JUDGMENT D. G. KARNIK, J. - By this petition, the State of Maharashtra - petitioner challenges the judgment dated February 28, 2002 passed by the Maharashtra Sales Tax Tribunal (for short, "the Tribunal") allowing the miscellaneous application filed by respondent No. 2. Respondent No. 2 is a manufacturer of a mouthwash which it markets under the brand name "Listerine Mouthwash". It made an application to the Commissioner of Sales Tax under section 52 of the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1959 (for short, "the Act") to get its product classified under entry 24 of Schedule C, Part I and also prayed that prospective effect be given to the order by virtue of the powers under sub-section (2) of section 52. By an order dated October 20, 1995, the Commissioner of Sales Tax held that the product of respondent No. 2 was covered by entry 86, Part II of Schedule C and was liable to tax at the rate of 15 paise in a rupee. Aggrieved by the order respondent No. 2 filed an appeal bearing No. 158 of 1995 before the Tribunal. The Tribunal heard the appeal filed by the petitioner along with another appeal bearing No. 4 of 1996 filed by M/s. Johnson & Johnson Ltd., another manufacturer of a similar product and by an order dated June 21, 1997 confirmed the order passed by the Commissioner. Respondent No. 2 filed an application for rectification bearing rectification Application No. 73 of 1997 before the Tribunal for modification/correction of the order. By an order dated December 19, 1998, the Tribunal rejected the rectification application. Respondent No. 2 then filed another application, bearing Misc. Application No. 171 of 2001 on December 8, 2001 alleging therein that one of the points raised by respondent No. 1 in the original appeal as well as the rectification application, namely, giving of prospective effect to the order of the Commissioner was not considered and decided by the Tribunal and, therefore, the Tribunal should consider the same and grant prospective effect to the order of the Commissioner. That application was made on December 8, 2001. By an order dated February 28, 2002, the Tribunal allowed the application and held that the determination made by the Commissioner on October 20, 1995 under section 52(2) of the Act would apply prospectively from the date of the decision, namely, October 20 1995. That order is impugned in this petition. That application was made on December 8, 2001. By an order dated February 28, 2002, the Tribunal allowed the application and held that the determination made by the Commissioner on October 20, 1995 under section 52(2) of the Act would apply prospectively from the date of the decision, namely, October 20 1995. That order is impugned in this petition. The learned Additional Government Pleader appearing for the petitioner submitted that once an application for rectification (Rectification Application No. 73 of 1997) of the order was rejected by the Tribunal, the order became final. Second application by whatever name called (numbered as Misc. Application No. 171 of 2001) was not maintainable and, therefore, the order passed by the Tribunal was without jurisdiction. In the alternative, the learned A.G.P. submitted that assuming that the Tribunal had the power of rectification or entertaining the second application, treating it as an application for rectification, it could not be entertained after expiry of two years from the date of the original order or in any event from October 19, 2001 when the first rectification application was decided. We find merit in the submissions of the learned A.G.P. Section 52 of the Sales Tax Act confers power on the Commissioner to decide the matters mentioned in clauses (a) to (e) of sub-section (1) thereof, one of which is the rate of tax payable. Sub-section (2) of section 52 states that the Commissioner may direct that his order shall not affect the liability of any person in respect of any sale or purchase effected prior to the determination. Thus, the Commissioner was specifically conferred a power to make his decision prospective. Order passed by the Commissioner is appealable to the Tribunal under section 55 of the Act. Section 62(1) of the Act confers a power on the Commissioner to rectify any mistake apparent from the record either on his own motion or on the same being brought to his notice by any person affected by such order. Sub-section (2) of section 62 confers the same power on the Tribunal as that of the Commissioner for rectification of a mistake in its order. Thus, the Tribunal has a power to rectify any mistake in its order. However, the section itself provides that the power of rectification can be exercised within two years. In the present case, the Commissioner passed the order on October 20, 1995. Thus, the Tribunal has a power to rectify any mistake in its order. However, the section itself provides that the power of rectification can be exercised within two years. In the present case, the Commissioner passed the order on October 20, 