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2009 DIGILAW 132 (AP)

Shantilal Ravji Patel v. Rudraraju Venkata Ramana

2009-02-27

P.S.NARAYANA

body2009
Judgment : Heard Sri N.Vidya Prasad the learned Counsel representing N. Ravi Prasad and Sri K.Rathangapani Reddy, the learned Counsel representing the contesting respondents. 2. Rev.C.M.A.M.P.No.248/2009 is filed praying for the relief to review the order dt.20-10-2008 made in C.M.A.No.335/2008 by this Court. 3. Sri Vidya Prasad, the learned Counsel representing the review petitioners had taken this Court through the findings recorded in C.M.A.No.335/2008 by this Court and would maintain that entrusting the delivery warrant with instructions to the Court Officer to deliver the suit schedule property after satisfying with the boundaries and the identity of the property cannot be sustained and thus the disposal of the Civil Miscellaneous Appeal itself is not in accordance with law. The learned Counsel had taken this Court through the grounds raised in elaboration and would maintain that in the facts and circumstances of the case, the Rev.C.M.A.M.P., to be allowed. The Counsel also relied on certain decisions to substantiate his submissions. 4. On the contrary, Sri Rathangapani Reddy, the learned Counsel representing the contesting respondents had taken this Court through the historical back- ground of the case and maintain that on some pretext or the other, the further execution proceedings had been delayed. The Counsel would maintain that at any rate, review is not the appropriate remedy and if at all, the petitioners have any other remedy, the remedy being elsewhere, this Rev.C.M.A.M.P. is definitely a misconceived remedy. The learned Counsel also relied on certain decisions tosubstantiate his submissions. 5. Heard the Counsel on record. 6. In the light of the submissions made by the Counsel, the following points arise for consideration in this Rev.C.M.A.M.P.:- 1) Whether there are any grounds to review the order already made by this Court in C.M.A.No.335/2008? 2) If so, to what relief the parties would be entitled to? 7. Point No.1:- The petitioners -appellants filed Rev.C.M.A.M.P.No.248/2009 praying for the relief to review the order dt.20-10-2008 made in C.M.A.No.335/2008 by this Court. After the Civil Miscellaneous Appeal had been disposed of, the review petitioner filed an application C.M.A.M.P.No.59/2009 and on 27-1-2009 this Court had dismissed the said C.M.A.M.P.No.59/2009 with liberty to file review petition and hence it is stated that the present Rev.C.M.A.M.P.had been preferred. 8. After the Civil Miscellaneous Appeal had been disposed of, the review petitioner filed an application C.M.A.M.P.No.59/2009 and on 27-1-2009 this Court had dismissed the said C.M.A.M.P.No.59/2009 with liberty to file review petition and hence it is stated that the present Rev.C.M.A.M.P.had been preferred. 8. It is stated that a total extent of Ac.3-71 cents made up of Ac.3-29 cents in S.No.1/1 part (old S.No.23/B3) of Buchirajupalem and Ac.0-42 cents in S.No.1/1 of Gopalapatnam, which are adjacent to each other, was originally belonging to one Seera Appala Suryanarayana Raju. On 14-5-62 under registered sale deed one Lanka Samudram, S/o.Appala Pathrudu and Polamarasety Sannamma w/o.Somi Naidu, jointly purchased the entire extent of land from Sri Appala Suryanarayna Raju, s/o.Appalaswamy of Advivaram village. Further it is stated that out of the said land of Ac.3-71 cents her half extent was sold by P.Sannamma to Pureddi China Pydaiah and Pacha Venkataiah Chowdary jointly under a registered sale deed dt.22-7-71. Similarly Lanka Samudram sold his half share out of Ac.3-71 cents to -1) Boppana Veeraraju, 2) Pamidimukkala Basava poornamma, 3) Myneni Lakshmaiah and his wife and (4) Myneni Seshamma, under a registered sale deed dt.5-7-91. It is also stated that the other vendee P.Venkataiah is alleged to have sold his half share under an agreement of sale in favour of Smt.Rudraraju Venkata Ramana, the Decree Holder - 1st respondent herein, basing on which she filed a suit in O.S.No.106/85 on the file of the II- Additional Senior Civil Judge, Visakhapatnam, for specific performance of contract of sale, obtained a decree and the Court executed a sale deed on 11-1- 91. She filed E.P.No.140/92 for the purpose of obtaining the sale deed. Further it is stated that till this stage, though there are so many sale transactions, division of land of Ac.3-71 into fragments, reduced to house- sites, the very same boundaries that were existing as on 14-5-62 sale deed continued to be shown as such. As a matter of fact in the Court sale deed obtained by the 1st respondent -Decree Holder was also continuing the same boundaries, though they could not be as such on the grounds. It is also stated that it is pertinent to mention that on 27-3-82 the owners of different fragments of land came to an understanding, divided the land and entered into a partition deed (Vibhagapu Dasthaveju). It is also stated that it is pertinent to mention that on 27-3-82 the owners of different