JUDGMENT R.S. Garg, J. 1. This judgment shall disposes of Co. Appeal No. 7/2009 and Co. Appeal No. 8/2009. Before we proceed to consider the appeals in question, be it noted that M/s. Bharat Commerce and Industries Limited was a company declared to be a sick company by the BIFR and on 12-4-2004 a reference was made by the BIFR regarding winding up of this company to the company court. On 11-7-2005 an order was passed by the Learned Company Judge directing winding up of M/s. Bharat Commerce & Industries Limited ('Company in liquidation'). From the list of dates and events submitted by the Learned Counsel for the respondent No. 3 it appears that from August - September, 2006 efforts were being made by the Official Liquidator (OL) under the control of the Company Court to dispose of the assets of the company in liquidation by issuing public notices inviting tenders in various newspapers, both at National and State level having circulation, especially in State of Punjab, State of M.P. and published from all major metro cities of the country. As placed on record on 25-2-2008 a public notice was issued by the Official Liquidator pursuant to which on 8-5-2008 the respondent No. 3 submitted its tender and deposited earnest money of Rs. 6 crores with the Official Liquidator. On 28-5-2008, the Official Liquidator filed OLR No. 28/2008 intimating that for lot Nos. 1 and 2 highest bid from respondent No. 3 for a total sum of Rs. 15 crores for lot No. 1 and Rs. 10 crores for lot No. 2 were received, it appears that on 23-6-2008 one M/s. SPA infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. filed LA No. 6229/08 seeking intervention to participate in the negotiations. On 11-8-2008 the Company Court allowed the said application and directed the said intervener to participate in the negotiations and directed the sale committee to complete the process within one month. It appears that negotiations took place between respondent No. 3 and the said SPA Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. and the said intervener was thrown out of the negotiations by out weighing his bid. On 12-9-2008 OLR No. 50/98 was submitted by the Official Liquidator informing the company court that the respondent No. 3 is the only successful and highest bidder left in the fray. On 28-9-2008 one M/s. Rohan Meta Chem Industries filed intervention application seeking to offer a higher bid of Rs. On 12-9-2008 OLR No. 50/98 was submitted by the Official Liquidator informing the company court that the respondent No. 3 is the only successful and highest bidder left in the fray. On 28-9-2008 one M/s. Rohan Meta Chem Industries filed intervention application seeking to offer a higher bid of Rs. 17.5 crores for lot No. 1 and Rs. 11.50 crores for lot No. 2, in effect only Rs. 50 lakhs more for each lot than what was offered by the respondent No 3. 2. On 6-5-2009 the Company Court while considering the applications made by the respondent No. 3 as also M/s. Rohan Meta Chem directed them to deposit earnest money of Rs. 6 crores + 18 per cent of their offer value to show their bona fides inasmuch as they did not respond to the public notice issued on 25-2-2008. 3. The Company Judge, in our opinion, rightly directed the two interveners to deposit the 18 per cent money of their respective offers along with earnest money. 4. From the records it transpires that on 19-8-2009 when the matter came up before the Learned Company Judge, neither on behalf of the appellant of Co. Appeal No. 8/09, nor on behalf of M/s. Rohan Meta Chem anyone appeared leaving the Learned Company Judge with no option but to dismiss their applications because it was reported that the order dated 6-5-2009 directing them to deposit EMD and 18 per cent amount of their offer value was not deposited. While dismissing the intervention applications the Learned Company Judge confirmed the sale and directed the respondent No. 3, the successful auction purchaser, to deposit the balance amount of Rs. 22 crores and a further direction was given to the Official Liquidator to execute necessary documents and hand over possession of the property in question. 5. It appears that on 17-9-2009 the respondent deposited the balance consideration of Rs. 22 crores and on 3-10-2009 the possession of the property in question (lot No. 1), sold after approval of the company court, was also handed over. 6. It appears that the appellant of company appeal No. 8/2009 and M/s. Rohan Meta Chem made applications for recalling of order dated 19-8-2009 which came to be rejected by the Learned Company Judge on 8-10-2009. 7. In Co. 6. It appears that the appellant of company appeal No. 8/2009 and M/s. Rohan Meta Chem made applications for recalling of order dated 19-8-2009 which came to be rejected by the Learned Company Judge on 8-10-2009. 7. In Co. Appeal No. 8/2009 filed by M/s. Pargatsingh Dhindsa Land Developers Pvt. Ltd. ('Pargatsingh') is directed again three orders respectively passed by the Learned Company Judge on 6-5-2009, 19-8-2009 and 8-10-2009. 