ORDER Yarava Ramesh, aged about 25 years was engaged in neem seed business. He was earning an amount of RS.50/- per day. One Batchala Narayana was owner of oil rotary mill and was doing business in neern seeds and oil and was earning Rs.2,000/to Rs.3,000/- per month. He was aged 32 years. These two persons along with some other people got into lorry bearing NO.AP 04 T 1427. The lorry was insured with Oriental Insurance Company Limited, Kadapa. One Vishwanatha Reddy was owner of the lorry and Nagur Nazeer was driving lorry on 14.10.1996 when the lorry fell into pit. Ramesh, Narayana and another person died and yet another person received injuries. The wife, father and two minor children of Narayana filed O.P.No.170 of 1997 claiming a sum of Rs.1,62,000/- as compensation. The wife, father and two minor children of Ramesh filed OPNo.290 of 1997 claiming a sum of Rs.1,28,000/-. Both the O.Ps., were filed on the file of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal-cum-District Judge, Cuddapah, 2, The driver and owner of the lorry remained ex parte, Insurance company opposed the matter contending that the allegation that lorry was driven In a rash and negligent manner is not correct, that the deceased were travelling unauthorisedly in goods vehicle and that compensation claimed is highly excessive, 3, Appropriate issues were framed in each O.P. A common trial was conducted recording evidence in connected O.P, The wife of Narayana and wife of Ramesh gave evidence as P.W.2 and P.W.3, Exs,A-1 to A-11 and Ex, B-1 policy were marked, Insurance company examined an Assistant of the Company as R.W,1. In O.P.No.170 of 1997, learned Tribunal fixed the multiplicand at Rs, 12,000/- and applying the multiplier of 16 (as deceased-Narayana was aged 32 years) and arrived at loss of dependency of Rs.1. In O.P.No.170 of 1997, learned Tribunal fixed the multiplicand at Rs, 12,000/- and applying the multiplier of 16 (as deceased-Narayana was aged 32 years) and arrived at loss of dependency of Rs.1. ,92,000/-, In addition to this, a sum of Rs,1 0,000/- was awarded towards loss of consortium, Rs,2,000/- for funeral expenses and Rs,5,000/- each towards loss of love and affection, An amount of Rs,2, 1 9,000/- was determined as just compensation but having regard to the fact that claimants restricted their claim to Rs,1,62,000/-, award was restricted to the same, In O.P.No.290 of 1997, dependents of deceased-Ramesh claimed Rs,1,28,000/, Though the learned Tribunal determined the just compensation as Rs.2,04,000/-, it was restricted to the relief claimed, Aggrieved by the award, insurance company filed C.M.A.No,822 of 2005 against O.P.No.290 of 1997 and C.M.A.No.831 of 2005 is filed against O.P.No.170 of 1997, 4, During pendency of appeal, respondents 1 to 4 in C.M.A.No.822 of 2005 tiled two miscellaneous applications being M.A.C.M.A.M.P.No.3124 of 2005 praying this Court for permission to amend the figure "Rs.1,28,000/-" shown at para 25 and prayer portion in O.P.No.290 of 1997 by substituting the figure "Rs.2,04,000/-", and M.A.C.M.A.M.P.No.3123 of 2005 praying this Court to enhance the compensation from Rs,1,28,000/- to Rs.2,04,000/- as found eligible by the Tribunal in O.P.No,290 of 1997, This Court on 1909,2005 ordered M.A.C.M.A.M.P.No.3124 of 2005 permitting amendment as prayed therein, Similarly, respondents 1 to 6 in C.M.A.NO.831 of 2005 also filed two miscellaneous applications being MAC,MAM,P,No,3097 of 2005 praying this Court for permission to amend the figure "Rs, 1 ,62,000/-" shown as para 25 and prayer portion in O.P.No, 170 of 1997 by substituting the figure "Rs,2,1 9,000/-", Yet another application is also filed being M.A.C.M.A.M.P.No.3098 of 2005 for enhancement of compensation, This Court on 22.08.2005 ordered M.A.C.M.A.M.P. No.3097 of 2005 permitting amendment as prayed therein, 5, In these appeals, learned counsel for insurance company submits that deceased were passengers in a goods vehicle and therefore, they are not covered under Ex.B-1, policy, Nextly, he contends that when claimants restricted their claim, which was awarded, it is not permissible for this Court to enhance the awarded compensation, He points out that claimants could not have filed cross-objections as entire amount claimed by them was awarded and therefore, at the appellate stage, compensation cannot be enhanced exceeding the amount claimed, for contra, learned counsel for claimants submits that the appellate Court has powers under Order XLI Rule 33 of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) and therefore, even if claimants did not ask for the amount they are entitled to, they can seek appropriate amendment at the stage of appeal for that purpose, He contends that as accident occurred on 14,10,1996, they are covered by Section 147(1 )(b)(i) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (1988 Act, for brevity) as amended by Central Act NO.54 of 1994. which came Into effect with effect from 14.11.1994. 