fragments of land came to an understanding, divided the land and entered into a partition deed (Vibhagapu Dasthaveju). It was never placed before any Court by the 1st respondent - Decree Holder. Further it is stated that P.Venkataiah Chowdary who is alleged to have sold the land to the 1st respondent – Decree Holder is also a party to the said partition document, dt.27-3-82. He agreed to take and has taken plots shown as 'B' series in the plan appended to the said partition document. It is also pertinent to mention that though this partition deed was dt.27-3-82, though the suit sale agreement was said to have come into existence on 11-4-82, a deliberate fraud is played by both the 1st respondent - Decree Holder as well as her vendor having not mentioned the specific boundaries of the so-called 11 plots that have been purchased by the 1st respondent - Decree Holder and the 1st respondent - Decree Holder continued her song showing the common boundaries for the entire extent of Ac.3-71 cents even while the sale deed was obtained from the Court also. It is further stated that in fact it was only while filing E.P.No.524/99 for the purpose of obtaining delivery of 11 plots said to have been purchased by the 1st respondent - Decree Holder from Pacha Venkataiah Chowdary s/o.Rosaiah, has been shown, deliberately by the side of the road with reduced extents of land, in a row to enjoy the maximum benefit thereof. This fact was a deliberate fraud being played on the Court. Court Amin was appointed for effecting delivery of the road side 11 plots fabricated by the 1st respondent - Decree Holder. It is submitted at that stage the petitioner happened to notice the fraud. It is also stated that the 1st petitioner fileld a suit in O.S.No.3052/2003 on the file of the II-Additional Junior Civil Judge, Visakhapatnam, against the 1st respondent - Judgment-debtor for the relief of perpetual injunction. It is submitted at that stage the petitioner happened to notice the fraud. It is also stated that the 1st petitioner fileld a suit in O.S.No.3052/2003 on the file of the II-Additional Junior Civil Judge, Visakhapatnam, against the 1st respondent - Judgment-debtor for the relief of perpetual injunction. On 22-9-2007 on the a joint Memo filed by both the parties, the suit was decreed in favour of 1st petitioner granting permanent injunction restraining the defendant - respondent from interfering with the possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule property by 1st petitioner, except under due process of law and without prejudice to his rights and contentions. In a similar way 2nd petitioner cousins Veerji Kamji Patel and jeevraj Kamji Patel filed a similar suit in O.S.No.3051/2003 and that suit was also decreed in the above same terms and manner. Inspite of it the 1st respondent - Decree Holder was threatening to dispossess the petitioners. The 1st respondent - Decree Holder got appointed an Amin for delivery of their property, showing the same as the property purchased by her in continuation of the fraud played upon the Court after the suit was decreed. Further it is stated that it is the petitioners contention that 1st petitioner purchased plot No.19 in an extent of 345 Sq.Yds. as house site from one Ganguri Venkata Rayudu and his family members on 18-8-92. In a similar 2nd petitioner who is cousin of the 1st petitioner herein viz., Veerji Kanji Patel along with his brother Jeevraj Kanji Patel, jointly purchased plot No.18 from Pureddi Umamaheswara Rao on 31-8-1990 in an extent of 345 Sq.Yds. All the petitioners have been put in possession of the respective plots. The petitioners have also obtained construction permission from the Municipal Corporation of Visakhapatnam. In respect of his constructions the permission was bearing BA.No.634/93/ACP/IV, dt.17-7-93. The 1st petitioner constructed a building in the first floor in the year 2000 with building plan sanction bearing BA.957/2000/G3/ACP/III, dt.15-7- 2000. The house has been assigned D.No.58-22-34/3A. It is stated that insofar as the 2nd petitioner Veerji Khanji Patel and Jeevaraj Khani Patel are concerned, who purchased joint plot No.18 of 345 Sq.Yds. under a sale deed dt.31-8-90 as stated above, from Pureddi umamaheswara Rao obtained building plan No.BA/1411/ACP/IV on 6-10-1993. They have later constructed the 1st floor in the year 2000 obtaining building plan vide BA No.954/2000/G3/ACP/II, dt.15-7- 2000 under assessment No.73999/640. under a sale deed dt.31-8-90 as stated above, from Pureddi umamaheswara Rao obtained building plan No.BA/1411/ACP/IV on 6-10-1993. They have later constructed the 1st floor in the year 2000 obtaining building plan vide BA No.954/2000/G3/ACP/II, dt.15-7- 2000 under assessment No.73999/640. Therefore, the petitioners have been in possession and enjoyment of the respective plot No.19 and 18, constructed houses and living therein. Further it is stated that coming to know about the flagrant fraud played by the 1st respondent - Decree Holder in completely chaneging the partition deed and the plan therein and