Judgment : The appellants are the legal heirs of the Defendants 1 and 3 in OS.No.30 of 1998 on the file of the Court of Senior Civil Judge, Gooty, Ananthapur district. 2. The brief facts of the case are as follows: The respondents 1 to 3 in this appeal are the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs are the sons of second defendant. The first defendant is the senior uncle of the plaintiffs. The third defendant is the junior paternal uncle of the plaintiffs and the fourth defendant is the aunt of the plaintiffs. They filed a suit for partition claiming that the plaint schedule property originally belongs to one Shaban Hajee Sarwar Saheb, who is the grand father of the plaintiffs and father of Defendants 1 to 4. The said Hajee Sarwar Saheb said to have executed registered will deed in favour of the plaintiffs on 25-12-1975 at Jammalamadugu bequeathing all his properties to the plaintiffs. The said Sarwar Saheb died on 20-2-1976 at Tadpatri. Under Mohammedan Law, the bequest is valid to 1/3rd share of the deceased. The remaining 2/3rd share devolve upon the defendants. The plaintiffs and defendants are enjoying the property jointly. Due to misunderstanding among them, the plaintiffs filed a suit for partition and separate possession of their 1/3rd shared in the suit properties. According to them, the defendants 1 to 3 will be entitled to 4/7th share and defendant No.4 will be entitled to 2/21st share in the plaint schedule properties as heirs of late Sarwar Saheb. 3. The defendants filed their written statement but contended that the suit property is not the absolute property of Sarwar Saheb but it belongs to partnership firm. In the said partnership firm, Sarwar Saheb had 40% share, while Defendants 1 and 3 had each 30% share. They also disputed the will said to have been executed by Sarwar Saheb. 4. On the basis of the above pleadings, the trial court framed the following issues for trial: (1) Whether the will executed by late Sarwar Saheb is true valid and binding on the defendants? (2) Whether the suit properties are properties of late Sarwar Saheb? (3) Whether the Court fee paid is not correct? (4) To what relief? 5. Before the trial court, on behalf of the plaintiffs PW.1 was examined and Exs.A1 and A2 were marked. On behalf of the defendants, no oral and documentary evidence was adduced. (2) Whether the suit properties are properties of late Sarwar Saheb? (3) Whether the Court fee paid is not correct? (4) To what relief? 5. Before the trial court, on behalf of the plaintiffs PW.1 was examined and Exs.A1 and A2 were marked. On behalf of the defendants, no oral and documentary evidence was adduced. After hearing both parties, preliminary decree was passed. Thereafter, an Advocate-Commissioner by name, Sri A.Prabhakar was appointed to inspect the property, draw necessary sketch and file detailed report allotting shares to plaintiffs as well as defendants and their legal heirs. On 29-12-2004 the learned Senior Civil Judge, Gooty passed a final decree and the order reads as follows: Petitioners and respondents counsel filed a joint memo stating that they have no objection for the Commissioner's Report filed in this petition. Hence, the petitioners and respondents are entitled to share of their properties as per the Commissioner's report. Final decree is passed in terms of Commissioner's report. Petitioners are directed to file N.J. stamps for engrossing decree. Memo recorded. 6. Aggrieved over the said order, an appeal was filed by the legal representatives of third defendant. The contention of the appellants in AS.No.28 of 2006 is that they have not authorized their counsel to agree for a compromise on their behalf based on which a final decree was passed and the trial court has acted against Order-23, Rule-3 of the Code of Civil Procedure on the ground that the signature of the parties has not been obtained in the compromise petition and therefore, the trial court should not have accepted compromise in the absence of signatures of the parties or the parties themselves. The said contention raised on behalf of the appellant was rejected by the lower appellate court on the ground that under Order-3, Rule-1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, counsel engaged by the parties are entitled and have power to represent on behalf of the appellants to sign or accept for compromise and thus rejected the appeal. Aggrieved over the said judgment, the present second appeal is filed by the same legal representatives of third defendant. 7. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellants is as follows: When the plaintiffs have claimed 1/3rd share in the plaint schedule property and final decree was also awarded 1/3rd for the plaintiffs. Aggrieved over the said judgment, the present second appeal is filed by the same legal representatives of third defendant. 7. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellants is as follows: When the plaintiffs have claimed 1/3rd share in the plaint schedule property and final decree was also awarded 1/3rd for the plaintiffs. It is wrong on the part of the Commissioner to award 11/21st share for the plaintiffs. The trial court erred in ordering the compromise and final decree in the absence of the parties themselves being present or in the absence of a compromise memo signed by the parties, which is in violation of Order-23, Rule-3 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 8. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondents would contend that there was no compromise petition filed before the Court. The advocates appearing for the appellants i.e., defendants only signed as no objection for passing final decree based on the report of the Commissioner. Further the defendants themselves accepted their shares in the execution proceedings without any objection or protest and after a delay of six months they have come forward with an appeal. He further contended that if the appellants are aggrieved over the said compromise decree on the ground that they have not instructed their counsel to go for a compromise, they could have filed a review before the same court for modification of a final decree but filing an appeal is not the correct procedure to agitate their rights. 