JUDGMENT Hon'ble CHAUHAN, J.—The application for cancellation of bail—for a bail granted by this Court vide order dated 24.10.2008—has come up for adjudication. 2. The brief facts of the case are that on 15.6.2006, a FIR under Sections 302, 201 and 120B IPC was registered against Prem Singh, the accused respondent, at Police Station Shipra Path, Mansarovar Jaipur. During the course of investigation, on 3.7.2006 Prem Singh was arrested. Subsequently, on 29.9.2006, the Police submitted a charge sheet against Prem Singh. Prem Singh moved a bail application, under section 439 Cr.P.C. before the District and Sessions Judge, Jaipur City. But, vide order dated 11.10.2006, the learned Judge dismissed the said bail application. On 18.10.2006, the trial of the criminal case was transferred from the court of District & Sessions Judge to the court of Special Judge (SC/ST Cases) Jaipur. Prem Singh filed his first bail application before this Court. Vide order dated 26.10.2006, this Court dismissed the said bail application, but granted liberty to Prem Singh to file the second bail application after the evidence of Kumari Gudia, the star witness of the prosecution, was recorded. This Court also directed the learned trial court to record the evidence of Kumari Gudia, within a period of two months, from the date of receipt of certified copy of the said order. The sequence of events of the case before the trial court is as under:- On 14.11.2006, the learned trial court framed charges against Prem Singh under Sections 302 and 201 IPC. Despite the direction of this court to record statement of Kumar Gudia, on 8.12.2006 the prosecution did not produce her for recording her testimony. On 9.12.2006, 11.12.2006 and 12.12.2006, the prosecution failed to produce her as a witness. Since, Prem Singh was aggrieved by the charge order, he filed a revision petition before this Court. The Court called for the record from the trial court. On 13.12.2006, the requisition for calling the record was produced before the learned trial court. Consequently, the record was sent to this Court. Since, the record was not available with the trial court, from 14.12.2006 till 17.4.2007, the prosecution did not produce any witness. On 15.2.2007 and 15.3.2007, the Presiding Officer of the trial court was absent. On 17.4.2007, the record was received back by the trial court from this Court. Consequently, the record was sent to this Court. Since, the record was not available with the trial court, from 14.12.2006 till 17.4.2007, the prosecution did not produce any witness. On 15.2.2007 and 15.3.2007, the Presiding Officer of the trial court was absent. On 17.4.2007, the record was received back by the trial court from this Court. On 16.5.2007, the case was transferred from the court of Special Judge (SC/ST Cases) Jaipur to the court of Additional Sessions Judge No.9 Jaipur City. On 21.5.2007 and 24.5.2007, the Presiding Officer was on leave and no effective hearing could take place. On 28.5.2007, Prem Singh brought the bail order, dated 26.10.2006, to the notice of trial court. Therefore, the trial court issued summons for appearance of Kumari Gudia. However, summons could not be served on Kumari Gudia. Therefore, summons were again issued for her appearance on 11.6.2007. Since, the accused, Prem Singh, had not been given copies of 31 photographs, which were taken by the prosecution, therefore, the accused filed application under section 207 Cr.P.C. for supply of copies of those 31 photographs. Vide order dated 11.6.2007, the trial court directed the prosecution to supply copies of 31 photographs to the accused within three days. On 15.6.2007, the Special PP sought time for giving the copies of the photographs to Prem Singh. However, on 20.6.2007, only 14 photos out of 31 photographs were given to Prem Singh. The Special PP sought further time to supply copies of the remaining photographs. Despite the repeated time given to the prosecution for supplying the copies of the photographs, the prosecution did not supply copies of all the photographs. Even on 28.6.2007, the Special PP supplied only two photographs, out of remaining 17 photographs to the accused. On 2.7.2007, the prosecution sought adjournment on the ground that it could not produce Kumari Gudia for her testimony. On 6.7.2007, although Kumari Gudia did appear, but as the Presiding Officer was on leave, her testimony could not be recorded. She again appeared on 10.7.2007, but due to condolence observed by the trial court, her testimony could not be recorded. On 17.7.2007, since elder brother of accused passed away, he sought adjournment for three days. The application of the accused was not opposed by the complainant. Therefore, the adjournment was granted by the trial court. Eventually, on 1.8.2007 Kumari Gudia's examination-in-chief was recorded. Her cross-examination was finally completed on 3.8.2007. On 17.7.2007, since elder brother of accused passed away, he sought adjournment for three days. The application of the accused was not opposed by the complainant. Therefore, the adjournment was granted by the trial court. Eventually, on 1.8.2007 Kumari Gudia's examination-in-chief was recorded. Her cross-examination was finally completed on 3.8.2007. Two witnesses were called for the next date i.e. 27.8.2007. However, these two witnesses did not appear on 27.8.2007. On 11.9.2007, P.W.2 appeared, but, his cross-examination was deferred as counsel for accused wanted to first crossexamine the complainant, Hari Mohan Meena. But, on the next date, Hari Mohan Meena, did not appear. Meanwhile, on 21.9.2007, the accused