6. Two questions would arise for consideration as to whether passengers travelling in goods vehicle along with their goods are also covered under the policy issued under Chapter XI of the 1988 Act and whether the claimants, who have been awarded compensation as claimed, can seek enhancement at the appellate stage in the appeal filed by insurer? 7. The first question need not detain this Court longer. The passengers travelling in goods vehicle for the purpose of determining the liability of the insurer in cases arising under Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 and 1988 Act falling in three categories, namely; (i) the passengers travelling in goods vehicles, which met with an accident while 1939 Act was in force; (ii) the passengers in goods vehicles after coming into force of 1988 Act; and (iii) the passengers travelling in goods vehicles, which met with accidents after coming into force of Central Act NO.54 of 1994, with effect from 14.11.1994. 8. Insofar as first category of cases is concerned, in Mallawwa v. Oriental Insurance Company Limited', Supreme Court interpreting Section 95 of 1939 Act held that under 1939 Act, Owners of the goods or gratuitous passengers travelling in goods vehicles are not covered by insurance and legal representatives cannot claim compensation for the loss On account of death. After 1988 Act came into force, has there been any change regarding legal position? In New India Assurance Company Limited v. Satpal Singh, Supreme Court held that vehicle insurance companies covering third party risks are not required to exclude gratuitous passengers in the vehicle, which may be of any type or class It was held therein: Under clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 95(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (for short, the Old Act), the insurance policy was not required to cover liability in respect of the death of or bodily injury to persons who were gratuitous passengers of that vehicle. But the proviso to Section 147(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for short, the new Act) shows that it is a recast provision by placing the erstwhile clause (iii) as the present clause (ii). In other words, clause (Ii) of the proviso to Section 95(1) of the old Act is totally non-existent in the proviso to Section 147(1) of the new Act. In other words, clause (Ii) of the proviso to Section 95(1) of the old Act is totally non-existent in the proviso to Section 147(1) of the new Act. Moreover, under Section 147(2) of the new Act there is no upper limit for the insurer regarding the amount of compensation to be awarded in respect of death or bodily injury of a victim of the accident. It is, therefore, apparent that the limit contained in the old Act has been removed and the policy should insure the liability incurred and cover injury to any person including owner of the goods or his authorized representative carried in the vehicle.... Therefore, under the new Act an insurance policy covering third-party risk is not required to exclude gratuitous passengers in a vehicle, no matter that the vehicle is of any type or class. 9. The above ratio in Satpal Smgh (2 supra) was doubted and the question was referred to a three-Judge Bench. In New India Assurance Company Limited v. Asha Rani' (Reference Order), a Division Bench of Supreme Court considered the question as to whether insurer is liable to pay compensation to the dependents of the deceased passenger while such deceased passenger was travelling in a goods vehicle, which met with an accident. While overruling Satpal Singh (2 supra), Supreme Court held I as follows. If the Motor Vehicles Amendment Act of 1994 is examined, particularly Section 46, by which the expression "injury to any person" in the original Act stood substituted by the expression "injury to any person including owner of the goods or his authorised representative carried in the vehicle", the conclusion is irresistible that prior to the aforesaid Amendment Act of 1994, even if the widest interpretation is given to the expression "to any person" it will not cover either the owner of the goods or his authorised representative being carried in the vehicle. The objects and reasons of clause 46 also state that it seeks to amend Section 147 to include owner of the goods or his authorised representative carried in the vehicle for the purposes of liability under the insurance policy. The objects and reasons of clause 46 also state that it seeks to amend Section 147 to include owner of the