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2009 DIGILAW 1275 (RAJ)

Apex Metchem P. Ltd. v. Income

2009-05-08

AJAY RASTOGI

body2009
JUDGMENT 1. - While considering the application under article 226(3) of the Constitution of India seeking vacation of the interim orders dated May 23, 2008, this court, vide order dated January 16, 2009, observed to finally dispose of the petition at the admission stage ; hence the instant petition was finally heard at joint request. The instant petition is directed against the order dated March 31, 2008 (Annexure 4) in Misc. Appl. 8/JP/ 2008, whereby the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Jaipur Bench (" ITAT, Jaipur" ), in exercise of powers under section 254(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, (" I. T. Act" ) recalled its earlier order dated March 29, 2006 (Annexure 1) and further directed both the appeals (ITSSA-105/JP/2004 and 35/JP/2005-assessment year-block period April 1, 1988, to March 23, 1999, to be heard by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Mumbai Bench, Mumbai, in terms of order dated April 4, 2005, (Annexure 3) of the President, Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Mumbai (respondent No. 4). 2. The basic issue raised herein is as to whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal has erred in law and in facts in recalling its final order passed under section 254(1) with a view to rectify the same in exercise of powers under section 254(2) of the Act. 3. Shorn of all details, only the relevant facts necessary for purposes of the issue raised herein are summarised. It appears that on January 21, 1999, the Revenue initially conducted a search operation under section 132 of the Act at the office and residential premises of one Shri Mayur M. Thakkar of Mumbai wherein certain cash and documents were seized and in the course of search of his bank accounts, the name of the petitioner-company (M/s. Apex Metchem P. Ltd., 193A, Industrial Area, Jhotwara, Jaipur) was found having debit and credit statements. Proceedings for the block period (April 1, 1988, to March 23, 1999) were initiated against M. Thakkar under section 158BC at Mumbai while against the petitioner-company under section 158BD of the Act at Jaipur. The assessing authority at Mumbai passed order of the assessment in the case of M. Thakkar under section 158BC on March 31, 2001, against which an appeal was preferred before the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals), Mumbai, and decided on April 30, 2003. The assessing authority at Mumbai passed order of the assessment in the case of M. Thakkar under section 158BC on March 31, 2001, against which an appeal was preferred before the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals), Mumbai, and decided on April 30, 2003. Since the petitioner-company also appeared as intervener in proceedings initiated against M. Thakkar, as such also preferred an appeal against the order of assessment made under section 158BC and the order of the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals), Central VII, Mumbai, before the Appellate Tribunal, Mumbai, which was transferred by the Appellate Tribunal, Mumbai, to Jaipur Bench and came to be registered as ITSSA-97/ JP/04. 4. Since appeal arises from the proceedings initiated against M. Thakkar under section 158BC of the Act on its transfer to Jaipur Bench, an application was filed by the petitioner to consolidate the appeals and on the said application, the President, Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Mumbai, passed an order dated April 4, 2005, (Annexure 3) directing appeal (IT(SS)A No. 97/Jp/04) to be heard and determined by the Mumbai Bench, Mumbai. As informed, hearing after transfer is pending before the Mumbai Bench. 5. Since the petitioner was assessed by the assessing authority under section 158BD of the Act, vide order dated July 13, 2004, against which an appeal was preferred and came to be decided by the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals)-III, Jaipur, on December 14, 2004, against which the petitioner-company preferred an appeal (IT(SS)A No. 105/JP/2004) on February 27, 2005, before the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Jaipur, and cross-appeal (IT(SS)A No. 35//JP/2005) was also filed by the Revenue and both the appeals (supra) were decided by a common order dated March 29, 2006, (Annexure 1) under section 254(1) of the Act. 6. Against the order dated March 29, 2006, (Annexure 1) of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Jaipur, the Revenue preferred appeals under section 260A of the Act (being D. B. Income-tax Appeals Nos. 77 of 2008 and 78 of 2008) which as informed, were admitted by this court and are pending adjudication. 7. 6. Against the order dated March 29, 2006, (Annexure 1) of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Jaipur, the Revenue preferred appeals under section 260A of the Act (being D. B. Income-tax Appeals Nos. 77 of 2008 and 78 of 2008) which as informed, were admitted by this court and are pending adjudication. 