Judgment :- Roshan Dalvi, J. 1. The Appellants have challenged the judgment and order of the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Greater Bombay in Sessions Case No.1007 of 1996, dated 27th October 2004, under which they have been convicted for offence punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian penal Code (IPC) and sentenced to suffer rigourous imprisonment for life and to pay fine of Rs.1000/- each and in default, to suffer further simple imprisonment for three months each. 2. The prosecution case is that the Appellants were the sister-in-law and mother-in-law of the deceased Vidya Shetye, respectively. They lived in the same house with Vidya and her husband one Prakash. There were frequent quarrels between the appellants and Vidya. A criminal complaint was also filed by Vidya’s brother against the Appellants as well as her husband for ill treating and harassing her. It is the prosecution case that on 4-1-1996 when the Appellants were in the house with Vidya, Appellant No.1, her sister-in-law poured kerosene over her person and Appellant No.2, her mother-in-law pushed her onto the stove which was burning and thus set her on fire. She received 100% burn injuries due to which she succumbed 4 days later on 8-1-1996. 3. This case has been sought to be proved essentially through her dying declarations made initially to the Police Officer who was called by the hospital Authorities and upon which this case came to be registered and then to the Special Executive Magistrate (SEM) who recorded the same and orally also to her husband and brother. There is no material difference between the 2 written Dying Declarations. 4. The case of the Appellants is that Vidya suffered from accidental burns and that they have been falsely implicated. 5. The prosecution has examined the Police Officer, the Magistrate, who recorded her Dying Declaration, as also the Doctor who certified her physical and mental condition at that time to prove the written Dying Declarations. The prosecution has also examined her husband and her brother to prove her oral Dying Declarations. The prosecution has also examined the panch to prove the spot panchanama, the Doctor to prove her postmortem report and the 2 Investigating Officers (IO) who investigated the case. The prosecution case is based on two written and two oral dying declarations. The prosecution has also examined her husband and her brother to prove her oral Dying Declarations. The prosecution has also examined the panch to prove the spot panchanama, the Doctor to prove her postmortem report and the 2 Investigating Officers (IO) who investigated the case. The prosecution case is based on two written and two oral dying declarations. The oral dying declarations were purportedly made to PW2-the husband and PW3-the brother of the deceased. 6. Vidya admittedly suffered burn injuries in her matrimonial home on 4th January 1996 at about 11 AM when the Appellants were admittedly present. Vidya was shifted to Mulund General Hospital. The police was immediately informed about the incident by the hospital. The Police Sub Inspector (PSI) immediately went to the hospital. By about 11.30 AM, he reached the casualty ward and met the Doctor on duty. The Doctor informed him that the patient was conscious and he recorded her statement and obtained the endorsement of the Doctor. He treated the same as the FIR and registered the case. He thereafter called the SEM-PW4, who recorded another similar dying declaration. PW4 also contacted the Doctor about the fitness of the patient. He also recorded her statement upon being informed that she was fit to make a statement. Thereafter the IO-PW8 prepared the spot panchanama and arrested the appellants. Further investigation was carried on by another IO-PW9. 7. The prosecution case has to be considered upon the evidence of the IO-PW8. It is his evidence that he received a message from Mulund General Hospital where a lady was admitted of burn injuries. At about 11:30 AM, he went to the hospital to see the injured person Vidya Shetye who was admitted to the casualty ward. He enquired from the Doctor the fitness of the patient to make the statement. He recorded the statement upon being informed by the doctor that the patient was conscious and fit to make the statement. He obtained the thumb mark of the patient upon recording the statement. He also countersigned the statement. He obtained the endorsement of the Doctor on the statement. He identified the thumb impression of the patient and his own signature. Upon such direct oral evidence, the statement of the patient recorded by him came to be marked as Exhibit 18A. He registered the offence under CR No.6 of 1996 upon that statement. 8. He also countersigned the statement. He obtained the endorsement of the Doctor on the statement. He identified the thumb impression of the patient and his own signature. Upon such direct oral evidence, the statement of the patient recorded by him came to be marked as Exhibit 18A. He registered the offence under CR No.6 of 1996 upon that statement. 8. His evidence further shows that after recording the statement and registering the offence, he requested SEM one Smt.Vaidya to record the dying declaration of the patient. He showed the patient to the SEM and left the Ward. That is the other statement of the patient marked Exhibit 14 in evidence upon being proved by the SEM-PW4. 9. It would be material to see the dying declaration recorded by the PO at this juncture. The dying declaration sets out the particulars of the deceased. It also shows her married life of 10 years and how it was spent with disputes between herself, her sister-in-law and mother-in-law. It then shows the incident that transpired on 4th January 1996 at 11 AM. It shows that these parties were in the house when the stove was on as the deceased was working. There was a quarrel between these parties. It sets out the specific roles of the Appellants. It shows that Appellant No.1, her sister-in-law came towards her and poured kerosene on her and Appellant No.2, her mother-in-law pushed her onto the stove which was burning and set her on fire and that is how she got burnt. It is thumb impressed by her and countersigned by the Police Officer-PW8. The Doctor has endorsed it in the margin thus:- “Patient is fully conscious to give the statement.” This dying declaration was recorded at about 11 40 AM as per the evidence of PW8. He has been extensively cross-examined in this regard. His cross-examination shows that it took about 20 to 25 minutes. His cross-examination clarifies that he had enquired from the Doctor about the fitness of the injured. Before he recorded the statement he enquired whether the patient was conscious to make the statement. That was because it was incumbent to obtain it. The cross-examination further clarifies that in about half an hour that transpired whilst he recorded the statement, no relative of the patient met him. It shows that he returned to the police station at 12:15 AM. That was because it was incumbent to obtain it. The cross-examination further clarifies that in about half an hour that transpired whilst he recorded the statement, no relative of the patient met him. It shows that he returned to the police station at 12:15 AM. Thereafter he again left to bring the SEM to cause another dying declaration to be recorded. His cross-examination further shows that it would take 6 to 7 minutes for him to reach the house of the SEM in a rickshaw. He went to the SEM's house from the hospital. The SEM came from her house to the hospital directly. The SEM had left her house within five minutes. Thereafter he was himself available in the hospital for about 25 minutes while the SEM recorded the other dying declaration. His cross-examination further shows that he took the SEM to the ward which was the casualty ward where the patient was admitted to show her the patient. He waited for her on the ground floor whilst the SEM recorded the statement of the patient. He thereafter reached her to her house and then went back to the police station. Thereafter he had gone to the place of the incident to record the spot panchanama. That recording was done between 12:55 PM and 2 PM. He arrested the accused thereafter. 