9. The preliminary decree has been passed after examination of PW.1. On behalf of the defendants no witness was examined nor any document was produced. The preliminary decree has become final. After passing of a preliminary decree, the second defendant died. Therefore, an application was filed by the plaintiffs to modify 1/3rd share allotted to them, as 11/21st share on the ground that on the death of the second defendant his share devolved on the plaintiffs which was also accepted by an order dated 16-7-2004 in I.A.No.129 of 2004. Thereafter, in I.A.No.129 of 2004 the Advocate-Commissioner was appointed to measure the properties, draw sketch and file detailed report about allotment of shares to the plaintiffs as well as defendants. Accordingly the Commissioner appointed by Court also filed his report. Over the said report, no objection was raised by any of the defendants. Thereafter, in I.A.No.129 of 2004 the Advocate-Commissioner was appointed to measure the properties, draw sketch and file detailed report about allotment of shares to the plaintiffs as well as defendants. Accordingly the Commissioner appointed by Court also filed his report. Over the said report, no objection was raised by any of the defendants. In fact, the defendants were represented by two different counsel who made endorsement of no objection. Since there was no objection for the Commissioner's report from any side either by the plaintiffs or the defendants, the trial court passed a final decree on 29-12-2004, which has been extracted. 10. The very final order passed by the trial court would show that there was no compromise petition filed by the parties concerned in the suit. A joint memo for no objection alone has been accepted by the court and final decree was passed in terms of the Commissioner's report. Subsequently, the parties were allotted their shares in execution proceedings and the third defendant himself has accepted his share without any mur mur. About six months later with a delay condonation petition, he has filed appeal before the District Court which was numbered as AS.No.28 of 2006 after condonation of delay. That itself would show that either at the time of filing of the Commissioner's report or at the time of execution or delivery of possession to the third defendant or to the other defendants and plaintiffs, nobody had any grievance and they accepted their share as it is. The appeal filed about six months later is only a subsequent development for reasons best known to the third defendant, who filed the appeal and after his death pursued by his legal representatives. Therefore, the first contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that when preliminary decree was passed only 1/3rd share was allotted to the plaintiffs, the Commissioner allotting 11/21st share is beyond the scope of preliminary decree is factually not correct because the court by itself by an order dated 16-4-2004 has allotted 11/21st share to the plaintiffs on their application based on the death of the second defendant whose share was devolved upon the plaintiffs. 11. 11. The second contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is that Order-23, Rule-3 of the Code of Civil Procedure has been violated and the Court has accepted the compromise in the absence of signatures of the parties concerned or their presence in the court. ORDER-XXIII, Rule-3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, reads as hereunder: Compromise of suit: Where it is proved to the satisfaction of the Court that a suit has been adjusted wholly or in part by any lawful agreement or compromise (in writing and signed by parties), or where the defendant satisfies the plaintiff in respect of the whole or any part of the subject matter of the suit, the Court shall order such agreement, compromise or satisfaction to be recorded, and shall pass a decree in accordance therewith (so far as it relates to the parties to the suit, whether or not the subject matter of the agreement, compromise or satisfaction is the same as the subject matter of the suit). (Provided that where it is alleged by one party and denied by the other that an adjustment or satisfaction has been arrived at, the Court shall decide the question; but no adjournment shall be granted for the purpose of deciding the question, unless the Court, for reasons to be recorded, thinks fit to grant such adjournment.) 12. It is true that the parties to the compromise are bound to sign and unless they sign the compromise memo should not be accepted and acted upon. The amendment by Act 104 of 1976 clearly states that the compromise memo should be signed by the parties. In AIR 1983 Calcutta-199 it has been held that compromise not signed by the parties cannot be recorded by the Court. Therefore, there is no dispute with regard to the legal proposition that a compromise memo not signed by the parties should not be accepted or recorded by Court. But this case is factually different. This is not a case of compromise memo filed by the parties adjusting the suit or comprising the suit wholly or in part. What happened in this case is the Commissioner's report was filed as per the directions of the trial court, for which the advocates signed no objection and a joint memo was filed, based on which, final decree was passed. What happened in this case is the Commissioner's report was filed as per the directions of the trial court, for which the advocates signed no objection and a joint memo was filed, based on which, final decree was passed. Final decree was also executed and acted upon and all the parties have accepted their respective shares without any protest or grievance. In a case of similar nature, In Jineshwardas (D) By Lrs., And Ors. V/S. Jagrani (SMT) And Anr. (2003) 11 Supreme Court