7. At this stage, without there being any application filed by either of the parties, vide order dated December 15, 2007, (Annexure 2), the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal suo motu issued a show-cause notice to the parties as to why the order dated March 29, 2006, (Annexure 1) be not recalled under section 254(2) of the Act and to get the matters heard and decided by the Mumbai Bench, Mumbai, as per the orders of the President, Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Mumbai, dated April 4, 2005, (Annexure 3). After the show-cause notice (supra) was served, the petitioner-company and the Revenue both appeared where the petitioner raised several objections including authority of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal to question the final order passed under section 254(1) and also tried to clarify that reasons referred to in the show-cause notice issued, vide order dated December 15, 2007, (Annexure 2) with respect to appeal being transferred from Jaipur to Mumbai Bench were not related to appeals having been decided by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Jaipur Bench, vide the final order dated March 29, 2006, (Annexure 1) ; as such reasons assigned in the notice (Annexure 2) were not legally sustainable. 8. However, the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Jaipur, vide the order impugned dated March 31, 2008 (Annexure 4) recalled its final order dated March 29, 2006, (Annexure 1) passed under section 254(1) of the Act, holding that it was a mistake apparent from the record and further directed to consolidate both the appeals to be heard along with the appeal pending before the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Mumbai Bench, being assailed herein. 9. Counsel for the petitioner submits that the Tribunal committed an error of law and jurisdiction in exercise of powers under section 254(2) while recalling its final order (Annexure 1) passed under section 254(1) of the Act. 9. Counsel for the petitioner submits that the Tribunal committed an error of law and jurisdiction in exercise of powers under section 254(2) while recalling its final order (Annexure 1) passed under section 254(1) of the Act. Counsel further submits that the Tribunal does not hold any plenary and inherent powers under the Act ; and once a substantive order passed by the Tribunal under section 254(1) was assailed by the Revenue by filing appeal under section 260A before this court, powers under section 254(2) of the Act were not required to be exercised pending adjudication before the High Court. Counsel further submits that under the limited scope of section 254(2) of the Act, the learned Tribunal could have rectified the mistake apparent from the record, but not hold competence of recalling the order and to rehear afresh, as such the order impugned passed by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Jaipur, in exercise of powers under section 254(2) of the Act is without jurisdiction and deserves to be set aside. 10. The respondents have filed separate reply through their respective counsel. In their reply, respondents Nos. 1 and 4 raised a preliminary objection that the writ petition is not maintainable in view of the statutory remedy of appeal being available under section 260A of the Act ; and that apart, it has been, inter alia, averred that at one stage, request was made by the petitioner-company by clubbing its appeals and to be heard at Mumbai Bench, Mumbai, pertaining to search conducted at the premises of Mayur M. Thakkar ; and despite the order of consolidation dated April 4, 2005, (Annexure 3) passed on its application by the President, Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Mumbai, in exercise of powers under rule 4 of the Income-tax (Appellate Tribunal) Rules, 1963, cancelled but was not brought to the notice of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Jaipur Bench, which was the mistake apparent from the record and thus the Tribunal has not committed any error in recalling its final order dated March 29, 2006, (Annexure 1) passed in exercise of powers under section 254(1) of the Act. It has also been averred that counsel for the petitioner was relative of one of the members of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Jaipur Bench, and the original order (Annexure 1) was obtained by the petitioner ; and when it came to the notice of the Mumbai Bench, Mumbai, the petitioner made an attempt to withdraw the appeal which was transferred to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Mumbai Bench, vide the order of the President, Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Mumbai, dated April 4, 2005, (Annexure 3). 11. At the same time, the assessing authority (respondents Nos. 2 and 3) have also filed their separate reply raising self-same preliminary objection about availability of remedy of appeal under section 260A of the Act against order impugned but nothing substantial has been averred by them in their reply. 12. It is relevant to mention that after passing of the order impugned, recalling final order dated March 29, 2006, (Annexure 1) passed in exercise of powers under section 254(2) of the Act, the President, Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Mumbai, has passed a further order dated August 20, 2008, in pursuance of rule 4 of the Income-tax (Appellate Tribunal) Rules, 1963, transferring the petitioner' s two appeals-IT(SS)A No. 97/JP/04 and No. 105/JP/04 ; and so also of the assessing authority (ACIT Cir. 3, Jaipur) (No. 35/JP/05) for being heard by the Mumbai Bench, Mumbai. 