JUDGEMENT Mihir Kr.Jha, J. 1. Heard counsel for the parties. 2. The petitioners, plaintiffs-decree holders, being aggrieved by an order of the executing court dated 5.1.2006 in Money Execution Case No. 2/2002 have moved this Court and their plain and simple case is that the court below has committed an apparent jurisdictional error in entertaining and allowing the application dated 18.7.2005 of the defendants-judgment debtors-0.Ps. 8, 12 and 13, permitting them to assail the sale dated 20.6.2005 even without compliance of mandatory provision of deposit of 5% of the sale amount and the entire amount of sale in terms of Order 21 Rule 89 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 3. Mr. Sukumar Sinha, learned Senior counsel for the petitioners, in this regard has submitted that when the Money Suit No. 5/1998 filed by the plaintiffs-petitioners for realization of Rs. 2,71,036/- had been decreed on 19.12.2001 with a direction to the defendants-judgment debtors-0.Ps. to pay the amount within 60 days and when the decretal amount was not deposited in the aforementioned period of 60 days, the court below having proceeded in the matter in the execution case filed by the plaintiffs-petitioners, Money Execution Case No. 2/2002, and put the property on auction sale on 20.6.2005 as well as the sale to have been effected on payment of Rs. 4,25,000/- in favour of the decree holders could not have even entertained much less allowed the aforesaid application dated 18.7.2005 without tendering the amount in question involved under sale within a period of 30 days from the date of sale and thus ought to have not passed the impugned order which has the effect of extending time for deposit of the amount under sale in complete violation of the spirit of Order 21 Rule 89 C.P.C. Mr. Sinha in that context has placed his strong reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of P.K.Unni vs. Nirmala Industries & Ors., reported in AIR 1990 S.C. 933 . 4. Mr. Shashi Shekhar Dwivedi, learned Senior counsel appearing on behalf of the contesting defendants-judgment debtors-0.Ps. Sinha in that context has placed his strong reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of P.K.Unni vs. Nirmala Industries & Ors., reported in AIR 1990 S.C. 933 . 4. Mr. Shashi Shekhar Dwivedi, learned Senior counsel appearing on behalf of the contesting defendants-judgment debtors-0.Ps. No. 8, 12 and 13, on the other hand, would submit that the court below has in fact only passed an order for calculation of the amount which the defendants-judgment debtors were required to pay in terms of Order 21 Rule 89 C.P.C. and since such application offering to pay the amount with the blank Challan for its being filled by the office of the court was filed well within 30 days of the sale, it has to be held that the defendants had already deposited the amount in view of their filing of the application on 18.7.2005 i.e. well within 30 days of the auction sale. In this regard Mr. Dwivedi has placed reliance on the Division Bench judgment of Calcutta High Court in the case of Shyama Charan Auddy & Anr. vs. Smt. Bimala Bala Sen & Anr., reported in AIR 1993 Calcutta 14. 5. Mr. Dwivedi in fact had also questioned the very maintainability of the civil revision application on the ground that by the impugned order the court below had not decided any issue inasmuch as by allowing the application of the defendants- judgment debtors dated 18.7.2005 it had merely directed the office of the court to assess the amount to be deposited by the judgment debtors under Order 21 Rule 89 C.P.C. which could not be subjected to revisional jurisdiction of this Court under Section 115 C.P.C. 6. Mr. Sukumar Sinha in reply to the question of maintainability would submit that import of the impugned order is virtually allowing the prayer of the defendants- judgment debtors-O.Ps. Mr. Sukumar Sinha in reply to the question of maintainability would submit that import of the impugned order is virtually allowing the prayer of the defendants- judgment debtors-O.Ps. as with regard to deposit of the amount well after expiry of the period of 30 days in view of the sale taking place on 20.6.2005 and such deposit being made on 23.1.2006 in terms of the impugned order having been passed on 5.1.2006 and as such, the order of the court below cannot be said to be a routine order, especially when it has also decided the issue as with regard to maintainability of the application filed by the defendants- judgment debtors in terms of Order 21 Rule 89 C.P.C. even