8. It would be apposite to take note of company appeal No. 7/2009 preferred by Sukhchainsingh. Be it noted that Sukhchainsingh neither submitted any tender nor offered any bid pursuant to the public notice dated 25-2-2008, so also even while other interveners submitted application before the Learned Company Judge offering higher price, Sukhchainsingh at a later point of time appeared before the Learned Company Judge and his application came up for hearing only after sale was confirmed on 19-8-2009. It appears that challenging order dated 8-10-2009 Sukhchainsingh has filed this appeal. At the outset we would reject the appeal of Sukhchainsingh because Sukhchainsingh had never offered any bid rauchless higher bid than the successful bidder respondent No. 3 before confirmation of sale on 19-8-2009 and did not espouse his cause before the Learned Company Judge at an appropriate stage before confirmation of sale on 19-8-2009. In these circumstances, the appeal preferred by Sukhchainsingh, being Co. Appeal No. 7/2009, has no merit and substance and we dismiss it without any hesitation. Co. Appeal No. 8/2009 9. At the outset Shri A.K. Chitley, Learned Senior Counsel appearing for respondent No. 3, contended, after referring to Section 483 of the Companies Act, that unless a parallel provision of appeal is traceable, an appeal would not lie from the order of the Company Judge to the Division Bench because the High Court does not have any original jurisdiction. To bolster his submission the Learned Senior Counsel contended that unless the High Court possesses original jurisdiction and unless a substantive parallel provision is found which vests the Division Bench with the power of appeal against any decision rendered by the Learned Single Judge in original jurisdiction, the mandate of Section 483 providing for an appeal to the same court, in the same manner, and subject to same conditions, under which an appeal lies from any order or decision within its ordinary original jurisdiction. In support of the said submission it was further contended that the High Court Rules and Orders, 2008. Chapter 2—Classification of Cases Rule 1(3) only provides that a company appeal shall be registered as COMA. Further it was contended that under Chapter 4A--Civil Matters, Rule 2(2) provides that a company appeal shall be heard and disposed of by a Division Bench. It was further contended that there is no substantive parallel statutory provision enacted or rule prescribed in M.P. under which an appeal can lie against the impugned orders passed by the Learned Company Judge. 10. The Learned Senior Counsel further submitted that an appeal is maintainable only if a Forum as well as a substantive right of appeal is created under a provision akin to Clause X of the Letters Patent or a statute such as Delhi High Court Act or otherwise. Placing strong reliance on this position of law the Learned Senior Counsel further contended that in absence of such provisions no appeal would lie under Section 483 before the Division Bench against the orders of the Company Judge. 11. The Learned Counsel referred to a Full Bench judgment in the matter of Punjab Co-operative Bank Ltd. v. Official Liquidator, Punjab Cotton Press Co. Ltd. AIR 1941 Lahore 257. 12. In oppugnation to the said objection raised by Shri A.K. Chitley, Learned Senior Counsel on behalf of the respondent No. 3, Shri S.C. Bagadiya, Learned Senior Counsel for the appellant submitted that the jurisdiction conferred upon the Company Judge is original jurisdiction and since jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is also an original jurisdiction and in the wake of M.P. Uchcha Nyayalaya (Khandpith Ko Appeal) Adhiniyam, 2005 an appeal having been prescribed from the original order passed by the Learned Single Judge in exercise of original jurisdiction, in the same manner an appeal would lie before the Division Bench under Section 483. Shri Bagadiya further submitted that the objection raised on behalf of the respondent No. 3 is misconceived as Section 483 provides the Forum and the manner and conditions subject to which an appeal lies and to give effect to Section 483 ibid clue should be drawn from the Adhiniyam, 2005 to take the view that though Section 483 is some what unhappily worded we should fall back upon the Adhiniyam, 2005 to hold that an appeal would lie to the Division Bench from the orders of the Learned Company Judge. Before testing the rival submissions raised by respondent No. 3 regarding maintainability of appeal and by the appellant in support of the maintainability of appeal, we would remind ourselves of certain general principles regarding interpretation of statutes. In the first place, where a statute provides a right of appeal, such a right is regarded as statutory right of appeal conferred upon a litigant for mitigating his grievance. In the first place, whenever a statute confers statutory right of appeal, effort should be made to give