ORDER U.B. Saha, J. 1. By this writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution the petitioner approached this Court for quashing the judgment dated August 2, 1999 passed by the learned Presiding Officer, Labour Court, West Tripura, Agartala in Labour Court Case No. 3/1998 whereby and whereunder the said Court dismissed the reference made by the State Government on contest being hot maintainable. 2. Heard Mr. P. Roy Barman, learned Counsel for the petitioner and Mr. K.N. Bhattacharjee, learned senior counsel, assisted by Mr. S. Acharjee, learned Counsel for the respondent. 3. The brief facts leading to the filing of this writ petition are as under: Proforma-respondent, Sri Samarendra Chakraborty (hereinafter referred to as 'the workman') while working as Medical Representative under the' Fair Deal Corporation (Pvt.) Ltd., presently known as FDC Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the 'respondent company') for Silchar Agartala region being posted at Agartala was transferred from Agartala to Nadiad in the State of Gujarat As the said transfer order was not issued in the interest of the respondent company, but as a measure of punishment, the workman did not join there for which he was terminated from the service by the respondent company. As the workman was illegally terminated from the service by the respondent company, the present petitioner being his, union through its Union Secretary took up the issue with the Labour commissioner, Government of Tripura for,' making necessary reference to the Labour Court under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short the Act of 1947). Thereafter, the State Government being satisfied that there existed a case for reference vide Memo. No. F.80(3)-LAB/IR/IDA/98/2852 dated June 18, 1998, referred the dispute to the learned Labour Court for proper adjudication and the petitioner was accordingly informed of by the Labour Commissioner, Government of Tripura vide his letter dated June 20,1998. After that pursuant to the provisions of Rule 10(B) of the Industrial Disputes (Central) Rule, 1957 (for short 'the Rule of 1957'), the petitioner was asked to submit a statement of demand to the Presiding Officer of the Labour Court. After that pursuant to the provisions of Rule 10(B) of the Industrial Disputes (Central) Rule, 1957 (for short 'the Rule of 1957'), the petitioner was asked to submit a statement of demand to the Presiding Officer of the Labour Court. Accordingly, the petitioner filed the statement of demand wherein it was stated that the workman was transferred to Nadiad, Gujarat in a motivated way of punishment and as such the same was an unfair labour practice, not permissible under law and the order of termination from service of the said workman was contrary to the provisions of the Act and Rule and the same was passed without providing any opportunity of being heard to the said workman and as such the same was liable to be set aside. 4. Respondent company filed its written statement before the learned Labour Court stating, inter alia, that the workman was employed as Medical Representative for the region of Silchar, Agartala and Manipur and was put on probation for a period of six months. Thereafter, he was confirmed in the service of the company. At the time of his joining he was issued an appointment letter dated June 23, 19.71 and was also issued a copy of standing order of the Medical Propagandists on June 25, 1971 and he also accepted all the terms and condition contained in the said appointment letter and also in the standing orders. It is also averred that he being a Medical Representative is not a workman as defined under Section 2(s) of the Act of 1947. The further contention of the respondent company in its written statement was that a Medical Representative is required to work in the field in accordance with the strategies and marketing plans of the company and is required to promote the products of the company and it is for this reason that there are periodical meetings held by the company for all the Medical Representatives so as to review the business strategies and, marketing plans for the company's products for the future. It is also contended that the Labour Court, West Tripura has no jurisdiction to decide the dispute as referred to as according to the terms and condition of service of the workman and standing orders, the dispute has to be decided by a Court having the jurisdiction within Bombay. The learned Labour Court upon hearing the parties ultimately dismissed the reference. The learned Labour Court upon hearing the parties ultimately dismissed the reference. Hence, the instant writ petition. 5. Mr. Roy Barman, learned Counsel for the petitioner contended that since the workman is a member of the petitioner, the petitioner rightly took up the matter with the Labour Commissioner for referring the dispute to the learned Labour Court. He also contended that the workman being a Medical Representative is held to be a "deemed workman" within the meaning of the Act of 1947 by virtue of Section 6(2) of the Sales Promotion Employees (Conditions of Service) Act, 1976 (for short 'SPE Act). While supporting the contention of the petitioner, inter alia, that the proforma-respondent is a workman, he contended that when the Act of 1947 came into force, the Medical Representatives were not treated as workmen and also did not fall within the definition of Section 2 of the Act of 1947, but after 1987 the Medical Representatives are very much treated as workmen in view of the provisions of Section 6(2) of the SPE Act. For ready reference Section 6(2) of the SPE Act is quoted herein below: 6.