10. He was cross-examined about the station diary entry that is required to be maintained by him. He deposed that he had made the relevant station diary entries. He produced the station diary. The relevant entries have been marked Exhibits 24 and 40. It may be mentioned that his examination-in-chief showed the precise work done by him; his cross-examination has clarified that aspect substantiated by the station diary entries got produced by him upon being required in the cross-examination. 11. The SEM-PW4 has deposed that she was requested to record the statement of the injured on 4th January 1996 in Mulund General hospital. She contacted the Doctor who was present in the Ward i.e. the casualty ward. She enquired whether the patient was conscious and fit to make a statement. The doctor told that the patient was in a fit condition to make a statement. The SEM went to the patient and questioned her. The patient told her about her life, disputes and the incident. The details of what she told have been recorded in the examination-in-chief. She enquired whether the patient was conscious and fit to make a statement. The doctor told that the patient was in a fit condition to make a statement. The SEM went to the patient and questioned her. The patient told her about her life, disputes and the incident. The details of what she told have been recorded in the examination-in-chief. These details show that upon being questioned, the deceased stated that she lived with her husband, 2 children mother-in-law and sister-in-law. They were cooking separately. The mother-in-law and sister-in-law used to harass her and pick up quarrels. On that day at about 11 AM when she lighted the stove for cooking she went to take a mixer grinder. The Appellants objected. She told them that they were using the utensils purchased by her husband. At that time her sister-in-law poured kerosene on her person and her mother-in-law pushed her on the stove which was burning. Hence, she received the burn injuries. This statement was reduced to writing by the SEM, it was read over to her and her thumb impression was taken. The contents were stated to be correct. The SEM also signed the statement and put her signature. The SEM identified the statement to be in her handwriting. She identified her signature and Vidya’s thumb impression. Upon such evidence the statement came to be marked as Exhibit-14. 12. It is material to see the said statement at this juncture. It is a detailed statement mentioning about the details of the deceased herself, her relations with her husband and her relatives being the Appellants and the details of the incident as aforesaid. It is thumb impressed by the deceased. It is signed and sealed by the Magistrate. It is dated 4-11-1996. It specifically shows the disputes between her and her mother-in-law and sister-in-law, the Appellants herein. It shows that she has no disputes with her husband. This statement does not have any endorsement of the Doctor. 13. The SEM has also been extensively cross-examined. In fact, immaterial and irrelevant questions have also been put to her. Her cross-examination shows that she had not obtained the endorsement of the Doctor at the beginning and at the end of the statement. She did not remember whether the Doctor was present near her when she recorded the statement. She refuted the case that she used to record as dictated by the Police Officer. Her cross-examination shows that she had not obtained the endorsement of the Doctor at the beginning and at the end of the statement. She did not remember whether the Doctor was present near her when she recorded the statement. She refuted the case that she used to record as dictated by the Police Officer. She did not record in question and answer form. When she obtained the thumb impression of the deceased the palm side of her thumb was slightly burnt. Before obtaining the thumb impression, she had asked the deceased whether the deceased would sign or put her thumb impression on her statement. The deceased had told her that she would put her thumb mark. Her cross-examination shows that she went to the hospital between 12.30 p.m. and 1 PM. As soon as she went to the hospital she contacted the Doctor and immediately went to the Ward and started recording the statement before 1 PM. She took about 20 minutes to record the statement. Her cross-examination further shows that when she went to the patient she was alone. The Police Officer took her to the patient in the Ward and showed the patient and thereafter he left the Ward. She further stated that the Police Constable had been to her house to call her. She went to the police station from where the police officer took her to the hospital. She did not remember the name of the police officer but he was the Investigating Officer in the case. She clarified that there was no other person from the relations of the deceased or her neighbourhood present when she recorded her statement. 14. It can be seen that in the examination-in-chief she has clearly shown the work that she did in recording the second dying declaration of Vidya. In the cross-examination she has clarified all these aspects. She has stated about what she did with the Doctor as well as the police officer. However, that was only her professional duty. She did not know either of them. She could not remember their names. Upon being questioned in the cross-examination, she has set out precisely the time during which she recorded the statement. Her cross-examination has clarified the two material aspects about the absence of the police officer as well as the relations of the patient at that time the statement was being recorded. She could not remember their names. Upon being questioned in the cross-examination, she has set out precisely the time during which she recorded the statement. Her cross-examination has clarified the two material aspects about the absence of the police officer as well as the relations of the patient at that time the statement was being recorded. It also shows how she approached the Doctor and obtained the certification of fitness of the patient from the Doctor and the fact of consciousness of the patient. 15. The doctor, PW6, examined the deceased and made an endorsement of her physical and mental condition on the Dying Declaration recorded by the Police Officer. His deposition shows that on 4th January 1996 when he served as Medical Officer in Mulund General Hospital he had examined the patient Vidya Shetye and as per his examination, the patient was fully conscious to make a statement. He was shown his endorsement on the dying declaration, Exhibit 18A. He identified his handwriting and his signature. He stated that the endorsement was correct. The endorsement has been marked Exhibit-18. 