intending to knock away the road side plots which are very much valuable, covering their two plots also in which houses were constructe.d The petitioners have been constrained to file applications under Order 21 Rule 97 of the Code of Civil Procedure in E.A.No.451/2008 and 452/2008 in E.P.No.524/99 on the file of the II-Additional Senior Civil Judge, Visakhapatnam. Further it is also stated that the petitioners purchased plot No.19 from one Ganguri Venkata Rayudu and his family members being the successors of the vendor Boppana Varalakshmi. The said Boppana Varalakshmi has signed as one of the parties to the said partition deed dt.27-3-82 and it disclosed that she along with Pacha Venkataiah got plots bearing No.'B' series. The said Pacha Venkataiah and Boppana Varalakshmi signed in the said document as parties, whereas the vendor Ganguri Venkata Rayudu signed as attestor. It is further stated that similarly 2nd petitioner Veerji Khanji Patel and his brother Jeevraj Khani Patel who have jointly purchased plot No.18 from Pureddi Umamaheshwara Rao is also a party in the aforesaid partition deed dt.27-3-82 and he signed as party No.3 who along with another who have been given plots bearing 'A' series. Further it is stated that therefore it is clear that the plots purchased by the 1st respondent - Decree Holder are totally different and unconnected with the plots purchased by the petitioner bearing No.19 and plot No.18 belonging to Veerji Khanji Patel and Jeevraj Khanji Patel. Further it is stated that therefore it is clear that the plots purchased by the 1st respondent - Decree Holder are totally different and unconnected with the plots purchased by the petitioner bearing No.19 and plot No.18 belonging to Veerji Khanji Patel and Jeevraj Khanji Patel. It is also stated that suppressing the partition deed as well as allotment of plots bearing nomenclature A, B, C, D and showing that all the 11 plots allegedly purchased are by the side of the road, seeking delivery of the said 11 plots cooking up self-serving fabricated plan, the 1st respondent – Decree Holder filed E.P.No.524/99 showing him as the 7th respondent and the aforesaid jeevraj khanji Patel, as the 8th respondent. In the plan filed by her she prepared for self-serving purpose as stated already, lying adjacent to the road, covering plots 18 and 19 belonging to them along with some other bona fide purchasers from the bona fide owners under the very same partition deed. The learned Judge after hearing both sides in E.A.No.1597/2000 filed for removal of objections under Order 21 Rule 98(2) of C.P.C. gave an erroneous finding to the effect that, though the plots alleged to be belonging to the 1st respondent - Decree Holder vis--vis the plots purchased by different respondents including the petitioners are over lapping each other, by means of a stroke of pen held. That the purchase of plots by the 1st respondent - Decree Holder is earlier in point of time to the purchase of plots by the petitioners and others ordered removal of obstruction and consequently appointed an Amin to deliver vacant schedule property. In fact no enquiry was conducted on their applications filed under Order 21 Rule 98 C.P.C. as to the truth of the contention of the 1st respondent - Decree Holder and that of the petitioner and other plot-holder. It is further stated that the 1st petitioner filed a proper application under order 21 Rule 97 C.P.C. in E.A.No.452/2008 setting forth their case and further requesting recall of delivery warrant. A similar application was filed in E.A.No.451/2008 by Jeevraj Khanji Patel. As a matter of fact, these two applications were filed in the year 2003. As per the present C.P.C., these applications E.A.No.451 and 452 of 2008 are required to be treated as suits, evidence has to be taken and decision should be given as to their contention. A similar application was filed in E.A.No.451/2008 by Jeevraj Khanji Patel. As a matter of fact, these two applications were filed in the year 2003. As per the present C.P.C., these applications E.A.No.451 and 452 of 2008 are required to be treated as suits, evidence has to be taken and decision should be given as to their contention. No separate suits can be filed. It was not done. Further though these applications were filed in the year 2003, they have not seen the light of the day and they were numbers only in the year 2008 after the petitioner and others made hue and contrary about this aspect. Further it is stated that as against the delivery order given by the learned II-Additional Senior Civil Judge, they have preferred the present C.M.A.No.335/2008. It was actually filed on 3-12- 2003 and after condonation of delay, it was numbered as C.M.A.No.335/2008 and came up for hearing. On hearing both sides, this Court was pleased to pass order on 20-10-208. In the said order, this Court was pleased to observe that "the properties claimed by the 1st respondent are different from the properties belonging to the petitioners and in that even the final order was passed" is to the effect. It is therefore clarified