moved application under section 91 Cr.P.C. The case was listed for arguments on the application on 28.9.2007. On 28.9.2007, the Special PP sought time. Meanwhile, the accused moved his second bail application before this Court. Vide order dated 28.9.2007, while rejecting the bail application, this Court directed the trial court to conclude the trial within six months. On 4.10.2007, the arguments were completed on the application under section 91 Cr.P.C. Vide order, dated 11.10.2007, the said application was dismissed by the trial court, by a detailed order. Since, the accused wanted to challenge the order dated 11.10.2007, he sought time and agreed that the duration, of 18.10.2007 to 1.11.2007, would not be counted towards the duration of six months, granted by the High Court. On 1.11.2007, the complainant, Hari Mohan Meena, was examined as P.W.3. However, due to shortage of time, his cross-examination had to be deferred. On 7.11.2007, his cross-examination could not be completed as the accused was not produced before the trial court. Similarly, on 21.11.2007 the accused could not be produced. Therefore, the cross-examination was deferred. On the next two dates, i.e. on 30.11.2007 and 7.12.2007, the cross-examination remained incomplete. On 12.12.2007, since the Presiding Officer was on leave, the case could not be taken up. Eventually, on 19.12.2007, cross-examination of complainant, Hari Mohan Meena, was completed; the matter was listed for 20.12.2007 for cross-examination of P.W.2. However, on 20.12.2007, cross-examination of P.W.2 remained incomplete. Cross-examination of P.W.2 remained incomplete on different dates, i.e. 3.1.2008, 5.1.2008, 8.1.2008, 11.1.2008, 15.1.2008 and 16.1.2008. On 16.1.2008, the Presiding Officer was on leave, therefore, the cross-examination could not take place. On 17.1.2008, cross-examination of P.W.2 was finally completed. However, on 20.12.2007, cross-examination of P.W.2 remained incomplete. Cross-examination of P.W.2 remained incomplete on different dates, i.e. 3.1.2008, 5.1.2008, 8.1.2008, 11.1.2008, 15.1.2008 and 16.1.2008. On 16.1.2008, the Presiding Officer was on leave, therefore, the cross-examination could not take place. On 17.1.2008, cross-examination of P.W.2 was finally completed. On 24.1.2008, the Special PP filed an application under section 319 Cr.P.C. praying for taking cognizance against Gajendra Singh and Devi Singh under sections 302, 201 and 498A IPC, and against Shiv Charan, Mahadevi, Rajendra and Girdhar under sections 302, 120B and 498A IPC. Although, P.W.4 was to appear, but he did not appear before the trial court as he was ill. Therefore, the case was adjourned to 8.2.2008. On 8.2.2008, the counsel for the accused sought time to file reply to the application filed by the Special PP. On 18.2.2008, the counsel for the accused filed reply to the application and sought time to argue the case. On the next date, i.e. 25.2.2008 the learned counsel for the accused contended that before an application under section 319 Cr.P.C. can be decided, in case further investigation were kept pending under section 173(8) Cr.P.C, the Court should call for the report of further investigation. Therefore, the learned trial court directed the Special PP to produce the report of further investigation. On 3.3.2008, since the Presiding Officer was transferred, no effective hearing could take place. On 5.3.2008, the prosecution failed to produce the report as directed by the trial court. On 19.3.2008, the case was transferred, as counsel for accused moved application for transfer of the case to another court. Although, the Special PP did not oppose the said application, the case was still listed for 26.3.2008. On 26.3.2008, the matter was adjourned, as the application for transfer of the case was still pending. On 9.4.2008, the Special PP sought time for submitting the report of further investigation. On 17.4.2008, since the Presiding Officer was on leave, no effective hearing could take place. On 28.4.2008, the Special PP again sought time to submit the report of further investigation. Eventually, on 7.5.2008, the Investigating Officer submitted the report of investigation before the trial court. On 17.5.2008, by a detailed order, the trial court directed the Director General of Police to complete the further investigation within a period of one month. On 17.6.2008, the Presiding Officer was on leave, and therefore, no effective hearing could take place. Eventually, on 7.5.2008, the Investigating Officer submitted the report of investigation before the trial court. On 17.5.2008, by a detailed order, the trial court directed the Director General of Police to complete the further investigation within a period of one month. On 17.6.2008, the Presiding Officer was on leave, and therefore, no effective hearing could take place. On 23.6.2008, the Special PP moved application seeking 15 days time for filing the report of further investigation. Neither on 7.7.2008, nor on 11.7.2008, the Special PP could submit the final report. Therefore, the learned trial Court sought explanation of the Investigating Officer and directed the Director General of Police to submit final report of further investigation, as soon as possible. On 29.7.2008, since the Special PP was absent, no effective hearing could take place. Similarly, on 5.8.2008 the Presiding Officer was on leave, no effective hearing could take place. Likewise, on 13.8.2008 the Special PP was absent, no effective hearing could take place. On 23.8.2008, the case was transferred to the Court of Additional Sessions Judge (Fast Track) No.4, Jaipur. On 