16. In his cross-examination he has confirmed that the statement of Vidya Shetye was recorded by the police officer after his examination. He has clarified that at the time of examination he took the history of the patient, her general condition, BP, pulse rate, and the percentage of burn injuries. Upon being questioned, he has deposed that he took notes of his examination in the MLC register maintained in the hospital. That was not available and hence not brought to Court. He also clarified that he examined the patient in the casualty room when the police officer was recording the statement. He attended to other patients in casualty ward. The police officer had taken about half an hour. He had administered IV fluids to the patient when her statement was recorded. He has refuted the suggestion that the patient's condition can deteriorate within 30 minutes from the time of the incident. He volunteered to state that nothing serious would happen within 30 minutes. 17. The two oral dying declarations are now required to be considered. The husband of the deceased has been examined as PW2. His evidence shows that both the Appellants were ill treating Vidya. His sister used to quarrel with her frequently. She used to tease her because she did not have an early pregnancy after marriage. 17. The two oral dying declarations are now required to be considered. The husband of the deceased has been examined as PW2. His evidence shows that both the Appellants were ill treating Vidya. His sister used to quarrel with her frequently. She used to tease her because she did not have an early pregnancy after marriage. He also deposed about a complaint filed by Vidya’s brother against all her in-laws, including himself. Despite such complaint, he has deposed about the dying declaration made by Vidya to him. He is a rickshaw driver. He was not in the house at the time of the incident. He came home soon thereafter. He was informed by his neighbours who had collected outside his house that his wife was shifted to the hospital. He did not go into his house. He went straight to the hospital. It is his deposition that when he went to meet his wife she told him that Appellant No.1 had poured kerosene on her and she caught fire because of burning stove. He was declared partially hostile. He did not depose about the role of his mother, Appellant No.2. However, in the cross-examination by the State, he agreed that what his wife had told him about the incident, he had stated when his statement was recorded by the police officer. His statement came to be recorded on 8th January 1996 soon after Vidya expired by P.W.10, the 2nd Investigating Officer, who took over investigation of the case. The case against the accused was converted from an offence under Section 307 to the offence under Section 302 of the IPC. He further agreed in his cross-examination that the statement recorded by the police officer was read over to him, but because of lapse of time he may not remember it when his evidence was recorded. However, he agreed that when the statement was recorded the incident was fresh and he had told the police officer all the facts. 18. His cross-examination shows that when he reached the hospital he did not enquire from the Appellants or any other relatives. He had straightaway gone to meet his wife. His cross-examination further shows that at the time his wife told about him about the incident no other relatives were present. He also clarified in his cross-examination that the statement of his wife recorded by the police officer was not in his presence. He had straightaway gone to meet his wife. His cross-examination further shows that at the time his wife told about him about the incident no other relatives were present. He also clarified in his cross-examination that the statement of his wife recorded by the police officer was not in his presence. He was near her bed for about half an hour. About one and half years after his wife died, he performed his second marriage. He has been residing separately from his sister, brother and mother thereafter in a licensed room. His brother resides with his mother. His cross-examination further shows that he messed separately from his mother and sister before the death of his wife. He has refuted the suggestion that his wife was quarrelling with him because he did not provide enough household expenses. He confirmed that he had no dispute with his wife, despite which her brother had lodged the complaint. He volunteered to state that the complaint was lodged because she had insisted on him staying separately from his mother and sister but at that time he was not ready to stay separately. 19. The brother of the deceased has been examined as PW3. He has deposed about the joint residence of the deceased with her husband and in-laws. He has deposed that soon after the marriage, Appellant No. 1 had ill treated his sister. This fact was told by her to her parents who informed him. He had lodged the complaint. With regard to the incident of 4th January 1996, he deposed that Vidya had told him that Appellant No.1 poured kerosene on her person when she was cooking food on the stove and both the Appellants pressed her on the stove which was in burning condition. His statement was recorded on 7th January 1996. 20. His cross-examination has clarified that he was alone when the oral dying declaration was made by Vidya to him. None of his relatives were present there. He was in the Ward with his sister for about one and a quarter hours. He had not seen the police officer in the Ward also. His cross-examination shows that after his sister told him about the incident he had not gone to the police station to lodge his report. 21. None of his relatives were present there. He was in the Ward with his sister for about one and a quarter hours. He had not seen the police officer in the Ward also. His cross-examination shows that after his sister told him about the incident he had not gone to the police station to lodge his report. 21. It would be material to collate the evidence relating to the 2 written dying declarations and the 2 oral dying declarations to appreciate the incident that took place and to see whether one, some or all of her statements can be accepted and whether conviction can be based thereupon. This would call for the appreciation of evidence of the I0-PW8 and the SEM-PW4 along with the Doctor-PW6 with regard to the written dying declaration. It would further require the appreciation of evidence of the husband-PW2 and the brother-PW3 with regard to the oral dying declarations. 22. The timing, as set out in the evidence, thanks to the cross-examination of the IO and the SEM, would be material to see how promptly and immediately the investigation was carried out in this case, especially with regard to the 2 written dying declarations of Vidya Shetty. The incident admittedly took place at 11 AM. PW8 received the message at 11:30 AM from Mulund General Hospital. He made the station diary entry Exhibit-24. He reached the hospital at 11.40 AM. Soon thereafter he met the Doctor-PW6. After inquiring about the condition of the patient, he recorded her statement in about 20 to 25 minutes. He immediately took the endorsement of the Doctor who was present in the same casualty ward/room. He returned to the police station at about 12:15 PM (incorrectly typewritten as 12.15 AM). He registered the offence at 12:15 PM. He went to the house of the SEM at 12:25 PM. The SEM left her house in five minutes. The SEM's evidence shows that she went to the hospital between 12:30 PM and 1 PM. She first met the Doctor and enquired about the patient's condition and consciousness. She took 20 minutes to record her statement. The IO-PW8 stood on the ground floor of the hospital for about 25 minutes while the SEM recorded her statement. Then he took her home and went back to the police