when their separate application for setting aside the sale in terms of Order 21 Rule 90 C.P.C. was also pending. He accordingly would submit that the civil revision application in the given set of facts and circumstances is maintainable as impermissible deposit after expiry of the period of 30 days has been allowed by the court below which would definitely amount to jurisdictional error within the ambit of section 115 C.P.C. 7. This Court having given anxious consideration to the question of maintainability as raised by Mr. Dwivedi, learned Senior counsel, must hold that the same is without any substance. In a case like this where the defendants-judgment debtors had filed two applications both dated 18.7.2005, the first one for deposit of the amount involved under the sale dated 20.6.2005 the same in effect was an application for setting aside the sale on deposit of the sale amount in terms of Order 21 Rule 89.C.P.C. specially when the second application filed on the same day for setting aside the sale was clothed in the spirit of Order 21 Rule 90 C.P.C. It has to be noted that in their first application dated 18.7.2005 (Annexure W to the counter affidavit) filed in the Execution Case pending for confirmation of sale the judgment debtors had made the following averments : 8. From the aforesaid averments, even in absence of a specific prayer for setting aside, it has to be held that the same was filed for deposit of the sate amount in terms of Order 21 Rule 89 C.P.C. 9. From the aforesaid averments, even in absence of a specific prayer for setting aside, it has to be held that the same was filed for deposit of the sate amount in terms of Order 21 Rule 89 C.P.C. 9. At the same time it has to be kept in mind that on 18.7.2005 after filing of the aforesaid application in Execution Case No. 2/2002, the defendants-judgment debtors had filed a separate application though by labeling it under Order 21 Rule 89 read with Section 151 C.P.C, but there was a specific prayer for setting aside the sale dated 20.6.2005 on the ground of fraud/no notice etc. which had all the attributes of being an application under Order 21 Rule 90 C.P.C. as would be evident from the contents thereof which is Annexure B to the counter affidavit and reads as follows: "1. That the O.P. 1st party filed Money Suit No. 5/98 against the petitioners and others for the realization of Rs. 2,71,036/- detailed in Schedule l and ll of the plaint of Money Suit No. 5/98. 2. That the petitioners filed W.S. and contested the suit. 3. That the learned Sub Judge IV, Madhubani decreed the suit vide judgment and decree dated 19.12.2001 and dated 2.1.2002 respectively. The learned Sub Judge IV, Madhubani has observed that the suit of the plaintiff is decreed on contest with cost. The pleader fee Rs. 64/- and pleader clerks fee Rs. 10/- only. 4. That the petitioners filed 1st Appeal No. 67/2002 in the Honble High Court Patna against the said judgment and decree passed by Sub Judge, Madhubani in Money Suit No. 5/98 and the said appeal is pending. 5. That the O.P. 1st party filed Money Execution Case No. 2/2002 for realization of the decretal amount Rs. 2,71,036/- and the amount of case Rs. 9714.50 total Rs. 220750.50 paise on the basis of the aforesaid judgment and decree. 6. That the recently the petitioners came to know that the O.P./1st party has filed money Execution case on the basis of the said decree of Money Suit No. 5/98 and auction purchased the land of the petitioners. 7. That the petitioners subsequently enquired into the matter and came to know about the fraudulent character of O.P. 1st party. 8. 6. That the recently the petitioners came to know that the O.P./1st party has filed money Execution case on the basis of the said decree of Money Suit No. 5/98 and auction purchased the land of the petitioners. 7. That the petitioners subsequently enquired into the matter and came to know about the fraudulent character of O.P. 1st party. 8. That the petitioner came to know that Money Execution Case No. 2/2002 was filed in the court of Sub Judge IV, Madhubani which was transferred from the said court and came into the court of Sub Judge I, Madhubani. 9. That the petitioners and other judgment debtors were not noticed in the said Money Execution 2/2002. 10. That Baby Kumari wife of Sri Shailendra Singh is judgment debtor no. 4 in Money Execution Case No. 2/2002 who died more than one and half years ago leaving behind a son, a daughter and her husband who have been made O.Ps. in her place. 