(2) The provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act 1947 (14 of 1947), as in force for the time being, shall apply to, or in relation to, sales promotion employees as they apply to, or in relation to, workmen within the, meaning of that Act and for the purposes of any proceeding under that Act in relation to an industrial dispute, a sales promotion employee shall be deemed to include a sales promotion employee who has been dismissed, discharged or retrenched in connection with, or as a consequence of, that dispute or whose dismissal, discharge or retrenchment had led to that dispute. In support of his aforesaid contention, Mr. Roy Barman also referred to the decision of the Apex Court in H.R. Adyanthaya and Ors. v. Sandoz (India) Ltd. and Ors. particularly paragraphs 28 and 29, wherein the Apex Court considering all the earlier cases noted that on and from March 6, 1976 the provisions of the Act of 1947 became applicable to the Medical Representatives and they are also treated as workmen. For better appreciation, paragraphs 28 and 29 of the aforesaid case law are re-produced herein below at p. 313 of LLJ: 28. For better appreciation, paragraphs 28 and 29 of the aforesaid case law are re-produced herein below at p. 313 of LLJ: 28. The SPE Act was amended by the Amending Act 48 of 1986 which came into force w.e.f. May 6, 1987. By the said amendment among others, the definition of sales promotion employee was expanded so as to include all sales promotion employed without a ceiling on their wages except those employed or engaged in a supervisory capacity drawing wages exceeding Rs. 1600 per mensem and those employed or engaged mainly in managerial or administrative capacity. 29. Section 6 of that Act made the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923, Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, (the I.D. Act), Minimum Wages Act, 1948, Maternity Benefit Act, 1961, Payment of Bonus Act, 1965 and Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, applicable forthwith to the medical representatives. Sub-section (2) of the said Section while making the provisions of the I.D. Act, as in force for the time being, applicable to the medical representatives stated as follows: (2) The provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), as in force for the time being, shall apply to, or in relation to, sales promotion employees as they apply to, or in relation to, workmen within the meaning of that Act and for the purposes of any proceeding under that Act in relation to an industrial dispute, a sales promotion employee shall be deemed to include a sales promotion employee who has been dismissed, discharged or retrenched in connection with, or as a consequence of, that dispute or whose dismissal, discharge or retrenchment had led to that dispute. In other words, on and from March 6, 1976 the provisions of the I.D. Act became applicable to the medical representatives depending upon their wages up to May 6, 1987 and without the limitation on their wages thereafter and upon the capacity in which they were employed or engaged. 6. Learned Counsel for the petitioner further contended that the learned Labour Court on the one hand dismissed the reference and on the other held that the termination of the workman arising but of his transfer was legal and justified meaning thereby he decided the dispute referred by the appropriate Government, which was not permissible under the law. 6. Learned Counsel for the petitioner further contended that the learned Labour Court on the one hand dismissed the reference and on the other held that the termination of the workman arising but of his transfer was legal and justified meaning thereby he decided the dispute referred by the appropriate Government, which was not permissible under the law. His further contention was that since the respondent company participated in the proceeding before the Labour Court, it ought not to have challenged the jurisdiction of the said Court and the learned trial Court also ought not to have taken the question of jurisdiction while deciding the reference. In the instant case since the appropriate Government referred the dispute under Section 10 of the Act of 1947 to the Labour Court, the Labour Court ought to have exercised the jurisdiction vested in it which it failed. Therefore, the impugned judgment is liable to be set aside. 