Judgment:- Koshy, Ag.C.J. These two writ petitions are filed as public interest litigation regarding granting of sanction for prosecuting the accused in the SNC Lavlin Scam which is the biggest scandal that rocked this small but literate State of Kerala. It is the contention of the petitioners that in view of the agreement executed between the Kerala State Electricity Board and SNC Lavlin, a Canadian Intermediary regarding renovation and modernisation of Pallivasal, Chengulam and Panniyar Hydro Electric projects, State has lost more than Rs.500 crores and certain persons obtained material gains of Rs.300 crores. Comptroller and Auditor General found out the great loss caused to the State. Sri.Balanandan Commission report also shows the irregularities in the above deal. State Vigilance also after investigation found grievous irregularities, corruption and loss to the State. But Vigilance enquiry pointed out more guilt on the officers rather than persons behind it. Petitioners approached this court earlier also which resulted in Ext.P1 judgment by which a Division Bench of this Court (One of us, Justice J.B.Koshy, was a member) directed the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) to investigate the matter, considering the earlier decision of the State Government to refer the matter to CBI. The above judgment has become final. The CBI, as per the directions of this Court, completed the investigation within the extended time frame allowed in subsequent orders. Thereafter, final report was produced before this Court in a sealed cover to show that investigation was completed. Since investigation was completed, we returned the sealed cover without opening, to the counsel for C.B.I.. It is submitted by the Standing Counsel for the CBI that application for sanction to prosecute Accused Nos.1, 9 and 10 who are two Government Officers and an Ex-Minister, was filed under section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.) for the offences punishable under section 120-B and 420 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). It is the case of the petitioners that sanction is not necessary to prosecute the accused as the offences alleged under sections 120-B and 420 of the IPC are committed not in the discharge of the official duties. It is further submitted that immediately on filing the final report, when the request reached the Government, the Home Minister made a statement that CBI investigation report is politically motivated. Hence in view of the political clout sanction may not be granted by this Government. It is further submitted that immediately on filing the final report, when the request reached the Government, the Home Minister made a statement that CBI investigation report is politically motivated. Hence in view of the political clout sanction may not be granted by this Government. According to the petitioner, Ex-Minister who is now arrayed as an accused in the report, is the Secretary of the political party which is a major partner of the front ruling the State and in view of his political influence Council of Ministers will not give sanction to prosecute them for obvious reasons. Therefore, it is prayed that if sanction is necessary, this court should issue a writ of mandamus for giving sanction within a reasonable time as this court should prevent politicians or bureaucrats looting the poor citizens of the country and being the guardian of the Constitution, this court shall rise to the occasion. When the case came up for admission, the learned Standing Counsel for CBI submitted that whether sanction is necessary under section 197 Cr. P.C. for prosecuting the above three accused is a question in dispute as there are divergent views expressed in various judgments and, by way of abundant caution, they filed the application for sanction and it is for the court to decide whether sanction is necessary or not and if this court is of the opinion that no sanction is necessary, CBI is ready to file the charge sheet. As held by the Apex Court that for granting sanction, the granting authority need not give an opportunity for hearing to the accused as it is not contemplated under section 197. (See: State of Maharashtra v. Iswar Piraji Kalpatri and others ((1996) 1 SCC 542) and State of Bihar and another v. P.P.Sharma and another ((1992) Suppl.(1) SCC 222), but, we thought that for deciding the question whether sanction is necessary or not, in a public interest litigation filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, accused also should be heard and, therefore, notice on admission was ordered to the accused also. We have also heard the counsel for the petitioners as well as counsel for the accused, apart from the learned Advocate General and Standing Counsel for the CBI. 2. Section 197 (1) of Cr.P.C. reads as follows: "197. We have also heard the counsel for the petitioners as well as counsel for the accused, apart from the learned Advocate General and Standing Counsel for the CBI. 2. Section 197 (1) of Cr.P.C. reads as follows: "197. Prosecution of Judges and public servants.