station. Thereafter he got the spot panchanama recorded between 12:55 PM and 2 PM. She took 20 minutes to record her statement. The IO-PW8 stood on the ground floor of the hospital for about 25 minutes while the SEM recorded her statement. Then he took her home and went back to the police station. Thereafter he got the spot panchanama recorded between 12:55 PM and 2 PM. Thereafter he arrested the accused. He enquired with the neighbours but nobody came forward as a witness to say anything about the incident. The second station diary entry made by him after completing such investigation is of 4.15 p.m. That entry has been marked Exhibit-40. He clarified in his cross-examination that during the period 11 AM to 4 PM he was not at the police station. This chronology of events of that date, as deposed by the SEM as well as the IO, fits almost perfectly. It shows the efficiency with which the investigation was promptly carried out on the date of the incident. Thereafter the investigation was handed over to PW9, who recorded statements of various witnesses essentially after the death of Vidya Shetye, with which we are not at present concerned. 23. The evidence of PW4 and 8 shows that their respective dying declarations have been recorded as per the disclosure made by the deceased. The contents of these dying declarations are almost entirely consistent. Minor differences do not deal with the material incident at all. In the cross-examination further material aspects have come to light about the absence of the IO at the time the Magistrate recorded the statement and the absence of the relatives at the time both the witnesses recorded their statements. 24. It is argued on behalf of the Appellants by their learned Counsel, Mr.Gupte that the two dying declarations, Exhibits 14 and 18A, must be taken to be suspicious and rejected because they are both detailed declarations made in the same style. They show the particulars of the name, age, address occupation of the deceased as well as details of her married life. She was married in 1986. The incident took place in 1996. She lived in a joint family. After some disputes, she and her husband messed separately. The dying declarations show no dispute between the deceased and her husband. It shows no dispute with the brother-in-law either. It only shows disputes between Vidya Shetye and the Appellants herein. The incident has been stated clearly. The incident took place in 1996. She lived in a joint family. After some disputes, she and her husband messed separately. The dying declarations show no dispute between the deceased and her husband. It shows no dispute with the brother-in-law either. It only shows disputes between Vidya Shetye and the Appellants herein. The incident has been stated clearly. The role of both the Appellants has been specifically given. This is not a case of pouring kerosene and lighting a match. No match-stick has been found even in the spot panchanama. This is a case of burning on a stove while the deceased was cooking. It shows the dispute upon the deceased taking the mixer-grinder, to which the Appellants took objection. It shows the deceased's insistence upon using the mixer because Appellant No.1 was using the vessels purchased by her husband. This was enough to cause her to be a victim of the Appellants’ anger and vengeance. Appellant No.1 poured kerosene on her person. Since the stove was already lighted, Appellant No.2 pushed her towards it. As expected she was set ablaze entirely. She suffered hundred percent superficial to deep Burns. She was immediately shifted to the hospital where she made the two dying declarations to two independent witnesses. 25. It is argued by Mr.Gupte that the dying declaration of the SEM must be rejected because it contains no endorsement of the Doctor and the dying declaration of the IO must be rejected because it is recorded by a police officer. It is seen that the police officer has followed all the required steps for recording the dying declaration upon which the crime is registered. There is nothing to preclude the IO from recording the Dying Declaration. As it was more desirable to record the dying declaration by a Magistrate, he called the Magistrate. He himself took care to bring her from her residence to the hospital and thereafter he did not remain with her. 26. The Doctor had examined the patient initially. The Doctor was in the same casualty ward when the IO had recorded the statement. That had taken a mere half an hour. Within another hour the statement by the SEM was also recorded. The Doctor was again asked by the SEM about her physical and mental condition. He had told her that the patient was in a fit condition to make a statement. That had taken a mere half an hour. Within another hour the statement by the SEM was also recorded. The Doctor was again asked by the SEM about her physical and mental condition. He had told her that the patient was in a fit condition to make a statement. This was minutes after he had put his endorsement when the first dying declaration was completed. This was after the police officer had inquired of her condition. Hence it is seen that both these witnesses had inquired and were informed by the Doctor about the consciousness and the physical and mental condition of Vidya before they recorded their respective dying declarations. The Doctor has not been cross-examined about whether the SEM had approached the Doctor to enquire about the patient's condition. The Doctor has also not been questioned in cross-examination as to why he did not give two separate endorsements on both the dying declarations. There is absolutely nothing to reject the evidence of the IO, the Magistrate as well as the Doctor with regard to either of the dying declarations; both are seen to be correctly recorded after understanding the physical and mental condition of the patient. 27. The two oral dying declarations assume lesser importance in view of the 2 written declarations recorded by the IO as well as the SEM. They have been recorded only after Vidya expired on 8th June 1996 after investigation was taken over by the 2nd IO. Nevertheless they need be considered. PW2, the husband of Vidya, has himself stated at least about the role of appellant No.1 as informed to him by his wife. This has also been similarly stated by the brother of the deceased, PW3. Hence the role of Appellant No.1 is consistent in all the 4 dying declarations. The role of Appellant No.2 is absent in the dying declaration of PW2. This is most understandable as he has had to depose against his own mother. He could not make himself to state in precise words the role of the mother, as reported to him by his wife in her oral dying declaration. Yet in his cross-examination he has accepted that he had told all the facts to the police officer while they were fresh in his mind soon after the incident. He could not make himself to state in precise words the role of the mother, as reported to him by his wife in her oral dying declaration. Yet in his cross-examination he has accepted that he had told all the facts to the police officer while they were fresh in his mind soon after the incident. He blamed his memory for the part hostility shown towards the prosecution by him in respect of the role of his mother. That, however, does not militate against or denude the written dying declarations recorded by the IO and the SEM in which her role has been clearly set out. That leaves the dying declaration of PW3, the brother with regard to the role of the mother-in-law of the deceased. Whereas in the written dying declarations she is stated to have pushed the