full effect to such provision creating a right of appeal rather than the effort to take away such a statutory right of appeal. In a situation where statutory provision conferring right of appeal is unhappily worded or is ambiguous, with regard to the forum, the manner and conditions subject to which an appeal would lie, efforts should always be made to adopt the principle of purposive construction to enable the Court to resolve the conflict so as to give full and complete effect to the legislative intent in creating statutory right of appeal. In such situation where the statute is short of appropriate prescription to make it operational, it is the duty of the Courts while interpreting provisions to supply casus omisus to resolve the conflict and for this purpose even the Court would be permitted to look outside such enactment creating right of appeal to make a sincere effort to find out with the help of other statutes the forum, the manner and the conditions subject to which the right of appeal so created could be saved and full effect is given to it. We wish to make it clear that no litigant can be left remediless and the intention of Legislature to create a right of appeal has to be respected and given full effect to. We wish to make it clear that no litigant can be left remediless and the intention of Legislature to create a right of appeal has to be respected and given full effect to. We would like to take support of the judicial pronouncements on the aforesaid principles which are trite in law and even applied consistently on umpteen number of occasions to resolve the cleavage to give effect to such construction which would promote the full operation of such provision to give solace to a litigant conferred with a statutory right of appeal. Recently, the Apex Court in the matter of Karnataka State Financial Corporation v. N. Narsimahaiah [2008] 5 SCC 176 has observed that for interpreting a statute in a reasonable manner, the Court must place itself in the chair of reasonable legislator and make attempt to pose a question as to why one provision has been enacted and why one terminology has been used while inserting statutory provision. It has further been held in the matter of Karnataka State Financial Corporation's case (supra) that a statute must be interpreted having regard to constitutional provisions as also human rights. The rule of "beneficent construction" is a rule which applies when two views are possible. If the statute is unambiguous and clear then this rule has no application. However, when the statute contains anomalies as regards its operation, then certainly rule of "beneficent construction" would be available to the Court to interpret the provision leaning towards "beneficent construction" to achieve the object underlying such statute. This view has been approved by the Apex Court in the matter of Manipal Academy of Higher Education v. Provident Fund Commissioner [2008] 5 SCC 428. The Apex Court in the matter of Karnataka State Financial Corporation's case (supra) has also held that the Court shall not construe a provision leaning in favour of such deprivation. This principle laid down by their Lordships of the Apex Court would come to rescue to the situation at hand inasmuch as if the preliminary objection of respondent No. 3 is to be upheld then right of appeal conferred by Section 483 would be rendered redundant depriving a litigant of such a statutory right of appeal. This principle laid down by their Lordships of the Apex Court would come to rescue to the situation at hand inasmuch as if the preliminary objection of respondent No. 3 is to be upheld then right of appeal conferred by Section 483 would be rendered redundant depriving a litigant of such a statutory right of appeal. The aforesaid observation of the Apex Court, though made in respect of right of property, shall apply even to situation at hand with full force inasmuch as if preliminary objection of respondent No. 3 was to succeed, it would lead to deprivation of right of appeal created by statute. A well known rule of construction is giving effect to all provisions of statute should be adopted as held in the matter of Sarabjit Rick Singh v. Union of India [2008] 2 SCC 417. The Apex Court in the matter of New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Nusli Neville Wadia [2008] 3 SCC 279 had opined that purposive construction should be preferred to literal construction leading to anomaly or absurdity. In the matter of Sarabjit Rick Singh's case (supra), the Apex Court had opined that such interpretation which makes the statute unworkable should be avoided. In the matter of Bihar State of Council of Ayurvedic & Unani Medicine v. Slate of Bihar AIR 2008 SC 595 in para 51 their Lordships have laid down that interpretation consistent with smooth working of the system which the statute purposefully regulates should be preferred to that which would introduce uncertainty, friction or confusion into the working of the system. Similarly