13. I have considered the contentions of counsel for both the parties and with their assistance, examined the material on record. Under the scheme of the Income-tax Act, in case of a search conducted under section 132, proceedings of the block assessment period against the assessee are initiated under section 158BC ; while at the same time, if the Assessing Officer is satisfied with undisclosed income belongs to any other persons other than those with respect to whom search was made, can initiate proceedings against such other persons under section 158BD of the Act. 14. In the instant case, search was conducted under section 132 of the Act against Mayur M. Thakkar at Mumbai on January 21, 1999, at his office and residential premises resulting into initiation of proceedings under section 158BC while at the same time, proceedings were also initiated against the petitioner-company as alleged under section 158BD for certain bank accounts in the name of the petitioner-company found in course of search conducted by the assessing authority at Jaipur. 15. 15. At the stage of pending assessment before the assessing authority, cases under jurisdiction of different Director General, Chief Commissioner or Commissioner can be transferred obviously after affording reasonable opportunity of being heard to the assessee and after recording reasons for doing so in exercise of powers under section 127 of the Act. 16. In the instant case, the assessment was made of the assessee (Mayur M. Thakkar) under section 158BC of the Act by the assessing authority Mumbai against which he preferred appeal (Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) C-VII/C-18/ROT-198/01/02) which was also decided on April 30, 2003, preferred further appeal to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Mumbai ; and the petitioner being intervener preferred an appeal before the Mumbai Bench which was transferred to Jaipur Bench on December 9, 2004, and this appeal was separately registered by Jaipur Bench as IT(SS)A No. 97/JP/04, which on request made by the petitioner for its consolidation was transferred to Mumbai Bench, Mumbai, vide orders dated April 4, 2005, (Annexure 3) passed by the President in exercise of powers under rule 4 of the Income-tax (Appellate Tribunal) Rules, 1963. 17. At the same time, the assessment order was passed by the assessing authority in the case of the petitioner at Jaipur under section 158BD of the Act on July 30, 2004, and the appeal preferred before the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) was decided on December 14, 2004 ; and since both the parties were aggrieved, cross-appeals (IT(SS) A-105/JP/04 of the petitioner-company and IT(SS) A No. 35/Jp/05 of the Revenue) were filed before the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Jaipur Bench, and were decided vide common order dated March 29, 2006, (Annexure 1). 18. It is relevant to mention that the order dated April 4, 2005, (Ann.3) passed by the President in exercise of rule 4 of the Income-tax (Appellate Tribunal) Rules, 1963, transferring the appeal of the petitioner to Mumbai Bench was confined to appeal (IT(SS)A No. 97/Jp/04) which indeed was transferred to Mumbai Bench ; and consolidated to appeal (No. 553/M/03) preferred by Mayur M.Thakkar and was pending before the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Mumbai Bench ; at the same time after cross appeals were decided by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Jaipur Bench, vide common order dated March 29, 2006, (Annexure 1), the Revenue preferred an appeal (D.B.I.T Appeals Nos. 77 of 2008 and 78 of 2008) before the High Court, Jaipur Bench, under section 260A of the Act which were admitted and are pending adjudication. 19. In the instant case, either of the parties did not file any application but the Tribunal suo motu ordered on December 15, 2007, to issue show-cause notice (Annexure 2) to the parties calling upon them to appear on January 15, 2008 ; and reasons referred to in the notice was that order dated April 4, 2005, of the President whereby the appeals were consolidated and to be heard by the Mumbai Bench was not brought to their notice, which according to the Tribunal, was a mistake apparent from the record ; and that compelled the Tribunal, Jaipur Bench, vide the order impugned (Annexure 4) to re-call its final order (Annexure 1) passed under section 254(1) of the Act. 20. There cannot be any dispute that if there is a mistake apparent from the record, it can always be rectified or amended by the Tribunal obviously within the period of limitation under section 254(2) of the Act. 21. Before I examine the controversy further, it will be relevant to look into section 254(1) and (2) of the Act which runs ad infra : " 254.(1) The Appellate Tribunal may, after giving both the parties to the appeal an opportunity of being heard, pass such orders thereon as it thinks fit. (2) The Appellate Tribunal may, at any time within four years from the date of the order, with a view to rectifying any mistake apparent from the record, amend any order passed by it under sub-section (1), and shall make such amendment, if the mistake is brought to its notice by the assessee or the Assessing officer." 