deceased to the stove, in the oral dying declaration deposed by the brother of the deceased, both the accused, including the mother-in-law, are stated to be pressed her on the stove. We may mention that it hardly matters whether she was pushed near the stove or pressed on it. The fact remains that the stove was lighted. That aspect has been brought out also in the evidence of PW2, which runs thus: “and when kerosene was poured on the person of Vidya she caught fire because of burning stove.” Hence even if we discard the dying declaration of the brother of the deceased, it would make no difference to the prosecution case. 28. We may mention that in the cross-examination of these two witnesses, the husband and brother of the deceased, further clarifications that are being brought on record are that whilst the oral dying declarations were respectively made to these witnesses, no other relations were present. The evidence of the husband further shows that the police officer never recorded Vidya’s statement in his presence. A telling circumstance has been tacitly brought out in the cross-examination of PW2, the husband of Vidya, that he has been living separately with his second wife after his second marriage! 29. Though much has been made about the length of the written dying declarations to claim that based upon such length alone they should be rejected, Mrs. A telling circumstance has been tacitly brought out in the cross-examination of PW2, the husband of Vidya, that he has been living separately with his second wife after his second marriage! 29. Though much has been made about the length of the written dying declarations to claim that based upon such length alone they should be rejected, Mrs. Deshmukh, the learned APP, brought to our notice that no question was asked to the Doctor whether the deceased was in a position to make the dying declarations of that length. It may be mentioned that the Doctor's evidence shows that as per his examination the patient was fully conscious to make the statement. His cross-examination shows that her condition would not deteriorate within 30 minutes. There is nothing to show that a person who was fully conscious could not make the two dying declarations of that length which took about 20 to 25 minutes each to record on the date of the incident itself. 30. The postmortem report shows hundred percent superficial to deep burns. It also shows slough in patches on the person of the deceased. The evidence of SEM shows that the palm side of her thumb was slightly burnt. There is, therefore, nothing to show that she could not make the statement. 31. The evidence of the SEM and the IO corroborate one another with regard to the presence of the IO when the SEM recorded the dying declaration of the deceased. The SEM has stated in her cross-examination that the police took her to the ward, showed the patient and thereafter left the Ward. The IO has deposed in his examination-in-chief that he showed the SEM the patient and left the Ward. In his cross-examination he has clarified that he took the SEM to the casualty ward and thereafter came out of the Ward. Even the brother and the husband of the deceased have deposed that no one was present when the IO recorded the statement. 32. The culpability of the accused, upon considering Vidya’s dying declarations, is required to be seen from the clear, distinct jurisprudence in this area. 33. In the case of Laxman vs. State of Maharashtra, 2002 All MR (Cri) 2259 (SC), it has been held that recording of the dying declaration by the Magistrate is a rule of caution. 32. The culpability of the accused, upon considering Vidya’s dying declarations, is required to be seen from the clear, distinct jurisprudence in this area. 33. In the case of Laxman vs. State of Maharashtra, 2002 All MR (Cri) 2259 (SC), it has been held that recording of the dying declaration by the Magistrate is a rule of caution. Though it is the usual practice, there is no requirement of law in that behalf. There is also no specified statutory form required for recording it. The evidentiary value and the weight to be attached to it depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The court is required to be satisfied about the state of mind of the person making the statement. Hence even if it is not recorded by the Magistrate or even if it does not contain the endorsement showing the examination by the Doctor, if the person making it satisfied himself about the condition of the deceased and if it is found to be truthful it can be accepted by the court. 34. This Court has also held in the case of the Tejram s/o. Ukandrao Patil vs. State of Maharashtra, 2009 ALL MR (Cri) 1047, to which our attention has been drawn by the learned APP that though the dying declaration was not recorded by the Special Magistrate, it would be accepted if it was otherwise reliable. In that case the accused came home in a drunken condition and seeing his mother-in-law in the house he went into a rage, abused his wife and her mother and poured kerosene over his wife and set her on fire. Her mother, as well as the landlady who intervened, both tried to save her. In the process they all sustained injuries. The wife had sustained 100% injuries; the mother-in-law sustained 77% were injuries. The Special Judicial Magistrate recorded the dying declaration of the mother-in-Law, but not of the wife. The wife’s statement was recorded by the police officer who failed to obtain the medical fitness certificate from the Doctor regarding her physical and mental condition. The wife had sustained 100% injuries; the mother-in-law sustained 77% were injuries. The Special Judicial Magistrate recorded the dying declaration of the mother-in-Law, but not of the wife. The wife’s statement was recorded by the police officer who failed to obtain the medical fitness certificate from the Doctor regarding her physical and mental condition. Despite the absence of these two important facts, upon considering the evidence as a whole and placing reliance upon the case of P.V. Radhakrishnan vs. State of Karnataka, AIR 2003 SC 2859 and Laxman vs. State of Maharashtra, 2002 ALL MR (Cri)2259 (SC) : AIR 2002 SC 2973 , the dying declaration of the wife showing homicidal death came to be accepted. It was observed that even the mother of the victim who was on the spot and attempted to extinguish the fire had serious burn injuries caused to her. Similarly the landlady suffered some burn injuries. Both the ladies along with the wife were admitted to the same hospital. The appellant himself was on the spot and suffered some burn injuries. The dying declaration showed the role played by her mother and the landlady. It also showed that the appellant was himself present and tried to pull his wife and in the process had sustained burn injuries. She also stated that people brought her to the hospital. The presence of the accused at the scene of the offence, the injuries to all, and the absence of any previous reason for the wife to end her life were the specific circumstances appreciated to fix the guilt upon the accused by placing reliance upon the dying declaration of the wife recorded by the police officer even without the Doctor’s endorsement. The observations of the Supreme Court in Laxman's case (supra) that the dying declaration could be recorded by the Magistrate, or a doctor or a police officer were taken into account. 35. In the case of State vs. Singari & anr., 2002(6) KLJ 52, the dying declaration came to be challenged before the Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court as it was not containing the doctor’s certificate in the prescribed form regarding the fitness of the victim to make the statement. 