11. That the O.P. 1st party had not filed any petition relating to death of Baby Kumari judgment debtor and as such the Money Execution proceeded against dead person and as such the entire proceedings the execution case is illegal and nullity. 12. That the O.P. 1st party the decree holder any how auction purchased the land of the petitioners in auction sale on 20.6.2005 for Rs.1,25,000/-. 13. That the O.P. 1st party illegally auction purchased the land of the petitioners. 14. That the petitioners are ready to deposit the amount specified to proclamation of sale or the entire decretal amount or the amount ordered by the court through challan. 15. That the petitioners have filed the civil challan, in Money Execution Case No. 2/2002 for the deposits of the amount as per order of the court. 16. That in the above facts and circumstances, it is essential in the interest of justice to set aside the auction sale held on 20.6.2005 in Money Execution Case No. 2/2002." (underlining for emphasis) 10. Paragraphs No. 7 to 13 of the aforesaid application and the prayer for setting aside the same would leave nothing for speculation that the subsequent application filed by the defendants-judgment debtors was one actually under Order 21 Rule 90 C.P.C. which reads as follows: "90. Paragraphs No. 7 to 13 of the aforesaid application and the prayer for setting aside the same would leave nothing for speculation that the subsequent application filed by the defendants-judgment debtors was one actually under Order 21 Rule 90 C.P.C. which reads as follows: "90. Application to set aside sale on ground of irregularity or fraud- (1) Where any immovable property has been sold in execution of a decree, the decree-holder, or the purchaser, or any other person entitled to share in a rate- able distribution of assets, or whose interests are affected by the sale, may apply to the Court to set aside the sale on the around of a material irregularity or fraud in publishing or conducting it. (2) No sale shall be set aside on the ground of irregularity or fraud in publishing or conducting it unless, upon the facts proved, the Court is satisfied that the applicant has sustained substantial injury by reason of such irregularity or fraud. (3) No application to set aside a sale under this rule shall be entertained upon any ground which the applicant could have taken on or before the date on which the proclamation of sale was drawn up. Explanation.The mere absence of, or defect in, attachment of the property sold shall not, by itself, be a ground for setting aside a sale under this rule." 11. This Court would, however, fail in its duty if it does not take into account that in paragraphs no. 14 and 15 the defendants-judgment debtors had given reference of their first application and their preparedness to deposit the amount under sale but then strictly speaking the second application (Annexure-B) was actually complying the provisions of Order 21 Rule 90 C.P.C., a fact which also gets demonstrated and supported by institution of a separate case, Misc. Case No. 13/2005, for setting aside the sale. In fact the Legislature while laying down two separate provisions for setting aside the same sale under Order Rule 89 and 90 of Order 21 C.P.C. has made a clear distinction in their respective scope and inasmuch as sale under Rule 89 can be set aside only on deposit of sale amount, there is no similar requirement of depositing any amount for getting sale set aside on the ground of its being vitiated by fraud or irregularity. 12. 12. Thus, in the light of the aforementioned facts of there being two separate applications, one as contained in Annexure A purportedly being one under Order 21 Rule 89 C.P.C. and another one, Annexure-B, fulfilling the test of an application under Order 21 Rufe 90 C.P.C, the approach of the court below in proceeding with the first application under Order 21 Rule 89 C.P.C by directing the office to assess the amount for its being deposited by the petitioners is itself in teeth of the mandate of legislature under Order 21 Rule 89{2) C.P.C. would make the civil revision application maintainable. 