that the lower Court is directed to once again entrust the delivery warrant with instructions to the Court Officer to delivery the suit schedule property after satisfying with the boundaries and identity of the property. It is also stated that having regard to the fact that their Advocate did not place before the Court the gist of past history and the fraudulent aspects of the case of the 1st respondent - Decree Holder. After the order was passed, for the purpose of taking necessary precautions they have preferred E.A.No.23 and 24 of 2009 before the lower Court for appointment of an Advocate Commissioner and direct him to take the assistance of a Surveyor for proper identification of the property. In the said petition the lower Court openly commented that except handing over delivery warrant to the Amin he is not going to appoint any Advocate-Commissioner and further direct him to seek assistance of surveyor for demarcating the plots and that it will cause grave hardship to the petitioners. In the said petition the lower Court openly commented that except handing over delivery warrant to the Amin he is not going to appoint any Advocate-Commissioner and further direct him to seek assistance of surveyor for demarcating the plots and that it will cause grave hardship to the petitioners. The 1st respondent - Decree Holder will show the same plots unjustly and fraudulently demarcated by him after the suit was decreed and at the time E.P., was filed and in that event if delivery is effected their property will be taken away by the 1st respondent – Decree Holder. Several specific grounds also had been raised tracing the history and also the questioning the order made by this Court in the Civil Miscellaneous Appeal aforesaid and further it was prayed that in the facts and circumstances of the case the order made in C.M.A.No.335/2008 to be reviewed directing the Court below to consider and decide the claim petitions filed under Order 21 Rule 97 C.P.C. and then only entrust warrant to Amin who could take adequate help from an Advocate Commissioner appointed for this purpose with the help of a Surveyor and to pass such other suitable orders. 9. Sri N. Vidya Prasad, the learned Counsel placed strong reliance on the decision in Board Of Control For Cricket, India V. Netaji Cricket Club AIR 2005 S.C., 592 wherein at paras 91 to 94 it was observed as hereunder:- "It is true that in Moran Mar Basselios catholicos and Another v. The Most rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius and Others ( 1955(1) S.C.R. 520 ), this Court made observations as regard limitations in the application of review of its order stating: "before going into the merits of the case it is as well to bear in mind the scope of the application for review which has given rise to the present appeal. It is needless to emphasise that the scope of an application for review is much more restricted than that of an appeal. Under the provisions in the travancore Code of Civil Procedure which is similar in terms to Order XLVII, Rule 1 of our Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the Court of review has only a limited jurisdiction circumscribed by the definitive limits fixed by the language used therein. Under the provisions in the travancore Code of Civil Procedure which is similar in terms to Order XLVII, Rule 1 of our Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the Court of review has only a limited jurisdiction circumscribed by the definitive limits fixed by the language used therein. It may allow a review on three specified grounds, namely (i) discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within the applicant's knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed, (ii) mistake or error apparent on the face of the record and (iii) for any other sufficient reason. It has been held by the Judicial Committee that the words "any other sufficient reason" must mean "a reason sufficient on grounds, at least analogous to those specified in the rule. ", but the said rule is not universal. Yet again in Lily Thomas ( AIR 2000 S.C. 1650 )(supra), this court has laid down the law in the following terms: "52 The dictionary meaning of the word "review" is "the act of looking, offer something again with a view to correction or improvement" It cannot be denied that the review is the creation of a statute. This Court in Patel narshi Thakershi v. Pradyumansinghji arjunsinghji, AIR 1970 SC 1273 held that the power of review is not an inherent power. It must be conferred by law either specifically or by necessary implication. The review is also not an appeal in disguise. It cannot be denied that justice is a virtue which transcends all barriers and the rules or procedures or technicalities of law cannot stand in the way of administration of justice. Law has to bend before justice. If the Court finds that the error pointed out in the review petition was under a mistake and the earlier judgment would not have been passed but for erroneous assumption which in fact did not exist and its perpetration shall result