Judgment :- Subhash B. Adi, J. In exercise of power conferred under Section 9 of the Karnataka High Court Act, 1961, learned Single Judge by his order dated 8th August, 2003 has referred the revision petition to the Division Bench. 2. During the course of the hearing of the revision petition by the learned Single Judge, Counsel appearing for the tenant cited a decision in the matter of, Smt. Sundari Acharthi v N. Shankara Bangera 2003(2) Kar. L.J. 181. ILR 2002 Kar. 4746 and contended that, the provisions of the Karnataka Rent Act, 1999 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) are not applicable to the pending proceedings. On the other hand, Counsel appearing for the landlord cited a decision of this Court in the matter of Smt. Thilothamma and Another v Smt. Rahmathunnisa 2002(6) Kar. L.J. 368 ILR 2002 Kar. 4846 and submitted that, the provisions of the Act would also govern the pending proceedings. The learned Single Judge found that, there is a conflictive view taken by this Court in the above mentioned decisions and referred the matter to the Division Bench particularly on the question of interpretation of the provisions of Section 5 of the Act. 3. Brief facts leading to this case are: Respondent-landlord had filed a petition under Section 21(1)(h) of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘KRC Act’ ) inter alia alleging that, the petition premises is required for his bona fide use and occupation. During the pendency of the proceedings before the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), Belgaum, the original tenant viz., Patric John died on 22-6-1997. A memo was filed by the Counsel representing the tenant to this effect. In view of the same, learned Counsel for the landlord filed an application for bringing the legal representatives of the deceased tenant on record and the said application was allowed and the legal representatives of the deceased tenant were brought on record. When the matter was pending before the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), the Karnataka Rent Act received the assent of the President on 22-11-2001 and it was gazetted on 27-11-2001. However, the provisions of Sections 1, 3 and 6 came into force with effect from 5-12-2001 and the remaining provisions came into force with effect from 31-12-2001. 4. When the matter was pending before the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), the Karnataka Rent Act received the assent of the President on 22-11-2001 and it was gazetted on 27-11-2001. However, the provisions of Sections 1, 3 and 6 came into force with effect from 5-12-2001 and the remaining provisions came into force with effect from 31-12-2001. 4. Learned Civil Judge (Junior Division) in view of the provisions of Section 70, subsection (2), clause (b) of the Act, found that, the provisions of the Act are applicable to the pending cases and heard the matter, as if it is filed under the provisions of the Act and by his order dated 5th April, 2002 allowed the eviction petition under Section 27, sub-section (2), clause (r) of the Act. 5. It is against the order of eviction passed by the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), the legal representatives of the tenant filed a revision petition before the II Additional District Judge, Belgaum. Learned District Judge relying on the decision in Smt. Thilothamma's case dismissed the revision petition observing that, the legal representatives of the tenant have no right of defence and they cannot continue in possession beyond the time stipulated under the provisions of Section 5 of the Act. 6. It is against the said order of the learned District Judge and the order of the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), this revision petition has been filed. 7. We have not only heard the learned Counsels appearing for the parties, but also Sri Shashikiran Shetty, Sri Udaya Holla, Sri Ramesh Chandra, Sri G. Balakrishna Shastry and Sri S.P. Shankar, who appeared as Amicus Curiae, as the matter involved the interpretation of provisions of Section 3(n), Section 5 and Section 70 of the Act and will have a wider application to the pending cases. 8. 8. The principal contentions raised by the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners-legal representatives of the tenant are that, the proceedings were initiated under the provisions of KRC Act and tenant died during the pendency of the proceedings i.e., even before ,the Act came into force and in view of the provisions of Section 3, clause (r) of the KRC Act, the spouse, parents, daughter, son living with the deceased tenant and who were dependent on him will become ‘tenant’ within the meaning of said definition and they have acquired the status of tenant even before the Act came into force. When the substantive right is accrued to the successors of the original tenant, the Act will not take away the substantive right already accrued to the parties and they become tenants within the meaning of Section 3(n) of the Act. 9. Section 70 of the Act has to be understood to mean only the proceedings initiated under the Act and not