Judgment N.K.Mody,J. ( 1. ) Being aggrieved by the judgment and decree dated 3.01.06 passed by XIII Additional District Judge,Indore in Civil Suit No.28A/04 whereby the suit filed by the respondent under section 12(l)(a) and(f) of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act (hereinafter called as "the Act") was decreed and the appellant was directed to vacate the suit accommodation and also to pay arrears of rent, present appeal has been filed. ( 2. ) Short facts of the case are that the respondent filed a suit for eviction against the appellant alleging that the appellant is in occupation of the accommodation bearing house No.22/1 situated at Kachhi Mohala,Indore. It was alleged in the plaint that Ambalal,father of respondent, was the owner of the accommodation, who has died in November, 1990. It was alleged that Ambalal during his life time executed a gift deed dated 31/12/1963, whereby the suit-property was gifted by Ambalal to the respondent. It was further alleged that appellant is the tenant in the suit-accommodation at the rate of 1500/- per month. Appellant is irregular in paying the rent and is in arrears of rent w.e.f. 01/11/93 which has not been paid in spite of demand. It was also alleged that respondent requires the suit-accommodation for running Computer Classes bonafidly and for this purpose, respondent is having no other alternative accommodation of his own. It was alleged that since the rent was not paid in spite of demand notice dated 12/06/03, which was duly served on the appellant, therefore, respondents entitled for a decree of eviction under Section 12(l)(a) and (f)of the Act. ( 3. ) The suit was contested by the appellant by filing written statement. It was alleged in the written statement that the appellant was inducted in the suit premises by Ambalal,father of the respondent, as tenant @ Rs.200/- per month in the year 1980. It was also alleged that after his death brother of the respondent was receiving the rent from the appellant and the rent has already been paid up to 30/06/2004. It was denied that appellant was in arrears of rent and the need of the respondent is bonafide. It was prayed that the suit filed by the respondent be dismissed. ( 4. It was denied that appellant was in arrears of rent and the need of the respondent is bonafide. It was prayed that the suit filed by the respondent be dismissed. ( 4. ) On the basis of the pleadings of parties learned trial Court framed the issues, recorded the evidence and decreed the suit filed by the respondent under Section 12(a) and (f)of the Act against which present appeal has been filed. ( 5. ) During pendency of appeal an application was filed by the appellant under Order VI Rule 17 CPC wherein prayer was made to amend written statement and to allow the appellant to raise a ground to the effect that respondent is a retired employee of the Steel authority of India which is an Undertaking of Government of India. It was alleged that since the respondent is a landlord of the category which is mentioned under Section 23-J of Act, therefore, learned Court below was having no jurisdiction to entertain the suit for eviction filed under Section 12(1 )(f)of the Act. ( 6. ) Learned counsel for the appellant Mr. G.M. Chaphekar,submits that learned trial Court committed error in decreeing the suit under Section 12(l) (a) and (f)of the Act. Learned counsel submits that respondent was in employment of M/s. Bhilai Steel Plant, which is a Government undertaking. Thus respondent is a landlord of the category specified under Section 23-J of the Act, hence the Civil Court is having no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. For this contention reliance was placed on a decision of Honble Apex Court in the matter of Dhannalal Vs. Kalawatibai,reported in 2002 (6) SCC 16 , wherein the Honble Apex Court has held as under : (i) Where a claim for eviction is filed by a landlord, or a co-landlord, belonging to any one of the five categories defined in Section 23J of the Act, as the sole applicant without objection by other co-landlords who have not joined as co-applicants and the nature of claim for eviction is covered by Section 23-A(b) of the Act, the proceedings would lie only before the Rent Controlling Authority. (ii) Where a claim for eviction is filed by a landlord or by such a co-landlord who does not belong to any of the categories defined by Section 23-J and the other co-landlord / landlady falling in one of the categories defined in Section 23-J is not joined as a co-plaintiff the claim shall have to be filed only by way of a suit instituted in a Civil Court. (iii) If the proceedings are initiated by such co-owner landlords, one or more of whom belong to Section 23-J