27.8.2008, since the Special PP was absent, so no effective hearing could take place. On 28.8.2008, an application was filed by the Special PP and the case was deferred till 30.8.2008. On 30.8.2008, the case was again transferred from the court of Additional Sessions Judge (Fast Track) No.4 Jaipur to the Court of Additional Sessions Judge (Fake Currency) Jaipur City, Jaipur. On 1.9.2008, since the Special PP was absent, no effective hearing could take place. Eventually, on 4.9.2008, arguments on the application under section 319 Cr.P.C were completed. The trial court fixed the next date as 6.9.2008 for production of prosecution witnesses. Neither on 6.9.2008, 26.9.2008, 27.9.2008 nor on 29.9.2008, the prosecution did produce any witness. Eventually, on 1.10.2008, P.W.14 was produced by the prosecution. Again on 3.10.2008, the prosecution did not produce any witness. On 4.10.2008, although witness Suresh Kumar appeared, but, due to the condolence observed by the trial court, his testimony could not be recorded. On 6.10.2008, P.W.5 was examined by the trial court. The Special PP filed application for dropping the witnesses P.Ws.9, 10, 14, 16, 17, 18, 19, 24, 25, 26, 27, 29 and 35 from the list of prosecution witnesses. From 10.10.2008 till 18.10.2008, although seven opportunities were given to the prosecution to produce witnesses, but the prosecution singularly failed to produce any witness. 3. The Special PP filed application for dropping the witnesses P.Ws.9, 10, 14, 16, 17, 18, 19, 24, 25, 26, 27, 29 and 35 from the list of prosecution witnesses. From 10.10.2008 till 18.10.2008, although seven opportunities were given to the prosecution to produce witnesses, but the prosecution singularly failed to produce any witness. 3. It is, in this background of the case, that the accused moved his third bail application before this Court. The accused contended before this Court that he has been languishing in jail since 3.7.2006, i.e. almost for two years and four months. Despite the clear orders of this Court to conclude the trial within six months, the trial is continuing ad infinitum. The accused had placed the copies of the order-sheet of trial court before this Court, to make out a case that the prosecution has been slack in producing witnesses and completing the trial. Therefore, the petitioner's right to speedy trial is being violated. This Court had considered the order-sheets so produced. This Court had observed that despite the clear direction of this Court, the trial court had failed to complete the trial within the stipulated period of six months. Moreover, considering the fact that the prosecution failed to produce its witnesses, despite lapse of one year, this Court concluded that fundamental right of speedy trial of the petitioner is being violated. Therefore, vide order dated 24.10.2008, this Court granted bail to the accused, Prem Singh. 4. The complainant Hari Mohan Meena has filed the present application for cancellation of the said bail. Mr. Anil Upman, the learned counsel for the complainant, has blamed this Court for concluding that the delay was caused by the prosecution and raised following contentions before this Court: firstly, that the accused had delayed the trial by filing revision petition against the orders passed by the trial court, and by seeking transfer of the case from one court to the other. Therefore, the conclusion drawn by this Court that right of speedy trial was being violated is bellied by the order-sheets, since the delay was not caused by the prosecution, but by the accused himself. Hence, the accused cannot take advantage of his own fault. Secondly, the trial was being delayed not only on account of the prosecution, but, by other factors as well, such as absence of the presiding officer and holding of condolence by the court. Hence, the accused cannot take advantage of his own fault. Secondly, the trial was being delayed not only on account of the prosecution, but, by other factors as well, such as absence of the presiding officer and holding of condolence by the court. Thirdly, the prosecution cannot be blamed for the delay of trial, since the case was adjourned on account of other reasons, which were not within the control of the prosecution. Fourthly, after being released on bail, the accused Prem Singh, had abused the bail. Therefore, a case under section 107/116(3) Cr.P.C. was filed against the accused; the said case is still pending. Therefore, the bail granted to the accused deserves to be cancelled. 5. On the other hand, Mr. Amit Ojha, learned counsel for the accused, contended that a bare perusal of the order-sheets clearly reveals that repeatedly the prosecution had sought time to produce report of further investigation, repeatedly, the prosecution had sought time to produce its witnesses. According to the latest order-sheets, the prosecution witnesses are being summoned through bailable warrants by the trial court. This clearly show the lapse on the part of prosecution to produce its witnesses. Therefore, this Court had correctly concluded that the fundamental right of the accused of speedy trial is being violated. Secondly, in the complaint, filed under Sections 107/116(3) Cr.P.C., the complainant has not explained the inordinate delay of two days in lodging the same. Moreover, the complainant has not mentioned the telephone number, on which he had received the threats. Further, the complainant has not informed the trial court about the alleged threats given to him by the accused. All these factors clearly prove that the complaint under Sections 107/116(3) Cr.P.C. is merely a ploy to get the bail cancelled. 6. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record. 7. It is highly unfortunate that the counsel for the petitioner has claimed that this Court has mis-read the order-sheet and has not applied its mind judiciously. The learned counsel for the petitioner seems to be oblivious of the fact that many a times a court has to pass an order in a restrained language. The Court is also required to show certain sense of moderation, while passing the order. The learned counsel for the petitioner seems to be oblivious of the fact that many a times a court has to pass an order in a restrained language. The Court is also required to show certain sense of moderation, while passing the order. When, the violation of right of speedy trial is pleaded, the Court can neither castigate the persons involved in causing the delay in conclusion of the trial, nor can the Court eloberately discuss the reasons for the delay. It is common knowledge that at times the trials are delayed because of absence of presiding officers, absence of counsel for accused, absence of public prosecutors, because of condolence observed by the court. Moreover, a Court is not supposed to deal with each and every order-sheet meticulously to give a judicious finding as to the cause for the delay. If after perusal of order-sheet the Court were to conclude that the prosecution caused the delay instead of the defence, the Court would be justified in concluding that the right of speedy trial is being violated. 8. In the present case a bare perusal of the order-sheets, mentioned above, clearly reveals that on few occasions the jail authorities failed to produce the accused in the court, repeatedly the Special Public Prosecutor was absent, repeatedly he sought time to produce the report of further investigation, repeatedly he failed to produce its witnesses. The failure to produce the witnesses has gone to such an extent that the trial court has been forced to issue bailable warrants against the prosecution witnesses in order to ensure their attendance. Clearly, the delay has been caused more by the prosecution, than by the defence. 9. As far as, delay caused by the accused is concerned, the accused can-not be denied the right to challenge the orders passed by the trial Court. After all, the accused is within his fundamental right to challenge the order, such as charge order. Therefore, the filing of revision petitions on two occasions by the accused cannot be treated as delay tactics. Moreover, the accused does have a right to seek transfer of the case, specially when there is no objection from the side of prosecution. Therefore, merely because the case has been transferred to different courts, it cannot be treated as delay tactics on the part of accused. Moreover, the accused does have a right to seek transfer of the case, specially when there is no objection from the side of prosecution. Therefore, merely because the case has been transferred to different courts, it cannot be treated as delay tactics on the part of accused. Thus, the contention of learned counsel for the petitioner that the accused is to be blamed for the delay in trial does not hold water. 10. Of course, there is an allegation that the accused had abused the privilege of bail by threatening the complainant over the telephone. However, the allegation seems to be on a weak wicket: firstly, the complainant does not explain the inordinate delay of two days in lodging the complaint against the accused. The delay of two days seems to point to the fact that the complaint has been filed after due deliberation and with ulterior motive of getting the bail cancelled. Secondly, the complainant has never pointed out to the trial court that he and his witnesses are being threatened. Moreover, he has not requested the trial court to expeditiously decide the case, so that he and his witnesses may escape from any threat or coercive action on the part of the accused. Thirdly, while on one hand the complainant claims that he is being threatened, yet, on the other hand, he is not producing his witnesses expeditiously before the court, as mentioned above. Therefore, there is an apparent contradiction between his allegation and his actions. In such a situation, it is not for this court to comment on the veracity of the threat. After all, the veracity of the threat is to be decided by the learned Magistrate, before whom the application under section 107/116 (3) Cr.P.C. has been filed. Prima facie it seems that the petitioner is using the complaint as a subterfuge for getting the bail cancelled. Therefore, this Court is not convinced that the accused is abusing the privilege of bail. Moreover, the complainant has failed to make out a case that the evidence is being tempered with by the accused. The complainant has also not made out a case that the accused is likely to abscond, in case benefit of bail is continued to him. Hence, the application for cancellation of bail is devoid of any merit. 11. Moreover, the complainant has failed to make out a case that the evidence is being tempered with by the accused. The complainant has also not made out a case that the accused is likely to abscond, in case benefit of bail is continued to him. Hence, the application for cancellation of bail is devoid of any merit. 11. However, as the trial is taking a long time to be completed, the trial Court is hereby directed to conclude the trial, as expeditiously as possible, and preferably before the 31st December, 2009. 12. In the result, the application for cancellation of bail is, hereby, dismissed.