in the matter of Swaran Singh v. State [2008] 8 SCC 435 it was held that construction which frustrates the object of the Act should be avoided and creative interpretation should be adopted to give full effect to the statutory provision. Again in the matter of R & B Falcon (A) Pty. Ltd. v. CIT [2008] 169 Taxman 515 (SC) their Lordships have reiterated the rule of purposive construction. In the matter of Bihar State of Council of Ayurvedic & Unani Medicine's case (supra) the Apex Court had again commented that the Court must always lean to the interpretation which is reasonable one and discard literal interpretation, which does not fit in with the scheme of the Act under construction. In the matter of Bihar State of Council of Ayurvedic & Unani Medicine's case (supra) the Apex Court had again commented that the Court must always lean to the interpretation which is reasonable one and discard literal interpretation, which does not fit in with the scheme of the Act under construction. In the same judgment, their Lordships have cautioned that a construction of statute causing injustice or even hardship or inconvenience is not required to be adopted unless the intention of the Legislature is such. Regarding workability of statute, it was held in [2008] 11 SCC 573 that provision must be construed in such a manner so as to make it workable and that construction should be avoided which makes it unworkable. 13. Before we advert to the rival contentions raised by the Learned Senior Counsel it would be apposite to consider the judgment in the matter of Punjab Co-operative Bank Ltd.'s case (supra). In the said case a petition under Section 166 of the Companies Act, 1913 was presented by a creditor of Punjab Cotton Press Co. Ltd. and High Court ordered the Company to be compulsorily wound up. The proceedings in the winding up were being taken before Single Bench and certain orders were passed and eventually those orders were challenged in an appeal. Under Clause X of the Letters Patent read with Section 202 of the Companies Act, 1913. The issue of limitation arose before that court and the question which fell for consideration was 'whether the appeals were within limitation or barred by limitation? When the question of maintainability coupled with question of limitation was raised the Learned Judges of the Division Bench referred the matter to a Bench of five Judges and the following questions were referred to the Larger Bench. (1) Does Section 12 of the Limitation Act, govern an appeal preferred under Section 202, the Companies Act, from an order of a single Judge exercising original jurisdiction where the forum of appeal (as distinct from the right of appeal) is provided by the Letters Patent; and if so, is the appellant in such cases entitled to exclude the 'time requisite' for obtaining a copy of the judgment appealed against, even though under the rules and orders of the High Court no copy of the judgment is required to be filed with the memorandum of appeal? (2) Does Section 12 of the Limitation Act, govern appeals under the Letters Patent in which not only the forum of appeal, but also the right of appeal is given by the Letters Patent; and is the appellant in such a case entitled to exclude under Section 12 the "time requisite" for obtaining a copy, whether such copy is filed or not? 14. Section 202, which fell for consideration in that case is also quoted herein below for ready reference: ...appeals from any order or decision made, or given, in the matter of the winding up of a company by the Court may be had in the same manner, and subject to the same conditions, in and subject to which, appeals may be had from any order or decision of the same Court in cases within its ordinary jurisdiction. 15. On consideration of the questions referred and the substantive provision, it was noticed by the Larger Bench that under the said section, which is pari materia to Section 483 while the aggrieved party had a right of appeal against orders passed in winding up, it contains no specific provision regarding the Forum in which the appeal is to be preferred, nor does it prescribe any particular period of limitation for such appeals. It was further noticed that the section lays down in general terms that for such purposes the orders passed in the matter of winding up shall be treated as if they had been passed by the same court in cases within its ordinary jurisdiction. For determination of Forum and conditions on which appeals from such orders would lie, their Lordships opined that they had to look outside the Companies Act. It was further noticed that if the order was passed by the District Judge in winding up proceedings transferred to it under Section 164 of the Companies Act, 1913, an appeal would lie to the High Court under Section 39 of the Punjab Courts Act and the period of limitation would be 90 days from the date of the order. If, however, the winding up proceeding was before the Single Judge in High Court under its