35. In the case of State vs. Singari & anr., 2002(6) KLJ 52, the dying declaration came to be challenged before the Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court as it was not containing the doctor’s certificate in the prescribed form regarding the fitness of the victim to make the statement. It was held that where the record can inspire confidence in the court’s mind with regard to the veracity and credibility and also the acceptability of the dying declaration, a mere technical lapse would not water down its evidentiary value. In that case the only dying declaration was accepted even in the absence of the doctor’s certificate. Conviction on that basis was held to be correctly made. In that case the incident took place on 25/04/1994. The deceased died of gunshot injuries on 27/04/1994. He had stated about the three accused in his statement which came to be recorded after the duty doctor’s sanction was taken by the police officer. The Doctor had examined the patient and opined that he was in a sufficiently fit condition to make a statement. The dying declaration did not contain the requisite certificate in the prescribed form. The contention that the doctor’s certificate should have been superscribed on the dying declaration by the Doctor's endorsement was rejected. It was observed that there was a refinement of the law. The Supreme Court had held that where the record would inspire confidence in the mind of the court about the veracity, credibility and acceptability of the dying declaration, a mere absence of the certificate was not a good enough technical lapse to reject the dying declaration. 36. Mr.Gupte urged that dying declarations, in this case, are unproportionately detailed and lengthy. Such detailed description of the declarant, including her name, age, occupation, address, etc. as also her life history could not have been given by her, given her medical condition. In support of such contention, Mr.Gupte relied upon a judgment in the case of State of Maharashtra vs. Sanjay Digambarrao Rajhans, 2005(1) Bom. C.R. (Cri.) 737. That was a case of the victim who alleged in her dying declaration that her fiancé (shown to be her husband) had set her on fire on a moving scooter. They were due to be married. They had certain quarrels. There were dying declarations recorded, one by the Police Officer and the other by the SEM. C.R. (Cri.) 737. That was a case of the victim who alleged in her dying declaration that her fiancé (shown to be her husband) had set her on fire on a moving scooter. They were due to be married. They had certain quarrels. There were dying declarations recorded, one by the Police Officer and the other by the SEM. Though both of them showed that the victim suffered burn injuries on a moving scooter, in material particulars they were different and inconsistent with one another. The earliest statement was recorded by the SEM. The later one was recorded by the Police Officer without consulting the Medical Officer in the hospital to which the victim was shifted. The Supreme Court has set out the contents of both the dying declarations in that judgment. In the first dying declaration recorded by the SEM at about 3.15 a.m., the victim stated that the accused, who was her fiancé, had told her that they would go out and had asked her to “take the petrol”. She had purchased one liter petrol can from the particular Petrol Pump, the name of which she gave in her declaration, and kept it in his house. They quarreled and he poured the petrol taking it out of the can and set her on fire, at which time she was wearing Terricot Punjabi dress. It is observed by the Supreme Court that such declaration gives the impression that the incident took place in the house of the accused. However, in the following sentence, she stated that the accused slowed down the scooter and poured petrol on her person from the can kept on the front side of the scooter and set her on fire by lighting a matchstick. The statement took 45 minutes to record - from 3.15 a.m. to 4 a.m. Her thumb impression was taken thereon. The statement was in Marathi language with a few words in English. It was observed that such language could not be used by an educated person well versed with Marathi language hailing from a traditional Marathi family. At the end of the statement, the declarant was asked whether she had doubt on any person and she had said that she had doubt on the accused, a question and answer which was observed to have been meaningless. The next dying declaration had been recorded after half an hour by the Investigating Officer. At the end of the statement, the declarant was asked whether she had doubt on any person and she had said that she had doubt on the accused, a question and answer which was observed to have been meaningless. The next dying declaration had been recorded after half an hour by the Investigating Officer. That was at about 4.30 a.m. That was a lengthy dying declaration running into two typed pages or more. It contained “necessary and unnecessary, minute and material details”. The declarant stated her family particulars, education, her contacts with the accused, the hour to hour details of her movements from the time she left home at 9 a.m. on the previous day, the colour and style of the dress she was wearing, places at which she spent time with the accused, the conversation they had, the scooter number, the name of the petrol pump where she purchased petrol etc. It showed a ready availability of petrol in the scooter. The accused is stated to have given her Rs.50/- to purchase petrol. She stated that the accused had taken her purse and petrol can first but later returned her purse and deposited the petrol can in the scooter dicky in the front. Then she narrated the incident. According to her narration, at about 7.30 p.m. whilst the accused took her to her house on his scooter they had a verbal quarrel. The accused slowed down the scooter, took out the petrol can from the front side dicky of the scooter by his right hand, opened to cork and poured petrol on her while uttering the words that he will not marry her and ignited the match. At that time she was busy talking with him Immediately she was engulfed by the fire and as the scooter was proceeding in slow speed, she jumped down. When she started shouting, people collected and extinguished the fire. The accused took her to the hospital in an auto rickshaw and admitted her there. The statement gives an explanation as to why the accused was keeping a match box with him. The IO did not explain why he had to record the second dying declaration after the Executive Magistrate had recorded the first dying declaration already. He could not explain why he did not take the opinion of the doctor as to the fitness of her condition. The IO did not explain why he had to record the second dying declaration after the Executive Magistrate had recorded the first dying declaration already. He could not explain why he did not take the opinion of the doctor as to the fitness of her condition. It was observed that such dying declaration was a manipulated document in the anxiety to plant evidence against the accused. The Supreme Court has considered the time and mode of recording the dying declarations. The Supreme Court has been unable to understand the lighting of the match stick. It has been observed that the dying declarations did not appear to be accurate or unalloyed version of the deceased. They contained many embellishments and could not pass the test of total reliability. The Supreme Court further