Cases -372, the Honourable Supreme Court has held that a recognized agent or pleader in terms of Order-3, Rule-1 can act on behalf of parties as well. That was a case in which the counsel on both sides expressed a desire to settle the dispute before the High Court and decree was passed. The Supreme Court has held that it may, at times, be also a judgment on admission. The above observation of the Hon'ble Supreme Court referred to supra-1, squarely applies to the facts of this case also. In this case also though no compromise petition was filed, signed by parties to the suit, the joint memo was filed by the advocates on behalf of the parties and the advocates are competent to make such admission as per Order-3, Rule-1 as held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court which followed in the earlier judgment in Byram Pestonji Gariwala V/S. Union Of India (1992) 1 SCC 31 . Therefore, the final decree passed on the basis of no objection by the advocates representing defendants as well as the plaintiffs is in order and does not suffer from any legal infirmity. 13. If at all the appellants were aggrieved by the final decree for which according to them they have not given consent, the proper remedy is to file a review before the same court. It is pertinent to note that the parties would disown the consent by their advocate on their behalf have not taken any actionagainst their advocates by issuing any notice or filing any case against them before the Consumer Court or by filing any application or complaint before the Bar Council. 14. In Shaik Basheer Ahmed And Ors. V/S. Shaik Yakoob Ahmed And Anr 2006 (3) ALT-510., it has been held that if a compromise decree is passed under Order-23, no fresh suit can be filed questioning the said decree. 15. 14. In Shaik Basheer Ahmed And Ors. V/S. Shaik Yakoob Ahmed And Anr 2006 (3) ALT-510., it has been held that if a compromise decree is passed under Order-23, no fresh suit can be filed questioning the said decree. 15. In Tulsan V/S. Pyare Lal And Ors (2006) 10 Supreme Court Cases-782, the binding effect of the consent decree has been discussed and the Hon'ble Supreme Court further held that after a consent decree subsequent suit in respect of same subject matter of consent decree cannot be filed. The Hon'ble Supreme Court further held that a consent decree, it is trite, remains valid unless it is set aside, it would be binding on the parties. 16. In Zahoor Bux And Anr. V/S. Fareed Bux And Ors (2005) 13 Supreme Court Cases383., their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court have discussed about the mode in the event of a party disputing or objecting a compromise on the ground that he has not signed the compromise. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed as follows: “If any of the parties has any objection to the recording of compromise on the ground that the same was not genuine inasmuch as it did not bear the signature of the affected party, in that event, the court, which recorded the compromise, is required to hold an inquiry with regard to genuineness or other wise of the compromise after giving opportunity to the parties to lead oral and documentary evidence on the said question ". 17. In Bsnl And Ors. V/S. Subhash Chandra Kanchan And Anr (2006) 8 Supreme Court Cases-279., the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as follows: Furthermore, in terms of Order-3, Rule-1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, a litigant is represented by an advocate. A concession made by such an advocate is binding on the party whom he represents. If it is binding on the parties, again subject to just exceptions, they cannot at a later stage resile there from. The matter may, however, be different if a concession is made on question of law. A wrong concession on legal question may not be binding upon his client. 18. From the discussions held above, it is clear that pleader appearing on behalf of a party can sign no objection for a petition or sign a joint memo which can be acted upon by a Court. A wrong concession on legal question may not be binding upon his client. 18. From the discussions held above, it is clear that pleader appearing on behalf of a party can sign no objection for a petition or sign a joint memo which can be acted upon by a Court. If the parties agreed on the ground that he has not given such instructions it is open to him to challenge the same before the same court which passed the judgment or decree but not by way of a separate suit. 19. As far as this case is concerned, both on law and facts, the contentions raised by the appellant framed substantial questions of law in para No.4 of the memorandum of grounds of second appeal: (a) Whether the judgment of the courts below in passing final decree on the basis of joint memo filed by the counsel of both parties is correct in law? (b) Whether the judgment of the courts below is correct in law in accepting joint memo filed by counsel of contesting parties, when the said joint memo is contrary to the provisions of Order-3, Rule-1 CPC, in the absence of specific power from party as required under the said provision? (c) Whether the decree passed by court below is contrary to provisions of Order- 23, Rule-3 CPC amounting to compromise decree wherein notice and signature of parties are required? 20. The Court could not have accepted the compromise signed by the Advocate in violation of Order-XXIII, Rule-3 of the Code of Civil Procedure in the absence of signature of the parties concerned. As already said, no compromise petition was filed under Order-XXIII, Rule-3 of the Code of Civil Procedure and therefore there could not be any signatures of the parties and in the absence of any compromise memo. But as already said, the Commissioner's report was accepted by counsel of all parties and based on that final decree was passed. There is no error committed by the court. The substantial questions of law are answered accordingly. 21. The second appeal stands dismissed. No costs.