7. Mr. Roy Barman, learned Counsel further contended that whether one is a workman or not as per the definition given in Section 2(s) of the Act of 1947 is a question of fact and the same can only be decided on the basis of evidence as per the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Sharad Kumar. v. Government of NCT of Delhi But in the instant case, the learned Labour Court without taking any evidence held that the pro-forma respondent is not a workman, which is bad in law and the said finding of the Labour Court is contrary to the findings of the Apex Court in the case of H.R. Adyanthaya and Ors. v. Sandoz (India) Ltd. and Ors. (supra). He also referred to the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of Ripu Daman Bhanot v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Ludhiana and Ors. 1997 I LLJ 557 (P&H), particularly para 4 of the case law to establish that the proforma-respondent as well as all the members of the petitioner Union are workmen for the purpose of deciding a dispute under the Act of 1947. 8. 1997 I LLJ 557 (P&H), particularly para 4 of the case law to establish that the proforma-respondent as well as all the members of the petitioner Union are workmen for the purpose of deciding a dispute under the Act of 1947. 8. Learned Counsel again contended that the appropriate Government can only cause reference and as either the employer or workmen cannot approach the Labour Court on their own and not only that no purported agreement between the parties can oust the jurisdiction of the Tribunal of the Labour Court constituted under the Act of 1947 and it is well settled position of law that the parties cannot confer jurisdiction on a Court which does not have the jurisdiction and at the same time cannot oust the jurisdiction of a Court which has the same and if more than two Courts; have territorial jurisdiction in respect of a cause of action then only the parties to the, cause of action can elect one such Court excluding the other by dint of agreement. In support of his aforesaid contention, he placed reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in the cases of Hakam Singh v. Gammon (India) Ltd. In the instant case, the petitioner being not a party to the agreement as alleged, was not bound by the terms and condition of the agreement and had rightly raised the dispute before the Labour Commissioner, Government of Tripura for referring the same to the Labour Court within the State of Tripura as the workman at the relevant time was working within the State of Tripura, Mr. Roy Barman contended. 9. Mr. Roy Barman on the question of cause of action, referring to the provisions of Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure contended that the cause of action of the present dispute arose in both the City of Bombay where the principal office of the respondent company is situated and in the State of Tripura where the subordinate office of the respondent company is situated and the workman had been discharging his duties and had received the order of transfer as well as the order of termination. In support of his aforesaid contention, he placed reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Patel Roadways Limited, Bombay v. Prasad Trading Company AIR 1992 SC 1514 : wherein the Apex Court discussed about the pros and cons of Section 20 of C.P.C. The relevant portion of the Apex Court observation in para 9 of the above case law is re-produced herein under: 9. ...What has been urged with the aid of the Explanation to Section 20 of the Code is that since the appellant has its principal office in Bombay it shall be deemed to carry on business at Bombay and consequently the Courts at Bombay will also have jurisdiction, On a plain reading of the Explanation to Section 20 of the Code we find an apparent fallacy in the aforesaid argument. The Explanation is in two parts, one before the word "or" occurring between the words "office in India" and the word "in respect of and the other thereafter. The Explanation applies to a defendant which is a corporation, which terms, as seen above, would include even a company such as the appellant in the instant case the first part of the Explanation applies only to such a corporation which has its sole or principal office at a particular place. In that event the Courts within whose jurisdiction the sole or principal office of the defendant is situate will also have jurisdiction inasmuch as even if the defendant may not be actually carrying on business at that place, it will "be deemed to carry on business" at that place because of the fiction created by the Explanation. The latter part of the Explanation takes care of a case where the defendant does not have a sole office but has a principal office at one place and has also a subordinate office at another place. The words "at such place" occurring at the end of the Explanation and the word "or" referred to above which is disjunctive clearly suggest that if the case falls within the latter part of the Explanation it is not the Court within whose jurisdiction' the principal office of the defendant is situate but the Court within whose jurisdiction it has a subordinate office which alone shall have jurisdiction in respect of any cause of action arising at any place where it has also a subordinate office. The Apex Court's further observation in para 10 of the judgment reads as under: Section 20 of the Code before its amendment by the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976 had two Explanations being Explanations I and II. By the Amendment Act Explanation I was omitted and Explanation II was renumbered as the present Explanation. Explanation I so omitted read as hereunder: Explanation I. Where a person has a permanent dwelling at one place and also temporary residence at another place, he shall be deemed to reside at both places in respect of any cause of action arising at the place where he has such temporary residence. 