13. Once this Court has held that the second application filed by the defendants-judgment debtors, as contained in Annexure B , giving rise to Misc. Case No. 13/2005 was an application under Order 21 Rule 90 C.P.C., there will be no difficulty in holding that the impugned order allowing the defendants-judgment debtors to press their application, also dated 18.7.2005, as contained in Annexure-A , was itself impermissible in view of the provisions made in Order 21 Rule 89 C.P.C. which for the sake of clarity is also extracted hereinbelow: " 89. Application to set aside sale on deposit (1) Where immovable property has been sold in execution of a decree, any person claiming an interest in the property sold at the time of the sale or at the time of making the application, or acting for or in the interest of such person, may apply to have the sale set aside on his depositing in Court, (a) for payment to the purchaser, a sum equal to five per cent, of the purchase money, and (b) for payment to the decree- holder, the amount specified in the proclamation of sale as that for the recovery of which the sale was ordered, less any amount which may, since the date of such proclamation of sale, have been received by the decree-holder. (2) Where a person applies under Rule 90 to set aside the sale of his immovable property, he shall not, unless he withdraws his application, be entitled to make or prosecute an application under this rule. (3) Nothing in this rule shall relieve the judgment-debtor from any liability he may be under in respect of costs and interest not covered by the proclamation of sale." (underlining for emphasis) 14. (3) Nothing in this rule shall relieve the judgment-debtor from any liability he may be under in respect of costs and interest not covered by the proclamation of sale." (underlining for emphasis) 14. This aspect of the matter as with regard to the scope of Order 21 Rule 89(2) C.P.C. is no longer res integra and stands settled by the Apex Court in the case of Shiv Prasad vs. Durga Prasad. reported in AIR 1975 S.C. 957 , wherein it was held: "An application under R. 89 validly made on the date of its presentation cannot be allowed to be prosecuted until the subsequent application filed under R. 90 is withdrawn. But it cannot be allowed to be made or be deemed to have been made unless the prior application filed under R. 90 is withdrawn. The words used in the sub-rule are "make or prosecute". If it were to be held that the applicant is not entitled merely to prosecute his application under R. 89 unless he withdraws his application under R.90, then the word make would become redundant. In order to bring about the true intention of the Legislature effect must be given to both the words. If a person has first applied under R. 90 to set aside the sate, then, unless he withdraws his application, he is not entitled to make and prosecute an application under R.89. The application even if made will be deemed to have been made only on withdrawal of the previous application. If, however, a person has filed an application under R. 89 first and thereafter another application under R. 90, he will not be allowed to prosecute the former unless he withdrew the latter." 15. There can be no two views that Annexure-A dated 18.7.2005 was filed at an earlier point of time and was followed by an application as contained in Annexure B and therefore, the court below ought to have not proceeded in terms of Order 21 Rule 89 C.P.C. till the defendants-judgment debtors had withdrawn their application for setting aside the sale and in any view of the matter, could not have allowed the judgment debtors to take advantage of their own self imposed failure to deposit the amount under sale. 16. 16. It has to be kept in mind that in the application filed on the same day, as contained in Annexure B, the amount of sale was clearly known to them, inasmuch as in its paragraph no. 12 they had taken a plea to the effect "that the O.P. 1st set/ decree holder anyhow auction purchased the land of the petitioners in auction sale on 20.6.2005 for Rs. 4,25,000/-. 17. As this application was also filed on the same day i.e. 18.7.2005 it cannot be. said that the judgment debtors were not aware of either the sale amount or the amount which they were liable to pay to the decree holder, being the amount specified in the proclamation for sale. The defendants-judgment debtors having contested the money suit were all along aware that the money suit was filed for realization of Rs. 2,71,036/- and the sale amount was Rs. 4,25,000/- and therefore, filing of an application with blank Chalan instead of depositing 5% of the sale amount and the balance amount payable to the decree holder as specified in the proclamation for sale being well known to them must be held an act to simply defeat the provision of Order 21 Rule 89 C.P.C. which mandates filing an application for setting aside the sale only on depositing of the amount. 