considered the entry in the hospital register made by the doctor while admitting the victim in which she also implicated the accused shown as her husband. That endorsement showed that since her husband was doubting her, today in the evening while they were going on scooter, he poured petrol on her body and set her on fire by matchstick. It further showed her statement that “Petrol was there in the can in my hand”. This contradiction of where the petrol can was has also been noticed. The Supreme Court has marshalled such evidence. The scooter was in motion. The accused is stated to have taken over the petrol can from her, removed its lid, sprinkled the petrol on her and ignited the fire with matchstick. The Supreme Court has observed that even if such operation was possible, it would have immediately attracted the attention of the deceased and she would have suspected foul-play. She could have jumped out of the scooter as it was slowed down and saved herself. It can be said that it is not only because of the length of the dying declarations that they have been rejected as has been the contention of Mr.Gupte. It was because the dying declarations inspired no confidence given the contents mentioned above. They were held to be manipulated documents consisting of a number of inconsistencies and improbabilities. They were contradictory with the statement recorded in the hospital register. Her physical condition also was seen not to have been good - she died later in the day. It was because the dying declarations inspired no confidence given the contents mentioned above. They were held to be manipulated documents consisting of a number of inconsistencies and improbabilities. They were contradictory with the statement recorded in the hospital register. Her physical condition also was seen not to have been good - she died later in the day. The doctor’s endorsement was not taken by the IO, who recorded the dying declaration even after the SEM had recorded it. Taking into account all these considerations, the dying declarations came to be rejected. 37. The other judgment relied upon by Mr.Gupte is in the case of Nallapati Sivaiah vs. Sub-Divisional officer, Guntur, A.P., 2007 All MR (Cri) 2949 (S.C.). In that case, the incident took place at 5 p.m. The deceased was noticed as dead at 9.30 p.m. Two dying declarations were recorded in between. Contradictions were noted in the two dying declarations. The doctor, who was stated to have examined the deceased, was not examined in Court. In the first dying declaration recorded at 6.35 p.m., the deceased was able to affix his right hand thumb impression but could not do so at 7.10 p.m. as blood was oozing from both hands and right foot and his toe impression of left foot was taken. The statement recorded by the Magistrate showed that the Magistrate certified that the declarant was conscious, coherent and in a fit condition to give statement. However, the Magistrate had not verified from the doctor this fact. The principles laid down in several earlier judgments of the Supreme Court were recited and under those circumstances, the dying declarations were held not reliable enough to be accepted for conviction without corroboration. 38. In the case of Om Prakash vs. State of Punjab, 1992 4 SCC 212 in paragraph 8 at page 216, a detailed statement of the victim of first and second degree septic burns, but who was conscious at the time, came to be accepted. 39. In the case of Deepak Baliram Bajaj & anr. vs. State of Maharashtra, 1993 Criminal Law Journal 3269, the dying declaration of the victim, who had suffered 100% burn injuries, was recorded by the Constable who asked questions in Sindhi, which the victim had replied in Sindhi and it was translated to the Constable in Hindi, who recorded them in Marathi language. vs. State of Maharashtra, 1993 Criminal Law Journal 3269, the dying declaration of the victim, who had suffered 100% burn injuries, was recorded by the Constable who asked questions in Sindhi, which the victim had replied in Sindhi and it was translated to the Constable in Hindi, who recorded them in Marathi language. The dying declaration containing minute details and extremely coherent replies, though the lady was in acute pain and agony, was held not reliable. In that case, the declaration showed, inter alia, that the victim was in a position to tell the names of the hospital where she was taken, including postal zone number of the first hospital as also the exact time of her arrival at the second hospital. Such coherence led to doubt in the mind of the Court. 40. In this case, the details are with regard to her own particulars and her married life. It could be that whilst she was asked questions about her age, occupation, address, etc, she could have replied which came to be taken down in her dying declarations. There is nothing unusual about the replies relating to such particulars. 41. Mr.Gupte laid much stress upon the fact that in the case of Deepak Baliram Bajaj (supra) (as in this case also) her brain was shown to be congested in the postmortem report. Mr.Gupte further argued that, in this case, the postmortem report shows that her brain was congested and consequently, she could have never been in a fit condition to give the statement. In paragraph 18 of that judgment, the observations relating to the victim having suffered 100% burns and the postmortem examination showed that most of her organs, including brain were congested. What is material to note is that in this case, the victim died after 3 to 4 days. The postmortem report showed her condition at the time of her death, 4 days after her dying declarations were recorded. Her condition could not have so deteriorated on the first day itself when her statements were recorded soon after her admission in the hospital. In the case of Deepak Baliram Bajaj (supra), the victim lady expired on the following evening. All her organs were shown to have been congested. That case is, therefore, not on the same footing as this case. 42. In the case of Deepak Baliram Bajaj (supra), the victim lady expired on the following evening. All her organs were shown to have been congested. That case is, therefore, not on the same footing as this case. 42. Mr.Gupte further relied upon a judgment in the case of Samadhan Mahadu Badgujar vs. State of Maharashtra, 2002 All MR (Cri) 342. In that case, two dying declarations came to be rejected by a Division Bench of this Court. The Court laid down the guiding principles for the dying declarations which require to be scrupulously followed. In that case, the victim lady died on the same night of the incident. Her statement that while she was sleeping she sustained burning sensation and on being awake, she saw her husband with kerosene bottle and a match box in his hand was disbelieved. In that case, the SEM visited the hospital and contacted the doctor. The doctor, upon inquiry, stated that the patient was in a position to make the statement. Her statement came to be recorded by the SEM. Then the Head Constable recorded her statement and the offence came to be registered thereupon. The Division Bench took exception to the fact that the dying declaration did not contain at its commencement the certificate of the doctor. The certificate given by the doctor was 5 minutes after the statement came to a close. The certificate did not show that the doctor had examined the patient with a view to ascertain whether she was physically and mentally fit to make the statement. It merely endorsed that the patient was conscious and in a position to make the statement. Hence, the Court concluded that the certification did