10. According to Mr. Roy Barman as per Clauses (a) to (c) of Section 20 of the Code, the plaintiff has a choice of forum and cannot be compelled to go to the place of residence or business of the corporation and can file a suit at a place where the cause of action arises and in the instant case, according to him, the cause of action arose at Agartala in the State of Tripura where the workman received the order of transfer as well as the purported termination order. 11. To repeal the contentions of Mr. Roy Barman, learned Counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Bhattacharjee, learned senior counsel for the respondent would contend, inter alia that the impugned order does not call for any interference by this Court in exercising its power under Article 227 of the Constitution as the proforma-respondent is not a workman. In support of this contention, he also placed reliance on the decision of the Constitutional Bench of the Apex Court in H.R. Adyanthaya and Others v. Sandoz (India) Ltd. and Ors. (supra) wherein, according to him, it is specifically stated that a Medical Representative is not a workman as defined under Section 2(s) of the Act of 1947 as the Medical Representatives do not perform any of the duties as enumerated under Section 2(s) of the Act of 1947, viz. manual, skilled, unskilled, technical, operational, clerical or supervisory. He further contended that the dispute raised by the workman before the Labour Court was not maintainable on the ground of jurisdiction and the learned Labour Court has rightly dismissed the reference. manual, skilled, unskilled, technical, operational, clerical or supervisory. He further contended that the dispute raised by the workman before the Labour Court was not maintainable on the ground of jurisdiction and the learned Labour Court has rightly dismissed the reference. He also contended that the proforma-respondent was employed in the respondent company as a Medical Propagandist for the region of Silchar, Agartala and Manipur and was on probation for a period of six months and after the expiry of the said period he was confirmed in the service of the company. At the time of his joining he was issued an appointment letter dated June 23, 1971 and was also issued a copy of standing order of the Medical Propagandists on June 25, 1971 and he also accepted all the terms and condition contained in the said appointment letter and also in the Standing orders. So, the: proforma-respondent was bound by the terms and condition contained therein. His further submission was that as per Clause 13 of the Standing Orders, the service of all the medical propagandist like the proforma-respondent is: transferable one and as per Clause 18 of the Standing Orders, if any question arises as to the validity of constructions, interpretation or performance of the agreement, in any place, city, province or State in India, it was agreed that the matter would be decided in a Court of the city of Bombay. Therefore the learned Labour Court rightly dismissed the reference as the same was not within its jurisdiction. He finally contended that the provisions of Section.' 6 of SPE Act has no application so far the 'alleged dispute is concerned as the said Section has already been omitted by virtue of the Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act, 1982 (Central Act No. 46 of 1982). 12. In response to the submission of Mr. Bhattacharjee, Mr. Roy Barman, learned Counsel for the petitioner contended that the Act of 1947 is a social beneficial legislation to, provide certain benefit to the employee workmen and regarding the dispute between the employee and employer, reference can only be made by the appropriate Government, not by any other authority and, in the instant case, since the Government of Tripura referred the dispute to the Labour Court, it was the duty of the Labour Court to decide the matter on its own merit ignoring the technical question raised by the respondent company. He also contended that the learned Labour Court even did not take any note of Section 6 of the SPE Act while considering the question whether the proforma-respondent is a workman or not. He ultimately contended that Clause 18 of the purported agreement had no manner of application in the present case and relying on the said clause, it cannot be held that the Labour Court had/has no jurisdiction to decide the dispute referred to it by the Government in exercise of its power under Section 10(1) of the Act of 1947 because the purported agreement was between the employee workman and the employer respondent company and not between the petitioner and the respondent company and not only that the purported agreement was contrary to the public policy and the same was hit by Section 28 of the Contract Act. 13. Upon consideration of the submissions made by the learned Counsel for the rival parties, the questions arise for consideration before these Courts are: (i) Whether a medical representative is a workman or not according to the provisions of the Act of 1947 read with the provisions of SPE Act? (ii) Whether a dispute raised by the Sales/Medical Representative and as referred by the State Government can be tried under the Act of 1947? (iii) Whether the provisions of Section 6(2) of the SPE Act stand omitted by virtue of the Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act, 1982? (iv) Whether under the facts and circumstances of the case the Labour Court was justified in dismissing the reference being not maintainable? 