in respect of the proceedings already initiated under the KRC Act. In this regard, they relied on the provisions of Section 6 of the Mysore General Clauses Act, 1899 and submitted that, the Act is prospective in nature, unless different intention is expressly or impliedly made under the Act itself, it cannot be construed as retrospective. Normally the Act would be only prospective and if the legislation intends to make it retrospective, it can do so only by express words or by implication of the provisions of the said Act. In this regard, a decision in the matter of Mahadeolal Kanodia v Administrator General of West Bengal AIR 1960 SC 936 : (1960)3 SCR 578 , was relied to submit that, when a substantive right is accrued under the repealed Act, ordinarily the provisions of the new Act are construed as prospective in nature. He further submitted that, the purpose of interpretation is to know the intention of the legislation. 10. It is also contended that, the intention of the legislation has to be gathered from the plain meaning of the words used in the provisions. It is the cardinal principle of construction that, every statute is prospective in nature, unless it is either expressly or by implication, the legislation makes it retrospective. 10. It is also contended that, the intention of the legislation has to be gathered from the plain meaning of the words used in the provisions. It is the cardinal principle of construction that, every statute is prospective in nature, unless it is either expressly or by implication, the legislation makes it retrospective. It is in this regard, he also relied on a decision in the matter of J.K. Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills Company Limited v State of Uttar Pradesh and Others AIR 1961 SC 1170 : 1961-I-LLJ-540 (SC). Nextly it is contended that, if there is a conflict between specific provision and general provision, specific provision prevails over the general provision. General provision would apply only in cases where the matter is not covered under the special provision. In this regard, Counsel relied on the interpretation of Section 3, clause (r) of the KRC Act read with Section 3, clause (n) of the Act to submit that, if the legal representatives had become tenant as on the date of coming into force of the Act, they would become tenant within the meaning of Section 3, clause (n) of the Act and for all purposes, they are the tenants. In view of the same, they cannot be treated as the successors of deceased tenant and their rights cannot be restricted in terms of the provisions of Section 5 of the Act. It is also contended that, though Section 70, sub-section (2), clause (b) continues the pending proceedings, but such continuation of the proceedings would not take away the substantive right already vested in the legal representatives of the tenant. 11. He further relied on the decision in Smt. Sundari Acharthi's case and submitted that, this Court on interpretation of the provisions of the Act has observed that, the provisions of the Act are not applicable to the pending proceedings. In this regard, he further relied on another decision of this Court in the matter of Kiran Bai and Others v K.V Jayachandra Setty and Others 2006(3) Kar. L.J. 165: 2006(1) AIR Kar. R. 345 and submitted that, this Court has observed that, Section 5 of the Act is not retrospective in nature and it applies only in cases where the tenant dies after the Act came into force and not before the same. L.J. 165: 2006(1) AIR Kar. R. 345 and submitted that, this Court has observed that, Section 5 of the Act is not retrospective in nature and it applies only in cases where the tenant dies after the Act came into force and not before the same. Further, he relied on a decision in the matter of Smt. Gian Devi Anand v Jeevan Kumar and Others AIR 1985 SC 796 : (1985)2 SCC 683 and submitted that, legal representatives of the tenants will have the same right as the original tenant and they will have the same protection as the tenant had and as such, the legal representatives, who have come on record much before the Act came into force, who, in terms of Section 3, clause (n) of the Act have become tenant, will have the same right as the original tenant had. He further relied on a decision in the matter of M/s. Mahendra Saree Emporium v G.V. Srinivasa Murthy 2004(6) Kar. L.J. 480 (SC): AIR 2004 SC 4289 : 2004 AIR SCW 4797 and submitted that, Section 70, sub-section (2) has three parts viz., clause (a), clause (b) and clause (c). Insofar as clause (a) is concerned, the proceedings do not abate and they continue under the provisions of old Act, the cases and proceedings covered under the said clause would be governed by the provisions of repealed Act. Clause (b) relates to pending proceedings to which the Act is applicable and they would be continued under the provisions of repealing Act. Clause (c) relates to cases and proceedings to which the Act is not applicable and in such case, the cases become abated. While interpreting the provisions of Section 70, sub-section (2), clause (c), though the Act is not applicable to