category while some others are those not falling within the definition of "landlord" under Section 23-J and the requirement pleaded proves a cause of action collectively to all the landlords arrayed as plaintiffs or applicants, the choice of forum lies with the landlords. They may file an application before RCA under Chapter III-A or may file a civil suit in a civil court under Section 12 of the Act; in either case the proceedings would be competent and maintainable. ( 7. ) Learned counsel submits that after the decision of Honble Apex Court, this Court in the matter of Nandlal Vs. Mangibai,reported in 2006(1) MPLJ, 231, has held that a composite plea of eviction cannot be entertained by a Civil Court as jurisdiction to try and decide applications under Section 23-J is conferred on Rent Controlling Authority. Reliance was also placed on a decision of this Court in the matter of Shyamsingh Vs. Mulyabai,reported in 2006 (3) MPLJ, 125, wherein in a suit filed by a divorced lady, it was held that since the divorced lady is covered under special category within the meaning of sub-section (iii) of Section 23-J, therefore. Civil Court is having no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. Reliance was also placed on a decision in the matter of Ram Ratan Vyas Vs. Goverdhan,reported in 2007 (1) MPACJ, 325, wherein this Court has held that a landlord who falls in these categories of cases specified in Section 23-J of the Act cannot file a civil suit before the Civil Court on the grounds covered under Section 12(l)(e) or(f) of the Act. ( 8. ) Mr. G.M. Chaphekar,learned counsel for the appellant further submits that the M.P. Accommodation Control Act came in force in the year 1961. Grounds for eviction which also covers ground under Section 12 (l)(e) and (f) remain for all categories of landlord till 15/08/1983. ( 8. ) Mr. G.M. Chaphekar,learned counsel for the appellant further submits that the M.P. Accommodation Control Act came in force in the year 1961. Grounds for eviction which also covers ground under Section 12 (l)(e) and (f) remain for all categories of landlord till 15/08/1983. Chapter- III- A was introduced by M.P. Amendment Act No.27/83, which came in force w.e.f.16/08/83, whereby Section 12( l)(e) and (f)were deleted and exclusive jurisdiction was given to Rent Controlling Authority. Learned counsel further submits that again the Act was amended by Act No 7/85, which came in force w.e.f.16/01/85, whereby Section 12( l)(e) and (f)was restored and Section 23-J was also added wherein the word landlord was defined and for the purpose of Chapter III -A categories of person were mentioned in Section 23-J of the Act. ( 9. ) Learned counsel submits that keeping in view the language of Section 11 -A of the Act which lays down that; The provisions of this Chapter i.e. Chapter III so far as they relate to the matter specially provided in Chapter III-A shall not apply to the landlord defined in Section 23-J of the Act. Learned counsel submits that since the respondent is an employee of undertaking owned by Government of India, therefore, respondent is landlord of the category defined, under Section 23-J of the Act and the ground mentioned under Section 12 of the Act is not available to the respondent. ( 10. ) It is also submitted that it is true that this ground has not been raised before the learned Court below, but since it is a legal ground, therefore, it can be raised at any step of the proceedings. For this contention reliance is placed ,on a decision in the matter of Ishwardas Vs. State of M.P., reported in AIR 1979, SC, 551, wherein Honble Apex Court has held that there is no impediment or bar against an appellate Court permitting amendment of pleadings so as to enable a party to raise a new plea. All that is necessary is that the Appellate Court should observe the well known principles subject to which amendments of pleadings are usually granted. All that is necessary is that the Appellate Court should observe the well known principles subject to which amendments of pleadings are usually granted. Naturally, one of the circumstances which will be taken into consideration before an amendment is granted is the delay in making the application seeking such amendment and if made at the appellate stage, the reason why it was not sought in the trial Court. If the necessary material on which the plea arising from the amendment may be decided is already there the amendment may be more readily granted than otherwise. But, there is no prohibition against an Appellate Court permitting an amendment at the appellate stage merely because the necessary material is not already before the Court. " Reliance was also placed on a decision of this Court in the matter