22. The proviso to rules 34A(3) and (4) of the Income-tax (Appellate Tribunal) Rules, 1963, (quoted below) provides procedure for dealing with applications submitted under section 254(2) of the Act : " (3) The Bench which heard the matter giving rise to the application (unless the President, the Senior Vice-President, the Vice President or the Senior Member present at the station otherwise directs) shall dispose it after giving both the parties to the application a reasonable opportunity of being heard : Provided that it shall not be necessary to post miscellaneous application for hearing if it prima facie appears to be a petition for review. (4) An order disposing of an application, under sub-rule (3), shall be in writing giving reasons in support of its decision." 23. In the instant case, the Tribunal suo motu issued notice to the parties purporting in exercise of powers under section 254(2) and recalled its final order passed under section 254(1) of the Act on the premise that there was a mistake apparent from the record in order dated March 29, 2006, (Annexure 1). 24. The question arises as to whether on the facts, the Tribunal was justified, vide the order impugned dated March 31, 2008 (Annexure 4) to recall its final order passed under section 254(1) for reconsideration. In other words, the question is as to whether the Tribunal committed an error of law in recalling its final order, which was appealable under section 260A of the Act, despite there being limited scope to rectify/amend the order only in case of mistake apparent from the record. 25. A bare perusal of section 254(2) of the Act shows that the section gives power to rectify any mistake apparent from the record ; and to amend any order passed by it and to make such amendment if the mistake is brought to its notice by the Assessing Officer or the assessee. 26. On a conjoint reading of sub-sections (1) and (2) of section 254, it clearly emerges that final order (Annexure 1) passed under section 254(1) must hold the field and the apparent mistake can be rectified or amended in exercise of powers under section 254(2) of the Act. 27. It is necessary that there must exist a mistake apparent from the record and the order passed under section 254(1) shall be made to be the basis with a view to rectify such a mistake. Therefore, whether the Tribunal acts on its own motion or at the behest of parties, it is imperative that there must be a mistake apparent from the record which would require the order in appeal to be amended. 28. That apart, section 254(4) of the Act provides that the orders passed by the Tribunal on appeal under section 254(1) shall be final save as provided subject to appeal under section 260A of the Act. 28. That apart, section 254(4) of the Act provides that the orders passed by the Tribunal on appeal under section 254(1) shall be final save as provided subject to appeal under section 260A of the Act. The language employed in section 254 is crystal that the order passed on appeal can be an order passed under section 254(1) or it could be an amended order passed under section 254(2) of the Act and in both the situations, an order would nonetheless remain an order subject to appeal under section 260A to the High Court. 29. The contention advanced by counsel for petitioner that such powers under section 254(2) could not be exercised suo motu is not of any substance. On a bare reading of the provisions of section 254 of the Act it depicts that the Tribunal has powers to rectify mistake apparent from record in two situations-(1) on its own motion ; and (2) on application being moved by either party before it. It cannot be contended that power can be exercised only on the application. If the Tribunal is vested with power to rectify a mistake apparent from the record, it can certainly do so on its own motion or on application being filed by either party. 30. A Division Bench of the Delhi High Court had an occasion to examine scope of section 254(2) of the Act in CIT v. K. L. Bhatia (1990) 182 ITR 361 (Delhi) and observed ad infra (page 367) : " As we have already observed, the Tribunal is a creation of the statute. It is an admitted case, and it is now well-settled, that though the Tribunal has no inherent power of reviewing its order on the merits, the Tribunal has incidental or ancillary powers which can be exercised by it. But such power cannot be invoked to rehear a case on the merits. The Tribunal can, after disposing of the appeal under section 254(1), rehear the matter on the merits only within the purview of section 254(2). The Supreme Court has held in Patel Narshi Thakershi v. Pradyuman-singhji Arjunsinghji, AIR 1970 SC 1273 , that the power to review is not an inherent power. It must be conferred by law either specifically or by necessary implication. The Supreme Court has held in Patel Narshi Thakershi v. Pradyuman-singhji Arjunsinghji, AIR 1970 SC 1273 , that the power to review is not an inherent power. It must be conferred by law either specifically or by necessary implication. It does not stand to reason that, if the power of review is not present with the Tribunal, it, nevertheless, can exercise such power indirectly when it cannot do so