some of the cases coming under the provisions of clause (c) of sub-section (2) of Section 70 of the Act, the Apex Court interpreting the said provision and considering the power under Article 136 of the Constitution of India has held that, the proceedings to which the Act is not applicable pending before the Supreme Court, will not abate. Referring to the said decision, learned Counsel submitted that, the provision being prospective as far as cases coming under clause (a), the Supreme Court having exercised power under Article 136 to hold that, the proceedings coming under Section 70(2)(c) of the Act will not abate, hence, the provisions of Section 70, sub-section (2), clause (b) of the Act cannot be held as retrospective, merely on the ground that the provisions of Section 70, sub-section (2), clause (b) make the Act applicable to the pending cases. 12. It is also submitted that, taking away the substantive right vested in the legal representatives of the tenant would cause greater hardship and that is not the intendment of the Act. Act is intended to protect the rights of the tenant and if that is the object of the Act, in furtherance of the Act, the provisions have to be interpreted and interpretation makes it clear that, the provisions of Section 5 are not applicable in case the tenant dies prior to coming into force of the Act even though the proceedings are continued under the provisions of the Act. 13. The Counsel representing the landlord mainly relied on the provisions of Section 70, sub-section (2), clause (b) of the Act and submitted that, under this provision, the cases and the proceedings to which the Act is applicable, such proceedings shall have to be continued and disposed of by the Court or the authority in accordance with the provisions of the Act. This provision makes it clear that, if the Act is applicable, the cases have to be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of the Act. On coming into force of the Act, provisions of Section 70 of the Act are self-explanatory, and explains the effect of the repealed Act and application of the repealing Act, if the legislation has provided the remedy under the repealing Act itself, need does not arise to look into the provisions of the General Clauses Act. Section 6 of the General Clauses Act would be invoked only if the repealing Act is silent. In this case, Section 70 of the Act does provide for all consequences and it expressly makes it clear as to the application of the provisions of the Act in certain circumstances. Section 6 of the General Clauses Act would be invoked only if the repealing Act is silent. In this case, Section 70 of the Act does provide for all consequences and it expressly makes it clear as to the application of the provisions of the Act in certain circumstances. In view of the same, there is no need to go into the provisions of the General Clauses Act for the purpose of interpretation. When the Act intends that the proceedings have to be disposed of in a particular manner, then they have to be dealt with same manner. Hence, in view of the provisions of Section 70(2)(b) of the Act, legal representatives have come on record during the pendency of the proceedings and in terms of Section 5, their rights get restricted. 14. In this regard, they also relied on the provisions of Section 3, clause (n) of the Act, the definition of ‘tenant’ Section 3, clause (n) does not include spouse, children, whether dependent or not. This makes it clear that, Legislature had not intended to extend the tenancy rights to the successors of tenant and such tenancy rights get extinguished the moment tenant dies. If the tenant dies during the pendency of the proceedings, his legal representatives would come on record only to derive the benefit under Section 5 of the Act and not for any other reason. 15. In this regard, it is also contended that, only in respect of proceedings in execution of a decree or order passed under the repealed Act and pending at the time of commencement of the Act would continue as if the old Act. When Section 70, subsection (2), clause (b) in express words makes the Act applicable to the pending cases and also requires to continue and dispose of such cases only under the provisions of the Act, there cannot be any other intention other than to proceed under the Act. 16. No doubt, Section 3, clause (r) of the KRC Act did cover spouse, daughter, son within the definition of ‘tenant’, but such a benefit is not extended under the provisions of the Act, as the definition of tenant is restricted to the lifetime of the tenant. 