of Sadashiv Balkrishna Vs. JagdishChandra,1967,JLJ, 117, wherein this Court has held that amendment going to root of jurisdiction should not be disallowed. Learned counsel further submits that the learned Court is having no jurisdiction therefore, learned Court below committed error in decreeing the suit. ( 11. ) So far as decree under Section 12(l)(a) is concerned learned counsel submits that undisputedly Ambalal was the owner of suit property, who happens to be the father of respondent. In his life time the gift deed alleged to have been executed by deceased Ambalal on 31/12/1963, which is Exhibit P-l,but it was never acted upon and could never see the light of the day in the life time of Ambalal,who passed away in November, 1990. It is submitted that the appellant has executed the rent note in favour of Ambalal on 01/08/1980, vide Exhibit D-21 and also executed a rent note,dated 19/10/1987, Exhibit D-22 which is the rent note of another portion, which is not in dispute. Learned counsel submits that the rent note Exhibit D-21 and D-22 goes to show that Ambalal always treated himself as landlord of suit accommodation. It is also submitted that Rent was always paid by the appellant to Ambalal in his lifetime for which receipts were issued from time to, time and the rent was being collected by Badrilal,who happens to be brother of respondent. It is also submitted that Rent was always paid by the appellant to Ambalal in his lifetime for which receipts were issued from time to, time and the rent was being collected by Badrilal,who happens to be brother of respondent. Since there was dispute about ownership and the rent was paid throughout by the appellant to Ambalal in his lifetime and to Badrilal after his death, therefore, no decree of eviction could have been passed against the appellant and in favour of respondent. It is also submitted that appellant has also examined Badrilal,who happens to be real brother of the respondent. It is submitted that since no specific part of the property was gifted to respondent by Ambalal,therefore,Badrilal and respondent were joint owners of the suit property, and no decree of eviction could have been passed against the appellant under Section 12(l)(a) of the Act, as the rent was always being paid by appellant to other co- owner, who is none else but brother of respondent. For tins contention reliance was placed on a decision in the matter of Uttam Singh Vs. Atiraj,reported in 1963,JLJ (S.N.) 303, wherein it was held that rent paid to one of the co-landlords, the other co-landlord cannot demand arrears and file ejectment suit for non-payment of arrears. ( 12. ) Learned counsel for the appellant further submits that even if it is assumed that ground under Section 12(l)(a) of the Act was made out then too, since there was a dispute about quantum and the person to whom the rent was payable, therefore, operation of Section 13(1) of the Act was arrested and after fixation of provisional rent, the rent was regularly deposited by the appellant in Court, in compliance of Section 13(1) of the Act, therefore, also no decree of eviction could have been passed against the appellant U/s 12 (l)(a) of the Act, as the appellant was entitled for protection against eviction U/s 12(3) and Section 13(5) of the Act. ( 13. ) Mr. GM. Chaphekar,learned senior counsel for appellant in alternate submits that even if it is assumed that the learned Court below was having the jurisdiction to entertain the suit under Section 12(l)(f) of the Act, then too, the said findings of the learned trial Court are illegal and deserves to be set aside. ( 13. ) Mr. GM. Chaphekar,learned senior counsel for appellant in alternate submits that even if it is assumed that the learned Court below was having the jurisdiction to entertain the suit under Section 12(l)(f) of the Act, then too, the said findings of the learned trial Court are illegal and deserves to be set aside. It is submitted that in support of the plaint allegations respondent has examined himself and no independent witness has been examined to prove the requirement. It is submitted that the. respondent is a retire and senior citizen. In his whole life respondent was residing at Bhilai since last 40 years, therefore, it is unbelievable that at the fag end of his life, respondent will settle at Indore. ( 14. ) Learned counsel further submits that even if it is assumed that the need of the respondent is bonafide,then respondent is having an alternative accommodation, which is on the first floor of the suit property, which is lying vacant and is in possession of the respondent. Learned counsel placed reliance on a decision in the matter of Hunsraj Lajpatrai Vs. Shanta Bai,1997 MPRCJ Note 67 wherein