JUDGMENT : A.K. Shrivastava , J . : - Thisappeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (in short'the Act of 1996') has been preferred against the orders dated 9-2-2009 and17-7-2009 passed by the learned Sixth Additional District Judge, Gwalior , in M.J.C. No. 29/2008 by which the application forsetting aside the award on the ground of want of jurisdiction and applicationfor review have been rejected. 2.The facts in brief are that for the purpose of supplying water to the generalpublic of Gwalior City , the Municipal Corporationinstalled several pumps. The work contract was given to the respondent on 1-5-2002 for maintaining and repairingthe motor pumps and starter for supply of water from the pumps. According tothe appellants, respondent did not execute the work as per the agreement andsubmitted bills against the terms of agreement, hence,payment was not made to him. Resultantly, respondent filed an application underSection 11 (6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 before this Courtwithout disclosing the material fact that Arbitration Tribunal had already beenconstituted under Section 3 of the Madhya Pradesh Madhyastham Adhikaran Adhiniyam , 1983(in short 'the Adhiniyam of 1983'), which isapplicable to the parties, for resolving the disputes arising out of workcontract and which excludes the provisions of the Act of 1996. The applicationwas registered as MCC No. 685/2006. 3.This Court while deciding the application under Section 11 (6) of the Act of1996 appointed sole arbitrator and referred the matter to it. An objection wasraised before the Arbitral Tribunal to the effect that since ArbitrationTribunal constituted under the Adhiniyam of 1983 isin existence, therefore, the matter which has been referred to ArbitralTribunal presided by the sole arbitrator appointed under the Act of 1996 has nojurisdiction. However, this objection was turned down by the arbitrator videits order dated 30-9-2007, which has been placed on record as Annexure 'A' andultimately the sole arbitrator passed a final award directing the appellants topay a sum of Rs . 76 ,64,725 /-to the respondent with interest at the rate of 9% per annum from the date ofpassing of the award till its payment. The learned arbitrator also awardedcosts to be paid to the respondent. 76 ,64,725 /-to the respondent with interest at the rate of 9% per annum from the date ofpassing of the award till its payment. The learned arbitrator also awardedcosts to be paid to the respondent. 4.The appellants, in order to set aside the award dated 30-1-2008 passed by thelearned Arbitral Tribunal presided by sole arbitrator, filed an application toset aside the arbitral award under Section 34 of the Act of 1996, inter alia on the ground that arbitrator had no jurisdiction toentertain the matter in view of the existence of Adhiniyam of 1983. A copy of the application has been placed on record as Annexure 'B'.The learned Court below rejected the objection of jurisdiction raised by theappellants. Thereafter, a review application was also submitted which was alsodismissed on 17-7-2009 . 5.This appeal was placed and listed before the learned Single Judge, however,learned Single Judge was of the view that because the value of the appealexceeds the pecuniary jurisdiction of Rs .25,00,000/-, therefore, it would lay only before the Division Bench, and hence,learned Single Judge held that it had no jurisdiction to hear the appeal. Thelearned Single Judge has placed reliance on Rule 2 of Chapter IV of the HighCourt of Madhya Pradesh Rules, 2008. Accordingly, the matter has been placedbefore us. 6.It has been vehemently contended by Shri H.D. Gupta,learned Senior Advocate for the appellants, that since the Adhiniyam of 1983 is applicable on the parties, therefore, the provision of Section 11 ofthe Act of 1996 is not applicable and, therefore, the appointment of the solearbitrator by exercising powers conferred on the Chief Justice or his nomineeunder Section 11 (6) of the Act of 1966 as well as order dated 30-9-2007overruling the objection of inherent lack of jurisdiction of the solearbitrator as well as its final award dated 30-1-2008 is nullity and withoutjurisdiction. According to learned Senior Counsel, if an order is nullity andis without jurisdiction, it can be challenged anywhere and wherever it isenforced to be executed and hence according to learned Senior Counsel since thespecific remedy under the special statute namely the Adhiniyam of 1983 is applicable to the parties, learned Court below illegally rejectedthe objection of appellants challenging the jurisdiction of the arbitrator inpassing the award. In support of his contention, learned Senior Counsel hasplaced heavy reliance on the Full Bench decision of this Court in Shri Shankarnarayana ConstructionCompany Vs. In support of his contention, learned Senior Counsel hasplaced heavy reliance on the Full Bench decision of this Court in Shri Shankarnarayana ConstructionCompany Vs. State of M.P. and others, 2007(4) M.P.H.T. 444 (FB) = 2008 (I) MPJR20. Learned Senior Counsel has also placed reliance on another Full Benchdecision of this Court in Administrator, Municipal Corporation, Durg and others Vs. Mis . Jainco Designers and Executors, Durg , AIR 1991 MP 233 . Learned Counsel has further placed reliance on Division Benchdecision of this Court in M/s. Spedra EngineeringCorporation Engineers and Contractors, Bhopal Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR1988 MP 111. By placing reliance on the Single Bench decision of this Court in Mahindra and Mahindra Ltd. ( Mis .) Vs. M/s. Kishan Tractors, 1998 (2) JLJ 57 , it has been contended that