14. (iii) Whether the provisions of Section 6(2) of the SPE Act stand omitted by virtue of the Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act, 1982? (iv) Whether under the facts and circumstances of the case the Labour Court was justified in dismissing the reference being not maintainable? 14. Before examining the aforesaid questions, it would be proper for this Court to reproduce Sections 2(k) and 2(s) of the Act of 1947, wherein the legislature has defined "industrial dispute" and "workman" as under: 2(k) "Industrial dispute" means any dispute or difference between employers and employees, or between employers and workmen, or between workmen and workmen, which is connected with the employment or non-employment or the terms of employment or with the conditions of labour, of any persons; 2(s) 'workman' means any person (including an apprentice) employed in any industry to do any manual, unskilled, skilled, technical, operational, clerical or supervisory work for hire or reward, whether terms of employment be express or implied, and for the purposes of any proceeding under this Act in relation to an Industrial dispute, includes any such person who has been dismissed, discharged or retrenched in connection with, or as a consequence, of, that dispute, or whose' dismissal, discharge or retrenchment had led to that dispute, but does not include any such person- (i) who is subject to the Air Force Act, 1950: (45 of 1950), or the Army Act, 1950 (46 of 1950), or the Navy Act, 1957 (62 of 1957); or (ii) who is employed in the police service or as an officer or other employee of a prison or (iii) who is employed mainly in a managerial or administrative capacity; or (iv) who, being employed in a supervisory" capacity, draws wages exceeding one thousand six hundred rupees per mensem or exercises, either by the nature of the duties attached to the officer or by reason of the powers vested in him, functions mainly of a managerial nature. 15. It is also necessary to quote the provisions of Section 10(1) of the Act of 1947 as exercising the said power the appropriate Government referred the dispute to the Labour Court. 10. Reference of disputes to Boards, Courts or Tribunals. 15. It is also necessary to quote the provisions of Section 10(1) of the Act of 1947 as exercising the said power the appropriate Government referred the dispute to the Labour Court. 10. Reference of disputes to Boards, Courts or Tribunals. (1) Where the appropriate Government is of opinion that any Industrial dispute exists or is apprehended, it may at any time, by order in writing: (a) refer the dispute to a Board for promoting a settlement thereof; or (b) refer any matter appearing to be connected with or relevant to the dispute to a Court for inquiry; or (c) refer the dispute or any matter appearing to be connected with, or relevant to, the dispute, if it relates to any matter specified in the Second Schedule, to a Labour Court for adjudication; or refer the dispute or any matter appearing to be connected with, or relevant to the dispute, whether it relates to any matter specified in the Second Schedule or the Third Schedule, to a Tribunal for adjudication. 16. In H.R. Adyanthaya and Ors. v. Sandoz (India) Ltd. and Ors. (supra), the Apex Court was called upon to give answer to three issues namely, (i) whether the Medical Representatives are workmen under Section 12 of the Act of 1947 (ii) whether a complaint made by a medical representative under the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971 is maintainable? and (iii) whether the dispute raised by a medical representative can be referred? It is necessary to note that though in the aforesaid case, the Apex Court rejected the claim of the workman with reference to the provisions of Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971, directed the State Government to refer the dispute under the Act of 1947 as would be evident from para 40 of the judgment, which is reproduced herein under :- 41. Although we hold that the complaint filed by the workmen is not maintainable under the Maharashtra Act, we are of the view that taking into consideration the fact that a long time has lapsed since the filing of the complaint, it-is necessary that we exercise our powers under Article 142 of the Constitution, which we do hereby and direct the State Government to treat the employee's said complaint as an industrial dispute under the ID Act and refer the same under Section 10(1)(d) of the said Act to the Industrial Tribunal, Bombay within four weeks from today. The Industrial Tribunal shall dispose of the reference within six months of the date of reference. 