(1) When any person who is or was a Judge or Magistrate or a public servant not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the Government is accused of any offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty, no Court shall take cognizance of such offence except with the previous sanction - (a) in thecase of a person who is employed or, as the case may be, was at the time of commission of the alleged offence employed in connection with the affairs of the Union, of the Central Government; (b) in thecase of a person who is employed or, as the case may be, was at the time of commission of the alleged offence employed, in connection with the affairs of a State, of the State Government:" The purpose of the above section is to avoid vexatious litigation against public servant for the acts done in the discharge of their duties. Sanction is a condition precedent in taking cognizance of an offence committed by a public servant while discharging official duties as held by the Apex Court in Birendra K. Singh v. State of Bihar, (2000) 8 SCC 498. Sanction is necessary before taking cognizance of an offence under section 197(1) only if the following ingredients are satisfied: (i) A public servant is accused of an offence (ii) that public servant is not removable from his office except by or with the sanction of the Government, (iii) the alleged offence committed by him should be in the discharge of his official duties or purporting to act in discharge of his official duties. There is clear difference between the wordings of Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act (for short, PC Act) and Section 197 of the Cr.P.C. Section 19(1) of the P.C. Act reads as follows: "19. There is clear difference between the wordings of Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act (for short, PC Act) and Section 197 of the Cr.P.C. Section 19(1) of the P.C. Act reads as follows: "19. Previous sanction necessary for prosecution.-(1) No Court shall take cognizance of an offence punishable under sections 7, 10,11, 13 and 15 alleged to have been committed by a public servant, except with the previous sanction,- (a) in the case of a person who is employed in connection with the affairs of the Union and is not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the Central Government, of that Government; (b) in the case of a person who is employed in connection with the affairs of a State and is not removable from his office save by or with sanction of the State Government, of that Government; (c) in the case of any other person, of the authority competent to remove him from his office.". Section 19 of the P.C. Act also requires sanction to prosecute public servants for offences punishable under that Act. But it has been the well settled law that under the Prevention of Corruption Act sanction is necessary only if the public servant is being prosecuted while in service. In other words, if at the time of filing the charge sheet if the accused is not a public servant, no sanction is necessary as decided by the Supreme Court in S.A.Venkataraman v. State, AIR 1958 SC 107, wherein it was held as follows: "14. .......... There is nothing in the words used in Section 6(1) (Sec.19 of the New Act) to even remotely suggest that previous sanction was necessary before a court could take cognizance of the offences mentioned therein in the case of a person who had ceased to be a public servant at the time the offence was committed. ........ .......... There is nothing in the words used in Section 6(1) (Sec.19 of the New Act) to even remotely suggest that previous sanction was necessary before a court could take cognizance of the offences mentioned therein in the case of a person who had ceased to be a public servant at the time the offence was committed. ........ A public servant who has ceased to be a public servant is not a person removable from any office by a competent authority." In Parkash Singh Badal v. State of Punjab, (2007) 1 SCC 1, it was held that there is no need to obtain sanction for prosecution of a person alleged to have committed offences under the P.C. Act in the capacity of a public servant where cognizance of such offence is taken after he had already ceased to hold the office in question, though he may continue to be a public servant in any other capacity at the time of taking cognizance. But under Sec.197, the question is whether the accused is or was a public servant at the time of commission of offence. In Badals case (supra), it was observed as follows: "12. The use of the expression "is" in Section 19 of the Act vis-à-vis the expression "is" or "was" is indicative of the legislative intent. Though certain changes were made in the Code no corresponding change was made in the Act.". The same view was taken in K.S.Dharmadatan v. Central Government, (1979) 4 SCC 204. This view was also followed in R.S.Nayak v. A.R.Antulay, (1984) 2 SCC 183. Therefore it is clear that the relevant date with reference to which a valid sanction is sine quo non for taking cognizance of an offence committed by a public servant as required by Section 19 is the date the