JUDGMENT : B. P. DHARMADHIKARI, J.:- Heard a learned Adv. Mr. Uday Dastane for the petitioner, learned Asstt. Govt. Pleader Mr. S. S. Doifode for respondent nos. 1 and 3 and learned Adv. Mr. S. K. Mishra for respondent 1 no.2. 2. By present petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner - land owner seeks a Writ of Mandamus to declare that the action of taking possession by the respondents of the land owned by him is illegal and without any authority of law. He has, in the alternative, sought compensation for said plot of land at the rate of Rs.400-500/- per sq. ft., with commensurate damages on account of mental agony he suffered for last several years and third prayer in the alternative is to direct the respondents to allot him a plot of equal dimension in the vicinity with compensation for mental agony. The respondent no.1 before is State of Maharashtra, while respondent no.3 is its Officer working as a Special Land Acquisition Officer for Local Authority, i.e., respondent no.2. 3. The facts, in brief, are :- Petitioner is the legal heir of original petitioner - Shri. Loonkaran Gandhi, who expired during pendency of petition. Admittedly, deceased was the owner of Plot No.8 admeasuring 9800 sq. ft. [corresponding to Khasra No.35/8]. Said Khasra No.35/8 forms part of Khasra No.35 of Mouza Khamla, and is at Pande Layout, Taluka & Distt. Nagpur. The said plot has been taken in its possession by the respondent no.2-Nagpur Improvement Trust in 1970 for construction of a Public Road, popularly known as “West High Court Road”. The stand of the petitioner is, this has been done illegally, because after Section 6 Notification issued under the Land Acquisition Act, no further steps to acquire said Plot No.8 were, at any time, taken, and till this date, there is no Award for its acquisition, with the result the deceased petitioner or his legal heir have not received any compensation therefor. Though Nagpur Improvement Trust accepts that plot has been taken in possession in 1970 and the road has been constructed upon, Nagpur Improvement Trust contends that it had all the while insisted for passing of appropriate A ward by the respondent no.3, and respondent no.3 did not pass the A ward. According to it, therefore, it cannot be blamed in the matter. 4. According to it, therefore, it cannot be blamed in the matter. 4. The petitioner had purchased two plots, both admeasuring together 17048 sq. ft., vide sale-deed dated 2nd March, 1944. He also got Non-agricultural Permission for both theses plots, i.e. Plot No.8 and Plot No.18, on 9th May, 1962. Plot No.18 does not form subject matter of present dispute, and it has been sold by petitioner in 1976. In order to show that these plots [corresponding Khasra Nos.35/8 and 35/9] were in the name of deceased petitioner, order dated 8th August, 1963 passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer, Nagpur, is being pressed into service. It is not in dispute that this Plot No.8 was forming subject-matter of Notifications for acquisition issued under Section 39 [corresponding to Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act] and further Declaration under Section 44/Section 45 of the Nagpur Improvement Trust Act [corresponding to Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act]. On 26th October, 1977, a notice under Section 8 (3) of the Land Acquisition Act was issued, but then in it, there was no mention of Khasra No.35/8 and it was only in relation to Khasra Nos.35/3 and 35/4. In view of these Developments, petitioner on 10th January, 1979 moved an application for discharge before Special Land Acquisition Officer in Land Acquisition Proceedings, pointing out that as his land is not being acquired, notice issued to him should be recalled and his land should be cleared of acquisition proceedings. On this application, on 1st August, 1981, the respondent no.3 - Special Land Acquisition Officer has passed an order and noticed that two land acquisition cases then on his file had no concern with Khasra Nos.35/8 and 35/9 and there was no acquisition proposal in respect of said Khasra numbers. He, therefore, separated papers pertaining to deceased petitioner and further observed that those papers could not have been registered unless and until the acquisition proposal is received from Nagpur Improvement Trust. According to petitioner. this order dated 1st August, 1981 has not been challenged and has attained finality. But then petitioner found that his land has been encroached by Nagpur Improvement Trust and a road has already been constructed. Hence petitioner moved an application on 25th November, 1981 for grant of equivalent plot as alternate land. Thereafter, for the first time, respondent no.2 sought details of his title on 2nd June, 1982. But then petitioner found that his land has been encroached by Nagpur Improvement Trust and a road has already been constructed. Hence petitioner moved an application on 25th November, 1981 for grant of equivalent plot as alternate land. Thereafter, for the first time, respondent no.2 sought details of his title on 2nd June, 1982. The Award was not declared and petitioner did not get alternate plot. Hence as advised, he approached the District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum in August, 191. Thereafter, he was advised to withdraw those proceedings and file present Writ Petition. 