18. The law and the provisions made under Order 21 Rule 89 C.P.C, therefore, does not conceive of a situation that there would be an application first and the amount could be deposited after filing of that application. It is this aspect of the matter which has been settled by the Apex Court in the case of P.K.Unni (supra), where the Court after considering the provisions of Order 21 Rule 89 as also Rule 92 C.P.C. thereof had held the deposit of the amount specified in Order 21 Rule 89 C.P.C. to be condition precedent to an application to set aside the sale. In that context the Apex Court had held as follows: "6. Rule 89 postulates an application on deposit. It says "may apply to have the sale set aside on his depositing in Court". These words show that deposit is a condition precedent to the making of an application to set aside a sale. That condition must be satisfied within the period prescribed by sub-rule (2) of Rule 92, which undoubtedly is 30 days. It says "may apply to have the sale set aside on his depositing in Court". These words show that deposit is a condition precedent to the making of an application to set aside a sale. That condition must be satisfied within the period prescribed by sub-rule (2) of Rule 92, which undoubtedly is 30 days. Parliament refused to alter that provision even when a part of the sub-rule was substituted." 19. The submission of Mr. Dwivedi that it is the duty of the court to fill up the Chalan and the amount in terms of Rule 613 of the Civil Court Rules and that the defendants-judgment debtors had only invoked the provisions of such Rule 613 of the Civil Court Rules seems to be wholly misplaced. Part X of the Account Rules (Judicial) containing general Rules 603 to 610 only lays down the procedure for receipt and payment of money and for keeping accounts to be observed by the Officer exercising judicial power and dealing with the money in that capacity. Part II of Chapter 1 under the heading receipt of money clearly provides that : "Payment of sums falling under heads (a) to (e), other items of (f) and of head (g) of rule 607 cannot be accepted either in Court or at the Treasury unless the money be tendered with a chalan in quadruplicate signed by the Chief Ministerial Officer of the Court, under whose decree or order the money is tendered, and also by the Accountant of the Court or group of Courts," 20. It is this provision of Rule 611 of the Civil Court Rules which is further carried in Rule 613 of the Civil Court Rules heavily relied by Mr. Dwivedi. Rule 613 of the Civil Court Rules in fact reads as follows: "613. The person desirous of paying in the money having filled up four forms of chalan, shall present them to the Chief Ministerial Officer of the Court mentioned in rule 611. Dwivedi. Rule 613 of the Civil Court Rules in fact reads as follows: "613. The person desirous of paying in the money having filled up four forms of chalan, shall present them to the Chief Ministerial Officer of the Court mentioned in rule 611. The latter shall then ascertain that the amount tendered is correct and is due from the person on whose account it is tendered to the person to whom it is stated to be payable and after correcting the forms of chalan, if necessary, shall sign it and pass the forms on to the Accountant of the Court or set of Courts who having made the necessary entries in Part II shall give a serial number to them. The chalans shall then be laid before the Judge-in-charge, and he shall, if in order, sign them. One chalan shall be retained by the Accountant and the other three shall be returned to the party tendering the money, and shall be his authority to pay the same into the Court, or into the Treasury. The copy left with the Accountant will be kept in a guard file and will be preserved for one year." 21. From a conjoint reading of Rules 607, 611 and 613 of the Civil Court Rules it would thus be clear that the person requiring to pay the amount, in this case that the defendants-judgment debtors being desirous of paying money, having filled up four forms of chalan and tendering money with such chalan could have completed transaction of deposit of amount in terms of Order 21 Rule 89 C.P.C. It has to be kept in mind that the primal object of Order 21 Rule 89 is to ensure even entertaining of an application only after the deposit has already been made. Thus, on 18.7.2005 when the defendants-judgment debtors had merely filed their application for ascertaining the amount to be deposited by them with a blank chalan without tendering the actual payment of amount which they were already knowing, they cannot be said to have completed the mandatory requirement of deposit of amount, a condition precedent for exercise of power under Order 21 Rule 89 C.P.C. Thus, Rule 613 of the Civil Court Rules also cannot come to the rescue of the defendants-judgment debtors. 