in miscarriage of justice nothing would preclude the Court from rectifying the error" It is also not correct to contend that the court while exercising its review jurisdiction in any situation whatsoever cannot take into consideration a subsequent event. In a case of this nature when the court accepts its own mistake in understanding the nature and purport of the undertaking given by the learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the Board and its correlation with as to what transpired in the AGM of the Board held on 29th September, 2004, the subsequent event may be taken into consideration by the court for the purpose of rectifying its own mistake. In Rajesh D. Darbar and Others v. Narasingrao Krishnaji Kulkarni and others (2000(7) S.C.C. 219) this Court noticed: "4. The impact of subsequent happenings may now be spelt out. First, its bearing on the right of action, second, on the nature of the relief and third, on its importance to create or destroy substantive rights. Where the nature of the relief, as originally sought, has become obsolete or unserviceable or a new form of relief will be more efficacious on account of developments subsequent to the suit or even during the appellate stage, it is but fair that the relief is moulded, varied or reshaped in the light of updated facts. Patterson v. State of Alabama [1934] 294 u. S. 600, illustrates this position. It is important that the party claiming the relief or change of relief must have the same right from which either the first or the modified remedy may flow. Subsequent events in the course of the case cannot be constitutive of substantive rights enforceable in that very litigation except in a narrow category (later spelt out) but may influence the equitable jurisdiction to mould reliefs. Conversely, where rights have already vested in a party, they cannot be nullified or negated by subsequent events save where there is a change in the law and it is made applicable at any stage. Lachmeshwar Prasad v. Keshwar Lal (AIR 1941 FC 5 falls in this category. Courts of justice may, when the compelling equities of a case oblige them, shape reliefs - cannot deny rights - to make them justly relevant in the updated circumstances. Where the relief is discretionary, Courts may exercise this jurisdiction to avoid injustice. Likewise, where the right to the remedy depends, under the statute itself, on the presence or absence of certain basic facts at the time the relief is to be ultimately granted, the Court, even in appeal, can take note of such supervening facts with fundamental impact. Where the relief is discretionary, Courts may exercise this jurisdiction to avoid injustice. Likewise, where the right to the remedy depends, under the statute itself, on the presence or absence of certain basic facts at the time the relief is to be ultimately granted, the Court, even in appeal, can take note of such supervening facts with fundamental impact. This Court's judgment in Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu v. Motor and General Traders AIR 1,975 SC 1409 read in its statutory setting, falls in this category. Where a cause of action is deficient but later events have made up the deficiency, the Court may, in order to avoid multiplicity of litigation, permit amendment and continue the proceeding, provided no prejudice is caused to the other side. All these are done only in exceptional situations and just cannot be done if the statute, on which the legal proceeding is based, inhibits, by its scheme or otherwise, such change in cause of action or relief. The primary concern of the court is to implement the justice of the legislation. Rights vested by virtue of a statute cannot be divested by this equitable doctrine -See v. P. R. V. Chockalingam Chetty v. Seethai Ache AIR 1927 PC 252. " 10. However, Sri Rathangapani Reddy, the learned Counsel representing the contesting respondents placed strong reliance on Haridas Das V. Usha Rani Bank 2006 (4) SCJ 182 wherein at paras 13 to 18 the Apex Court observed as hereunder:- "In order to appreciate the scope of a review, Section 114 of the CPC has to be read, but this section does not even adumbrate the ambit of interference expected of the Court since it merely states that it "may make such order thereon as it thinks fit. " the parameters are prescribed in Order XLVII of the CPC and for the purposes of this lis, permit the defendant to press for a rehearing "on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the records or for any other sufficient reason". The former part of the rule deals with a situation attributable to the applicant, and the latter to a jural action which is manifestly incorrect or on which two conclusions are not possible. The former part of the rule deals with a situation attributable to the applicant, and the latter to a jural action which is manifestly incorrect or on which two conclusions are not possible. Neither of them postulate a rehearing of the dispute because a party had not highlighted all the aspects of the case or could perhaps have argued them