JUDGEMENT Mihir Kr.Jha, J. 1. Having heard learned counsel for the petitioners and respondent nos. 5 and 6 as also the Official respondents, this Court in the light of the averments made in I.A. No. 31 of 2009 would allow for impleadment of persons named in Paragraph 1 of the said application, namely, 1. Munma Devi wife of late Siya Saran Paswan, 2. Ram Prawesh Paswan, 3. Pramod Paswan and 4. Binod Paswan, as petitioner nos. 1(a), (b), (c) and (d) to this writ application. 2. Heard counsel for the petitioners, counsel for the State as also counsel for private respondent nos. 5 and 6. 3. In this writ application the petitioners, purchaser of the land, have assailed the order dated 15.3.1990 passed in Revision Case No. 314 of 1989, whereby and whereunder, the Additional Member Board of Revenue has set aside the appellate order passed in favour of the petitioners and in the process has restored the order passed by the D.C.L.R. allowing preemption application in favour of respondent nos. 5 and 6. 4. The facts which would be necessary to be noticed for disposal of this application lie in a very narrow compass. The petitioners had purchased 66 dismissal of land in plot no. 132 which by virtue of sale deed dated 29.6.1986 which was registered on 25.9.1986 for a consideration of Rs. 10,000/-. Respondent Nos. 5 and 6 being father and son claiming to be adjoining raiyat filed an application for claiming pre-emption which was allowed by the L.R.D.C, Sheikhpura by order dated 4.6.1987 holding respondent nos. 5 and 6 to be adjoining raiyat and hence eligible for pre-emption of the land in question. The petitioners being aggrieved by the aforementioned order of the L.R.D.C, Sheikhpura had filed an appeal before the Collector of the district and the same after being transferred to the Additional Collector, Munger was disposed of by order dated 16.6.1989, but while allowing the appeal he had dismissed the application for pre-emption on the ground that the petitioners were such landless persons for whom purchased land was only piece of land and as such they being in the category of landless persons, were entitled to save their land from the rigors of the pre-emption as being claimed by respondent nos. 5 and 6. The said appellate order was thereafter challenged by respondent nos. 5 and 6. The said appellate order was thereafter challenged by respondent nos. 5 and 6 before the Board of Revenue in the revision application and the Additional Member Board of Revenue by the impugned order dated 15.10.1990 has set aside the appellate order and in the process has restored the order passed by the L.R.D.C, Sheikhpura allowing pre-emption in favour of respondent nos. 5 and 6. 5. Counsel for the petitioners had raised three issues, namely; (i) Respondent Nos. 5 and 6 having their claim to separate piece of land and even though being father and son could not have maintained the joint pre-emption application; (ii) The form (LC. 13) filled up by respondent nos. 5 and 6 was containing incorrect date of registration of sale deed which made the pre-emption application barred by limitation; (iii) The petitioners were landless persons and as such the pre-emption application filed by respondent nos. 5 and 6 could not have been allowed as against them. 6. Counsel for the respondent nos. 5 and 6, on the other hand, has submitted that the moment it is accepted the fact that respondent nos. 5 and 6 were the admitted boundary raiyat, their application for pre-emption was to be allowed and to that extent status of the purchasers of either being landless or otherwise will be of no avail. Counsel further makes sub-mission that as a matter of fact it is not the job of the persons filing pre-emption application to find out as to whether the purchasers had any other land or not. Counsel has finally submitted that there would be no bar in law for maintaining application for pre-emption under Section 16(3) of the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) especially when there will be no adverse inference with regard to one sale deed and that too in the present case of the persons being father and son. He has also explained that there was no discrepancy in the form (L.C.13), inasmuch as, admittedly registration of the land was made and the application was filed within the prescribed period of limitation. 7. He has also explained that there was no discrepancy in the form (L.C.13), inasmuch as, admittedly registration of the land was made and the application was filed within the prescribed period of limitation. 7. Having given anxious consideration to the aforementioned submissions this Court would not find any merit in the first two points raised by counsel for the petitioners, inasmuch as, there is no bar in law that father and son, even if they have two separate plot of land, for establishing their claim for their being adjoining raiyat, cannot maintain a common joint application. The same interest of father and son as against a common sale deed for claiming pre-emption cannot be rejected on a technical plea of filing a joint petition. Moreover/counsel for the petitioners failed to produce any material to show that father and son had any adverse interest requiring them to file separate application. 