the case of the landlord was for his personal requirement and shifting his business from Nagpur to Indore,this Court held that the condition of the landlord is not appearing logical and reasonable, hence it was found that bonafide requirement is not proved. It is submitted that the burden to prove that respondent requires the suit accommodation bonafidely,was on the respondent. It is submitted that respondent himself admitted that respondent is permanently residing at Bhilai and has not pleaded that he wants to settle at Indore. It is submitted that unless respondent is settled at Indore, it is not possible for respondent to run computer classes in the suit accommodation. It. is submitted that inspite of his retirement respondent is residing at Bhilai, this fact itself is sufficient to negative the ground of alleged bonafide need and suit ought to have been dismissed on that ground. Learned counsel further submits that prior to the filing of the suit, notice Ex.P/2 was issued by the respondent through his counsel and in the said notice also the alleged need of running the computer classes was not mentioned. Learned counsel further submits that prior to the filing of the suit, notice Ex.P/2 was issued by the respondent through his counsel and in the said notice also the alleged need of running the computer classes was not mentioned. It is submitted that respondent has stated that the fact relating to the need was disclosed to his counsel, but inspite of that the fact remains that it was not stated in the notice. It is also submitted that respondent failed to prove that respondent has acquired the knowledge of Computer technology. It is submitted that the area of the tenanted premises is also not sufficient to run the Computer Classes. ( 15. ) Mr. S.C. Bagadia,learned counsel for the respondent submits that respondent has filed the suit under Section 12(l)(a) and (f)of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act and is not claiming eviction to be a landlord of a special category specified under Section 23-J of the Act. It is submitted that since the amendment application filed by the appellant is based on the facts which requires elaborate enquiry and is not a simpliciter legal amendment, therefore, at this stage the same cannot be entertained. Learned counsel submits that since the suit for eviction was filed under Section 12(l)(a) and (f) of the Act and no claim was made that respondent is a landlord of special category, therefore, it is only civil court where the suit can be entertained. Learned counsel further submits that even if a suit is filed under section 12( 1 )(a) and (f)of the Act, by a landlord of specified category, then too, suit filed by the respondent under Section 12(l)(a) of the Act cannot be thrown out. It is also submitted that in none of the case laws cited by the learned counsel for the appellant, it was being held by any of the Court that the Civil Court is not competent to decide the suit filed on other grounds. So far as Section 12(l)(a) of the Act is concerned learned counsel submits that inspite of repeated demand the rent was not paid by the appellant. Even after filing of the suit the appellant failed to comply with section 13(1) of the Act. So far as decree under Section 12(1 )(f)ofthe Act is concerned, learned counsel submits that after due appreciation of evidence learned trial Court found the need of respondent as bonafide,which requires no interference. Even after filing of the suit the appellant failed to comply with section 13(1) of the Act. So far as decree under Section 12(1 )(f)ofthe Act is concerned, learned counsel submits that after due appreciation of evidence learned trial Court found the need of respondent as bonafide,which requires no interference. It is submitted that in the facts and circumstances of the case learned Court below has committed no error in passing decree under Section 12(1 )(a) of the Act. ( 16. ) In the matter of Officers Association, Bhilai Steel Plant Vs. Steel Authority of India Ltd. reported in 1983, MPLJ, 51, it was held that Bhilai Steel Plant is an undertaking of the Government of India. Since it is no more in dispute that the respondent is a retired employee of a Government undertaking, therefore, appellant is permitted to raise the ground in the arguments and for that formal amendment is not necessary in the written statement. ( 17. ) In the matter of Dhannalal Vs. Kalawatibai(Supra) the suit was filed by a landlord of the category under Section 23-J of the Act before the Rent controlling Authority and the Honble Supreme Court has not examined the situation whether the suit can be filed by the landlord of special category laid down under Section 23-J before the Civil Court