Research › Search › Judgment

Madhya Pradesh High Court · body

2009 DIGILAW 1320 (MP)

Kirti Prakash Saxena v. State of M. P.

2009-11-27

PIYUSH MATHUR

body2009
ORDER 1. This petition under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter for short "the Code") is preferred against an order dated 2.8.2008 passed by the Second Additional Sessions Judge, Guna, in Criminal Revision No 401/07, which arose out of an order dated 4.10.2007 passed by the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Guna, in Criminal Case No.36312006, wherein the Courts below, while examining the provisions of sections 177 and 178 of the Code, have found that inspite of accrual of cause of action at Bhopal, the Criminal Court at Guna has the jurisdiction to take cognizance of ,the offences, punishable under sections 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (hereinafter for short "the Act"). 2. The facts of the case demonstrate that the complainant Smt. Archana Saxena got married with present petitioner Kirti Prakash Saxena at Bhopal on date 18.3.2003 and she resided at Bhopal uptill date 12.11.2004 and on account of continuing cruelty by her in-laws, Smt. Archana Saxena left the matrimonial home, on her own and reached the house of her parents at Guna. 3. Smt. Archana Saxena has submitted a complaint before the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Guna, praying for taking cognizance of the complaint, in terms of sections 4 and 6 of the Act by describing that her marriage was solemnized at Bhopal and the entire dowry items were handed over to the husband at Bhopal, but since she is presently residing at Guna, after leaving the matrimonial home, therefore, the Criminal Court at Guna has the jurisdiction to take cognizance of her complaint. The learned Magistrate took the cognizance of the matter and issued process to the husband, who submitted an application under section 177 of the Code and raised a preliminary objection about the territorial jurisdiction that since none of the Gause of action have accrued to the complainant at Guna, therefore, the Criminal Court situated at Guna would have no jurisdiction either to issue process to the husband or to try the offence. 4. 4. The learned Magistrate heard the parties on the application preferred under section 177 of the Code and passed an order on date 4.10.2007 by finding that the territorial jurisdiction to deal with the complaint, regarding the scope of section 4 of the Act, would be exclusively available with the Criminal Court at Bhopal, but the Criminal Court at Guna would have jurisdiction in relation to the complaint made about the demand and return of dowry as per section 6 of the Act. This is how the learned Magistrate has partially allowed the application by granting liberty to the wife to approach the competent Court at Bhopal for the purposes of section 4 of the Act and has found the complaint to be entertain-able by Criminal Court at Guna in relation to section 6 of the Act. 5. The husband Kirti Prakash Saxena has preferred a criminal revision against the order passed on date 4.10.2007' by the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Guna, by demonstrating that section 177 of the Code provides for the exclusivity of the jurisdiction of the Criminal Court, where the cause of action accrues to a complainant and since no pan of cause of action has accrued to the complainant at Guna, in absence of continuity of the chain of events, the Judicial Magistrate, Guna, ought not to have entertained the complaint for the purposes of sections 4 and 6 of the Act. 6. The Additional Sessions Judge, Guna, has rejected the revision petition by finding that the Criminal Court at Guna was having territorial jurisdiction in relation to both the offences punishable under sections 4 and 6 of the Act. Aggrieved by the rejection/dismissal of the revision petition, the husband Kirti Prakash Saxena has now preferred this petition under section 482 of the Code, before the High Court. 7. Aggrieved by the rejection/dismissal of the revision petition, the husband Kirti Prakash Saxena has now preferred this petition under section 482 of the Code, before the High Court. 7. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner revolves around the scope of section 177 of the Code to contend that from a bare perusal of the complaint and the allegations levelled therein, it is evident that the marriage was solemnized at Bhopal and the alleged dowry articles were handed over to the husband/his family members at Bhopal and even the alleged cruelty was played at Bhopal and in view of the plain reading of the pleadings of the complainant, the Criminal Court at Guna would have no jurisdiction and as such section 177 of the Code would come into play by vesting jurisdiction only in the Criminal Court at Bhopal, as Criminal Court at Guna cannot assume such jurisdiction in itself, which is not statutorily vested in it. 8. The learned counsel for the respondent has drawn my attention to the contents of the complaint and the averments made about the events of marriage, handing over of dowry items and cruelty played with the complainant at Bhopal and has stressed for extending the scope of section 177 of the Code to the extent by applying the provisions, to clothe the complainant with the jurisdiction, in terms of section 178 of the Code, on account of her present abode at Guna, however, he expressed his inability to pick up even a solitary instance from the reading of the complaint to connect the same with the factum of accrual of cause of action at Guna. 9. The Code of Criminal Procedure prescribe for the territorial jurisdiction of the Criminal Court, and also conceptualize about the existence and accrual of a cause of action, like civil matters and a bare reading of sections 177 and 178 of the Code demonstrate that the statute does take care of the events of accrual of the cause of action, for connecting the same with the territorial jurisdiction of a Criminal Court. For ready reference, the text of sections 177 and 178 of the Code is quoted herein below: "177. Ordinary place of inquiry and trial -- Every offence shall ordinarily be inquired into and tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction it was committed. 