22. If the abovonoted submission of Mr. 22. If the abovonoted submission of Mr. Dwivedi, learned Senior counsel appearing on behalf of the defendants-judgment debtor-O.Ps., is taken to its logical conclusion, the expression in Order 21 Rule 89 C.P.C. "on his depositing in court" itself would be rendered redundant, inasmuch as not only the Legislature has made depositing of the amount a condition precedent for entertaining of an application under Order 21 Rule 89 C.P.C. but even the word deposit by itself as per Blacks Law Dictionary connotes "the act of giving money or other property to another who promises to preserve it or to use it and return it in kind". The expression "deposit in court" as used in Order 21 Rule 89 C.P.C. as per Blacks Law Dictionary would mean placing of money or other property that represents a person potential liability in a courts temporary custody pending outcome of the suit. In this background it cannot be held that a mere promise to pay or filing of an application for ascertaining the amount to bo paid by the judgment debtor or any person interested in getting the sale set aside would be deposit of money for meeting the mandatory requirement of Order 21 Rule 89 C.P.C. 23. The view that this Court takes gets support from the judgment of Bombay High Court in the case of Manaji Kaverji vs. Aramita, reported in AIR 1922 Bombay 193, where the Division Bench of Bombay High Court noticing part payment of the amount had held that: "Now an undertaking to pay a certain amount, is not payment, and, as has been laid down in previous decisions, the provisions of Rule 89 are a concession allowed to judgment-debtor, and they must be strictly complied with in order to enable the judgment-debtor to obtain the advantage of the concession. If part payment coupled with an undertaking to pay the balance were to be considered as payment in full, then the provisions of the rule would not be complied with." 24. In fairness to the submission of Mr. Dwivedi, learned Senior counsel for the opposite parties, this Court also must take into consideration the judgment of Calcutta High Court in the case of Shyama Charan Auddy (supra) . In fairness to the submission of Mr. Dwivedi, learned Senior counsel for the opposite parties, this Court also must take into consideration the judgment of Calcutta High Court in the case of Shyama Charan Auddy (supra) . From a bare reading of the facts of that case it would be clear that in the peculiar facts therein it was held that an application made for information of correct decretal dues for making deposit under Order 21 Rule 89 C.P.C. was maintainable and its rejection and confirmation of sale by the court by giving opportunity to judgment debtor to make deposit for setting aside the sale was illegal. In that case it would be found that in a money suit the decree holder had obtained a sum of Rs. 6100/- and the defendant judgment-debtors had agreed to pay their dues in the money execution case itself and they wanted to be favoured as to the exact amount payable by them. That was therefore a case where the execution proceeding was pending and the decision to effect sale had not yet been taken. It was only subsequently that on 7th July, 1990 a two storied pucca building situated at R.K.Chatterjee Road, Kasba, Calcutta were attached and put to auction sale for Rs. 1.5 lacs on 7th July, 1990 which according to the defendants judgment-debtors was far less than the alleged market value of Rs. 8 lacs and therefore, when they had filed an application on 10th July, 1990 i.e. within three days of the auction sale conveying their unequivocal undertaking which they had already given earlier even before auction sale and had filed an application for ascertaining the dues for the purpose of filing an application under Order 21 Rule 89 C.P.C., and accordingly it was held that the act of the court of keeping such application dated 10th July, 1990 pending and passing the impugned order on 8th August, 1990 confirming the sale dated 7th July, 1990 was bad. 25. No such case could, however, be made out by Mr. Dwivedi in the present case, inasmuch as Mr. Dwivedi did not controvert the fact that the defendant judgment-debtors were not only aware of the