original jurisdiction, the forum of appeal would be a Bench of two or more Judges of the High Court under Clause X of the Letters Patent. If, however, the winding up proceeding was before the Single Judge in High Court under its original jurisdiction, the forum of appeal would be a Bench of two or more Judges of the High Court under Clause X of the Letters Patent. It was further noted that if the matter in winding up was being dealt with by a Bench of two or more Judges no appeal would lie from such order to any Bench in any court of India but the aggrieved party may have to appeal to his Majesty-in-council in the same manner and subject to the conditions as laid down under Section 109 of CPC. 16. Reverting back to situation obtaining in this case, we are at a loss to record that while putting forth the preliminary objection the Learned Senior Counsel for the respondent No. 3 did not take any clue from the provisions of M.P. Uchcha Nyayalaya (Khandpith Ko Appeal) Adhiniyam, 2005 as also Clause X of the Letters Patent contained in Section 4 Chapter 4 (at page 352) of High Court Rules and Orders by Jindal. A perusal of Section 2 of the Adhiniyam, 2005 and Clause X of the Letters Patent clearly reveals that against orders passed by a Single Bench in the course of original jurisdiction, an appeal is provided to the Division Bench. It would be apt to note that now Clause X is controlled by Section 100A of the Code of Civil Procedure introduced with effect from 1-7-2002 prohibiting an appeal from any appellate decree passed by the Learned Single Judge. We may hasten to add that we may not be understood to have decided anything regarding survival of Clause X or its effect as an enabling provision for maintainability of LPAs etc. but for the limited purpose of taking a clue as regards the forum, the manner and conditions subject to which an appeal is provided under Section 483 ibid. We may hasten to add that we may not be understood to have decided anything regarding survival of Clause X or its effect as an enabling provision for maintainability of LPAs etc. but for the limited purpose of taking a clue as regards the forum, the manner and conditions subject to which an appeal is provided under Section 483 ibid. [Emphasis supplied] After considering the forum, the manner and conditions subject to which, an appeal is provided against orders of a learned Single Judge passed in exercise of original jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to the Division Bench, we lean in favour of adopting the approach of purposive construction in preference to the literal construction and we also feel that in order to give full effect to the legislative intent the extraordinary test with regard to the forum, the manner and conditions subject to which an appeal would lie, can be taken from statutes such as Adhiniyam, 2005, which clearly defines such parameters with regard to the right of appeal against an order passed in original jurisdiction. Keeping in view the various principles laid down as discussed herein above, we are unable to hold that Section 483 ibid should be construed literally and in isolation to hold that no appeal would lie rather we would prefer to adopt such construction which leans towards the workability of Section 483 ibid. Thus, we hold that an appeal against an order of learned Company Judge against the orders passed in exercise of original jurisdiction would lie to a Division Bench and accordingly, we reject the preliminary objection raised by respondent No. 3. 17. The Learned Senior Counsel for the respondent No. 3 further raised an objection that the appeals having been preferred against orders dated 6-5-2009, 19-8-2009 and 8-10-2009, the appeals would be barred by limitation, because under Article 117 of the Limitation Act period of 30 days is available. The Learned Counsel further contended that the above Article applies to appeals under Section 483, is clearly held in the matter of Punjab Co-operative Bank Ltd.'s case (supra) and Dhobi Charan Sahu v. Official Liquidator of Shri Jagannath Industries Ltd. AIR 1963 Ori. 220 . The Learned Counsel further contended that the above Article applies to appeals under Section 483, is clearly held in the matter of Punjab Co-operative Bank Ltd.'s case (supra) and Dhobi Charan Sahu v. Official Liquidator of Shri Jagannath Industries Ltd. AIR 1963 Ori. 220 . It was further added by the Counsel for the respondent No. 3 that no application for condonation of delay have been made, the question of entertaining the appeal does not arise and the question of limitation has to be determined by us first, as narrated in Lacchman Singh v. Hazara Singh [2008] 5 SCC 444 and K.S. Nanji & Co. v. Jatashankar Dossa AIR 1961 SC 1474 and Commr. Nagar Paris had, Bhilwara v. Labour Court [2009] 3 SCC 525. 