directly. If the contention of learned counsel for the respondent is correct, then it could mean that, even on the merits, the Tribunal can recall its earlier order and then hear the case afresh and pass a different order. If this is so, it would amount to the Tribunal exercising power of review when it does not have any such power. To give an example, under the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, Order 47 provides the circumstances in which a judgment may be reviewed. If the contention of learned counsel for the respondent is correct, then, applying the same analogy to a civil case, it would be open to a court to recall its judgment in a case where the provisions of Order 47 are not applicable, and then to rehear the case. With respect, we see no warrant for this in legal jurisprudence. The appellate court can hear a case and decide it on the merits, once for all, and cannot keep on rehearing the same appeal over and over again. Full effect has to be given to the provisions of section 254(4) which specifically provides that a decision of the Tribunal passed in appeal is final. This decision is final not only for the assessee but also final as far as the Tribunal, itself, is concerned." 31. In Asst. CIT v. Saurashtra Kutch Stock Exchange Ltd. (2008) 305 ITR 227; 173 Taxman 322 (SC) the apex court observed ad infra (page 239 of 305 ITR : " 37. In our judgment, therefore, a patent, manifest and self-evident error which does not require elaborate discussion of evidence or argument to establish it, can be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record and can be corrected while exercising certiorari jurisdiction. An error cannot be said to be apparent on the face of the record if one has to travel beyond the record to see whether the judgment is correct or not. An error cannot be said to be apparent on the face of the record if one has to travel beyond the record to see whether the judgment is correct or not. An error apparent on the face of the record means an error which strikes on mere looking and does not need long-drawn-out process of reasoning on points where there may conceivably be two opinions. Such error should not require any extraneous matter to show its incorrectness. To put it differently, it should be so manifest and clear that no court would permit it to remain on record. If the view accepted by the court in the original judgment is one of the possible views, the case cannot be said to be covered by an error apparent on the face of the record." 32. In Honda Siel Power Products Ltd. v. CIT (2007) 295 ITR 466 ; 12 SCC 596 , the apex court observed ad infra (page 472 of 295 ITR) : " 12. As stated above, in this case we are concerned with the application under section 254(2) of the 1961 Act. As stated above, the expression ' rectification of mistake from the record' occurs in section 154. It also finds place in section 254(2). The purpose behind the enactment of section 254(2) is based on the fundamental principle that no party appearing before the Tribunal, be it an assessee or the Department, should suffer on account of any mistake committed by the Tribunal. This fundamental principle has nothing to do with the inherent powers of the Tribunal. In the present case, the Tribunal in its order dated September 10, 2003, allowing the rectification application has given a finding that Samtel Color Ltd. was cited before it by the assessee but through oversight it had missed out the said judgment while dismissing the appeal filed by the assessee on the question of admissibility/allow-ability of the claim of the assessee for enhanced depreciation under section 43A. One of the important reasons for giving the power of rectification to the Tribunal is to see that no prejudice is caused to either of the parties appearing before it by its decision based on a mistake apparent from the record. (emphasis (1) added) 1. Here printed in italics. 33. One of the important reasons for giving the power of rectification to the Tribunal is to see that no prejudice is caused to either of the parties appearing before it by its decision based on a mistake apparent from the record. (emphasis (1) added) 1. Here printed in italics. 33. From the judgments cited (supra), it is clear that the Tribunal is vested with powers to rectify mistake apparent from the record suo motu or at the behest of either party to dispute ; and if there is a mistake apparent from the record, the Tribunal is bound to carry out the amendment in the original order to correct particular mistake as is evident from a latter portion of the proviso, as per which there should exist mistake apparent from the record which would require the order in appeal to be amended. The scope and ambit of application of section 254(2) of the Act is very limited. It is restricted to rectification of mistakes apparent from the record. But to review or recall the order is not permissible under section 254(2) if necessitating rehearing and readjudication of the entire subject-matter of appeal and the dispute after being put for rehearing no longer remains restricted to any mistake sought to be rectified. Power to recall an order is provided under rules 24 and 25 of the Income-tax (Appellate Tribunal) Rules, 1963 ; that too only in cases where the appellant/respondent shows reasonable cause for being absent at a time when the appeal was taken up and decided ex parte. 