crime is committed and he must continue to be a public servant in that capacity on the date on which the court is called upon to take cognizance of the offence of which he is accused. But in Section 197 Cr.P.C., the question is whether at the time of alleged commission of offence, the person accused is a public servant or not. But in Section 197 Cr.P.C., the question is whether at the time of alleged commission of offence, the person accused is a public servant or not. In R.Balakrishna Pillai v. State of Kerala, 1996 (1) KLT 250 (SC), it was held that sanction for prosecution of a public servant under Sec.197 of Cr.P.C. is necessary even if he ceased to be a public servant on the date of taking cognizance of the offence. Section 197 of Cr.P.C. provides for sanction for prosecution of any person who is or was a public servant. The use of the expression was after the expression is makes it clear that sanction is applicable even in cases where a retired or ex-public servant is sought to be prosecuted. Even without a sanction under Section 197 (1) Cr.P.C., a final report can be filed before the criminal court, but in that case, before taking cognizance the criminal court has to consider whether sanction is necessary against any of the accused in that case under Section 197 of the Code. 3. An order of sanction is an administrative act and therefore, it need not contain detailed reasons, but it should contain some reasons, so as to show that there is application of mind. In State of Bihar v. P.P.Sharma, AIR 1991 SC 1260, it was held as follows: "67. It is equally well settled that "before granting sanction the authority or the appropriate Govt. must have before it the necessary report and the material facts which prima facie establish the commission of offence charged for and that the appropriate Government would apply their mind to those facts". The order of sanction only is an administrative act and not a quasi judicial nor a lis involved. Therefore, the order of sanction need not contain detailed reasons in support thereof as was contended by Sri.Jain. But the basic facts that constitute the offence must be apparent on the impugned order and the record must bear out the reasons in that regard. The question of giving an opportunity to the public servant at that stage as was contended for the respondent does not arise. Proper application of mind to the existence of a prima facie evidence of the commission of the offence is only a pre-condition to grant or refuse to grant sanction. When the Govt. The question of giving an opportunity to the public servant at that stage as was contended for the respondent does not arise. Proper application of mind to the existence of a prima facie evidence of the commission of the offence is only a pre-condition to grant or refuse to grant sanction. When the Govt. accorded sanction, S.114(e) of the Evidence Act raises presumption that the official acts have been regularly performed. The burden is heavier on the accused to establish the contra to rebut that statutory presumption. Once that is done then it is the duty of the prosecution to produce necessary record to establish that after application of mind and consideration thereof to the subject the grant or refusing to grant sanction was made by the appropriate authority. At any time before the Court takes cognizance of the offence the order of sanction could be made. It is settled law that issuance of the process to the accused to appear before the Court is sine qua non of taking cognizance of the offence. The emphasis of S.197(1) or other similar provisions that "no court shall take cognizance of such offence except with the previous sanction" posits that before taking cognizance of the offence alleged, there must be before the Court the prior sanction given by the competent authority. Therefore, at any time before taking cognizance of the offence it is open to the competent authority to grant sanction and the prosecution is entitled to produce the order of sanction....". 4. There is no dispute that Ministers also will come within the definition of public servant. Before taking cognizance against Ministers or ex-Ministers for the alleged act in discharge of official duties or purported to be committed in discharge of official duties, Governments sanction is necessary. With regard to the Ministers, sanction has to be given by the Governor. The expression government means Governor in the case of Chief Minister or a Minister. A Constitution Bench of the Honourable Supreme Court in M.Karunanidhi v. Union of India, 1979 (3) SCR 254, was required to consider whether a Chief Minister was a public servant within the meaning of S.21 of the Indian Penal Code and S.197 of the Code. The Apex Court referred to the decision of the High Court of Bombay in Namdeo Kashinath Aher v. H.G.Vartak & Anr. The Apex Court referred to the decision of the High Court of Bombay in Namdeo Kashinath Aher v. H.G.Vartak & Anr. (AIR 1970 Bombay 385) wherein it is observed that, "whatever be the practical and actual position, the fact remains that it is the Governor who can accept the resignation of the Ministry or Minister and it is the Governor again who can dismiss or remove the Minister from office. Under S.3(60) of the General Clauses Act, 1897, the word State Government has been defined. Clause (c) of S.3(60) is applicable to the present case and, therefore, the State Government is to mean the Governor for the purpose of the present case. The result, therefore, is that accused No.1 is a public servant who can be said to be removed only by the State Government, meaning thereby the Governor, and I do not find any difficulty in coming to the conclusion that the second requirement of S.197 Cr.P.C. also is fully satisfied as per the accused No.1 is concerned". 