Hon'ble RAFIQ, J.—Petitioner has challenged the order dated 9.3.1995 by which he was awarded penalty of stoppage of two annual grade increments with cumulative effect and difference of salary, and that of subsistence allowance for the period of suspension with direction not to recover a sum of Rs. 5,174.97 from the petitioner. 2. Shri Nitin Jain, learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that in fact, no enquiry as required by Rule 53 read with Appendix-B thereto of the Rajasthan Agriculture Produce Market (Market Committee Employees) Service Rules, 1975 (for short, "Rules of 1975") was held and that respondents did not examine a single witness to prove as many as 23 charges against him. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that initially, one Assistant Director was made the enquiry officer but subsequently when he did not submit the enquiry report, he was changed and one Shri Shankar Lal Koolwal Supervisor Mandi Samiti was appointed as enquiry officer. Shri Shankar Lal Koolwal Supervisor Mandi Samiti never conducted the enquiry inasmuch not a single letter was issued by him to the petitioner to appear before him. Petitioner was not afforded any opportunity of hearing to defend himself. Petitioner was not even conveyed that the enquiry officer has been changed. Learned counsel argued that respondents did not even serve upon the petitioner copies of the enquiry report. Petitioner was in those circumstances gravely prejudiced by non-supply of the enquiry report. Order of penalty is therefore liable to be quashed and set-aside. 3. Shri Hemant Gupta, learned Deputy Government Counsel appearing for the respondents has opposed the writ petition and submitted that the petitioner was given a written communication on 9.5.1994 in which he was informed that the Mandi Samiti was contemplating to take a final decision in the pending enquiry against the petitioner. He should therefore firstly appear before the Secretary on 19.5.1994 for personal hearing, failing which; no further opportunity shall be given to him. If he wanted to produce any evidence or witness or if he wanted to examine the document, he may do so before the personal hearing on 19.5.1994. He should therefore firstly appear before the Secretary on 19.5.1994 for personal hearing, failing which; no further opportunity shall be given to him. If he wanted to produce any evidence or witness or if he wanted to examine the document, he may do so before the personal hearing on 19.5.1994. Learned counsel cited the letter dated 26.5.1994 written by the petitioner to the Secretary of the Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti Bandikui wherein, the petitioner submitted that he had even duly replied to the charge-sheet and that considering his defence in reply, matter should be concluded in appropriate and justified manner as expeditiously as possible. It was argued that petitioner was given full opportunity to defend himself and in fact he inspected the documents for as many as six days. He cannot therefore by now be allowed to complain about not providing any opportunity of hearing. 4. Consideration of the arguments aforesaid and perusal of the pleadings of the parties and other supporting documents, clearly shows that respondents in reply to the writ petition have not rebutted the assertion of the petitioner that not a single witnesses was cited to prove a plethora of charges against the petitioner numbering as many as 23. Contention of the respondents in reply to para 5 of the writ petition is that petitioner was required to appear before the enquiry officer and that he was allowed time to inspect the report of the Mandi Samiti and such time was extended and that he inspected such record for as many as six days and thus it is proved that he was not given sufficient opportunity for participation in the enquiry. It was the further contention of the respondents in the reply that the charges were based on the audit report regarding irregularities committed by him and therefore he was under an obligation to submit his explaination/defence to rebut such allegation of irregularities. It is further contended that the argument of the petitioner that enquiry officer should have first examined the departmental evidence of the petitioner without cross-examination, is not correct. Burden of proof disproving the charges framed would be on the delinquent. It is further contended by the respondents that departmental evidence in the form of documents was itself sufficient to establish the charge and it was for the petitioner to submit his defence to rebut such charge which were based on audit report. 5. Burden of proof disproving the charges framed would be on the delinquent. It is further contended by the respondents that departmental evidence in the form of documents was itself sufficient to establish the charge and it was for the petitioner to submit his defence to rebut such charge which were based on audit report. 5. In fact, tenure of the letter dated 9.5.1994 which was heavily relied on by the respondents, clearly shows the faulty manner in which the enquiry was proceeded with. This letter was written simply to the petitioner on 9.5.1994 and clearly reflects that it was written at the stage when enquiry was still pending. Even then, the Secretary, who was working as disciplinary authority of the petitioner, wrote to him that a disciplinary enquiry against him is pending and that the Mandi Samiti was contemplating to take a final decision in such disciplinary enquiry and therefore he should appear for personal hearing on 19.5.1994 and that this was a last opportunity to defend himself and thereafter no further opportunity shall be granted to him and that whatever documents or witnesses he wanted to produce and the records he may inspect, he may, do so prior to such personal hearing. It is indeed surprising that if the enquiry officer yet not submitted its report, as is evident from the tenure of the latter that the matter was still pending at the stage of departmental enquiry, how could the disciplinary authority call upon the petitioner for personal hearing and that too as a last chance with advise to produce whole of his documents/witnesses. Reply to the writ petition is completely silent as to why the enquiry report was not provided to the petitioner and the manner in which enquiry appears to have been conducted clearly shows that non supply of such enquiry report to the petitioner has certainly prejudiced him in the sense if it had been supplied to him, he would have had an opportunity to submit representation against such enquiry report before the disciplinary authority and disciplinary authority in that event could have been persuaded to remand the matter for de-novo enquiry. 6. 6. There is one additional reason for aforenoted conclusions and that is that the petitioner had categorically asserted that in midst of the proceedings, the enquiry officer was changed and one Shri Shankar Lal Koolwal, Supervisor Mandi Samiti was appointed as enquiry officer vide order dated 5.11.1993. Petitioner was never called upon by the said Shri Shankar Lal Koolwal Supervisor Mandi Samiti, to appear before him or to even submit any evidence. If at all, the enquiry report had been submitted by Shri Shankar Lal Koolwal Supervisor Mandi Samiti, the respondents could be expected to atleast place such enquiry report for perusal of this court. The procedure as contained in Appendix-B to Rules of 1975 appears to have been given a complete go-bye. If respondents were convicted that audit objects were sufficient to prove the charges against the petitioner and they could on that basis penalize him, there was no necessity for them to have at all initiated the departmental enquiry against the petitioner and when they served charge-sheet, appointed enquiry officer, enquiry officer was expected to act like a quasi judicial authority giving opportunity to both, the department as well as the delinquent even handed to prove their respective case. If that burden lay on the department to prove the charges and once that burden was discharged; delinquent obviously could be called upon to adduce his evidence in rebuttal thereof. All this procedure, as is clear from the record of the case, was not at all adhered to. 7. In view of the above discussion, the writ petition is allowed. The impugned-orders dated 9.3.1995 (Ann. 5) 28.10.1991 (Ann. 1) are quashed and set-aside. Petitioner shall be entitled to consequential benefits. 8. Compliance of this judgment shall be made within a period of three months from the date its copy is produced before the respondents.