5. After narrating facts as above, Adv. Mr. Dastane for the petitioner states that admittedly till today, there is no Award acquiring Plot No.8 of petitioner. Hence, the acquisition proceedings have lapsed. He contends that in such circumstances, when petitioner has made several representations and his grievance is pending before this Court since 1992, for last about 16 years, as no steps have been taken to ventilate his grievance, the acquisition proceedings on the basis of old Section 39 Notification cannot be allowed to be continued, and must be treated as lapsed. He has relied upon certain judgments to show that even if there is no express time-limit in g the Nagpur Improvement Trust Act for completion of such acquisition proceedings, the respondent no.2 was under obligation to Complete the acquisition within a reasonable time, and, according to him, said reasonable time, as judicially settled, is, at the most, two yrears, He, therefore, states that as nothing has been done even after application for discharge moved by the petitioner, within two years, or then during pendency of present writ petition, the respondents cannot be permitted to act further on notifications published under Sections 39 and 45 of the Nagpur Improvement Trust Act. He has further pointed out that though all provisions of Land Acquisition Act as such are not adopted by Nagpur Improvement Trust, still a provision in the shape of Section 48-A has been added to Land Acquisition Act for the purposes of Nagpur City, and as per that provision, in case the Award is not published within two years, the petitioner is entitled to damages. He further states that for the purposes of said damages, provisions of Chapter-III of Land Acquisition Act, 1894 have been made applicable. He further states that for the purposes of said damages, provisions of Chapter-III of Land Acquisition Act, 1894 have been made applicable. He, however, contends that recourse to Section 48- A in present circumstances is out of question view of first challenge raised by the petitioner that the acquisition has already lapsed. 6. Mr. Dastane further stats that the petitioner had requested for grant of alternate site and even if respondents offer the petitioner alternate equally suitable site, grievance of the petitioner will stand vindicated. According to him, during pendency of these matters, the provisions of Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966, have come into force and under the same, there is now a procedure for transfer of TDR. According to him, as Award is not made till today, in the alternative, the acquisition proceedings can be presumed to be continuing and hence by applying amended provisions, corresponding TDR of Plot No.8 can be made over to petitioner, to satisfy his grievance. He states that this proposal was also given by the petitioner to respondent no.2. 7. Learned Adv. Mr. Mishra appearing for respondent no.2 states that grievance of petitioner against respondent no.2 is misconceived. He states that notice under Section 9(3) of the Land Acquisition Act was served upon the petitioner and order dated 1st August, 1981 relied upon is not an order of discharge. He contends that the acquisition proceedings validly initiated against the lands of petitioner were not dropped or discontinued by order dated 1st August, 1981 and hence there is no question of challenging that order further. He has invited attention to the facts of the case to show that Plot No.8 of the petitioner was always the subject-matter of acquisition and he also states that several times respondent no.3 was requested to declare the Award, but then that Award was not declared, as the financial proposal for working out the cost price of the petitioner's Plot No.8 was never received by the respondent no.3. He states that the reason given by respondent no.3 for separating the papers of the petitioner from Land Acquisition Case are incorrect and the respondent no.2 is not responsible at all for the delay in the matter. He contends that it is respondent