5. It was argued that petitioners has no right to file public interest litigation because essentially prosecuting such offence is the duty of the State and once prosecution starts, the parties involved are only the accused and the State, and third parties cannot file writ petitions as public interest litigation. In support of the above contention, the respondents cited the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court in M.C.Mehta v. Union of India, (2008) 1 SCC 407, where it was held that once a final report is filed in terms of Sec.173 Cr.P.C., it is the Magistrate alone who can take an appropriate decision in the matter, which would be subject to judicial review. The possibility of prosecuting agencies not approaching the higher forum against Magistrates order by itself would not confer jurisdiction for third parties to file a public interest litigation. In that case, it was held as follows: "Once a final report has been filed in terms of sub-section (1) of Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, it is the Magistrate and Magistrate alone who can take appropriate decision in the matter one way or the other. If he errs while passing a judicial order, the same may be a subject matter of appeal or judicial review. If he errs while passing a judicial order, the same may be a subject matter of appeal or judicial review. There may be a possibility of the prosecuting agencies not approaching the higher forum against an order passed by the learned Magistrate, but the same by itself would not confer a jurisdiction on this Court to step in. We should not entertain the application of the learned amicus curiae on such presupposition. A judicial order passed by a Magistrate may be right or wrong, but having regard to the hierarchy of the courts, the matter which would fall for consideration before the higher court should not be a subject matter of a decision of this Bench. In an unlikely event of the interested parties in not questioning such orders before the higher forum, an independent public interest litigation may be filed. Instances are not unknown where this Court has entertained public interest litigation in cases involving similar question under Article 32 of the Constitution of India. [See Rajiv Ranjan Singh Lalan (VIII) v. Union of India, (2006) 6 SCC 613]". (emphasis supplied) The Honble Supreme Court, at paragraph 14, has also observed as follows: "14. We may observe that while entertaining a public interest litigation in a given case, this Court may exercise a jurisdiction to set aside a decision of a constitutional authority, but we are not concerned with such a situation.". 6. Here, in this case, the court has not taken cognizance and that stage has not reached. The sole question is, whether sanction is necessary or not? Once cognizance is taken and prosecution started, it is essentially a matter for the prosecution and the defacto complainant. But, at the same time, a criminal case of this nature affects the entire public, especially in a great scam regarding loss of public revenue is involved. On the basis of petitioners complaint, the CBI investigation was ordered. In fact the present Government objected investigation by the CBI. In Zahira Habibullah Sheikh (5) v. State of Gujarat, (2006) 3 SCC 374, it was held that crimes are public wrongs. The Supreme Court in the said decision held as follows: "35. .........The concept of fair trial entails familiar triangulation of interests of the accused, the victim and the society and it is the community that acts through the State and prosecuting agencies. The Supreme Court in the said decision held as follows: "35. .........The concept of fair trial entails familiar triangulation of interests of the accused, the victim and the society and it is the community that acts through the State and prosecuting agencies. Interest of society is not to be treated completely with disdain and as persona non grata. The courts have always been considered to have an overriding duty to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice - oftern referred to as the duty to vindicate and uphold the "majesty of law". Due administration of justice has always been viewed as a continuous process, not confined to determination of the particular case, protecting its ability to function as a court of law in the future as in the case before it.". The modern trend is that political scams involving crores of rupees will go unnoticed unless public spirited parties question the same. The anxiety of the petitioners is that since the CBI has asked for sanction, the matter will be delayed and in view of the present set up, it is likely that sanction may not be granted. We are of the view that since cognizance is not taken in this case, and in view of the magnitude of the scam and political backdrop, we cannot dismiss this writ petition as not maintainable, especially when public interest is involved. 