Judgment S.D.Anand, J. 1. The respondent-husband filed a plea under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act (hereinafter referred as "the Act") for restitution of conjugal rights on a pure and simple averment that the appellant-wife had withdrawn from his conjugal company without any reasonable cause. 2. The allegations of the appellant-wife at the trial were as under :- Mst. Surjit Kaur, a sister of father of the appellant-wife, also got married to Lachman Singh, a real brother of the respondent-husband. That marriage had taken place on the very day the parties to the present cause got married. Mst. Surjit Kaur was maltreated by Lachman Singh aforementioned who (Lachman Singh) obtained an exparte decree of divorce against Mst. Surjit Kaur. That decree was obtained on the basis of factual misrepresentation. A revision petition filed by Mst. Surjit Kaur against the exparte decree of divorce is pending consideration at the hands of the District Judge, Bathinda. When the appellant-wife indicated a grievance in that behalf, the respondent-husband belaboured and turned her out of the matrimonial house in three bare clothes. She is putting up thereafter at her natal house. 3 The respondent-husband also raised a plea that he had taken a Panchayat to obtain restitution of conjugal rights but it did not bear any fruit. 4. It is apparent from the record that appellant-wife does not dispute having withdrawn from the conjugal company of the respondenthusband on her own. However, she pleaded that she had parted company with respondent-husband for a sufficient cause inasmuch as she had been belaboured and turned out of the matrimonial house when she made a grievance of the fact that Lachman Singh (a real brother of respondent-husband) had obtained an exparte decree of divorce (against her fathers sister) on the basis of factual misrepresentation. 5. The testimony on oath of the respondent-husband that he endeavoured reconciliation is proved by the deposition of AW-1 Labh Singh, Sarpanch, AW-2 Baldev Singh and AW-3 Labh Singh (AW-1 and AW-3 are different individuals bearing the same name), all of whom testified on oath that they had accompanied the appellant to effect reconciliation between the parties but that the respondent-wife was adamant and not ready to live with the appellant-husband. That part of the evidence is buttressed by the fact that, even in the course of crossexamination, the appellant-wife declined to go to the matrimonial house at any cost. That part of the evidence is buttressed by the fact that, even in the course of crossexamination, the appellant-wife declined to go to the matrimonial house at any cost. A similar stance had been taken up by her at the time the statutory reconciliation efforts were made at the trial. While refusing to go to the matrimonial house, the respondent-wife averred that she would not go with her husband at any cost as there is danger to her life. However, there is not even a word in her pleadings that she apprehended danger to her life. It requires pointed notice that she had conceded, in the crossexamination, that she herself left her matermonial house because her paternal aunt had been deserted by Lachman Singh who was a real brother of the appellant-husband. Thus, the respondent-wife has not been able to prove that her withdrawal from conjugal company of her husband was for sufficient cause. 6. In terms of the provisions of Hindu law, marriage is considered a sacrament in the Indian society. Minor aberrations in behaviour, obviously, would not furnish a sufficient ground to any spouse to withdraw from the conjugal company of other spouse. Such like aberrations are termed as the routine wear and tear of marriage life. A marriage brings together two grown up individuals who have spent atl `east two decades in their natal families. Each individual comes from a family having its own own thoughts and values of life. It is in that backdrop that routine aberrations are termed to be insufficient to justify withdrawal from the matrimonial company. Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the plea taken up by the appellant-wife for leaving her matrimonial house is correct, it cannot nonetheless be denied that it was she only who left the matrimonial house of her own. The mere fact that the relationship between her paternal aunt and her husband (who happened to be real brother of respondent-husband) was far from easy, would not furnish sufficient cause to the appellant-wife to wreck her own matrimonial nest. 7. It is further apparent from the record that appellant-wife had through out indicated that she has not inclined to cohabit with the respondent-husband. That stance was taken up by her at the time the reconciliation efforts were made by the Trial Court. That attitude was indicated by her even in the course of her cross-examination. 7. It is further apparent from the record that appellant-wife had through out indicated that she has not inclined to cohabit with the respondent-husband. That stance was taken up by her at the time the reconciliation efforts were made by the Trial Court. That attitude was indicated by her even in the course of her cross-examination. As against it, the respondent-husband had through out been expressing inclination to resume co-habitation with the appellant-wife. 8. The finding recorded by the learned Trial court is well reasoned and thoroughly appropriate in character, besides being relateable to the material obtaining on the file. The petition is held to be denuded of merit and is ordered to be dismissed.