16. No doubt, Section 3, clause (r) of the KRC Act did cover spouse, daughter, son within the definition of ‘tenant’, but such a benefit is not extended under the provisions of the Act, as the definition of tenant is restricted to the lifetime of the tenant. In case of the contract of tenancy, as long as the tenant is alive, he continues to be tenant and on expiry of the term of the contract, if the Act is applicable, he continues as statutory tenant and on his death, the tenancy is inherited' only for limited period, even though some right had accrued under the old Act, that gets extinguished by virtue of the provisions of the Act. Even if the provisions of the Act cause hardship, that is not a ground to hold that the legislation is prospective. In this regard, learned Counsel relied on the decision in the matter of Kolhapur Canesugar Works Limited and Another v Union of India and Others AIR 2000 SC 811 : (2000)2 SCC 536 and submitted that, when the legislation intended to make the provisions retrospective and apply to all the pending cases, it cannot be understood that the provisions would have a prospective effect. They also relied on another decision in the matter of M/s. Easland Combines, Coimbatore v Collector of Central Excise, Coimbatore AIR 2003 SC 843 : (2003)3 SCC 410 and submitted that, merely because the provisions of the Act cause hardship, it cannot be interpreted in a manner so as to defeat the object of the Act itself. 17. They also relied on another decision in the matter of Gajraj Singh Vs State Transport Appellate Tribunal and Others AIR 1997 SC 412 : (1997)1 SCC 650 , and submitted that, when a repeal is followed by a fresh legislation on the same subject, Courts undoubtedly have to look into the provisions of the new Act for the purpose of determining whether the new Act intends any different intention and obliterates the rights already vested so as to get rid of obsolete matters. Referring to these decisions, it is submitted that, intention of legislation to bring about the new Act was to get rid of rigid restriction imposed on the landlord in the matter of eviction. Referring to these decisions, it is submitted that, intention of legislation to bring about the new Act was to get rid of rigid restriction imposed on the landlord in the matter of eviction. The legislation thought it fit to liberalize the rights of the landlord and tenant and to restrict the application of the provisions of the Act only to certain premises and to restrict the tenancy rights only to the lifetime of tenant. These provisions make it clear that, the legislation had different intention than the one in the repealed Act and it is in this context, the provisions of the Act have to be understood. It is also submitted that, the Act does not require any interpretation or external aid, the meaning of the words themselves would make abundantly clear the purpose and intention of the legislation and rights accrued to the parties. Learned Counsel representing the landlord submitted that, Section 5 of the Act restrict the inheritance of the tenancy for a specific period and the successors of the tenant do not have any rights more than what is accrued to them under Section 5 of the Act. 18. In the light of the various submissions made at the Bar, the following points arise for consideration: (i) Whether the provisions of Section 5 are applicable to the proceedings initiated under the repealed Act? (ii) Whether the legal representatives brought on record during the pendency of the proceedings under the old Act would become tenant within the meaning of Section 3, clause (n) of the Act and provisions of Section 5 in such cases are not applicable? (iii) Whether the view taken by the learned Single Judge in Smt. Thilothamma’s case is good law or the view taken in Smt. Sundari Acharthis case is good law? 19. In the light of the various contentions raised by the learned Counsels appearing for the parties, it becomes necessary to notice few of the provisions under the KRC Act and also the provisions of the Act. 19. In the light of the various contentions raised by the learned Counsels appearing for the parties, it becomes necessary to notice few of the provisions under the KRC Act and also the provisions of the Act. Section 3, clause (r) of the KRC Act defines the ‘tenant’ which reads as under: "(r) "tenant” means any person by whom or on whose account rent is payable for a premises and includes the surviving spouse or any son or daughter or father or mother of a deceased tenant who had been living with the tenant in the premises as a member of the tenant's family upto the death of the tenant and a person continuing in possession after the termination of the tenancy in his favour, but does not include a person placed in occupation of a premises by its tenant or a person to whom the collection of rents or fees in a public market, cart-stand or slaughter house or of rents for shops has been framed out or leased by a local authority”. Under this definition of tenant, surviving spouse or any son or daughter or father or mother of deceased tenant, who had been living with the tenant in the premises as a member of the tenant's family till his death and a person continuing in possession after the termination of tenancy in his favour would also come within the meaning of definition of ‘tenant’. Under this provision, the surviving members covered under the above definition of tenant would also become tenant and continue the proceedings and they will get the same rights as the tenant. 