no.1 and respondent no.3 who did not take timely steps which ultimately resulted in today's position. He states that the reason given by respondent no.3 for separating the papers of the petitioner from Land Acquisition Case are incorrect and the respondent no.2 is not responsible at all for the delay in the matter. He contends that it is respondent no.1 and respondent no.3 who did not take timely steps which ultimately resulted in today's position. He also invited attention provisions of Section 48-A of the Land Acquisition Act to state that as there is no time limit for declaration of Award, in so far as acquisition by respondent no.2 is concerned, that provision has been added and Legislature has taken adequate precaution to protect the interest of a person like petitioner. He contends that the argument of reasonable time of two years by petitioner is, therefore, misconceived and as A ward has not been declared, at the most, this Court may direct respondent no.3 to declare the Award in accordance with law. He further argues that the first Development Plan for Nagpur City has come into force in 1976 and in it, the plot belonging to petitioner has been shown as a Public Road. He, therefore, states that it does not have any development rights which can be transferred the petitioner and hence mere pendency of acquisition matter on account of fault on the Part of respondent no.3 cannot be used by the Petitioner to claim TDR in relation thereto. He contends that question of computation of damages in accordance with law can be left open for consideration by respondent no.3. He, therefore, states that there is no substance in he petition and petition needs to be dismissed. 8. Learned AGP Mr. Doifode appearing for respondent nos. 1 and 3 accepts hat till date no Award is declared. He, however, states that notice issued under Sub-section (3) of Section 9 did not include Khasra No.35/8 corresponding to Plot No.8 of the petitioner and hence there was no question of declaring any Award in relation to Plot No.8. He further contends that the position was brought to the notice of respondent no.2 and a fresh proposal in relation to Khasra No.35/8 was demanded from it, but then such proposal was never received by the respondent no.2. He contends that had the proposal been sent, then the ward could have been published and hence respondent no.2 alone is responsible for his delay. He contends that had the proposal been sent, then the ward could have been published and hence respondent no.2 alone is responsible for his delay. According to him, the respondent No.3 is even today ready and willing to declare the Award in accordance with law. 9. The position in law is not much n dispute. The Judgment of Hon'ble Apex court in the group of cases Nagpur improvement Trust V s. Vasantrao & ors. AIR 2002 SC 3499 : 2002(4) ALL MR 905 S.C.)] clearly shows that the time-limit and 1967 or 1984 amendments in that respect introduced by Parliament in Land Acquisition act, 1894 are not applicable, and cannot be looked into for the purposes of acquisition by he respondent no.2. In this background, the judgments cited by learned counsel for the petitioner need to be looked into. Adv. Mr. Dastane has relied upon the Judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in the group of cases Aflatoon & ors. Vs. Lt. Governor of Delhi ors. [ (1975)4 SCC 285 ], to urge that even n absence of such express stipulation in Land Acquisition Act, the requirement of acting within reasonable time is found inbuilt. As said judgment is considered by Hon'ble Apex Court ( in subsequent Judgment in case of Ram ( Chand & ors. Vs. Union of India & ors. [ (1994)1 SCC 44 ] cited by petitioner, we do not find it necessary to refer to said judgment. In the Judgment delivered in case of Ram Chand & ors. Vs. Union of India & ors. [cited supra], the Hon'ble Apex Court in t Paragraph 16 has considered the aspect of laches in approaching the Court of Law on the part of the land owner. One of the arguments of respondent no.2 before us has been that the petitioner has knocked the doors of Court in 1992 for the first time after Section 9(3) s notification issued in 1977. It was also contended then that if the Land Acquisition Proceedings were dropped, and petitioner was discharged therefrom in August, 1981, his e action of seeking relief in 1992 suffers from laches and negligence. The observations of Hon'ble Apex Court in Para 16 show that the question of delay in invoking the writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 needs to be considered alongwith the inaction on the part of Authorities who had to perform their statutory duties. The observations of Hon'ble Apex Court in Para 16 show that the