for eviction on other ground including the ground of genuine requirement. In the matter of Rajendra Singh Vs. Smt. Sulochna,decided by this Court in S.A. No. 260/04. on 28/09/2006. while deciding the second appeal filed by a tenant wherein originally the suit was filed under Section 12(l)(a) and (f)of the Act and decree was granted under Section 12(l)(f) of the Act by the learned Court below holding that the suit accommodation is needed for business purposes, in second appeal it was only the decree passed under Section 12(l)(f) of the Act which was under challenge and in the circumstances this Court observed that the decree passed under Section 12(l)(f) of the Act was without jurisdiction. In this Case also this Court has placed reliance in the matter of Nandlal Vs. Nangibai(Supra) wherein suit for eviction was filed under Section 12(l)(a)(d) and (e)of the Act and when the matter came up before this Court on the point of jurisdiction this court has not dismissed the suit, as it was also filed on other grounds. In this Case also this Court has placed reliance in the matter of Nandlal Vs. Nangibai(Supra) wherein suit for eviction was filed under Section 12(l)(a)(d) and (e)of the Act and when the matter came up before this Court on the point of jurisdiction this court has not dismissed the suit, as it was also filed on other grounds. On the contrary this Court directed that the Civil Court shall proceed with the trial of the suit leaving beside the question of bonafide need. That apart judgment passed by this Court was challenged before the Honble Supreme Court and the matter is reported in AIR 2008 SC 2611 Smt. Sulochana Vs. Rajendra Singh wherein the landlady was widow and composite suit for eviction filed on different grounds including bona fide requirement, Honble Apex Court held that keeping in view the everments in plaint not showing that suit is filed in the capacity of specified landlord, jurisdiction of civil Court does not stand excluded, moreso when title of landlady was disputed. ( 18. ) Mr. GM. Chaphekar,learned senior counsel for appellant submits that this case i.e. Smt.Sulochana Vs. Rajendra Singh (Supra) has no application in the present case. It is submitted that in that suit landland who was the widow filed the suit for eviction on various grounds, including on the ground of genuine requirement in the Civil Court and the Honble Apex Court has held that the jurisdiction of Civil Court is not excluded because at the time when the suit property was purchased, landlady was widow, while in the present case when the suit property was gifted to the respondent in the year 1963, respondent was not a retired employee meaning thereby not a landlord of specified category. ( 19. ) Keeping in view all the facts and circumstances of the case and the position of law, in the opinion of this Court,suit filed by the respondent can not be dismissed on the ground that the Civil Court was not having jurisdiction as the respondent was a landlord of a special category because of following reasons:- i.The jurisdiction of Civil Court is to be determined having regards to the averments contained in the plaint. When landlord respondent herein did not proceed on the basis that he was specified landlord "within the meaning of Sub-section (j)of Section 22 of the Act though he was retired. ii. When landlord respondent herein did not proceed on the basis that he was specified landlord "within the meaning of Sub-section (j)of Section 22 of the Act though he was retired. ii. Respondent filed a composite suit of eviction i.e. not only on the ground of bonafide requirement but also on the ground of default of payment of rent. iii. Appellant in his written statement not only denied and disputed the title of the respondent but also denied and disputed that he was in default, alleging that the respondent is not a landlord / owner of the suit premises and it is Badrilal who is brother of the respondent is the owner / landlord. In the matter of Sulochana(Supra) Honble Apex Court has observed that indisputably the issue as regards title over a property can be decided . only by a civil Court and, therefore, there cannot be any doubt whatsoever that the suit as framed was maintainable. Apart from the contention raised as regards to the bonafide requirement of the respondent, the issue as regards title over a property can be decided only by the civil Court, hence the suit was maintainable. v. It was more so when not only decree for eviction was prayed but a decree for payment of arrears of rent which otherwise could not have been granted by the Rent Controller was also prayed. vi. Moreover in the matter of Smt. Sulochana(Supra) Honble Apex Court,has taken into consideration the