8. Similarly, once it is concluded that filing of application under Section 16(3) of the Act alongwith statutory form (L.C.13) was filed within the period of 90 days ot the registration of sale deed dated 29.7.1986 (registered on 25.9.1986), there would be hardly any scope for this Court to take a different view that the application filed by respondent nos. 5 and 6 was well within the prescribed period of limitation under Section 16(3) of the Act and hence maintainable. 9. However, the last submission made by counsel for the petitioners would, require some serious consideration and in fact would make the order of the Additional Member Board of Revenue to be vulnerable inasmuch as he has failed to consider a settled position in law while deciding the same in a very cursory manner. It is the specific case of the petitioners right from beginning that they were landless persons. Such averment made by them in their objection to the application filed by respondent nos. 5 and 6 before the D.C.L.R. wherein it was categorically stated that they were poor landless Harijans and in fact they had no land of their own and were doing the job of labourer and by dint of their hard labour they had purchased the land in question. This statement of the petitioners was tested by the D.C.L.R. who had not found the same to be incorrect on any score rather the same was only noted without recording any categorical finding. 10. This statement of the petitioners was tested by the D.C.L.R. who had not found the same to be incorrect on any score rather the same was only noted without recording any categorical finding. 10. As stated above, pre-emption application was allowed by the D.C.L.R. and therefore the petitioners had raised this issue again before the Collector of the district and the Additional Collector while disposing of the appeal had examined this aspect at great length and had recorded its finding that the petitioners were landless persons and in fact respondent nos. 5 and 6 did not produce any document or raise any plea before the D.C.L.R. to prove that respondent nos. 5 and 6 had some other land so as disentitle them to claim benefit of landless persons. The Additional Collector accordingly having held the petitioners to be landless persons had allowed pre-emption application by following the ratio of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Nathuni Singh Yadav & Anr. vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. reported in 1997(2) PLJR 287. 11. it is very important to note here that when respondent nos. 5 and 6 were non-suited by the appellate authority only on the ground that the petitioners being landless person they had raised this issue in their revision petition before the Member Board of Revenue, who after detailed discussion had decided the issue in question in their favour in paragraph 7 of the impugned order in the following terms: "The arguments of the learned counsel on behalf of the opposite party No. 1 to 4 regarding exemption of opposite party nos. 1 to 4 from the provisions of Section 16(3) of the Act is not at all acceptable as no such exemption is contemplated under the provisions of the Act......" 12. In the opinion of this Court the Additional Member Board of Revenue has completely failed to take into account the ratio of the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Nathuni Singh Yadav (supra). In the opinion of this Court the Additional Member Board of Revenue has completely failed to take into account the ratio of the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Nathuni Singh Yadav (supra). This Court having discussed the statutory provisions under Section 16{3) of the Act and the earlier decision of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of "Mukhi Mali vs. State of Bihar" reported in 1997 BBCJ 151 as also the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Bishan Singh vs. Khazan Singh reported in AIR 1958 SC 838 had held that "if a landless purchaser is not allowed the protection it may mean, taking the matter to its logical conclusion, that he cannot acquire any land, for in the event any claim is made by a cosharer or adjacent Raiyat of the land transferred, he cannot resist the claim as in terms of the provisions, only such person who are either co-sharer or adjacent Raiyats can resist the claim. This would put him to an unjust and inequitable position." 13. The same view, in fact, has been also subsequently taken by this Court in the case of Sachindra Prasad Singh vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. reported in 2007 (Suppl.) PLJR 165 wherein this Court again relying on the case of Nathuni Singh Yadav (supra) has rejected prayer of pre-emption of the pre-emptor. 14. On the basis of aforesaid discussions the net position, which emerges is that the petitioners on the basis of materials on record must be held to be landless persons. This Court therefore will have no hesitation in by following the ratio of the judgment in the case of Nathuni Singh Yadav (supra) while allowing this application by quashing the impugned order passed by the Additional Member Board of Revenue. 15. That being so, this application is allowed and the impugned orders passed by both the Additional Member, Board of Revenue as also the original order of D.C.L.R. is quashed and the appellate order of the Collector the appellate authority is hereby restored. There would be, however, no order as to costs.