more forcefully and/or cited binding precedents to the Court and thereby enjoyed a favourable verdict. This is amply evident from the explanation in Rule 1 of the Order XLVII which states that the fact that the decision on a question of law on which the judgment of the Court is based has been reversed or modified by the subsequent decision of a superior court in any other case, shall not be a ground for the review of such judgment. Where the order in question is appealable the aggrieved party has adequate and efficacious remedy and the court should exercise the power teleview its order with the greatest circumspection. This Court in M/s. Thungabhadra Industries Ltd. (in all the Appeals) v. The Government of Andhra Pradesh represented by the Deputy Commissioner of commercial Taxes, Anantapur (AIR 1964 1372), held as follows: "There is a distinction which is real, though it might not always be capable of exposition, between a mere erroneous decision and a decision which could be characterized as vitiated by "error apparent". A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is reheard and corrected, but lies only for patent error. Where without any elaborate argument one could point to the error and say here is a substantial point of law which states one in the face and there could reasonably be no two opinions entertained about it, a clear case of error apparent on the face of the record would be made out. " In Meera Bhanja v. Smt. Nirmala kumari Choudary (AIR 1995 S.C.,455) it was held that: "It is well settled law that the review proceedings are not by way of an appeal and have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of order XLVII, Rule 1, CPC. " In Meera Bhanja v. Smt. Nirmala kumari Choudary (AIR 1995 S.C.,455) it was held that: "It is well settled law that the review proceedings are not by way of an appeal and have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of order XLVII, Rule 1, CPC. In connection with the limitation of the powers of the Court under order XLVII, Rule 1, while dealing with similar jurisdiction available to the High Court while seeking to review the orders under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, this Court, in the case of Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma v. Aribam Pishak Sharma speaking through Chinnappa Reddy, J. has made the following pertinent observations: It is true there is nothing in Article 226 of the constitution to preclude the High Court from exercising the power of review which inheres in every Court of plenary jurisdiction to prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct grave and palpable errors committed by it. But, there are definitive limits to be exercise of the power of review. The power of review may be exercised on the discovery of new and important matter of evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence was not within the knowledge of the person seeking the review or could not be produced by him at the time when the order was made; it may be exercised where some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record is found, it may also be exercised on any analogous ground. But, it may not be exercised on the ground that the decision was erroneous on merit. That would be in the province of a court of appeal. A power of review is not to be confused with appellate power which may enable an appellate court to correct all manner of error committed by the Subordinate Court. " A perusal of the Order XLVII, Rule 1 show that review of a judgment or an order could be sought: (a) from the discovery of new and important matters or evidence which after the exercise of due diligence was not within the knowledge of the applicant; (b) such important matter or evidence could not be produced by the applicant at the time when the decree was passed or order made; and (c) on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of record or any other sufficient reason. In Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma v. Aribam Pishak Sharma (AIR 1979 S.C., 1047) this Court held that there are definite limits to the exercise of power of review. In that case, an application under order XLVII, Rule 1 read with section 151 of the Code was filed which was allowed and the order passed by the judicial Commissioner was set aside and the writ petition was dismissed. On an appeal to this Court it was held as under: "It is true as observed by this Court in Shivdeo singh v. State of Punjab (AIR 1963 SC 1908) there is nothing in Article 226 of the Constitution to preclude a High Court from exercising the power of review which inheres in every court of plenary jurisdiction to prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct grave and palpable errors committed by it. But, there are definitive limits to the exercise of the power of review. The power of review may be exercised on the discovery of new and important matter of evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence was not within the knowledge of the person seeking the review or could not be produced