18. The aforesaid submission of counsel for respondent No. 3 has been seriously opposed by the Learned Counsel for the appellant and it was submitted that the certified copy was applied on 11-5-2009 and the copy was delivered on 9-10-2009, similarly the copy of order dated 19-8-2009 was also delivered along with the same copy and regarding the order dated 8-10-2009 the certified copy was applied on 9-10-2009 and was received on 12-10-2009 and the appeal was filed on 22-10-2009, therefore, even under Article 117 the appeal is within limitation, after excluding the time spent in obtaining the certified copy as envisaged by Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act. 19. After considering the rival submission made we are of the considered opinion that the Full Bench Judgment in the matter of Punjab Co-operative Bank Ltd.'s case (supra) is an authority for the proposition that provisions of Section 12 of the Limitation Act would also be attracted and applicable to a company appeal under Section 483 which is pari materia to Section 202 of Companies Act, 1913, which was in question before their Lordships. Once we hold that the entire period spent in obtaining the certified copy is excludible, we have no option but to hold that appeal is within limitation. Accordingly, we reject the objection of the respondent No. 3 and hold that the appeal is within limitation. 20. Coming to the merits of the appeal it would be necessary to take note of certain facts and the law which has been laid down by the Apex Court. Accordingly, we reject the objection of the respondent No. 3 and hold that the appeal is within limitation. 20. Coming to the merits of the appeal it would be necessary to take note of certain facts and the law which has been laid down by the Apex Court. In this regard we may refer to the judgment in the matter of FCS Software Solutions Ltd. v. LA Medical Devices Ltd. [2008] 10 SCC 440. In this judgment particularly all issues regarding acceptance of higher bid have been considered. The ratio decidendi in FCS Software Solutions Ltd. 5 case (supra) clearly lays down that no hard and fast rule in a straitjacket formula can be laid down rather the circumstances of each case have to be appreciated before exercising power either in the course of winding up proceedings or in the course of an appeal before a confirmed sale could be set aside either resulting in order for re-sale or acceptance of a higher offer at appellate stage. We would not like to burden our judgment with the number of decisions of the Apex Court which have already been considered in the matter of FCS Software Solutions Ltd.'s case (supra), suffice it to say that we have to consider the facts and circumstances of this case. 21. A perusal of order dated 6-5-2009 passed by the Company Judge shows that the respondent No. 3 Shri Omji Infrastructure and Projects Pvt. Ltd. had submitted its bid of Rs. 17 crores for lot No. 1 and Rs. 11 crores for lot No. 2 and had promptly deposited the earnest money of Rs. 6 crores on 8-5-2008. Thereafter on 23-6-2008 one M/s. SPA Infrastructure (P.) Ltd. filed an application before the Company Judge seeking intervention to permit it to participate in the negotiation. On 11-8-2008, the Learned Company Judge allowed the said application and permitted the said M/s. SPA Infrastructure (P.) Ltd. to participate in the negotiation. A meeting of Sale Committee was convened on 10-9-2008 and in negotiation proceedings the respondent No. 3 outweighed the said M/s. SPA Infrastructure (P.) Ltd. resulting in filing of OLR 50/08 on 12-9-2008 by the Official Liquidator recommending confirmation of sale in favour of respondent No. 3. 22. A meeting of Sale Committee was convened on 10-9-2008 and in negotiation proceedings the respondent No. 3 outweighed the said M/s. SPA Infrastructure (P.) Ltd. resulting in filing of OLR 50/08 on 12-9-2008 by the Official Liquidator recommending confirmation of sale in favour of respondent No. 3. 22. We would refer to the date of invitation of public notice dated 25-2-2008 to ascertain the bona fides and the genuineness of the parties with which they had come to the court. The appellant has furnished his address as village Agety, Tehsil Nacha in District Patyala Punjab. Undisputedly the public notice issued on 25-2-2008 was published in Dainik Bhaskar - Indore and Bhopal edition. It was also published in Punjab Kesri (Hindi Edition) having circulation in all editions in the State of Punjab and Haryana. The pubic notice was also published in Economic Times -Murnbai, Delhi and Ahmedabad edition. The public notice was also published in a newspaper called Jagwani (in Gurumukhi Language) in all its editions having circulation in entire State of Punjab and Haryana. The public notice was also published in the Tribune (English) all editions in Punjab and Haryana; all editions in M.P., Nai Duniya having circulation in Indore, Gwalior, Bhopal, Jabalpur, Bilaspur, Raipur. It was also published in the Hindu all editions, having circulation in Chennai, Coiambatore, Madurai, Tiruchirapalli, Hyderabad, Vijaywada, Trivendrum, Bangalore, Mangalore and Delhi. In addition to the above newspapers, as contended by the respondent No. 3, the Official Liquidator also published notices through FICCI New Delhi, Indo-American Chambers of Commerce and Industries, Association-Cwm-New Delhi and M.P. Chamber and Commerce Industries, Gwalior. 