20. It is in this background, it is necessary to notice the object with which the KRC Act came into force. The object of the said legislation was to provide for control of rents and evictions, leasing of buildings, control the rates of hotels and lodging houses and create bar on the rights of the landlord to evict the tenants notwithstanding any contract, order, decree, except on the application filed under various clauses under the KRC Act. The provisions of Section 21 of the KRC Act restrict the rights of the landlord to take possession unless he proves his case in terms of the said provision. Section 51 of the KRC Act enables the parties to bring the legal representatives on record during the pendency of the proceedings. The provisions of Section 21 of the KRC Act restrict the rights of the landlord to take possession unless he proves his case in terms of the said provision. Section 51 of the KRC Act enables the parties to bring the legal representatives on record during the pendency of the proceedings. Looking at the various provisions of the KRC Act, the intention of the legislation was to restrict the rights of the landlord in the matter of eviction and leasing. 21. However, the object and intention with which the Karnataka Rent Act, 1999 has come into force is different from the object with which the repealed Act was enacted. The object behind the new Act is to balance the interest of the landlord and the tenants and to stimulate the future construction in the light of the economic reforms. In this regard, reference was made to Economic Administration Reforms Commission and the National Commission on Urbanisation, which Commissions have recommended reform of the Rent Legislation in a way to balance the interests of both landlord and the tenant. In the light of the same, object, if the provisions of the Act are looked into, they make it clear that, the landlords’ rights are not rigid or restrictive, as they were in the repealed Act. It would be useful to refer the provisions of Section 3, clause (n), the definition of ‘tenant’ for the purpose of Act, which reads as under: "(n) "Tenant" means any person by whom or on whose account or behalf the rent of any premises, is or but for a special contract would be, payable, and includes. (i) a sub-tenant; (ii) any person continuing in possession after the termination of his tenancy, but does not include any person to whom a licence as defined in Section 52 of the Indian Easements Act, 1882 (Central Act 5 of 1882) has been granted". From the above definition, it is clear that, it does not include any other person other than the tenant. Definition of tenant read with the provisions of Section 5 further makes it clear that, rights of the survivor to inherit the tenancy are also restricted and particularly, if they are not dependent. The maximum period to which the inheritance is permissible is five years from the date of death. It is also useful to refer to the provisions of Section 5, which reads as under: "5. The maximum period to which the inheritance is permissible is five years from the date of death. It is also useful to refer to the provisions of Section 5, which reads as under: "5. Inheritability of tenancy. (1) In the event of death of a tenant, the right of tenancy shall devolve for a period of five years from the date of his death to his successors in the following order, namely. (a) spouse; (b) son or daughter or where there are both son and daughter both of them; (c) parents; (d) daugher-in-law, being the widow of his pre-deceased son: Provided that the successor has ordinarily been living or carrying on business in the premises with the deceased tenant as a member of his family upto the date of his death and was dependent on the deceased tenant: Provided further that a right to tenancy shall not devolve upon a successor in case such successor or his spouse or any of his dependent son or daughter is owning or occupying a premises in the local area in relation to the premises let. (2) If a person, being a successor mentioned. in sub-section (1), was ordinarily living in or carrying on business in the premises with the deceased tenant but was not dependent on him on the date of his death, or he or his spouse or any of his dependent son or daughter is owning or occupying a premises in the local area in relation to the premises let to which this Act applies such successor shall acquire a right to continue in possession as a tenant for a limited period of one year from the date of death of the tenant; and on the expiry of that period, or on his death, whichever is earlier, the right of such successor to continue in possession of the premises shall become extinguished”. Section 5 also does not confer inheritance of tenancy for five years if the successors are not dependents or are having the accommodation of their own. On reading of these two provisions, further makes it clear that, the protection intended under the Act is limited to tenant only. Section 5 also does not confer inheritance of tenancy for five years if the successors are not dependents or are having the accommodation of their own. On reading of these two provisions, further makes it clear that, the protection intended under