17. The Apex Court in a number of cases was called upon to answer who is workman as per Section2(s) of the Act of 1947. Some of those cases are Hussan Mithu Mhasvadkar v. Bombay Iron & Steel Labour Board and Anr. and Sharad Kumar v. Government of NCT of Delhi and Ors. (supra). In both the cases while answering the aforesaid question, the Apex Court held that designation alone is not decisive, one has to examine the nature of the employee's duties, powers and function. In Sharad Kumar v. Government of NCT of Delhi and Ors. (supra), the appellant was holding the post of Area Sales Executive and his service was terminated by an order dated December 20, 1995 without affording any opportunity. However, one month's salary was paid to him along with the termination letter. The appellant: challenged the legality of the termination order and the matter was taken up for reconciliation, which ended in submission of a failure report. The State Government by its order dated July 14, 1998 declined to refer the dispute for adjudication as in its view the appellant was not a workman within Section 2(s) of the Act of 1947. That order was upheld by the High Court, which held that an officer appointed as an Area Sales Executive cannot be considered to be a workman. Being aggrieved the appeal was' preferred before the Apex Court and the Apex Court allowing the appeal held as follows: 16 In order to come within the meaning of the expression "workman" in Section2(s), I.D. Act, the person has to be discharging any of the types of the works enumerated in the first portion of the Section. Being aggrieved the appeal was' preferred before the Apex Court and the Apex Court allowing the appeal held as follows: 16 In order to come within the meaning of the expression "workman" in Section2(s), I.D. Act, the person has to be discharging any of the types of the works enumerated in the first portion of the Section. If the person does not come within the first portion of the Section then it is not necessary to consider the further question whether he comes within any of the classes of workmen excluded under the latter part of the Section. The question whether the person concerned comes within the first part of the Section depends upon the nature of duties assigned to him and/or discharged by him. The duties of the employee may be spelt out in the service rules or regulations or standing orders of the appointment order or in any other material in which the duties assigned to him may be found. When the employee is assigned a particular type of duty and has been discharging the same till the date of the dispute then there may not be any difficulty in coming to a conclusion whether he is a workman, If on the other hand the nature of duties discharged by the employee is multifarious then the further question that may arise for consideration is which of them is his principal duty and which are the ancillary duties performed by him. In such a case, determination of the question is not easy at the stage when the State Government is exercising the administrative jurisdiction vested in it for the limited purpose of satisfying itself whether the dispute raised is an industrial dispute within the meaning of Section 2(k) of the Act. While deciding the question, designation of the employee is not of much importance and certainly not conclusive in the matter as to whether or not he is a workman under Section 2(s). 18. The Apex Court further held that for determination of the question requires examination of factual matters for which materials Including oral evidence will have to be considered. In such a matter the State Government could not arrogate on to itself the power to adjudicate on the question and hold that the respondent was not a workman within the meaning of Section 2(s), thereby terminating the proceedings prematurely. In such a matter the State Government could not arrogate on to itself the power to adjudicate on the question and hold that the respondent was not a workman within the meaning of Section 2(s), thereby terminating the proceedings prematurely. Such a matter should be decided by the Industrial Tribunal or the Labour Court on the basis of the materials to be placed before it by the parties. Thus, the rejection order passed by the State Government is clearly erroneous and the order passed by the High Court maintaining the same is unsustainable. 