7. Now, we will come to the main question. Whether sanction is necessary for prosecuting public servants for offences punishable under Section 120-B and 420 of the Indian Penal Code. Both sides cited various decisions from 1955 to 2007 in support of their views. In Om Prakash v. State of U.P., AIR 1957 SC 458, it was held that no sanction is necessary to prosecute the public servant as he does not normally act in his capacity as a public servant when committing criminal breach of trust. The court held as follows: "30. The last argument of Mr.Issac is that despite the fact that prosecution is under S.409, Penal Code, still sanction to prosecute is necessary. The court held as follows: "30. The last argument of Mr.Issac is that despite the fact that prosecution is under S.409, Penal Code, still sanction to prosecute is necessary. Quite a large body of case law in all the High Courts has held that a public servant committing criminal breach of trust does not normally act in his capacity as a public servant, see (a) The State v. Pandurang Baburao, AIR 1955 Bom.451, (b) Bhup Narain Sexana v. State, AIR 1952 All.35, and (c) State v. Gulab Singh, AIR 1954 Raj. 211. We are in agreement with the view expressed by Hari Shankar and Randhir Singh, JJ. that no sanction is necessary and the view expressed by Mulla, J. to the contrary is not correct.". In B.Saha v. M.S.Kochar, (1979) 4 SCC 177 it was held that sanction is not necessary if there is no direct or reasonable nexus between the offence alleged and discharge of official duty. In Parkash Singh Badal v. State of Punjab, (supra), the Honourable Supreme Court has held as follows: "50. The offence of cheating under Section 420 or for that matter offences relatable to Sections 467, 468, 471 and 120-B can by no stretch of imagination by their very nature be regarded as having been committed by any public servant while acting or purporting to act in discharge of official duty. In such cases, official status only provides an opportunity for commission of the offence.". The Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Satwant Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1960 SC 266, held that the offence of cheating (Sec.420) by its very nature cannot be regarded as having been committed by a public servant while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of official duties. In R.Balakrishna Pillai v. State of Kerala, (1996) 1 SCC 478, it was held that sanction for prosecution is necessary under Section 197 as the public servant is accused of an offence acting or purporting to be acting in discharge of official duties. In that case, since the allegation was that he has done the alleged act as a Minister of the Electricity, for prosecuting for the offence of criminal conspiracy under Sec.120-B IPC, sanction was necessary. In that case, since the allegation was that he has done the alleged act as a Minister of the Electricity, for prosecuting for the offence of criminal conspiracy under Sec.120-B IPC, sanction was necessary. Similar view was also taken in the following decisions: (i) Matajog Dobey v. H.C. Bhari, AIR 1956 SC 44, (ii) Rangesh Sharma v. State of U.P. 1990 Crl.L.J. 861, (iii) Rakesh Kumar Mishra v. State of Bihar, AIR 2006 SC 820, (iv) Sankaran Moitra v. Sadhna Das, AIR 2006 SC 1599, It was argued that if the view is taken that no criminal offence can be committed while acting or purporting to act as a public servant, Sec.197 of Cr.P.C. is unnecessary and meaningless. In Sankaran Moitra v. Sadhna Das, (supra), the Apex Court held that even in a case of charge under Sec.302, if it is intrinsically connected with official duty, sanction under Sec.197(1) is a necessary legal formality. The Apex Court has held as follows: "73. The High Court has stated that killing of a person by use of excessive force could never be performance of duty. It may be correct so far as it goes. But the question is whether that act was done in the performance of duty or in the purported performance of duty. If it was done in performance of duty or purported performance of duty Section 197(1) of the Code cannot be bypassed by reasoning that killing a man could never be done in an official capacity and consequently Section 197(1) of the Code could not be attracted. Such a reasoning would be against the ratio of decisions of this Court referred to earlier. The other reason given by the High Court that if the High Court were to interfere on the ground of want of sanction, people will lose faith in the judicial process, cannot also be a ground to dispense with a statutory requirement or protection. Public trust