decretal amount for which the sale had been held on 20.6.2005, i.e. 2,71,036/- but they were also aware of the auction amount of Rs. 25. No such case could, however, be made out by Mr. Dwivedi in the present case, inasmuch as Mr. Dwivedi did not controvert the fact that the defendant judgment-debtors were not only aware of the decretal amount for which the sale had been held on 20.6.2005, i.e. 2,71,036/- but they were also aware of the auction amount of Rs. 4.25 lacs and as such, when it is on record of the order sheet of the execution case that the service of notice on judgment debtors was effected on each and every stage of the execution proceedings as duly recorded in the order sheet dated 3.8.2002, 19.4.2003, 25.5.2005 in terms of Order 21 Rule 22, Order 21 Rule 54 and Order 21 Rule 66 C.P.C. before giving permission to the plaintiff decree holders to participate in the auction proceedings on 18.6.2005 and declaring them to be the highest bidder by accepting their offer of Rs. 4.25 lacs which was also deposited by them on 20.6.2005 and thus completing the sale well before filing of the aforesaid two applications by the defendant judgment-debtors on 18.7.2005. and that too without taking any plea that the auction sale of the land in question was for a very low price alike in the case of Shyama Charan Auddy (supra), it cannot be held that the ratio of that judgment would be one of universal application and would be a route for escape for judgment debtors not to deposit the amount for setting aside the sale in terms of Order 21 Rule 89 C.P.C. 26. It has to be noted that the deposit in this case of the amount by the judgment debtors has been made only on 23.1.2006 i.e. well after seven months of the auction sale, whereas the law provides. only 60 days time to deposit such amount. Nothing had prevented the defendant judgment-debtors in depositing the amount of 5% of auction sale amount of Rs. 4.25 lacs as was already conveyed by them in their second application to the court filed on the same day 18.7.2005 and they being the judgment debtors were definitely aware that their liability to pay to the decree holders was Rs. 2,71,036/-. Nothing had prevented the defendant judgment-debtors in depositing the amount of 5% of auction sale amount of Rs. 4.25 lacs as was already conveyed by them in their second application to the court filed on the same day 18.7.2005 and they being the judgment debtors were definitely aware that their liability to pay to the decree holders was Rs. 2,71,036/-. Had the judgment-debtors, therefore, paid the amount which could be short on account of some calculation, probably it could have been argued on their behalf that they did not lag behind in depositing the amount but their mere offer to pay the amount cannot be held to be deposit of the amount in terms of Order 21 Rule 89 C.P.C. 27. The Legislature never intended an "offer to pay" to be an equivalent to "deposit" of the amount and therefore, judged from the aforementioned angle this Court would find it difficult to accept the submission of Mr. Dwivedi that they had suffered on account of act of the court which had not passed an order on their application dated 18.7.2005 intimating the amount that they were required to pay. The law does not envisage any information to be given to the judgment-debtors or any other person seeking setting aside of the sale in terms of Order 21 Rule 89 C.P.C. It is this aspect of the matter which makes the impugned order bad and thus unsustainable, inasmuch as it is well settled that under Order 21 Rule 89 C.P.C. a judgment-debtor may obtain a reversal of a safe by deposit of money in court but such deposit has been made compulsorily within 60 days of the sale and the court has no jurisdiction, except with the consent of the parties, to extend the time nor can it set aside a sale by allowing the judgment debtor to deposit the decretal money after the period of limitation has expired. Reference in this connection may also be made to a Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Chaudhry Rameshwar Misser vs. Chaudhry Sureshwar Misser, reported in XXXIX (1917) Indian Cases 664. 