178. Place of inquiry or trial. For ready reference, the text of sections 177 and 178 of the Code is quoted herein below: "177. Ordinary place of inquiry and trial -- Every offence shall ordinarily be inquired into and tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction it was committed. 178. Place of inquiry or trial. -- (a) When it is uncertain in which of several local areas an offence was committed, or (b) where an offence is committed partly in one local area and partly in another, or (c) where an offence is a continuing one, and continues to be committed in more local areas than one, or (d) where it consists of several acts done in different local areas, it may be inquired into or tried by a Court having jurisdiction over any of such local areas." 10. A bare perusal of the complaint, lodged by Smt. Archana Saxena demonstrate that she has made exclusive averments about the events of marriage and handing over of the dowry items and the incidents of cruelty at Bhopal alone as also about the factum of leaving the matrimonial home, on her own, but the complaint does not comprehend about any element of cause of action, which could have accrued to her within the territorial jurisdiction of the Criminal Court situated at Guna. Therefore, it is difficult to accept the contention of Shri N.P. Dwivedi, learned counsel for the respondent that on account of her present place of residence, the Criminal Court at Guna can usurp the jurisdiction, which is not vested in it, on account of the geographical/territorial limitation. 11. Learned counsel for the petitioner Shri Shishir Saxena has placed reliance on the wordings used in sections 4 and 6 of the Act to demonstrate that the occasion of demand of dowry and the supply of the dowry items has to necessarily have a nexus with the 'Place', where these events take place and items supplied and since the demand of dowry is alleged to have been made at Bhopal only and the marriage has also taken place at Bhopal, the territorial jurisdiction would exclusively vest with the Criminal Court at Bhopal only. Since the wordings contained in sections 4 and 6 of the Act have a direct bearing with the decision of this case, both the provisions are, therefore, quoted herein below for ready reference: "4. Since the wordings contained in sections 4 and 6 of the Act have a direct bearing with the decision of this case, both the provisions are, therefore, quoted herein below for ready reference: "4. Penalty for demanding dowry -- If any person demands, directly or indirectly, from the parents or other relatives or guardian of a bride or bridegroom, as the case may be, any dowry, he shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than six months, but which may extend to two years and with fine which may extend to ten thousand rupees: Provided that the Court may, for adequate and special reasons to be mentioned in the judgment, impose a sentence of imprisonment for a term of less than six months. 6. Dowry to be for the benefit of the wife or her heirs. -- (1) Where any dowry is received by any person other than the woman in connection with whose marriage it is given, that person shall transfer it to the woman - (a) if the dowry was received before marriage, within three months after the date of marriage; or (b) if the dowry was received at the time of or after the marriage, within three months after the date of its receipt; or (c) if the dowry was received when the woman was a minor, within three months after she has attained the age of eighteen years; and pending such transfer, shall hold it in trust for the benefit of the woman. (2) If any person fails to transfer any property as required by subsection (1) within the time limit specified there for, or as required by sub-section (3), he shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than six months, but which may extend to two years or with fine which shall not be less than five thousand rupees, but which may extend to ten thousand rupees or with both. (3) Where the woman entitled to any property under sub-section (1) dies before receiving it, the heirs of the woman shall be entitled to claim it from the person holding it for the time being: Provided that where such woman dies within seven years of her marriage, otherwise than due natural causes, such property shall, - (a) if she has no children, be transferred to her parents; or (b) if she has children, he transferred to such children and pending such transfer, be held in trust for such children. (3A) Where a person convicted under sub-section (2) for failure to transfer any property as required by sub-section (1) or sub-section (3) has not, before his conviction under that sub-section, transferred such property to the woman entitled thereto or, as the case may be, her heirs, parents or children the Court shall, in addition to awarding punishment under that sub-section, direct, by order in writing, that such person shall transfer the property to such woman or, as the case may be, her heirs, parents or children within such period as may be specified in the order, and if such person fails to comply with the direction within the period so specified, an amount equal to the value of the property may be recovered from him as if it were a fine imposed by such Court and paid to such woman, or, as the case may be, her heirs, parents or children. (4) nothing contained in this section shall affect the provisions of section 3 or section 4." 12. To strengthen the submissions, the counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on the two judgments of this Court which are reported as 2005(II) MPWN 39 =2005 CrLR (MP) 435 Shakuntala Sharma v. State of M.P. and 2009 CrLR (MP) 453 Jitendra and others v. State of M.P. to demonstrate that only that Criminal Court would have jurisdiction to try an offence where the actual and exclusive cause of action has accrued to the complainant and unless the cause of action is scattered in part or has accrued in different territorial jurisdiction of different Criminal Court (in which circumstance, section 178 of the Code would come to the rescue of the complainant) no other Criminal Court can entertain a complaint, where no cause of action has accrued to a complainant. 