sessions only. The University is directed to permit the petitioner to attend the classes and appear in the Ist semester examination of MSW, Ist Year, from the academic session 2009-2010 onwards. Even though the petitioner was permitted to give his examination of the Ist semester pursuant to an interim order of the Court, the Court finds that the petitioner had partly given his examinations, and sessional examinations was not given. The Court finds that the petitioner has to suffer the consequences of being debarred for 2 years and therefore, his results for the Ist semester cannot be declared. This Court further directs that if the petitioner remains well behaved and does not misconduct himself again, the University will permit him to seek further studies in future for other courses but, in the event, the petitioner misconduct himself, it would be open to the University authorities to take action in accordance with law. 30. In the light of the aforesaid, the writ petition is partly allowed. In the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to cost. 31. Before parting with the case, the Court cautions the authorities of the University that the principles of natural justice, as embodied in Article 14 of the Constitution of India and in Rule 9 of the Rules of 1985 are required to be fully complied with and that half hearted measures are not required to be adopted. 31. Before parting with the case, the Court cautions the authorities of the University that the principles of natural justice, as embodied in Article 14 of the Constitution of India and in Rule 9 of the Rules of 1985 are required to be fully complied with and that half hearted measures are not required to be adopted. All documents, reports relied upon by the disciplinary authority should be provided to the delinquent which is the basic principle of fair play. The Court also advises the petitioner that he must remember that the University is a temple of learning and is not a play ground for unlawful activities. The petitioner is a student and is not a union leader. The petitioner has not joined the University to indulge in politics or to cause the destruction of public property. The union activities is secondary to the main activity of learning imparted by the University. This the petitioner has to keep in mind while pursuing his course in the University during the remaining period of his term. ————