not show her fit mental condition. Though the doctor and the Magistrate had gone to the ward where the patient was admitted, the doctor had taken her pulse and had stated to the Magistrate that she was in a position to make the statement, the doctor had endorsed 5 minutes after the statement was recorded. The statement was not read over by the Magistrate to the victim lady and the doctor was not present throughout the time that her statement was recorded. The statement was not read over by the Magistrate to the victim lady and the doctor was not present throughout the time that her statement was recorded. It was also observed that the doctor or the SEM had not asked her questions before recording dying declaration as to whether her mental and physical condition was such that she was fit to give the statement. In those circumstances, her dying declarations came to be rejected. We may mention that these requirements of the dying declarations set out in paragraph 19 of the judgment go contrary to the requirements of the dying declarations in the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Laxman vs. State of Maharashtra (2002) 6 SCC 710 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 1491 and the case of P.V. Radhakrishnan vs. State of Karnataka, (2003) 6 SCC 443 followed in the case of State of Rajasthan vs. Peermentra Singh, (2009) 7 SCC 320 (supra) of the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court laying down the guidelines with regard to the dying declarations thus:- “The court also must further decide that the deceased was in a fit state of mind and had the opportunity to observe and identify the assailant. Normally, therefore, the court in order to satisfy whether the deceased was in a fit mental condition to make the dying declaration looks up to the medical opinion. But where the eyewitnesses state that the deceased was in a fit and conscious state to make the declaration, the medical opinion will not prevail, nor can it be said that since there is no certification of the doctor as to the fitness of the mind of the declarant, the dying declaration is not acceptable. A dying declaration can be oral or in writing and any adequate method of communication whether by words or by signs or otherwise will suffice provided the indication is positive and definite. In most cases, however, such statements are made orally before death ensues and is reduced to writing by someone like a magistrate o r a doctor o r a police officer. When it is recorded, no oath is necessary nor is the presence of a magistrate absolutely necessary, although to assure authenticity it is usual to call a magistrate, if available for recording the statement of a man about to die. When it is recorded, no oath is necessary nor is the presence of a magistrate absolutely necessary, although to assure authenticity it is usual to call a magistrate, if available for recording the statement of a man about to die. There is no requirement of law that a dying declaration must necessarily be made to a magistrate and when such statement is recorded by a magistrate there is no specified statutory form for such recording. Consequently, what evidential value or weight has to be attached to such statement necessarily depends on the facts and circumstances of each particular case. What is essentially required is that the person who records a dying declaration must be satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of mind. Where it is proved by the testimony of the magistrate that the declarant was fit to make the statement even without examination by the doctor the declaration can be acted upon provided the court ultimately holds the same to be voluntary and truthful. A certification by the doctor is essentially a rule of caution and therefore the voluntary and truthful nature of the declaration can be established otherwise.” [Emphasis supplied] 43. We may mention that since the dying declaration may be oral or written, long or short, and could be recorded by any person, including the Magistrate or a doctor or police officer, the stringent tests laid down in the case of Samadhan Mahadu Badgujar (supra) would not hold good and must be taken to have been impliedly set aside by the judgment in the case of Laxman (supra). 44. The case of the Appellants is also required to be considered. The case put to the IO in his cross-examination is that the deceased received burn injuries in an accidental fire. The accused had admitted their presence in the house when the incident took place. That was the matrimonial home of the deceased, though it is their home also. The accused have admitted that Vidya suffered kerosene Burns on 4th January 1996 at about 11 AM and was shifted to the hospital. Their case in their statements recorded under Section 313 of the Criminal Procedure Code is of false implication. The Appellants have not removed the deceased to the hospital, though Appellant No.2 also came to the hospital. The spot panchanama has not shown any burst stove which was seized. Their case in their statements recorded under Section 313 of the Criminal Procedure Code is of false implication. The Appellants have not removed the deceased to the hospital, though Appellant No.2 also came to the hospital. The spot panchanama has not shown any burst stove which was seized. The Appellants claim that one neighbour, whose statement was recorded by the police officer, has stated that Appellant No.1 had extinguished the fire. This shows that they had not caused the injuries. The case that has been put to the IO-PW9, who recorded the statement of that witness, who was not examined, is that Appellant No.2 was putting a chadder on the body of the deceased and Appellant No.1 was “there with the bucket and water.” We fail to understand how these two cases would show that the Appellants did anything to extinguish the fire or to help the deceased when she was set ablaze. They may use the bucket and water because their own house could have caught fire. Putting Chadder on the body of the deceased after she suffered burns would not ameliorate her condition. 45. The Appellants have also tried to show and suggest that they received some burn injuries. No evidence in that regard is produced by the prosecution. They have also not caused any such evidence to be produced. However, their medical certificates show that the thumb of Appellant No.1 and 4 fingers of the left hand of Appellant No.2 were burnt. They received 2.4% Burns. These injuries do not show any effort put in by the Appellants to extinguish the fire. In fact, these injuries show the slight burns suffered by Appellant No.1 immediately upon she pouring kerosene on the person of Vidya and the injuries on the fingers of the left hand of Appellant No.2, in fact, corroborate her role of pushing Vidya onto the burning stove after she was doused with kerosene. This, further corroborates the aforesaid written dying declarations. 46. The evidence recorded by the prosecution, including the cross-examination made on behalf of the accused, leaves no manner of doubt that the deceased died a homicidal death as stated by her initially to the police officer and then to the SEM which has been recorded in the two dying declarations, Exhibit-18A and Exhibit-14 respectively after obtaining the endorsement of the Doctor, Exhibit-18. The conviction recorded by the learned trial Judge based upon such clear, cogent and reliable evidence is, therefore, seen to be correct. We find no reason to interfere with the conviction and sentence awarded by the trial Judge. The conviction is, therefore, confirmed. The Appeal stands dismissed.