goods or his authorised representative carried in the vehicle for the purposes of liability under the insurance policy. It is no doubt true that sometimes the legislature amends the law by way of amplification and clarification of an inherent position which is there in the statute, but a plain meaning being given to the words used in the statute, as it stood prior to its amendment of 1994, and as it stands subsequent to its amendment in 1994 and bearing in mind the objects and reasons engrafted in the amended provisions referred to earlier, it is difficult for us to construe that the expression "including owner of the goods or his authorised representative carried in the vehicle" which was added to the pre-existing expression "injury to any person" is either clarificatory or amplification of the pre-existing statute. On the other hand it clearly demonstrates that the legislature wanted to bring within the sweep of Section 147 and making it compulsory for the insurer to insure even in case of a goods vehicle, the owner of the goods or his authorised representative being carried in a goods vehicle when that vehicle met with an accident and the owner of the goods or his representative either dies or suffers bodily injury. 10. Thus, though the owner of the goods travelling in a goods vehicle is not covered under the insurance policy, after 14.11.1994 subsequent to amendment of Section 147(1)(b)(i) of the 1988 Act, even the owner of the goods travelling in a goods vehicle is considered as third party covered under the policy. Thus, categories 2 and 3 passengers are covered by the dicta in Asha Rani (3 supra). In these cases, the accident occurred on 14.10.1996 and therefore, even though they are passengers travelling in the goods vehicle as owners of the goods, they are covered under the policy as per Section 147(1)(b)(i) of 1988 Act. 11. In view of the above conclusion, these two appeals are not maintainable because appellant insurer did not obtain permission under Section 17(b) (sic. 170 (b)) of 1988 Act. It was so held in National Insurance Company Limited v. Nicolletta Rohtagi', wherein the following observations were made. 11. In view of the above conclusion, these two appeals are not maintainable because appellant insurer did not obtain permission under Section 17(b) (sic. 170 (b)) of 1988 Act. It was so held in National Insurance Company Limited v. Nicolletta Rohtagi', wherein the following observations were made. We have already held that unless the conditions precedent specified in Section 170 of the 1988 Act are satisfied, an insurance company has no right of appeal to challenge the award on merits. However, in a situation where there is a collusion between the claimants and the insured or the insured does not contest the claim and, further, the Tribunal does not implead the insurance company to contest the claim, in such cases it is open to an in surer to seek permission of the Tribunal to contest the claim on the ground available to the insured or to a person against whom a claim has been made. If permission is granted and the insurer is allowed to contest the claim on merits, in that case it is open to the insurer to file an appeal against an award on merits is aggrieved. In any case where an application for permission is erroneously rejected the insurer can challenge only that part of the order while filing appeal on grounds specified in sub-section (2) of Section 149 of the 1988 Act. But such application for permission has to be bona fide and filed at the stage when the insured is required to lead his evidence. So far as obtaining compensation by fraud by the claimant is concerned, it is no longer res integra that fraud vitiates the entire proceeding and in such cases it is open to an insurer to apply to the Tribunal for rectification of award. For the aforesaid reasons, our answer to the question is that even if no appeal is preferred under Section 173 of the 1988 Act by an insured against the award of a Tribunal, it is not permissible for an insurer to file an appeal questioning the quantum of compensation as well as findings as regards negligence or contributory negligence of the offending vehicle. 12. Therefore, the appeals are liable to be dismissed. The dismissal of appeals would not give quietus to these matters because the miscellaneous applications are filed by contesting respondents! claimants seeking amendment. 12. Therefore, the appeals are liable to be dismissed. The dismissal of appeals would not give quietus to these matters because the miscellaneous applications are filed by contesting respondents! claimants seeking amendment. The question, therefore, is whether claimants whose claim was allowed, as prayed, who were granted relief in toto and who did not seek any amendment for enhancement of compensation when the matters were pending before Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, can seek enhancement in the appeals filed by insurer? The answer must be in the negative for the following reasons. 