question of delay in invoking the writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 needs to be considered alongwith the inaction on the part of Authorities who had to perform their statutory duties. Hon 'ble Apex Court has found that a statutory authority cannot take a plea that although it has not performed its duty within reasonable time, it is of no consequence, because the person wronged thereby has not c approached the High Court for suitable writ or direction within reasonable time. These observations of Hon'ble Apex Court apply to a present facts, because even today, the admitted position on record is that the Award for acquiring the lands has not been published and petitioner has not been paid any compensation therefor. In Paragraph 27 of this Judgment, the Hon ble Apex Court has held that in view of Pits earlier judgment in case of Aflatoon & ors. Vs. Lt. Governor of Delhi & ors. [cited supra], the reasonable time for making A ward would be two years. The facts there show that the lands to be acquired were already developed and put to public use. In paragraphs 25 and 26, the Hon'ble Apex Court found that the delay in matter before it after its Judgment in case of Aflatoon & ors. V s. Lt. Governor of Delhi & ors.. Was unexplainable and there was not a single A ward passed in relation to any land. Hence in Para 25, Hon'ble Apex Court found that it was an attempt to peg down the prices. Here, in present facts, it is to be noticed that road was already laid on Plot No.8 way back in 1970. 10. In the judgment delivered by Apex Court in case of Hira Tikkoo Vs. Union Territory, Chandigarh & ors. [(2004)6 SCC 765], relied upon by Adv. Mr. Dastane to substantiate his demand of alternate plot or in the alternative for grant of TDR, the facts show that the Chandigarh Administration there had effected allotment which was found to be erroneous and wrong. In Paragraph 24, Hon'ble Apex Court has noticed that in preparing the Development Scheme, the existing notifications reserving major part of land as forests and restriction on construction in the periphery of 900 meters of Air Force base were overlooked. In Paragraph 24, Hon'ble Apex Court has noticed that in preparing the Development Scheme, the existing notifications reserving major part of land as forests and restriction on construction in the periphery of 900 meters of Air Force base were overlooked. In this background, in Paragraph 25, Hon'ble Apex Court found that though the doctrine of "estoppel" could not be invoked, directing administrative redressal would be more appropriate remedy than payment of monetary compensation. The observations of Hon'ble Apex Court in Paragraph 26 shows that Chandigarh Administration had stated that it would give alternate plots, but of smaller sizes because of paucity of land available. It is in these facts that the direction to issue alternate plots has been issued by Hon'ble Apex Court. 11. In the Judgment delivered in case of P. Appalamurthy & Ors. Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh & ors. [ AIR 1981 AP 278 ], the High Court [learned Single Judge] has held, the period of two years would the reasonable period. Same view is reiterated by Full Bench of Punjab & Haryana High Court in the Judgment rendered in case of Radhey Sham Gupta & ors. V s. State of Haryana & ors. AIR 1982 Punjab & Haryana 519]. There, in Paragraph 14, Full bench has also held that delay in approaching Court in such circumstances cannot be used to non-suit petitioner. In view of the Judgments of Hon'ble Apex Court considered above, it is not necessary for us to make reference in more details to both these judgments. 12. The Judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in the group of cases [State of Madhya Pradesh & another Vs. Bhailal Bhai & ors.] [ AIR 1964 SC 1006 ] relied upon by Adv. Shri Mishra states that in writ jurisdiction, when the petitioner approaches after expiry of time limit fixed for filing of civil suit by Limitation Act, 1963, the approach should be treated as stale or barred. Such delay has been held to be unreasonable. In present facts, as already observed by us, till date, the A ward entitling the petitioner to claim compensation for his land has not been delivered and respondents have stated that land acquisition proceedings are still pending. It is obvious that, therefore, this ruling also has got no application. 13. Such delay has been held to be unreasonable. In present facts, as already observed by us, till date, the A ward entitling the petitioner to claim compensation for his land has not been delivered and respondents have stated that land acquisition proceedings are still pending. It is obvious that, therefore, this ruling also has got no application. 