definition of specified landlord as contained in Section 23-J of the Act and observed that it is not as broad as the definition of landlord defined under Section 2-b of the Act. It was further observed that since Sulochana purchased the suit premises on 23rd March, 1996 while the respondent was inducted as tenant of the premises was back in 1978, therefore,Sulochana was not a landlady of a special category. Applying the same analogy in the present case the appellant was inducted as tenant somewhere in the year 1980, while the suit property was gifted to the respondent on 31/12/63 and the father of the respondent died in the year 1990. Applying the same analogy in the present case the appellant was inducted as tenant somewhere in the year 1980, while the suit property was gifted to the respondent on 31/12/63 and the father of the respondent died in the year 1990. At the time when the suit property was gifted to the respondent though the gift deed was not acted upon in his life time or at the time when the appellant was inducted in the year 1980 or at the time when the father of the appellant died in the year 1990, respondent was in job and was not a landlord of special category, therefore, it can not be said that the Civil Court was having no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. vii. Apart from this objection which have been raised in first Appeal which is not purely a question of law, cannot be entertained at this stage. ( 20. ) In view of this, objection raised by the appellant relating to the jurisdiction has no merits, hence rejected. ( 21. ) So far as suit filed under Section 12(1 )(a) of the Act is concerned, it is no more in dispute that appellant was tenant of Ambalal @ Rs.1,500/- per month. Ambalal died in the year 1990, gift deed was executed by Ambalal in the year 1963, which was never acted upon by the parties. Before his death Ambalal executed the will. After his death notice was given by the respondent in the year 1993, which is Exhibit D-15, wherein it was specifically mentioned by the respondent that suit property in which appellant is tenant falls into the share of respondent and the name of respondent has been mutated in the Municipal records. By the said notice a demand of arrears was also made from the appellant. The notice was again repeated in the year 2003 before filing of the suit and appellant was asked to make the payment of rent. Receipts of the notice are not in dispute as the notice Exhibit D-15 was filed by the appellant himself. Appellant is not an illiterate man, but a Doctor by profession and it is not expected from the appellant that knowing it well that there is a dispute regarding the ownership, appellant shall go on paying rent to Badrilal,who happens to be brother of respondent. Appellant is not an illiterate man, but a Doctor by profession and it is not expected from the appellant that knowing it well that there is a dispute regarding the ownership, appellant shall go on paying rent to Badrilal,who happens to be brother of respondent. It is true that some of the documents were filed by respondent during the cross-examination of Bardilal,who was examined by appellant and who happens to be brother of respondent, relating to the mutation of name of the respondent in municipal record. However it is not in dispute between the parties that the status of appellant was as of tenent. Apart from this the gift deed which was executed by the father of the respondent Exhibit P-l is having a recital in para 6 which reads as under : ( 22. ) Exhibit P-7 is the suit filed by-Badrilal and his one brother Kanhaiylal against the respondent, wherein the will of the deceased Ambalal was under challenge and in the suit also there was reference about the property which is subject matter of the present suit. In Exhibit P-13,which is the extract of register of Municipal Corporation, respondent is shown as owner of the suit property, which is numbered as II.No.22/1 and appellant is shown as tenant in the suit accommodation. This information was given to the municipal authorities by Badrilal,who has also admitted in his statement that the particulars furnished in Ex.P/13 are based on the information given by him. Badrilal has also admitted in para 26 of his cross-examination that whatever notice were being received from the Municipal Corporation relating to suit property was being received by the appellant and after giving information to Badrilal the same was being sent by the appellant to the respondent. ( 23. ) After taking all the facts into consideration learned Court below has found . that the respondent was the landlord of the suit accommodation in which the appellant is tenant @ Rs.1,500/- per month. This Court finds