13. Rule 473 of Andhra Pradesh Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 makes certain provisions of the First Schedule to CPC applicable to proceedings before the Claims Tribunal. These are Rules 9 to 13 and 15 to 30 of Order V, Order IX, Rules 3 to 10 of Order XIII, Rules 2 to 21 of Order XVI Order XVII and Rules 1 to 3 of Order XXVIII of CPC. In R.Kamala v. United India Insurance Company Limited, this Court observed that, "all provisions of CPC have no application before the Claims Tribunal". In view of this, Order XLI Rule 33 of CPC on which reliance is placed by learned counsel for appellant (sic. claimants), is not applicable. It is no doubt true that the civil appellate Court is conferred with the power to pass any decree and make any order, which ought to have been passed or made and to pass or make such further or other decree or order notwithstanding the fact that the appeal is regarding part of the decree. This power may be exercised in favour of all or any of the respondents although such respondents have not filed any appeal or objection. The proviso to Order XLI Rule 33 of CPC, however, inhibits residuary power of appellate Court contained in Rule 33 saying that such power shall not be exercised to make an order under Section 35A when such order was refused by the Court, whose order is under appeal. 14. Learned counsel for appellants (sic. claimants) relied on Delhi Electric Supply Undertaking v Basanti Devi to draw support for his submission that Order XLI Rule 33 of CPC enables the Tribunal or the appellate authority to pass an order enhancing compensation. However, having regard to the Rule 474 of CPC (sic. 14. Learned counsel for appellants (sic. claimants) relied on Delhi Electric Supply Undertaking v Basanti Devi to draw support for his submission that Order XLI Rule 33 of CPC enables the Tribunal or the appellate authority to pass an order enhancing compensation. However, having regard to the Rule 474 of CPC (sic. A.P. Motor Vehicles Rules), this Court cannot Ignore a provision of law and pass any order, which would amount to an order per Incuriam 15. There is no doubt that the respondents in C.M.A.No.822 claimed Rs.1,62,000/- and they were granted the same. In other appeal being C.M.A.No.831 of 2005, respondents claimed Rs.1,28,000/-who were granted the same. Precisely for this reason, they did not prefer cross-objections under Order XLI Rule 22 of CPC. Indeed, when the party to the proceedings got the relief in the Court of original jurisdiction, in the appellate Court even if there is appeal against lower Court, such party cannot file cross-objections and may not seek amendment to get a better relief than what was claimed. 16. When a party is barred from filing cross-objections and when a party ordinarily is barred from claiming a better relief than what he claimed before the Court Tribunal of original jurisdiction, can such party be permitted to seek quantitatively better relief in terms of money, only because the Court below observed that the parties would have got more money. The law does not permit such course of action. Procedural law is no doubt described as an adjutant law for proper enforcement of substantive law. It does not, however, mean that by interpreting procedural law to suit a situation, the substantive rights of others can be defeated. Procedural law is always intended to be used for effective implementation and enforcement of substantive law and not to deny the rights, privileges flowing from substantive law. In that view of the matter, even though the applications filed by appellants (sic. respondents) were allowed by this Court as not opposed, for amendment of the relief portion in the impugned order as well as the relief portion in the O.P., this Court is of considered opinion that it may not have much relevance in the facts and circumstances of this case. If only the respondents had been diligent, they would have certainly filed an amendment application before the Tribunal. If only the respondents had been diligent, they would have certainly filed an amendment application before the Tribunal. Having not done so, they cannot be permitted to claim more amount by amending the impugned award or their O.Ps., at the appellate stage. Further more, in the appeal filed by the insurer, the claimants cannot seek enhancement of amount without filing I cross-objections or a separate cross appeal. 17. In the result, these appeals are dismissed without any order as to costs.