in the institution can be maintained by entertaining causes coming within its jurisdiction, by performing the duties entrusted to it diligently, in accordance with law and the established procedure and without delay. Dispensing with of jurisdictional or statutory requirements which may ultimately affect the adjudication itself, will itself result in people losing faith in the system. Public trust in the institution can be maintained by entertaining causes coming within its jurisdiction, by performing the duties entrusted to it diligently, in accordance with law and the established procedure and without delay. Dispensing with of jurisdictional or statutory requirements which may ultimately affect the adjudication itself, will itself result in people losing faith in the system. So, the reason in that behalf given by the High Court cannot be sufficient to enable it to get over the jurisdictional requirement of a sanction under Section 197(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. We are therefore satisfied that the High Court was in error in holding that sanction under Section 197(1) was not needed in this case. We hold that such sanction was necessary and for want of sanction the prosecution must be quashed at this stage. It is not for us now to answer the submission of learned counsel for the complainant that this is an eminently fit case for grant of such sanction.". In Bholu Ram v. State of Punjab, (2008) 9 SCC 140, the Apex Court at para 60, held as follows: "60. We express our inability to agree with the learned counsel. It is settled law that offences punishable under Sections 409, 420, 467, 468, 471, etc. can by no stretch of imagination by their very nature be regarded as having been committed by a public servant while acting or purporting to act in discharge of official duty (vide Parkash Singh Badal v. State of Punjab).". In Raghunath Anant Govilkar v. State of Maharashtra, (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 130, even though it was held that sanction was necessary even if the action is taken after retirement of the public servant, after considering a plethora of decisions, it was held at para 11 that, the offence of criminal conspiracy punishable under Section 120-B IPC, cannot be done by a public servant in discharge of his official duties, and hence no sanction is necessary. 8. Only an act constituting an offence directly or reasonably connected with his official duty will require sanction for prosecution. To put it briefly, it is the quality of the act that is important. The alleged act should be directly or reasonably connected with the official duty. A Constitution Bench of the Honble Supreme Court after referring to two other large Bench decisions, in Matajog Dobey v. H.C.Bhari, (supra) held as follows: "18. To put it briefly, it is the quality of the act that is important. The alleged act should be directly or reasonably connected with the official duty. A Constitution Bench of the Honble Supreme Court after referring to two other large Bench decisions, in Matajog Dobey v. H.C.Bhari, (supra) held as follows: "18. There are two cases of this Court to which reference may be made here. In Shreekantiah Ramayya Munipalli v. State of Bombay (S) AIR 1955 SC 287 at pp.292-293 (E), Bose, J. observed as follows: "Now it is obvious that if section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is construed too narrowly, it can never be applied, for of course, it is no part of an officials duty to commit an offence and never can be. But it is not the duty we have to examine so much as the act, because an official act can be performed in the discharge of official duty as well as in dereliction of it. The section has content and its language must be given meaning". The question of previous sanction also arose in -"Amrik Singh v. State of Pepsu (S) AIR 1955 SC 309 at p.312(F). A fairly lengthy discussion of the authorities is followed up with this summary: "If the acts complained of are so integrally connected with the duties attaching to the office as to be inseperable from them, then sanction under S.197(1) would be necessary; but if there was no necessary connection between them and the performance of those duties, the official status furnishing only the occasion or opportunity for the acts, then no sanction would be required". (19). The result of the foregoing discussion is this: There must be a reasonable connection between the act and the discharge of official duty; the act must bear such relation to the duty that the accused could lay a reasonable, but not a pretended or fanciful claim, that he did it in the course of the performance of his duty.". Even though divergent views were expressed on the facts of each case, the above quoted view is still to be followed. We are of the view that everything will depend upon the intrinsic facts of each case. 9. Even though divergent views were expressed on the facts of each case, the above quoted view is still to be followed. We are of the view that everything will depend upon the intrinsic facts of each case. 9. Even though it is stated that by way of