that no illegality has been committed by the learned Court below in holding respondent as landlord and appellant as tenant in the suit accommodation of the respondent. ( 24. that the respondent was the landlord of the suit accommodation in which the appellant is tenant @ Rs.1,500/- per month. This Court finds that no illegality has been committed by the learned Court below in holding respondent as landlord and appellant as tenant in the suit accommodation of the respondent. ( 24. ) In the present case the arrears of rent were demanded vide notice dated 31/12/93 Ex.D/15 and notice dated 12/06/03 Ex.P/5 , which were duly served and the suit was filed on 16/03/04, wherein arrears of rent were claimed for the period of last three years from the date of filing of the suit. Undisputedly neither notices were replied nor arrears of rent as claimed was tendered by the appellant to the respondent. Thus, the ground for eviction under Section 12(l)(a) of the Act is made out. ( 25. ) Summons of the Court was served on the appellant on 08/04/04. The appearance was made by the appellant on 24/04/04 and the written statement was filed on 15/06/04 i.e. after one month from the date of service of summons. In that written statement also there was no dispute raised about the amount of rent payable by the appellant, which can be said to be a dispute U/s 13(2) of the Act. So far as provisional rent is concerned,that was fixed by the learned trial Court upon the application dated 14/09/04 filed by respondent landlord vide order dated 28/02/05, whereby the appellant was directed to deposit the rent from March 2005. In the interim order dated 28/02/05 also it was specifically mentioned by the learned Court below that the case is listed for enquiry for fixation of provisional rent, but the offer has been made by the respondent that the respondent is accepting the contention of the appellant for the time being that the appellant has paid rent up to February 2005 to Badrilal brother of respondent, which itself is sufficient to show that the dispute raised by the appellant was U/s 13(3) of the Act, which relates to the rent payable to whom. ( 26. ) In the matter of Jamnalal Vs. Radheshyam,Reported in 2000 (2) MPLJ 385, the Honble Apex Court has held that the scheme of section 13 of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act,1961, suggests that the provisions thereof are intended for the benefit of both the tenant as well as the landlord. ( 26. ) In the matter of Jamnalal Vs. Radheshyam,Reported in 2000 (2) MPLJ 385, the Honble Apex Court has held that the scheme of section 13 of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act,1961, suggests that the provisions thereof are intended for the benefit of both the tenant as well as the landlord. While section 13 affords protection to a defaulting tenant, willing to abide by the obligation to pay the rent regularly, against eviction on the ground of default in payment of rent, it also ensures payment of rent to the landlord, which he is entitled to receive for both the pre-litigation period as well as during the pendency of the litigation. Honble Apex Court has also held that in a case where tenant admit the rate of rent but disputed the quantum of arrears of rent or/and the period for which it was due, the Court is not enjoined to hold summary inquiry contemplated under Section 13(2) of the Act to fix provisional rent. It was also held that Section 13(2) will become operative and tenant will have to face the consequences of non-payment of rent. It was held that if Court finds that the arrears of rent for the period in question were not paid, it has to pass the order for eviction and the tenant is not entitled to the benefit of section 13(5) read with Section 12(3) of the Act. Honble Apex Court has further observed that where the rate of rent payable by the tenant for the accommodation is not in dispute and the quantum of arrears of rent is not paid/deposited other because the tenant pleads that he has paid the arrears of rent or adjusted the same towards the amounts payable by the landlord or in the discharge of his liability, the tenant succeeds or fails on his plea being accepted or rejected in that behalf by the Court, in such a case sub-section (2) is not attracted because the plea taken by the tenant has to be adjudicated by a full-fledged trial and not in a summary inquiry postulated for fixing a reasonable provisional rent in relation to the accommodation in question. This being the position a tenant takes the risk of suffering an order of eviction by raising a dispute in regard to the amount of rent payable by him while admitting the rate of rent and not making payment or deposit under sub-section (1) because