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2009 DIGILAW 130 (PAT)

Madeshwar Prasad Singh S/o Late Chamru Singh v. State Of Bihar Through The Chief Secretary, Bihar, Patna

2009-01-28

AJAY KUMAR TRIPATHI

body2009
JUDGEMENT 1. Heard learned counsel for the parties. 2. Petitioner was initially appointed as a truck driver under the respondent Road Construction Department on 4.10.1967. He worked in various places, but when he was posted at Fulwarisharif he was implicated in a criminal case and was taken into custody. When the above matter came to the notice of the respondent authorities, then in exercise of power under Rule 99 of the Bihar Service Code he was put under suspension from 23.11.1992. It seems that the petitioner was enlarged on bail subsequently by the High Court and therefore vide order dated 22.7.1994 contained in Annexure-2 the petitioners suspension was revoked. In other words, the petitioner remained under suspension from 23.11.1992 to 19.10.1993. Thereafter the petitioner served the respondents and finally superannuated on 31.5.1998. After many years of retirement based on the objection raised by the Accountant General a series of orders contained in Annexure-5 series come to be passed against him. These orders are refixing his pay scale on various posts and promotion to which he got in the meanwhile. Petitioner wants quashing of these orders because they have been passed after many a years of retirement and without any opportunity of hearing given to him. 3. Petitioner is also aggrieved by a letter dated 7.7.2004 which is Annexure-6. By this order the respondents have treated the period of suspension between 23.11.1992 to 19.10.1993 as the period of breakage in service. These orders therefore have civil consequence for the petitioner in matters of deciding the final pension. 4. Submission of learned counsel for the petitioner is that the benefit of certain pay scale was given to petitioner years ago starting from 1971 onwards and it is not the case of the respondents that the petitioner had played any role in allowing fixation of pay during course of service. If that be so then in view of the settled position in law the same could not be taken back after more than six years of his retirement and that too behind the back of petitioner. The position in this regard is well settled in the case of Ram Binod Singh V/s. Bihar State Electricity Board & Ors. alongwith other analogous cases reported in 2007(3) PLJR 398 . The position in this regard is well settled in the case of Ram Binod Singh V/s. Bihar State Electricity Board & Ors. alongwith other analogous cases reported in 2007(3) PLJR 398 . Not only this the petitioner has brought on record the order dated 5.4.2005 passed in the case of one Ram Nath Singh which was CWJC No. 13758 of 2004. In this case the Honble Court in similar circumstances allowed the writ application and quashed the various orders, refixing or revising pay scale and order of recovery. This Court takes notice of the case of Ram Nath Singh because in the counter affidavit filed by the respondents they have placed reliance that they are awaiting the decision of the High Court in the case of Ram Nath Singh. 5. Since the writ application of Ram Nath Singh has been allowed for the reasons indicated in the order, the Court comes to a considered opinion that the orders contained in Annexure-5 series passed against the petitioner cannot be sustained nor can the order for recovery which contained in Annexures-7 and 9 to the writ application. The impugned orders contained in Annexures-5 series, 7 and 9 stand quashed. 6. In so far as the order of break in service of petitioner is concerned, since at no point of time any departmental proceeding was held or any punishment was imposed against the petitioner, it cannot be the case of the respondents on the settled principle that they are allowed to treat break in service since the suspension by no stretch of imagination is sever of master-servant relationship. The order of concerned respondents contained in Annexure-6 to that extent is also quashed. 7. This writ application of the petitioner therefore stands allowed with a direction upon the respondents that they shall now decide the retiral dues of the petitioner as if the impugned orders had not come into existence. Since the issue relates to 1998 when the petitioner retired it is hoped and expected that the retiral dues of the petitioner would be settled within a period of four months from the date of communication or production of a copy of this orders.