St. Xavier's School, Bokaro Steel City, Bokaro v. State of Jharkhand
2009-09-10
D.K SINHA, GYAN SUDHA MISRA
body2009
DigiLaw.ai
Order This appeal has been preferred against the order dated 18th August, 2009 passed in a batch of writ petitions including the writ petition bearing W.P.(C) No.5939 of 2008* out of which the instant appeal arises. 2. The writ petitions are still sub-judice before the learned Single Judge but the appellant has preferred this appeal against an interim order passed by the learned Single Judge on the date referred to hereinbefore, whereby the learned Single Judge granted interim relief to some of the Institutions which were private, aided and affiliated Schools by permitting them to raise school fee from the previous Sessions starting from 2008-09. 3. However, in course of argument, it could be noticed that the writ petition had been filed by the petitioner-appellant without even impleading the necessary party to the writ petition, who is claiming to be a public spirited person namely Pappu Singh and had moved the Jharkhand Education Tribunal raising several issues before the Tribunal, which were essentially in the nature of public interest, viz. removing the live wire from the top of the school building, overloading of school buses, charging exorbitant fees by the school authorities etc. 4. It was first of all submitted by learned counsel for the appellant that the Jharkhand Education Tribunal in the first place was not vested with the authority and jurisdiction to entertain the cause, as the Tribunal is not vested with the constitutional authority to decide such issues of public importance. In spite of this, the Jharkhand Education Tribunal entertained and decided the matter restraining the schools, including the appellant, from enhancing the school fees. 5. One of the affected Schools, who is the appellant herein, alongwith a batch of other Schools, filed several writ petitions separately before the learned Single Judge, challenging the order passed by the Tribunal and all the writ petitions are still sub-judice before the learned Single Judge. However, an interim order was passed on 18th August, 2009, as already referred to hereinbefore, permitting some of the petitioners/Institutions to enhance the fee but rejected the plea of the appellants herein to increase the school fees. 6.
However, an interim order was passed on 18th August, 2009, as already referred to hereinbefore, permitting some of the petitioners/Institutions to enhance the fee but rejected the plea of the appellants herein to increase the school fees. 6. The matter however appears to have been contested before the learned Single Judge, even though the complainant who had moved the Tribunal had not even been impleaded by the appellant as party to the writ petition but the Jharkhand Education Tribunal which was merely a proforma respondent and had decided the matter in the capacity of a quasi-judicial authority, contested the matter by engaging a counsel in order to justify the order passed by the Chairman of the Tribunal. 7. The contention of the counsel for the appellants to the extent that the Chairman of ,the Jharkhand Education Tribunal was not legally authorized to contest the matter in his personal capacity is correct, as the order passed by the Tribunal was obviously in the nature of discharge of his legal duties as Chairman of the Tribunal vested only with quasi-judicial power and, therefore, the Chairman at the most was a proforma respondent in the writ petition. However, the counsel for the appellant is missing that the writ petition also could not have been filed without impleading the necessary party and that was Pappu Singh, who had moved the Tribunal in which the orders had been passed, which was assailed by the petitioners before the learned Single Judge. 8. Confronted with this technical and legal impediment, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that permission may be granted to him to implead the necessary party to the appeal, which cannot be accepted as this appeal cannot be held maintainable against an interim order passed by the learned Single Judge in a writ petition which had been filed by the appellants without even impleading the necessary party and hence at the stage of appeal, this permission cannot be granted. Thus, the error which was committed by the petitioners by filing a writ petition without impleading necessary party cannot be allowed to be compounded by entertaining an appeal and interfering with the interim order passed by the learned Single Judge by overlooking a vital technical and legal hurdle of non-joinder of necessary party. 9.
Thus, the error which was committed by the petitioners by filing a writ petition without impleading necessary party cannot be allowed to be compounded by entertaining an appeal and interfering with the interim order passed by the learned Single Judge by overlooking a vital technical and legal hurdle of non-joinder of necessary party. 9. Hence in order to arrive at a just solution, we deem it appropriate to direct the appellant to withdraw this appeal and move the learned Single Judge for impleadment of the necessary party, who obviously will be permitted to contest the matter. The question as to whether the Tribunal can be permitted to contest the matter in its individual capacity, although the order was passed merely as a quasi-judicial authority, is left open to be considered by the learned Single Judge. 10. The appeal, under the circumstance, is dismissed as withdrawn.