abundant caution CBI filed an application for sanction and that is pending before the Government, full facts with records and clear allegations are not before us and the entire matter is placed before the sanctioning authority for consideration. It is the contention of the respondent that ex-Minister and the officials are involved in the finalisation of the contract only in the course of official duty. If during the course of discharge of such duty, an offence is committed, sanction under Section 197 is necessary. Since the investigating agency has already applied for sanction, the sanctioning authority has to either grant sanction or refuse sanction. It is also well settled that it is for the sanctioning authority to apply its mind after considering the records and decide the matter. Even if sanction is given for prosecuting only some of the accused, the order will not become vitiated and the persons who were granted sanction cannot question the above order merely on the ground of discrimination. The learned Advocate General has cited a decision of the Supreme Court in M.P. Special Police Establishment v. State of MP and others, (2004) 8 SCC 788. In that case, allegations were filed against two ministers and the Lok Ayuktha also found that there are grave allegations regarding them, but, when the matter was sent for sanction to the Governor and Governor sent for the opinion of the Council of Ministers and the Council of Ministers refused to give sanction. Rejecting the above, Governor granted sanction. While accepting the stand of the Governor, the Honble Supreme Court observed as follows: "31. We have, on the premises aforementioned, no hesitation to hold that the decision of the Council of Ministers was ex facie irrational whereas the decision of the Governor was not. In a situation of this nature, the writ court while exercising its jurisdiction under article 226 of the Constitution as also this Court under articles 136 and 142 of the Constitution can pass an appropriate order which would do complete justice to the parties. The High Court unfortunately failed to consider this aspect of the matter. 32. In a situation of this nature, the writ court while exercising its jurisdiction under article 226 of the Constitution as also this Court under articles 136 and 142 of the Constitution can pass an appropriate order which would do complete justice to the parties. The High Court unfortunately failed to consider this aspect of the matter. 32. If, on these facts and circumstances, the Governor cannot act in his own discretion there would be a complete breakdown of the rule of law inasmuch as it would then be open for Governments to refuse sanction in spite of overwhelming material showing that a prima facie case is made out. If, in cases where a prima facie case is clearly made out, sanction to prosecute high functionaries is refused or withheld, democracy itself will be at stake. It would then lead to a situation where people in power may break the law with impunity safe in the knowledge that they will not be prosecuted as the requisite sanction will not be granted." It was further observed as follows at paragraph 33: "..... We also presume that a high authority like the Council of Ministers will normally act in a bona fide manner, fairly, honestly and in accordance with law. However, on those rare occasions where on facts the bias becomes apparent and/or the decision of the Council of Ministers is shown to be irrational and based on non-consideration of relevant factors, the Governor would be right, on the facts of that case, to act in his own discretion and grant sanction." So, in the case of ex-minister, as a Constitutional authority, Governor has to take a decision in the matter as he is entitled to take a decision against the advice of the Council of Ministers. The Council of Ministers should also act independently despite political compulsions. The Honble Supreme Court in S.R. Chaudhuri v. State of Punjab and others (AIR 2001 SC 2707) considered how the Chief Minister and Governor should consider these constitutional functions and said that they should remain conscious of their constitutional obligations and not sacrifice either political responsibilities or parliamentary conventions at the altar of political expediency. The Honble Supreme Court observed as follows: "40. The Honble Supreme Court observed as follows: "40. Chief Ministers or the Governors, as the case may be, must for ever remain conscious of their constitutional obligations and not sacrifice either political responsibility or parliamentary conventions at the altar of political expediency. Prof.B.O.Nwabueze in his book "Constitutionalism in the Emergent States" (1973 Edition - page 139), almost thirty years ago warned: "Experience has amply demonstrated that the greatest danger to constitutional Government in emergent States arises from the human factor in politics, from the capacity of politicians to destort and vitiate whatever Governmental forms may be devised. Institutional forms are of course important, since they can guide or better or for worse the behaviour