the Act is limited to tenant only. In this regard, if the provisions of Section 27 of the Act, which is analogous to Section 21 of the KRC Act, are considered, it makes it clear that, the landlord's right to seek possession is more liberalised and landlord is not required to undergo rigid test of requirement or hardship. Furthermore, it is clear from the application of the provisions of the Act that, under Section 2, sub-section (2) of the Act, provisions of the Act are not made applicable in respect of non-residential premises having plinth area more than 14 square meters and is also not made applicable to premises to which the standard rent exceeds Rs. 3,500/- in respect of area mentioned in Part A of the First Schedule, that means, the protection given to the tenant is also in respect of certain premises and not all. It only shows that, in view of the fast urbanisation and economic growth to make more premises available, the restriction on the landlord has been taken away to encourage more construction to make more buildings available for occupation. 22. From the reading of the provisions referred to above, the intention of the legislation in enacting the new Act is different from that of the repealed Act and intention was to get rid of certain matters including inheritance of tenancy. 23. In order to know whether the Act is retrospective or whether the Act is not applicable to the pending proceedings or if applicable, whether the successors of the deceased tenant, who have acquired right prior to coming into force of the Act are protected, it is useful to refer to Section 70 of the Act itself, which reads as under: “Section 70. Repeal and savings.-(1) The Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 (Karnataka Act 22 of 1961) is hereby repealed. Repeal and savings.-(1) The Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 (Karnataka Act 22 of 1961) is hereby repealed. (2) Notwithstanding such repeal and subject to the provisions of Section 69.- (a) all proceedings in execution of any decree or order passed under the repealed Act, and pending at the commencement of this Act, in any Court shall be continued and disposed off by such Court as if the said enactment had not been repealed; (b) all cases and proceedings other than those referred to in clause (a) pending at the commencement of this Act before the Controller, Deputy Commissioner, Divisional Commissioner, Court, District Judge or the High Court or other authority, as the case may be in respect of the premises to which this Act applies shall be continued and disposed off by such Controller, Deputy Commissioner, Divisional Commissioner, Court, District Judge or the High Court or other authority in accordance with the provisions of this Act; (c) all other cases and proceedings pending in respect of premises to which this Act does not apply shall as from the date of commencement of the Act stand abated. (3) Except as otherwise provided in Section 69 and in sub-section (2) of this section, provisions of Section 6 of the Mysore General Clauses Act, 1899 (Mysore Act III of 1899), shall so far as may be applicable in respect of repeal of the said enactment, and Sections 8 and 24 of the said Act shall be applicable as if the said enactment has been repealed and re-enacted by this Act". 24. Section 70 of the Act has got three parts viz., Section 70, sub-section (2), clause (a), clause (b) and clause (c). The cases and the proceedings coming within the provisions of Section 70, sub-section (2). clause (a), they will continue under the repealed Act and the provisions of the Act are not made applicable. To this extent, the Act can be held to be prospective. 25. However, Section 70, sub-section (2), clause (b) is concerned, in respect of cases and proceedings to which the Act is applicable, such cases and proceedings shall be continued and disposed of by the authority or Courts, as the case may be, in accordance with the provisions of this Act. 25. However, Section 70, sub-section (2), clause (b) is concerned, in respect of cases and proceedings to which the Act is applicable, such cases and proceedings shall be continued and disposed of by the authority or Courts, as the case may be, in accordance with the provisions of this Act. Two things emerge from this provision viz., the proceedings and cases have to be continued and disposed of under the Act and must be in accordance with the provisions of the Act itself, that means, the provisions of the Act would govern all such proceedings pending, for which the provisions of the Act are applicable. If the proceedings have to be concluded under the provisions of the Act, all such proceedings though initiated prior to coming into force of the Act, which are continued under this Act, have to be proceeded in terms of the provisions of the Act itself, certainly all the provisions of the Act would be applicable as if the said proceedings are initiated under the provisions of the Act. 26. No doubt, in this case, tenant had died prior to coming into force of the Act and the legal representatives had already come on record. If the proceedings