28. This Court in fact has viowed the matter from yet another angle, namely, even if it be accepted that only application seeking setting aside the sale leading to institution of Misc. 28. This Court in fact has viowed the matter from yet another angle, namely, even if it be accepted that only application seeking setting aside the sale leading to institution of Misc. Case No. 13/2005 was an application both in terms of Order 21 Rule 89 and Rule 90 C.P.C. in view of the offer to pay the amount and the ground of fraud taken therein, even then such consolidated application under Rule 89 and 90 of Order 21 could not have been pressed simultaneously as is clear from the order sheet of the execution case and the order sheet of the miscellaneous case showing both of them to be still pending and the defendant judgment-debtors still proceeding with both of them. Somewhat a similar situation was also noticed by Bombay High Court in the case of Shankar Laxman Katkar vs. Dr. Sharad Mahadeo Vable and Anr., reported in AIR 1986 Bombay 386, wherein it was held that as the judgment debtor had even after making the deposit had insisted with an application under Order 21 Rule 90, the application under Order 21 Rule 89 was not maintainable. In the present case also the payment of Rs. 4,46,250/- has been made by the defendant judgment-debtors on 23.1.2006 but the order sheet of me separate Misc. Case No. 13/2005, even after the date of 23.1.2006 would go to show that they are still continuing with their application under Order 21 Rule 90 and are proceeding to get the sale set aside on the ground of fraud/material irregularity as alleged in their second petition dated 18.7.2005. 29. Case No. 13/2005, even after the date of 23.1.2006 would go to show that they are still continuing with their application under Order 21 Rule 90 and are proceeding to get the sale set aside on the ground of fraud/material irregularity as alleged in their second petition dated 18.7.2005. 29. Lastly, assuming that the second application filed by the defendant judgment-debtors is one under Order 21 Rule 89 and not under Rule 90 (though there would be no scope for such confusion in view of the wordings of the said application already quoted above) even then it has to be held that the limitation for depositing the amount having already expired on 19.8.2005 (60 days in view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Dadi Jagannadham vs. Jammulu Ramulu and Ors., reported in AIR 2001 S.C. 2699 , partly over-ruling the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of P.K. Unni (supra) holding the period of limitation to be of not 30 days but of 60 days), the deposit of the amount under auction sale having not been made within 60 days, though the application to set aside the sale dated 18.7.2005 i.e. Annexure A, was within the time but it cannot be construed that the deposit made thereunder on 23.1.2006 which was made after expiry of the period of limitation of 60 days was also in time. In taking this view this Court is supported from the judgment of Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of Devineni Durgamba vs. M/s Raj Kumar Financiers Vijayawada, reported in AIR 1998 A.P. 365 . 30. In taking this view this Court is supported from the judgment of Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of Devineni Durgamba vs. M/s Raj Kumar Financiers Vijayawada, reported in AIR 1998 A.P. 365 . 30. Thus, having given a serious consideration to the submissions made by both the parties and analyzing facts of this fact (siccase?) in the light of settled law as discussed above, this Court is of the opinion that the impugned order permitting deposit of amount for setting aside the sale by the defendant-judgment- debtors after expiry of the period of limitation or depositing of the said amount subsequent to the impugned order cannot be held to be a correct exercise of jurisdiction by the court below and consequently this Court noticing apparent error on the part of the court below in allowing the prayer of the defendant-judgment-debtors for depositing the amount of auction sale well beyond the prescribed period of limitation must set aside the impugned order and also consequently the prayer of the defendant-judgment-debtors for setting aside the sale in terms of Order 21 Rule 89 C.P.C. 31. This Court, however, must make it clear that Misc.Case No. 13/2005 which is proceeding on the basis of an application filed by the defendant-judgment-debtors will be treated under Order 21 Rule 90 C.P.C. and the same will be decided on its own merit without being prejudiced by any finding or anything said in this order and that the confirmation of sale in favour of the plaintiff decree-holder petitioners would be only made after disposal of Misc. Case No. 13/2005. 32. With the aforementioned observations and directions, this application is allowed. There shall be, however, no order as to costs.