13. 13. The Supreme Court has ruled in the matter of Y. Abraham Ajith and others v. Inspector of Police, Chennai and another [ (2004)8 SCC 100 ], in relation to an offence committed in term of sections 498A and 406 of IPC read with section 4 of the Act that the offence shall "Ordinarily" be inquired into and tried by a Court, within whose local jurisdiction it was committed and unless an exception to this general rule exists, no Criminal Court shall usurp the jurisdiction, only on account of the fact of filing of a complaint, within its territorial jurisdiction. The relevant discussion about the accrual of the cause of action and the application of the principles of sections 177 and 178 find mention in the judgment where the Supreme Court has observed: "15. The expression "cause of action" has acquired a judicially settled meaning. In the restricted sense cause of action means the circumstances forming the infraction of the right or the immediate occasion for the action. In the wider sense, it means the necessary conditions for the maintenance of the proceeding including not only the alleged infraction, but also the infraction coupled with the right itself. Compendiously, the expression means every fact, which it would be necessary for the complainant to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right or grievance to the judgment of the Court. Every fact, which is necessary to be proved, as distinguished from every piece of evidence, which is necessary to prove such fact, comprises in "cause of action". 16. The expression "cause of action" has sometimes been employed to convey the restricted idea of facts or circumstances which constitute either the infringement or the basis of a right and no more. In a wider and more comprehensive sense, it has been used to denote the whole bundle of material facts. 17. The expression "cause of action" is generally understood to mean a situation or state of facts that entitles a party to maintain an action in a Court or a Tribunal; a group of operative facts giving rise to one or more bases for sitting; a factual situation that entitles one person to obtain a remedy in Court from another person. In Black's Law Dictionary a "cause of action" is stated to be the entire set of. In Black's Law Dictionary a "cause of action" is stated to be the entire set of. facts that gives rise to an enforceable claim; the phrase comprises every fact, which, if traversed, the plaintiff must prove in order to obtain judgment. In Words and Phrases (4th Edn.), the meaning attributed to the phrase "cause of action" in common legal parlance is existence of those facts, which give a party a right to judicial interference on his behalf. 18. In Halsbury's Laws of England (4th Edn.) it has been stated as follows: "Case of action" has been defined as meaning simply a factual situation, the existence of which entitles one person to obtain from the Court a remedy against another person. The phrase has been held from earliest time to include every fact which is material to be proved to entitle the plaintiff to succeed, and every fact which a defendant would have a right to traverse. "Cause of action" has also been taken to mean that a particular act on the part of the defendant which gives the plaintiff his cause of complaint, or the subject-matter of grievance founding the action, not merely the technical cause of action." 14. In yet another case of Manish Ratan and others v. State of M.P. and another [ 2007(1) JLJ 198 = (2007)1 SCC 262 ], the Supreme Court, while dealing with an identical dispute of the place of inquiry and trial, had examined about the existence of the territorial jurisdiction of Criminal Court situated at Jabalpur and Datia and found that since the entire set of evidence described in the complaint/report discloses the accrual of the cause of action at Jabalpur, the proceedings pending at Datia would not be justified because no cause of action accrued at Datia. 15. In the case of ALok and another v. State of M.P., reported as 2006(2) JLJ 121 = 2006(1) MPLJ 205 , this Court, while following the dictum of the Supreme Court, has also found that the entire cause of action in relation to the raising of the demand of dowry and ill-treatment, was not found to have accrued within the territorial jurisdiction of the Criminal Court at Shajapur, but the jurisdiction vests with the Criminal Court at Bhopal. 16. 16. In view of the entire facts and legal provision, it becomes crystal clear that when the entire cause of action or rather the entire bundle of facts contained in the complaint, narrate about the accrual of the cause of action to complainant Smt. Archana Saxena at Bhopal, the Criminal Court at Bhopal alone would have the territorial jurisdiction to adjudicate the matter as also to take cognizance of the matter and the Criminal Court at Guna would have no territorial jurisdiction to either entertain a complaint under section 4 or section 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 and as such the two orders passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Guna and the order passed by the Judicial Magistrate, Guna, on dates 2.8.2008 and 4.10.2007 are hereby set aside and quashed. 17. Since this Court has found that the Criminal Court at Bhopal would have the exclusive jurisdiction to deal with the complaint, where the complainant has raised the grievance in relation to the offences in terms of sections 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, this Court grants liberty and allow the complainant to institute a fresh/independent complainant before the competent Criminal Court at Bhopal, for seeking adjudication and decision on her complaint. 18. Consequently, this petition preferred under section 482, CrPC succeeds and is allowed with the aforesaid liberty to the complainant.