JUDGMENT A.M. Sapre, J. 1. This is an appeal filed by CIT (Revenue) under Section 260A of Income Tax Act against an order dated 31-8-2005 passed by Tribunal in case No. ITA No. 487/Ind/1999. The appeal was admitted for final hearing on following substantial question of law: Whether the Tribunal was right in coming to the conclusion that the assessee was entitled to interest for the period 15-11-1991 to 3-10-1992 when the bank guarantee furnished by the assessee on 15-11-1992 for the tax was encashed by the department only on 3-10-1992? 2. Heard Mr. R.L. Jain, learned senior Counsel with Ms. Veena Mandlik, learned Counsel for the appellant revenue and Mr. G.M. Chaphekar, learned senior Counsel with Mr. D.S. Kale, learned Counsel for respondent. 3. Having heard the learned Counsel for the parties and on perusal of record of the case, we are satisfied that appeal involves one additional substantial question of law and hence, by taking recourse to the provisions of Section 260A ibid and with the consent of parties we frame following additional 2 questions said to arise out of impugned order: II. In the absence of any categorical finding recorded by Tribunal on the issue as to on what dates namely 15-11-1991 or 3-10-1992, the bank guarantee in question furnished by assessee was encashed by IT department, whether Tribunal was justified in dismissing the appeal of the revenue? III. In case, if answer to question No. 2 is in favour of appellant (Revenue), whether a case for remand to Tribunal is made out for re-deciding the appeal of revenue afresh? 4. The facts of the case lie in a narrow compass. The assessment years involved in the case are 1990-91 and 1992-93. The question is as to from which date, the assessee is entitled to claim interest under Section 244(1A) of the Income Tax Act on the amount in question for which they had furnished the bank guarantee in favour of department. The assessment years involved in the case are 1990-91 and 1992-93. The question is as to from which date, the assessee is entitled to claim interest under Section 244(1A) of the Income Tax Act on the amount in question for which they had furnished the bank guarantee in favour of department. According to assessee, since the department encashed the bank guarantee on 15-11-1991 and hence, they are entitled to claim interest on the sum so encashed, which eventually was directed to be refunded to assessee by the orders of authority under Section 244(1A) whereas according to department, since the bank guarantee was encashed by department on 3-10-1992 and hence, the department is not liable to pay any interest on the sum so encashed prior to period of 3-10-1992 i.e. from 15-11-1991 to 3-10-1992. In other words, the contention of revenue is that revenue is liable to pay interest only from the date on which they encashed the bank guarantee and received the money in their account and not from the date prior to it. 5. So the basic question that arises for consideration in this appeal is as to on what date the IT department (CIT/Income Tax Officer) encashed the bank guarantee i.e. whether on 15-11-1991 or 3-10-1992. 6. We find from the impugned order of Tribunal, that this question was not decided by Tribunal though debated by the parties on facts before Commissioner (Appeals) and again raised before Tribunal on facts. In our opinion, when the parties are at an issue on particular fact then the fact-finding authority including fact-finding appellate authority is under legal duty to record a categorical finding either way on appreciating the evidence adduced by the parties in support of the issue. Not recording a factual finding and proceeding to decide the issue on some assumption is not warranted. Since in this case, parties were at variance so far as date of encashing of the bank guarantee by the department was concerned, the Tribunal while examining the factual finding of Commissioner (Appeals) and which was also assailed by revenue in their appeal should have either affirmed the said finding of fact recorded by Commissioner (Appeals) or reversed it, as the case may be by assigning the reasons for their conclusion. It is only then the liability to pay interest from that date would have arisen determined. It is only then the liability to pay interest from that date would have arisen determined. The Tribunal being the last court of appeal so far as facts are concerned, was required to examine this material fact and then should have fixed the date for paying interest from that date. 7. So far as this Court is concerned, we cannot go into this factual aspect of the case nor can record any finding. It is more so when it is being assailed by placing reliance upon certain letter correspondence to show that bank guarantee was encashed on 15-11-1991 arid not on 3-10-1992. It may be noted that even this correspondence was not filed before any of the appellate authorities by the parties. 8. It is for all these reasons, we are inclined to answer question No. 2 in favour of appellant and hold that Tribunal failed to record a categorical finding of fact on the material question as to on what date, the department encashed the bank guarantee. As a necessary consequence of this, the question No. 3 has also to be answered in favour of appellant by remanding the case to Tribunal. Both questions are, accordingly, answered. In this view of the matter, we need not decide question No. 1 as the same would now be decided by the Tribunal after recording a factual finding as to on what date the bank guarantee was encashed by revenue. Needless to say, the Tribunal would decide this issue on the basis of material on record and any additional material, if parties wish to file in support of their case. 9. Accordingly and in view of foregoing discussion, the appeal succeeds and is allowed. Impugned order is set aside. The case is remanded to Tribunal for redeciding the appeal afresh on merits as indicated above. We, however, make it clear that so far as, other issues, decided by Tribunal are concerned, the impugned order would remain as it is and this setting aside and remand of appeal would confine only to the issue on which this appeal was admitted for final hearing. The Tribunal will thus decide only the issue which was subject-matter of this appeal as indicated above. Let this be done within 6 months. No costs.