19. Taking a cue from the aforesaid observations of the Apex Court in Sharad Kumar v. Government of NCT of Delhi and Ors. (supra), it can easily be said that in the instant case though the State Government referred the dispute to the Labour Court, the Labour Court without examining the factual, matrix by way of taking oral evidence came to the conclusion that the Medical Representatives of the respondent company are not workmen under the Act of 1947, which, according to this Court, was not proper. The Labour Court ought to have considered the provisions of Section 2(s) of the Act of 1947 as well as Sections 2(d) and 6(2) of SPE Act as the earlier Act did not include the Medical Representative as workman within the purview of Act of 1947, but due to the latter provisions, the Medical Representatives very much come within the meaning of 'workmen. The aforesaid observation of this Court also gets support from the judgment of a Division Bench of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in Ripu Daman Bhanot v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Ludhiana and Ors. (supra). The Division Bench held that Section 6(2) of SPE Act has not been omitted and it continues to remain in force. Para 4 of that judgment is relevant for the purpose, which is re-produced herein under :- 4. Before coming to the main question, we may mention that the various provisions contained in the Industrial Disputes Act,, 1947, have been amended by the Industrial' Disputes (Amendment) Act, 1982.(Central Act No. 46 of 1982). Section 10 of the Amendment Act provides that it shall come into force on such date as Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette notify. By virtue of Section 24 of the Amendment Act No. 46 of 1982, Section 6(2) of 1976 Act has been omitted. Section 10 of the Amendment Act provides that it shall come into force on such date as Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette notify. By virtue of Section 24 of the Amendment Act No. 46 of 1982, Section 6(2) of 1976 Act has been omitted. The provisions contained in Clauses 'a', 'b', 'd' to 'k' of Section 2 and Sections 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12,14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21 and 23 of the Amendment Act have been brought into force by notification No. S.O. 606 (E) dated August 21, 1984. This shows that in its wisdom, the Central Government has not given effect to Clause 24 of Amending Act No. 46 of 1982 Act'. As a logical consequence, it will have to be held that Section 6(2) of 1976 Act' has not been omitted and it continues to remain in force.... 20. On the question of jurisdiction, this Court finds force in the submission of Mr. Roy Barman, learned Counsel for the petitioner and at the same time is unable to accept the; submission of Mr. Bhattacharjee, learned senior counsel for the respondent company as on perusal of Clause 18 of the Agreement as referred to in para 4 of the counter, it cannot be said that except the Court of Bombay, the other Courts in country have no jurisdiction to decide the dispute between the employee workman and the employer respondent company. The respondent company did not specifically prevent the petitioner from raising the dispute before a Labour Court within the State of 'Tripura by inserting any word like "only", "alone" or "exclusive" in Clause 18 of the agreement. It was stated in the aforesaid clause that if any question arises as to the validity of constructions, interpretation or performance of the agreement, in any place, city, province or State in India, it was agreed that the matter would be decided in a Court of the city of Bombay. But no mention was made about the dispute relating to transfer or termination of its employees. Hence, the said Clause 18 has prima facie no application in the present case. 21. This Court has no hesitation to hold that the learned Presiding Officer of the Labour Court failed to properly apply his mind to the ratio of the decision of the Apex Court in H.R. Adyanthaya and Ors. Hence, the said Clause 18 has prima facie no application in the present case. 21. This Court has no hesitation to hold that the learned Presiding Officer of the Labour Court failed to properly apply his mind to the ratio of the decision of the Apex Court in H.R. Adyanthaya and Ors. v. Sandoz (India) Ltd. and Ors. (supra). Had he gone through the judgment of the Apex Court properly then it could not have been possible for him to ignore the fact that the Apex Court had itself directed for reference of the dispute under the Act of 1947. Had the Apex Court felt that the provisions of Act of 1947 are not applicable to the employees governed by SPE Act, there could not have been any occasion for the Apex Court to give a direction for reference of the dispute. This aspect of the matter lost sight of by the learned Labour Court. Hence, according to this Court, the learned Labour Court committed manifest error and injustice to the petitioner due to its failure to properly appreciate the provisions of law and the decisions of the Apex Court. 22. For the reasons and discussions made above, this Court holds that the award of the ' learned Labour Court by its judgment dated August 2, 1999 suffers from an error of law apparent on the face of it and it also failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested in it. 23. Hence, this Court allow the writ petition and quash the judgment dated August 2, 1999 passed by the learned Presiding Officer, Labour Court, West Tripura, Agartala in Labour Court Case No. 3/1998. 24. The learned Presiding Officer, Labour Court, West Tripura, Agartala is directed to decide the dispute on merit preferably within a period of six months of the receipt of the certified copy of this order. Registry is directed to send down the case record along with a copy of this order to the learned Labour Court at the earliest for compliance of the direction of this Court. No costs.