23. We are at a loss to record that even after such wide publicity having been given, the appellant did not submit its offer pursuant to the public notice. From the records it would clearly appear that on 23-6-2008 when one M/s. SPA Infrastructure (P.) Ltd. could seek intervention, why the present the appellant waited until the negotiation proceedings were held inter se between. M/s. SPA Infrastructure (P.) Ltd. and respondent No. 3. 24. As is apparent on the face of record the appellant was permitted by the Learned Company Judge to participate in the further negotiation proceedings by depositing earnest money of Rs. 6 crores + 18 per cent of his original offer of Rs. 31 crores. If the appellant was so serious about its offer of Rs. 24. As is apparent on the face of record the appellant was permitted by the Learned Company Judge to participate in the further negotiation proceedings by depositing earnest money of Rs. 6 crores + 18 per cent of his original offer of Rs. 31 crores. If the appellant was so serious about its offer of Rs. 31 crores, in terms of the order dated 6-5-2009 the appellant could have deposited the earnest money of Rs. 6 crores and Rs. 5.58 crores (18 per cent of Rs. 31 crores) as directed by the Learned Company Judge. We would hasten to add that if the appellant was not satisfied with the said order passed by the Learned Company Judge, the said order could have been challenged either in an appeal or an application ought to have been made before the Learned Company Judge for recall and/or modification of the said order. However, no such steps were taken rather on 19-8-2009 when the matter was set down for hearing before the Company Judge no one appeared before the Company Judge on behalf of the appellant to press their offer leaving the Learned Company Judge with no option except to reject their applications. Even after rejection of their applications offering a higher amount, no steps were taken because on 19-8-2009 itself the Learned Company Judge had confirmed the sale and directed the Official Liquidator to hand over possession of the property of Lot Nos. 1 and 2. Even at that stage the appellant did not choose to initiate appropriate proceedings and did not come out of its slumber and allowed the sale to be crystallized and subsequent events to take place making it impracticable and inequitable for any court to set the clock back. Undisputedly pursuant to order dated 19-8-2009 the respondent No. 3 deposited the balance consideration of Rs. 22 crores on 17-9-2009 and the possession of the property (lot No. 1) in question was handed over on 3-10-2009. It was further submitted on behalf of the respondent No. 3 which has not been disputed, that after obtaining possession of Lot No. 1 certain parts of machineries etc. have also been removed by the respondent No. 3. It is only thereafter that a half hearted and feeble attempt was made by the appellant for recall of order dated 19-8-2009 when all subsequent events had already taken place. 25. have also been removed by the respondent No. 3. It is only thereafter that a half hearted and feeble attempt was made by the appellant for recall of order dated 19-8-2009 when all subsequent events had already taken place. 25. In view of the aforesaid undisputed facts floating on surface of record the original offer of Rs. 31 crores, which during the course of this appeal was revised to Rs. 35 crores, does not appeal to us so as to set aside the confirmed sale made by the Learned Company Judge in favour of the respondent No. 3. We feel disposed to take note of the fact that the EMD of Rs. 6 crores as deposited by the respondent No. 3 on 8-5-2008 was lying for more than a year with the Official Liquidator. Even by straight calculation this amount of Rs. 6 crores lying deposited with the Official Liquidator, if had not been deposited, would have been used by the respondent No. 3 and it could have at least fetched interest of Rs. 6 lakhs per month in the ordinary course of business. On the contrary the appellant did neither deposit any Earnest Money nor 18 per cent of his offer in violation to the court order which does not portray the picture of a bona fide and higher offerer. In these circumstances we are unable to hold that the appellant has made out any case calling for our interference in the matter. We are also unable to hold that the impugned orders dated 6-5-2009,19-8-2009 and 8-10-2009 suffer from any illegality and we uphold the same. The appeal fails and is hereby dismissed with cost of Rs. 25,000. Resultantly we dismiss the company appeal No. 7/09 as also company appeal No. 8/09 with costs of Rs. 25,000 each payable by the appellant to the respondent No. 3. Let a copy of this judgment be placed on record of Co. A. No. 7/09.