even if the appellants have givenconsent to appoint sole arbitrator under the Act of 1996, the sole arbitratorcannot assume its jurisdiction on that ground. Learned Senior Counsel has alsoplaced reliance on Single Bench decision of Chhattisgarh High Court in M/s. R.S. Bajwa & Company Vs. Stateof Chhattisgarh and others, 2008(4) M.P.H.T. 105 (CG)and also on the decision of Supreme Court in A. Jithendernath Vs. Jubilee Hills Co-op. House Building Society and another, (2006) 10 SCC 96 .On these premised submissions, it has been argued by learned Senior Counselthat by allowing this appeal the order of the Court below overruling theobjection of appellants of inherent lack of jurisdiction of sole arbitrator beset aside as well as final award dated 30-1-2008 passed by the sole arbitratorbe also set aside being without jurisdiction and nullity by also rejecting theorder dated 30-9-2007, by which the objection in respect to inherent lack ofjurisdiction raised by the appellants was rejected by the sole arbitrator. 7.Combating the aforesaid submissions of learned Senior Counsel for theappellants, Shri V.K. Bhardwaj ,learned Senior Counsel for the respondent, submitted that validly theappointment of sole arbitrator was made by the nominee of the Chief Justiceunder Section 11 of the Act of 1996 and the consent was also given by theappellants to appoint the sole arbitrator, and therefore, now somersault standcannot be permitted to be raised. By placing reliance on Section 16 (2) of theAct of 1996, it has been contended by learned Senior Counsel that if the solearbitrator was not having jurisdiction, this objection ought to have beenraised before entering into the submission of statement of defence and since before entering into the defence , theappellants have not raised the objection in that regard, hence, such anobjection cannot be raised by them at a later stage before the arbitrator. Insupport of his contention, learned Senior Counsel has placed heavy reliance onthe decision of Supreme Court in Gas Authority of India Ltd. and another Vs. Keti Construction (I) Ltd. and others, (2007) 5 SCC 38 .Further, it has been contended by learned Senior Counsel that the appointmentof the sole arbitrator by the Chief Justice or his designate while functioning underSection 11 of the Act of 1996 can only be challenged before the Supreme Court.Since the appointment of the sole arbitrator has not been challenged before the Apex Court , thejurisdiction of the sole arbitrator cannot be questioned in the proceedingsunder Section 34 of the Act of 1996. To bolster his submission, learned SeniorCounsel has placed heavy reliance on the decision of Constitution Bench ofSupreme Court in SBP& Co. Vs. Patel Engineering Ltd. and another, 2006(1)M.P.H.T. 61 (SC) = (2005) 8 SCC 618 , and also on the decision of Calcutta HighCourt of Niraj Kumar Bohra Vs. Union of India, 2009 Arb.W.LJ . 261( Cal ). By putting emphasis on Sections 4 and 5 of the Act of1996, it has been argued by learned Senior Counsel that in the light of these provisions,the question of validity of jurisdiction of the arbitrator now cannot be takeninto consideration. 8.Having heard the learned Counsel for the parties, we are of the considered viewthat this appeal deserves to be allowed. 9.In order to take out the grain from its chaff, it is to be ascertained as towhether the Adhiniyam of 1983 is applicable on theparties or not. If this Court comes to the conclusion that the provisions of Adhiniyam of 1983 are applicable, then only the contentionof learned Senior Counsel for the respondent can be taken into consideration onits own merit based on various provisions of the Act of 1996 and the decisionsplaced reliance by him. The Act of 1996 too is also very specific on thisproposition. If this Court comes to the conclusion that the provisions of Adhiniyam of 1983 are applicable, then only the contentionof learned Senior Counsel for the respondent can be taken into consideration onits own merit based on various provisions of the Act of 1996 and the decisionsplaced reliance by him. The Act of 1996 too is also very specific on thisproposition. If we go through Section 2 (3), (4) and (5) of the Act of 1996, wefind that since the Adhiniyam of 1983 is applicableto the parties, therefore, the Act of 1996 cannot be made applicable. Because, the State Legislature was competent to make a law ( Adhiniyam of 1983) although the Arbitration Act, 1940enacted by the Central Legislature was already in existence when the Adhiniyam of 1983 was enacted by the State Legislature. The said Adhiniyam of 1983 had received the assent ofthe President, as provided in clause (2) of Art. 254 of theConstitution. According to this provision of the Constitution,Parliament was competent to make the Act of 1996 in the same field, but whilemaking the Act of 1996, has expressly saved the provisions of the Adhiniyam of 1983 in sub- sections (4) and (5) of Section 2of the Act of 1996 which speaks of statutory arbitrations in respect ofdisputes arising out of work contracts between the State Government or a StateGovernment Undertaking and the contractor from the provisions of Part I of theAct of 1996 which are inconsistent with the provisions of the Adhiniyam of 1983. Therefore, the Adhiniyam of 1983 is not repugnant to the Act of 1996 or for no rhyme or reason it can besaid that the same is impliedly repealed by the Act of 1996. Our view issupported by the Full Bench decision of this Court in the case of Shri Shankarnamyana ConstructionCompany (supra), (See Para 24 of the said decision). 