1995. The Tribunal passed the order in appeal on June 21, 1997. An application for rectification was made within two years and was rejected by the Tribunal on December 19, 1998. Once the application was rejected, there could be no second application for rectification of a mistake appearing in the first appellate order. In our view, successive applications for rectification would not be maintainable as there is no such power specifically conferred by section 62 of the Act. Assuming however that the second application for rectification is maintainable, it cannot be filed after two years. In the present case, second application under the caption "misc. application" was filed on December 8, 2001. That clearly after two years of the appellate order and even after two years of the rejection of the first rectification application on October 19, 1998. The second application, assuming second application lay, was clearly barred by limitation. Therefore, the Tribunal had no power to entertain it. The impugned order therefore has to be set aside. Though we have set aside the order, in our view, ends of justice require further order to be passed as indicated below. It was the contention of the petitioner that the Commissioner should have given a prospective effect to his order which he was entitled to under section 52(2) of the Act. The ground that prospective effect should be given to the order of the Commissioner was specifically urged before the Tribunal. Such a ground is also found in the appeal memo, a copy of which is handed over to us. However, that ground was not dealt with by the Tribunal at all in its order dated June 21, 1997. Perhaps, this happened because the Tribunal had heard and disposed of the two appeals, one filed by the respondent and the other filed by Johnson & Johnson, by a common order and therefore only the common point raised in the two appeals were considered by the Tribunal. The specific ground of giving prospective effect to the order of the Commissioner was not considered by the Tribunal. The specific ground of giving prospective effect to the order of the Commissioner was not considered by the Tribunal. Two separate rectification applications, one bearing No. 73 of 1997 by respondent No. 2 and another bearing No. 71 of 1997 by Johnson & Johnson Ltd. filed before it, were decided by the Tribunal by a common judgment. Though respondent No. 2 specifically raised a ground that the Commissioner ought to have given specific prospective effect to his order under section 52(2) of the Act and had pointed out that the said point was not dealt with by the Tribunal in the first order, it was not dealt with by the Tribunal even in the application for rectification. Again this mistake appears to have occurred because the Tribunal was dealing with the two separate appeals simultaneously and appears to have considered only the common grounds raised in the two rectification applications which were decided by a common order. The ground of giving of prospective effect of the order of the Commissioner was required to be decided by the Tribunal first while deciding the appeal at the first instance and, in any event, while deciding the rectification application filed by the present respondent No. 2. As the said issue was not decided, respondent No. 2 was required to make the second application. As the second application was allowed, the respondent No. 2 had no occasion to challenge the first appellate order passed by the Tribunal in rectification application No. 73 of 1997. We are therefore of the view that the matter be remanded back to the Tribunal for rehearing rectification application No. 73 of 1997 filed by respondent No. 2 but only regarding the contention of respondent No. 2 that the Commissioner and the Tribunal ought to have given prospective effect to the order of the Commissioner under section 52(2) of the Act. We make it clear that the points already decided in rectification application No. 73 of 1997 shall stand concluded and would not be reopened, but on remand the Tribunal would only consider the issue regarding prospective effect to be given to the order of the Commissioner under section 52(2) of the Act. The Tribunal shall consider the same independently and without being in any way influenced by any of the observations in the impugned order dated February 28, 2002 which is hereby set aside. The Tribunal shall consider the same independently and without being in any way influenced by any of the observations in the impugned order dated February 28, 2002 which is hereby set aside. For these reasons, rule is made absolute to the extent indicated above. The impugned order dated February 28, 2001 is set aside. However, the matter is remanded back to the Tribunal to decide the rectification application No. 73 of 1997 afresh as regards the issue of prospective effect to be given to the order of the Commissioner under section 52(2) of the Act. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the parties shall bear their own costs.