by him at the time when the order was made, it may be exercised where some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record is found; it may also be exercised on any analogous ground. But, it may not be exercised on the ground that the decision was erroneous on merits. That would be the province of a court of appeal. A power of review is not to be confused with appellate power which may enable an Appellate Court to correct all manner of errors committed by the Subordinate Court. " The judgment in Aribam's case ( AIR 1979 S.C. 1047 ) has been followed in the case of Smt. Meera Bhanja (AIR 1995 S.C., 455). In that case, it has been reiterated that an error apparent on the face of the record for acquiring jurisdiction to review must be such an error which may strike one on a mere looking at the record and would not require any long drawn process of reasoning. In that case, it has been reiterated that an error apparent on the face of the record for acquiring jurisdiction to review must be such an error which may strike one on a mere looking at the record and would not require any long drawn process of reasoning. The following observations in connection with an error apparent on the face of the record in the case of Satyanarayan Laxminarayan hegde v. Mallikarjun Bhavanappa Tiruymale (AIR 1960 S.C.,137) were also noted: "An error which has to be established by a long drawn process of reasoning on points where there may conceivably be two opinions can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record. Where an alleged error is far from self-evident and if it can be established, it has to be established, by lengthy and complicated arguments, such an error cannot be cured by a writ of certiorari according to the rule governing the powers of the superior court to issue such a writ. " It is also pertinent to mention the observations of this Court in the case of Parsion Devi v. Sumiri Devi ( 1997(8) SCC 715 ). Relying upon the judgments in the cases of Aribam's (AIR 1979 S.C., 1047) and Smt. Meera Bhanja (AIR 1995 S.C., 455) it was observed as under : "Under Order XLVII, Rule 1, CPC a judgment may be open to review inter alia, if there is a mistake or an error apparent on the face of the record. An error which is not self evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record justifying the court to exercise its power of review under order XLVII, Rule 1, CPC. In exercise of the jurisdiction under Order XLVII, Rule 1. CPC it is not permissible for an erroneous decision to be reheard and corrected. A review petition, it must be remembered has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be an appeal in disguise. In exercise of the jurisdiction under Order XLVII, Rule 1. CPC it is not permissible for an erroneous decision to be reheard and corrected. A review petition, it must be remembered has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be an appeal in disguise. " Reliance also was placed on Dasari Uma Maheshwara Rao V. Somasi Venkata Ramachandra Murthy 2003 (2) Alt 135 wherein this Court observed at para 9 as hereunder:- "On the overall consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case and after going through the several grounds raised and the elaborate arguments which had been advanced by learned Counsel for review petitioners, I am of the considered opinion that several of the grounds are matters to be decided, if the Judgments of the Division Bench in this Letters Patent are questioned before the regular forum and not by filing the review application at any rate in view of the limitations imposed by law under Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure." 11. This Court had given anxious consideration to the grounds raised in the present Rev.C.M.A.M.P. No doubt, the historical background had been traced and several facts touching the merits and demerits had been well explained. The learned Judge while disposing of the Civil Miscellaneous Appeal, no doubt, observed as hereunder:- "It is therefore clarified that the lower Court is declared to once again entrust the delivery warrant with instructions to the Court Officer to deliver the suit schedule property after satisfying with the boundaries and the identity of the property." Several submissions were made relating to this aspect to the effect that this observation is not in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. It is needless to say that several of the grounds which had been raised in fact touching the merits and demerits to be decided in the Civil Miscellaneous Appeal. When the learned Judge taking the facts and circumstances into consideration had already disposed of the Civil Miscellaneous Appeal after recording certain reasons, it is needless to say that if the review petitioners are aggrieved of, their remedy is elsewhere. This Court is thoroughly satisfied that no grounds had been made out by the review petitioners to review the order under challenge in the present Rev.C.M.A.M.P. In the light of the same, the Rev.C.M.A.M.P. is hereby dismissed. No order as to costs.