10.In another Full Bench decision of this Court Administrator, MunicipalCorporation, Durg and others (supra), it has beenheld that any dispute between the Administrator and Contractor in execution ofthe work of Municipal Corporation would come under the ambit and sweep ofSection 2(1) (g) of the Adhiniyam of 1983 since theAdministrator is a statutory body controlled by the State Government. 10.In another Full Bench decision of this Court Administrator, MunicipalCorporation, Durg and others (supra), it has beenheld that any dispute between the Administrator and Contractor in execution ofthe work of Municipal Corporation would come under the ambit and sweep ofSection 2(1) (g) of the Adhiniyam of 1983 since theAdministrator is a statutory body controlled by the State Government. TheDivision Bench of this Court in M/s. Spedra Engineering Corporation Engineers and Contractors, Bhopal (supra), alsoexamined the provisions of Adhiniyam of 1983 vis-a-vis the provisions of the Arbitration Act, 1940,which was in force before the commencement of the Act of 1996 and it was heldby the Division Bench that the provisions of Adhiniyam of 1983 would be applicable. 11.Thus, according to us, the award of Arbitral Tribunal presided by solearbitrator appointed under the Act of 1996 is without jurisdiction. Needless tosay, if the order or award is without jurisdiction, its validity can be set upat any moment of time. According to us, the learned Court below erred inrejecting the objection of inherent lack of jurisdiction raised by theappellants. 12.We do not find any substance in the contention of learned Counsel for therespondent that the notification under the Adhiniyam of 1983 speaks about the disputes of agreement pertaining to the StateGovernment only, and therefore, the provisions of Adhiniyam of 1983 are not applicable because in the present case the dispute is betweenthe Municipal Corporation and the contractor/respondent. In this regard, wethink it appropriate to quote the Notification No. 17 (E) 85-96-XXI-B (II),which reads thus : - "(ii) Notfn . No. 17 (E)85-96-XXI-B (II), dated 4-11-1996.- In exercise of the powers conferred byclause (1) of sub-section (1) of Section 2 of the Madhya Pradesh Madhyasthajn Adhikaran Adhiniyam , 1983 (No. 29 of 1983), the State Governmenthereby specifies that the agreements in writing for the execution of the workrelating to construction, repair or maintenance of electric lines, water supplyand sewerage/drainage system shall also be "work contract". Theterm 'work contract' has been explained under Section 2(1) ( i )of the Adhiniyam of 1983 which speaks as under:- "2.(1) ( i ) "works contract" means an agreementin writing for the execution of any work relating to construction, repair ormaintenance of any building or superstructure, dam, weir, canal, reservoir,tank, lake, road, well, bridge, culvert, factory, work-shop, powerhouse,transformers or such other works of the State Government or Public Undertakingas the State Government may by notification, specify in this behalf at any ofits stages, entered into by the State Government or by an official of the StateGovernment or Public Undertaking or its official for and on behalf of suchPublic Undertaking and includes an agreement for the supply of goods ormaterial and all other matters relating to the execution of any of the saidworks". Theterm "Public Undertaking" has also been defined under Section 2(1)(g) of the Adhiniyam of 1983, which reads thus : - "2.(1) (g) "Public Undertaking" means a Government Company within themeaning of Section 617 of the Companies Act, 1956 (No. 1 of 1956) and includesa Corporation or other statutory body by whatever name called in each case,wholly or substantially owned or controlled by the State Government." 13.On going through the above said provisions conjointly and by keeping them injuxtaposition since the term 'Corporation' would include Municipal Corporationalso, hence, we have no scintilla of doubt that the provisions of Adhiniyam of 1983 would be applicable. Admittedly, the workcontract is dated 1-5-2002 ,viz., much after the enforcement of the Notification No. 17 (E) 85-96-XXI-B(II), dated 4-11-1996 .Therefore, full effect to above said notification is to be given according toits true spirit. 14.Since the sole arbitrator appointed under the Act of 1996 was having inherent lack of jurisdiction to decide the arbitraldispute, according t us, award passed by it, cannot be allowed to remain stand. In this context, we ma place reliance on the ratio decidendi of Apex Court inthe decision of A Jithendernath (supra). 15.The decisions placed reliance by learned Senior Counsel for the respondent arenot applicable in the present factual scenario for the simpl reason that in those decisions the similar provision of the enactment of the Adhiniyam of 1983 was not there, and therefore, accordingto us, the variou provisions of the Act of 1996placed reliance by learned Senior Counsel for the respondent are not applicablein the present case. 16.For the reasons stated hereinabove, we hereby allow this appeal and set asidethe impugned order dated 9-2-2009 passed by learned Court below overruling theobjection of the appellants that Arbitral Tribunal presided by the solearbitrator was not having jurisdiction over the matter as well as order date17-7-2009 rejecting the review application of the appellants and we hereby holi that the arbitral award dated 30-1-2008 passed by thesole arbitrator is without jurisdiction and the same is hereby set aside.However, if parties are so advisee they may seek the remedy before the Tribunalconstituted under the Adhiniyar of 1983. 17.Looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, parties an directed to bear their own costs.