are to be continued and disposed of under this Act, this Act restricts the right ox the legal representatives. If the provisions of Section 5 are to be understood as not applicable to the tenant, who died prior to coming into force of the Act, then, it may result in interpreting the provisions of Section 70, sub-section (2), clause (b) of the Act as not applicable to the proceedings in which the legal representatives brought on record prior to the Act came in force, but this is not the intention of the legislation. Legislation intended to apply the provisions of the Act to all the pending proceedings to which the Act is applicable and they have to be proceeded only in accordance with the provisions of the Act. When there is a specific requirement to proceed with the case under the provisions of the Act, no other meaning could be attached, which otherwise would defeat the very purpose of making the Act applicable. 27. A decision in Kiran Bai’s case was relied by the learned Counsel for the respondent. When there is a specific requirement to proceed with the case under the provisions of the Act, no other meaning could be attached, which otherwise would defeat the very purpose of making the Act applicable. 27. A decision in Kiran Bai’s case was relied by the learned Counsel for the respondent. In this decision, the learned Single Judge holds that, retrospective effect to Section 5 of the Act cannot be given in the absence of provisions to that effect. While considering Section 5 of the Act, learned Single Judge has not referred to the provisions of Section 70, sub-section (2) of the Act, whereas, the Division Bench of this Court in a decision in the matter of M/s. Mercury Press and Others v Ameen Shacoor and Others 2003(3) Kar. L.J. 505 (DB): ILR 2002 Kar. 2304 (DB) elaborately considered the effect of repeal of the Karnataka Rent Control Act and the savings and also considered the effect of the same on the proceedings under the repealed Act. On considering the law of interpretation, this Court at para 16 referring to the provisions of Section 70 of the Act has observed as under: “16. The wording of Section 70 of the new Act are clear and unambiguous. There is no inconsistency or absurdity in its provisions. Sub-section (1) repeals the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961. Sub-section (2) clearly shows the legislative intent to exclude the operation of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act to all pending proceedings under the old Act and make specific and special provisions as to what should happen to the pending proceedings. Sub-section (3) makes the provisions of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, applicable to the repeal of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961, where Section 70(2) is not applicable. 16.1 If Section 70 had contained only sub-section (1) repealing the old Act and nothing more, the provisions of Section 6 of the Mysore General Clauses Act, 1899 in its entirety would have applied. But applicability of Section 6 of the G.C. Act is subject to any different intention appearing in the repealing Act. The Legislature has expressed a clear different intention in regard to pending proceedings under the Old Act, by enacting sub-section (2) of Section 70. But applicability of Section 6 of the G.C. Act is subject to any different intention appearing in the repealing Act. The Legislature has expressed a clear different intention in regard to pending proceedings under the Old Act, by enacting sub-section (2) of Section 70. But for the sub-section (2), all pending proceedings would have also been governed by Section 6 of GC Act and would have been continued and disposed of in accordance with the old Act, as if the repealing Act had not been passed. No pending proceedings under the old Act could escape from the provisions of Section 70(2) and all pending proceedings will have to be decided as per Section 70(2) and not as per the provisions of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act”. If there is only repeal of the Act and nothing more is shown, provisions of Section 6 of the Mysore General Clauses Act, 1899 in its entirety would have applied. Section 6 of the Mysore General Clauses Act is subject to any different intention appearing in the repealing Act. Legislature in its wisdom has expressed a clear different intention in regard to pending cases, all pending cases and proceedings are governed by the provisions of Section 70 of the Act. In view of the provisions, of Section 70, sub-section (2), clauses (a), (b) and (c), none of the pending proceedings could escape from the said provision. Section 70 does not take care of all situations such as, cases where the proceedings are pending in execution case, the cases where the proceedings are pending for which the Act is applicable and cases to which the Act is not applicable. Hence, the proceedings are governed only by the provisions of Section 70 of the Act and the provisions of Section 6 of the Mysore General Clauses Act and same will have no application. Division Bench considered the effect of the