13. The perusal of order dated 1st August, 1981 passed by the Land Acquisition Officer only shows that after considering the application moved before him, the Land Acquisition Officer separated the papers pertaining to lands of Shri. L.D. Gandhi [deceased petitioner]. He has further stated that papers submitted by respondent no.2 in relation to those lands cannot be registered unless and until an acquisition proposal is received. It is clear that there was already a valid notification under Section 39 and under Section 44/Section 45 of the Nagpur Improvement Trust Act in relation to Plot No.8 [corresponding to Khasra No.35/8]. In these circumstances, the Land Acquisition Officer could not have declared that the said land covered by those notifications was dropped or excluded from land acquisition proceedings. The order also does not convey any such meaning and it only postponed the action under Section 9(3) in relation to lands of the petitioner, particularly Khasra No.35/8. Though the order mentions Khasra No.35/9 also, it is an admitted position that said Khasra No.35/9 corresponding to Plot No.18 does not form part of dispute in present writ petition. The said plot was already sold by the petitioner in 1976 itself after obtaining a clarification that said Plot No.18 was not required for the "Ajni Street Scheme". The contention of the petitioner that as order dated Ist August, 1981 has not been challenged, it has attained finality and, therefore, the acquisition proceedings in relation to his lands are already dropped, therefore, cannot be accepted solely on the basis of this order-sheet dated 1st August, 1981. We do not find any such import in that order-sheet. 14. The service of notice under Section 9(3) upon petitioner is not in dispute. The said notice expressly makes a reference to Khasra Nos.35/3 and 35/4 against its Clause No.4 while giving numbers of property under acquisition. The Khasra No.35/8 has not been mentioned in it. We do not find any such import in that order-sheet. 14. The service of notice under Section 9(3) upon petitioner is not in dispute. The said notice expressly makes a reference to Khasra Nos.35/3 and 35/4 against its Clause No.4 while giving numbers of property under acquisition. The Khasra No.35/8 has not been mentioned in it. Petitioner, therefore, moved for discharge after this notice and in it he has mentioned that the Land Acquisition Cases were in relation to Khasra No. 35 admeasuring 8.56 acres and he also made reference to Order-sheet dated 20th December, 1974, wherein Land Acquisition Officer has mentioned that the whole area of 8.56 acres was under acquisition. The petitioner also mentions a later order dated 27th May, 1975, and states that Land Acquisition Officer has later on clarified that entire 8.56 acres was not under acquisition. But then he has not mentioned that by order dated 27th May, 1975 Khasra No.35/8 was cleared of acquisition. In his application for discharge, petitioner has made reference to notice under Section 9(3), and has stated that it is in relation to Khasra Nos.35/3 and 35/4. He has then given area of Khasra Nos.35/8 and 35/9. He has also stated that other Land Acquisition Case Nos.84 to 86 were in respect of Khasra Nos.35/5, 35/6 and 35/7 respectively. Thus, only because Khsra No.35/ 8 was not appearing in Section 9(3) notification, he moved application for discharge. It is to be noted that there is no order of discharge in terms of this application. 15. Though in notice under Section 9(3) dated 18th October, 1977 [26th October, 1977], Khasra Nos.35/S and 35/9 are not mentioned, boundaries of property under acquisition are clearly stated. The parties have produced before us the map of the property and perusal of that map clearly shows that Khasra No.35/S was included or covered within those boundaries. Similarly, from correspondence between parties, particularly Nagpur Improvement Trust and Land Acquisition Officer, it becomes clear that the Nagpur Improvement Trust had moved the proposal for acquiring parts of Khasra No.35, which initially was divided into seven subdivisions. Khasra Nos.35/l and 35/2 admeasuring 5.51 acres and 1.05 acres respectively were shown as Govt. lands. Remaining Khasra numbers, i.e., from 35/3 to 35/7, were shown as belonging to private persons. Khasra Nos.35/l and 35/2 admeasuring 5.51 acres and 1.05 acres respectively were shown as Govt. lands. Remaining Khasra numbers, i.e., from 35/3 to 35/7, were shown as belonging to private persons. The total area of sub-divisions of Khasra No.35 is shown to be S.56 acres, and as Khasra Nos.35/1 and 35/2 were shown as Govt. lands, a Valuation Report was submitted to Land