of the individuals who operate them. Yet, however carefully the institutional forms may have been constructed, in the final analysis, much more will turn upon the actual behaviour of these individuals --upon their willingness to observe the rules, upon statesman like acceptance that the integrity of the whole Government framework and the regularity of its procedures should transcend any personal aggrandizement. The successful working of any constitution depends upon what has aptly been called the democratic spirit, that is, a spirit of fair play, of self-restraint and of mutual accommodation of differing interests and opinions. There can be no constitutional Government unless the wielders of power are prepared to observe the limits upon Government powers." (emphasis supplied) 10. A contention was also raised that the two government officers concerned were acting as the employees of the Board during the relevant time and they are not public servants and hence for them sanction is not necessary. Based on the observations in Badals case, (supra) it was argued that since government officers ceased to hold office as officers of the Board, merely because they are working as public servants in another capacity, sanction is not necessary. But that argument is at the maximum possible for prosecution under the P.C.Act as ex-public servants also will come under Section 197(1) of the Code. But that argument is at the maximum possible for prosecution under the P.C.Act as ex-public servants also will come under Section 197(1) of the Code. It was further contended that in Mohd.Hadi Raja v. State of Bihar, AIR 1998 SC 1945 and K.Jagmohan v. State of Kerala, 1997 AIR SCW 2577, it was held that protection by way of sanction under Section 197 is not available to officers of the Government companies or public sector undertakings even when such public undertakings are State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution on account of the deep and persuasive control of the Government. At the time of occurence of the offence the two officers were working as employees of the Board and it was argued their services from the Board can be terminated without the sanction of the Government since Section 197(1) is not attracted. That depends upon the service conditions in the Board. The question that who is competent to remove a public servant from that post is more important. Introduction of sub-section (12) to Section 21 in the definition of Public Servant in the Indian Penal Code also assumes importance in this matter. In any event this question was not specifically pleaded in the writ petition and therefore, we are not considering the above question. Of course, if an accused person is prosecuted without sanction where sanction was necessary, it is for the accused to take that contention at any stage of the proceedings. At the same time, if sanction is required, cognizance cannot be taken without sanction. So, if final report is filed without sanction, it is for the criminal court to consider those aspects and that stage has not arisen. In this case, admittedly, petition for sanction was already filed. Learned Advocate General submitted that with regard to Ex-minister, Governor has already sent the matter for the opinion of the Council of Ministers and they are considering the same and the matter will be decided within a reasonable time. Since CBI after investigation requested for sanction and action was duly taken on the question whether sanction shall be given or not, there is no point in our deciding the question whether sanction is necessary or not. According to our view, it is a premature and unnecessary exercise of jurisdiction. Since CBI after investigation requested for sanction and action was duly taken on the question whether sanction shall be given or not, there is no point in our deciding the question whether sanction is necessary or not. According to our view, it is a premature and unnecessary exercise of jurisdiction. Since voluminous records are there, sufficient time is required as Council of Ministers and the Governor has to apply their mind and they are doing this along with other mandatory duties to be performed by them. 11. Next is whether a writ of mandamus can be issued to grant sanction. The Honble Apex Court in Mansukhlal Vithaldas Chauhan v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1997 SC 3400, has held that no writ of mandamus can be issued to the sanctioning authority to give sanction within a time frame, but, at the same time, since considering the involvement of public interest, we are of the opinion that it will be proper on our part to direct the sanctioning authority to take a decision in the matter as expeditiously as possible and if possible within an outer limit of three months from today. If further time is required for unavoidable reasons, it is for the sanctioning authority to approach this court with proper reasons. We are not expressing any views on the merits of the matter as it is premature and the prosecuting agency has already applied for sanction. Both writ petitions are disposed of accordingly.