provisions of Section 70, sub-section (3) also. 28. Hence, the proceedings are governed only by the provisions of Section 70 of the Act and the provisions of Section 6 of the Mysore General Clauses Act and same will have no application. Division Bench considered the effect of the provisions of Section 70, sub-section (3) also. 28. In the light of the decision of the Division Bench of this Court and also in the light of the decision of the Apex Court in the matter of Mahadeolal Kanodia, wherein the Apex Court considered the settled principles of interpretation of statute inasmuch as, if the strict grammatical interpretation gives rise to an absurdity or inconsistency, such interpretation should be discarded and an interpretation which will give effect to the purpose will be put on the words, if necessary, even by modification of the language used. However, if any provision of the legislation is unambiguous and clear, the plain and normal grammatical meaning could be derived from words used therein, it does not require any interpretation and the provisions have to be understood in terms of the plain meaning of the words. 29. Normally substantive right created in the repealed Act and sought to be taken away, such legislation would be treated as prospective, unless it is made expressly or by necessary implication construed as retrospective in operation. Words of Section 70 of the Act are clear, unambiguous, there is no inconsistency or absurdity, which requires an interpretation. Repealing Act contains an exhaustive provision to cover the effect of the repeal. If the legislation want to repeal the right insofar as the proceedings to which this Act is applicable, legislation intended to destroy all existing rights in pending proceedings. This is because the effect of repealing Act is to obliterate the existing rights under the repealed Act except to the extent of sharing. Hence, the provision has to be understood as it is worded. 30. In another decision in the matter of Shahwar Basheer and Others v Veena Mohan 2004(3) Kar. L.J. 49: ILR 2003 Kar. 4732, the learned Single Judge of this Court has held that, Section 5 of the Act is a comprehensive provision enacted with specific purpose of limiting the inheritability of tenancy to a certain fixed period, the legal heirs of the original tenant are liable to be evicted upon completion of the period stipulated under Section 5 of the Act. 4732, the learned Single Judge of this Court has held that, Section 5 of the Act is a comprehensive provision enacted with specific purpose of limiting the inheritability of tenancy to a certain fixed period, the legal heirs of the original tenant are liable to be evicted upon completion of the period stipulated under Section 5 of the Act. All that the landlord is required to satisfactorily show that, the legal representatives have stayed for the period provided under Section 5. Even in Smt. Thilothamma's case also, the learned Single Judge has held that the relief that is bestowed on the respondent to claim possession premises after expiry of five years is activated by sheer operation of law without imposing the need to establish the requirement of the premises for bona fide use and occupation. 31. In our opinion, plain meaning of the provisions of Section 70 of the Act and considering the intention of the legislation, to bring about the changes makes it clear that, the provisions of the Act in toto are applicable to all the pending cases to which the Act is applicable, as such, the provisions of Section 5 are also applicable in case tenant dies during the pendency of the proceedings. In this case, merely because the tenant had died before the Act came into force, that does not by itself confer a special status on the legal representatives other than what is provided under the provisions of the Act. It cannot be held that, for one purpose, old Act is not applicable and for the remaining, the new Act is applicable. Intention of the legislation is to give effect to the provisions of the Act to the cases and proceedings to which the Act is applicable. In our considered opinion, the reading of Section 70 of the Act does not give any other opinion other than what we have held. In the light of the above discussion, we pass the following order: (i) Revision petition is dismissed. (ii) The tenant, who dies during the pendency of the proceedings to which the provisions of the Karnataka Rent Act are made applicable, though initiated prior to coming into force of the Act, the legal representatives brought on record will have right to inherit only in terms of Section 5 of the Act, even though the legal representatives were brought prior to commencement of the Act. (iii) Legal representatives, who are brought on record under the old Act and proceedings continued under the new Act will not get the status of tenant, but they remain as legal representatives for the purpose of Section 5 of the Act. (iv) The view taken in Smt. Thilothamma's case is the correct law and the view taken in Smt. Sundari Acharthi's case is not a correct law. Accordingly, we answer the issue referred to us.