Acquisition Officer by respondent no.2 for Khasra Nos.35/1 and 35/2. The Govt., was also moved for transferring Khasra Nos.35/1 and 35/2 to respondent no.2. This communication of Nagpur Improvement Trust to Secretary to Govt. of Maharashtra dated 10th October, 1969 has been replied by Collector, Nagpur, on 31st May, 1972, pointing out that Khasra Nos.35/1 and 35/2 were occupied by ex-Mal Gujar and hence Govt., was unable to transfer them to Nagpur Improvement Trust. Record shows that Khasra Nos.35/1 and 35/2 were later on sub-divided and Khasra Nos.35/ Sand 35/9 came into existence. The respondent no.2 has, in fact, filed reply on 5th May, 1979 before respondent no.3 opposing the prayer for discharge of petitioner, and in it, pointed out that Khsara Nos.35/S and 35/9 were part and parcel of land Khasra Nos.35/1 and 35/2. They have also specified that both these main Khasras including Khasra Nos.35/S and 35/9 were under acquisition. It is not necessary for us to dwell more on this controversy, because by then land was already taken in possession [in 1970] by Nagpur Improvement Trust and road was already constructed upon it. The facts, however, clearly show that because of subdivisions of Khasra Nos.35/1 and 35/2 into Khasra Nos.35/5 and 35/9, the said Khasra numbers were not mentioned in notice issued under Section 9(3) issued to the deceased petitioner. It is also seen from boundaries that entire Khasra Nos.35/l and 35/2 were subjected to acquisition and no notice under Section 9(3) in relation thereto was issued, though necessary, as respondent no.2-Nagpur Improvement Trust was under the impression that the same were Govt. lands. The Govt. was, therefore, moved on 10th October, 1969 itself for transfer of those lands free of costs to it by said respondent. 16. lands. The Govt. was, therefore, moved on 10th October, 1969 itself for transfer of those lands free of costs to it by said respondent. 16. Thus, we find that in these circumstances, though respondent no.2 cannot be blamed for causing any delay deliberately in the matter of acquisition, or in the matter of declaration of Award, having realized that Khasra No.35/1 was also subject-matter of acquisition and notice dated 18th October, 1977 [26th October, 1977] issued to petitioner mentioned a wrong khasra number, or then notice under Section 9(3) in relation to Khasra Nos.35/1 and 35/2 was not issued, it did not take necessary corrective measures immediately. The respondent no.3 had not discontinued the acquisition proceedings in relation to Khasra No.35/8, but he had only separated papers and was awaiting proper proposal in relation to Khasra No.35/5 from the respondent no.2. That proposal was never submitted by the respondent no.2. This ultimately resulted in today's situation. 17. The petitioner was aware of the boundaries of the land sought to be acquired and he also, before effecting sale of his another Plot No.15, situated in the vicinity, obtained clarification that said Plot No.15 was not required for acquisition. This Plot Nos.5 and 18 were purchased by him in Court auction from Court of Wards and he had also obtained necessary permission to put it to nonagricultural purposes. Thus, plots were identified in layout and hence the fact that the possession was already taken by Nagpur Improvement Trust in 1970 and road 'was already constructed upon it was well within knowledge of the deceased petitioner. Though deceased petitioner in his subsequent application moved for granting equivalent plot on 25th November, 1981 stated that he got knowledge of construction of road only four to five years back, the said statement cannot be accepted. Facts show that in 1976 itself, a separate plot in the very same locality/layout was sold by the petitioner and he was also aware that Khasra Nos.35/8 and 35/9 were part and parcel of entire old Khasra No.35. In these circumstances, we are not inclined to hold that acquisition proceedings have lapsed because A ward was not made within a reasonable time of two years. 18. The provisions of Schedule appended to Nagpur Improvement Trust Act, 1936 show the extent to which provisions of Land Acquisition Act have been made applicable to acquisition of land by Nagpur Improvement Trust. 