where the dispute raised by the tenant is outside the ambit of sub-section (2) of sub-section (1) of section 13 of the Act does not become inoperative. ( 27. ) Keeping in view the aforesaid position of law and keeping in view the fact that inspite of notice dated 31/12/93 Ex.D/15 and notice dated 12/06/03 Ex.P/2 and after filing of suit on 16703/04 and after service of summons and also after appearance on 24/04/04 appellant has chosen not to deposit the rent in Court. Appellant took the risk of suffering an order of eviction. In view of this, this Court is of the opinion that not only ground under Section 12(l)(a) of the Act was made out but also appellant is not entitled for protection under Section 12(3) and 13(5) of the Act, as the appellant never deposited the, rent as claimed by the respondent. ( 28. ) So far as the decree U/s. 12(l)(f) of the Act is concerned undoubtedly respondent is resident of Indore by birth. Respondent was born and brought up at Indore. The suit accommodation is also ancestral property of the respondent. Respondent shifted to Bhilai because of his job. Respondent has categorically stated that respondent requires the suit accommodation tor starting of Computer Classes. This part of the evidence of the respondent remained unrebutted. Nothing has been stated by the appellant regarding the alleged requirement of the respondent. The only witness which has been examined by the appellant apart from himself is Badrilal who is none else but the brother of the respondent and was always extending assistance to the appellant in the suit filed by the respondent. Badrilal also has stated that he has no information in regard to the intention of respondent to establish at Indore. There is nothing on record to disbelieve the respondent who is also a senior citizen that he requires the suit accommodation for carrying on a small business of Computer Classes, after settling down in his home town at Indore. Badrilal also has stated that he has no information in regard to the intention of respondent to establish at Indore. There is nothing on record to disbelieve the respondent who is also a senior citizen that he requires the suit accommodation for carrying on a small business of Computer Classes, after settling down in his home town at Indore. It is pertinent to note that in cross examination of respondent it has come that respondent is still in occupation of the house which was alloted by M/s Bhilai Steel Plant, at Bhilai. Undisputedly respondent is original resident of Indore. Respondent is having the suit accommodation. Apart from this, respondent is also having another house, therefore, it can not be said that the respondent is making a false claim of bonafide need just to evict the appellant. In the matter of Rambabu Vs. Jaikishanlal,2009 (IV) LSCT 103 Honble Apex Court has observed that a person can start a new business even if he has no experience in the new business. ( 29. ) So far as alternative accommodation which has been suggested by the learned counsel for the appellant at the first floor of the suit property is concerned,in the matter of Dhannalal(Supra) Honble Apex Court observed that an accommodation situated on first floor can not be said to be an alternative suitable accommodation in connection with the shop situated on the ground floor. It was further held that alternative accommodation should be a reasonably suitable non residential accommodation. Honble Apex Court has further observed that a shop on the first floor can not attract the same number of customers and earn the same business as a shop on the ground floor would do. ( 30. ) Apart from all the aforesaid facts and keeping in view the age of respondent the suit accommodation is more convenient for carrying on the business and the most important fact is that the appellant is doctor by profession and is aged 53 years only, has taken the suit accommodation for carrying on the clinic. Appellant has admitted in his cross-examination that appellant is in Government employment and is also receiving the non-practicing allowance from the Government, while running the clinic from the suit accommodation ( 31. Appellant has admitted in his cross-examination that appellant is in Government employment and is also receiving the non-practicing allowance from the Government, while running the clinic from the suit accommodation ( 31. ) In view of the aforesaid facts this Court is of the view that no illegality has been committed by the learned Court below in passing a decree of eviction against the appellant U/s 12(l)(a) and (f)of M.P. Accommodation Control Act. In view of this appeal has no force and is hereby dismissed. No order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.