34. However, in the instant case, mistake apparent from the record which was made by the Tribunal to be the basis to recall the final order passed under section 254(1) of the Act was in fact an order dated April 4, 2005, (Annexure 3) being passed by the President, Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Mumbai, in exercise of powers under rule 4 of the Income-tax (Appellate Tribunal) Rules, 1963,-a bare perusal whereof depicts that appeal (ITSSA No. 97/JP/04) block period April 1, 1988, to March 23, 1999) filed by the appellant (petitioner-company herein) was transferred from Jaipur to Mumbai Bench and its copy was also forwarded to Asstt. Registrar, Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Mumbai, to hear appeal preferred by the petitioner (ITSS A No. 97/JP/04) together with (ITSS A. No.375 of 2004) filed by Mayur M. Thakkar. 35. Registrar, Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Mumbai, to hear appeal preferred by the petitioner (ITSS A No. 97/JP/04) together with (ITSS A. No.375 of 2004) filed by Mayur M. Thakkar. 35. But there was no order available on record being passed of consolidating appeals (ITSS A. No.105/JP/2004 and cross-appeal No. IT(SS) 35/JP/2005) for being heard at the Mumbai Bench in the absence whereof, there cannot be said to be any mistake apparent from the record being committed by the Tribunal, Jaipur Bench, in hearing such appeals and decided finally under section 254(1) of the Act, vide order dated March 26, 2006 (Annexure 1). Hence, the very plea of mistake apparent from the record having been taken to be the basis by the Tribunal while recalling its final order passed under section 254(1) of the Act on the facts of the instant case is otherwise not legally sustainable. 36. However, it is relevant to mention that after the impugned order was passed by the Tribunal (Annexure 4), the President, Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Mumbai, also issued an order dated August 20, 2008, in pursuance of rule 4 of the Income-tax (Appellate Tribunal) Rules, 1963, transferring both the appeals (supra) which were decided by the Tribunal, Jaipur Bench, to be consolidated and heard by the Mumbai Bench. Since there was no prior order of consolidation of two appeals being passed by the President under rule 4 of the Income-tax (Appellate Tribunal) Rules, certainly there cannot be said to be any mistake apparent from the record while deciding the two appeals, vide order (Annexure 1) in exercise of powers under section 254(1) of the Act. 37. The objection raised by the respondents that the petitioners have an alternative remedy of appeal under section 260A of the Act in the facts of the instant case is of no substance for the reason that the appeal lies against the order passed under section 254(1) of the Act and any amendment made later on by the Tribunal under section 254(2) certainly merged into final order passed which is certainly appealable under section 260A. If final order under section 254(1) of the Act is recalled and the matter is to be re-heard afresh, there cannot be said to be an order under section 254(1) allegedly appealable under section 260A of the Act and that apart, if the order is without jurisdiction, that can certainly be assailed under the writ jurisdiction of this court under article 226 of the Constitution. 38. Before parting with the judgment, this court would like to observe that in their separate reply, respondents Nos. 1 and 4 have, inter alia, averred about the procedure adopted by the Tribunal while passing the final order dated March 29, 2006, (Annexure 1) and further imputed allegation against one of the members of the Tribunal which passed the final order under section 254(1), taking note of vakalatnama filed by some of his relatives and also made averment that the order was passed in collusion. It is pertinent to mention that such a reply imputing allegations against a member of the Tribunal is supported by affidavit of the Registrar of the Tribunal, who has no personal knowledge and the record does not depict so. 39. This court has not examined the validity of the final order passed under section 254(1) of the Act and what has been averred by respondents Nos. 1 and 4 in their reply imputing allegations, are not relevant factors for being considered or influenced thereby for the issue under consideration herein. However, this court likes to observe that what has been raised by the respondents in their reply imputing allegations, respondent No. 4 being at the helm of affairs, it is for him to keep its office in order. Remedy lies within and not elsewhere but needs no comments from this court which refrains from probing into further and expressing any opinion in this regard. 40. Consequently, the writ petition succeeds and is hereby allowed. The order dated March 31, 2008 (Annexure 4), passed in exercise of powers under section 254(2) of the Act and consequential order dated August 20, 2008, (Annexure AR. 1) of the President, Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, for transferring appeals (ITSSA No. 105/JP/04 and 35/JP/05) to Mumbai Bench are hereby quashed and set aside. No costs. *******