18. The provisions of Schedule appended to Nagpur Improvement Trust Act, 1936 show the extent to which provisions of Land Acquisition Act have been made applicable to acquisition of land by Nagpur Improvement Trust. By Clause 14 of that Schedule, Section 48-A has been added to the Land Acquisition Act in so far as same is applicable in Nagpur City for such acquisition. Said provision is as under : "48-A. Compensation to be awarded when land not acquired within two years. (1) If within a period of two years from the date of the publication of the declaration under section 6 in respect of any land, the Collector has not made an award under section 11 with respect to such land, the owner of the land shall, unless he has been to a material extent responsible for the delay, be entitled to receive compensation for the damage suffered by him in consequence of the delay. (2) The provisions of Part III of this Act, shall apply so far as may be, to the determination of the compensation payable under this Section." 19. The said provision, therefore, takes care of situation in which the A ward has not been made within a period of two years from the date of publication of declaration under Section 6 equivalent to Section 44/ Section 45 of the Nagpur Improvement Trust Act. The owner of such land is entitled to compensation, if he was not responsible for the delay to material extent. The damages suffered by him in consequence of said delay are stated to be the measure for computing compensation by Sub-section (2) of said provision. Provisions of Part-III of Land Acquisition Act have been made applicable for determination of compensation payable under Section 48-A. It is therefore, obvious that the petitioner is entitled to consideration under said provision and it is for respondent no.3-Land Acquisition Officer to find out whether the benefit as contemplated therein can be extended to petitioner. 20. Both parties have addressed us to show material on record revealing market price then prevailing. Our attention has been invited to claim statement by deceased petitioner and additional claim statement filed by him. However, in view of provisions of Section 48A, the matter needs to be determined by respondent no.3 and hence we leave it open for consideration by the said respondent. 21. Accordingly, Writ Petition is partly allowed. Our attention has been invited to claim statement by deceased petitioner and additional claim statement filed by him. However, in view of provisions of Section 48A, the matter needs to be determined by respondent no.3 and hence we leave it open for consideration by the said respondent. 21. Accordingly, Writ Petition is partly allowed. The prayer for grant of alternate land or then for transfer of TDR, in lieu of plot No.8 cannot be allowed by us in view of the disputed facts and conduct of the petitioner which have come on record. Said Plot Khasra No.35/8 was already constructed upon, and was being used as a Public Road since 1970. The Development Plan for Nagpur City has come into force in 1976. Therefore, in 1976, no TDR was available in relation to said plot or Khasra No.35/8. Hence request for grant of proportionate TDR cannot be granted by this Court. 22. Adv. Mr. Dastane here points out that an exercise of title verification was undertaken after the petitioner requested for grant of suitable plot in the alternative, but then, thereafter no further steps have been taken. Adv. Mr. Mishra fairly states that right now, he is not in a position to make any definite statement in relation to said request. It appears that the said request of the petitioner has not been rejected by the respondent no.2. 23. In these circumstances, we permit the respondent no.2 to consider the request of the petitioner for grant of alternate land, if it can be legally done, as compensation for land already being used by it. If such alternate plot of land can be legally given to petitioner, the same shall be as compensation for Khasra No. 35/8 acquired by respondent no.2. If such grant is not possible, the respondent no.3 shall determine compensation and damages, if any, under Section 48-A of the Land Acquisition Act in accordance with law. As the possession of petitioner's land has been taken way back in 1970 and A ward appears to have been published in relation to other lands some time in the year 1986, we direct respondent nos.2 and 3 to complete the exercise within a stipulated time. Respondent no.2 shall take a decision on the request made by the petitioner for grant of alternate land as compensation, as early as possible, and in any case by 31st January, 2010. Respondent no.2 shall take a decision on the request made by the petitioner for grant of alternate land as compensation, as early as possible, and in any case by 31st January, 2010. If such grant is not legally feasible, the respondent no.2 shall inform the petitioner accordingly by said date and thereafter respondent no.3 shall proceed further to declare A ward in accordance with law, as early as possible, and, in any case by 30th April, 2010. 24. Writ Petition is, thus, partly allowed. In the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs. Petition partly allowed.