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2009 DIGILAW 1367 (MP)

SAVITRI BAI v. KRISHNA MORARI

2009-12-14

ABHAY M.NAIK

body2009
Judgment Abhay M.Naik,J. ( 1. ) Plaintiff/respondent instituted a suit for restoration of possession and mesne profits in respect of piece of land admeasuring 15 ft. 55 ft., situated at Mohna,district Gwalior. According to the plaintiff, he was owner of the suit land which formed part of a plot admeasuring 80 ft. x 195 ft., which was given to him by one Rao Sultan Singh, the Ex-Zamindar of village through a deed dated 20/3/1945. Since then,the plaintiff was in possession of the land. In the year 1956, he obtained permission for construction of a house on the said land from Gram Panchayat,Mohna and collected building material on it. The original defendant,namely,Nahneram forcibly encroached upon the land in the year 1965 and constructed a house on it. Defendant did not remove the encroachment despite notice dated 31/3/1965 which forced the plaintiff to institute a suit giving rise to the present appeal. Plaintiff claimed restoration of possession with mesne profits @ Rs.5 p.m. w.e.f,,1/3/1965 till the date of restoration. ( 2. ) Nahneram submitted written statement denying thereby the claim of the plaintiff. He denied that the land was given to the plaintiff by Ex-Zamindar. On the contrary, it is contended that the defendant Nahneram obtained the land from Gram Panchayat,Mohna for constructing a house. Thus, the house constructed by him is a valid construction. The deed dated 20/3/1945 was opposed as inadmissible. ( 3. ) Learned trial court after recording the evidence dismissed the suit vide judgment and decree 24/7/1976. ( 4. ) Aggrieved by the aforesaid, plaintiff preferred Civil Appeal No.3A/85 which was allowed and decree for restoration of possession has been granted by the learned lower appellate court vide impugned judgment and decree dated 15/2/99. ( 5. ) Aggrieved by this reversal, the defendant/appellant preferred present appeal which has been admitted and heard on the following substantial question of law:- Whether plaintiff could have acquired title vide Ex.P/1 despite its non-registration in contraventipnof Section 9 of Qanoon Registry,Riyasat Gwalior Samvat 1971 ?. ( 6. ) Shri A.K.Jain and Shri H.K. Shukla learned counsel for the parties made their respective submissions. ( 7. ) It is contended by Shri A.K.Jain, learned counsel for the appellant that Ex.P/1 is not mere grant or licence to construct house but is a deed of transfer in respect of immovable property. ( 6. ) Shri A.K.Jain and Shri H.K. Shukla learned counsel for the parties made their respective submissions. ( 7. ) It is contended by Shri A.K.Jain, learned counsel for the appellant that Ex.P/1 is not mere grant or licence to construct house but is a deed of transfer in respect of immovable property. Therefore, it ought to have been registered in view of Section 9 of Qanoon Registry,Riyasat Gwalior Samvat 1971. ( 8. ) Per contra,Shri Shukla learned counsel for the respondent contended that it is merely a grant for allowing the defendant to make construction and the same therefore does not require registration. ( 9. ) Considered the submissions and perused the record available in the file. ( 10. ) In order to appreciate significance and admissibility of Ex.P/1, I feel it necessary to reproduce it. It runs as under:- 11.Ex.P-1 is stated to have been executed on 20/03/1945 by the then Zagirdar Sultan Singh. It confers a right on the plaintiff to make construction of house on the suit land as per the map endorsed on its reverse of Ex.P-1. ( 11. ) Plaintiffs counsel Shri Shukla contended that this is a licence to construct a house on the suit land. However, on complete perusal of Ex.P-1, it is observed that a right to sell/mortgage is conferred not only on the grantee alone but generation to generation in future. Keeping this in mind, Ex.P-1 is to be construed as a document of transfer in the nature of gift because there is no mention of consideration in it. Transfer of Property Act of Erstwhile Gwalior State known as the "Transfer of Property Act Gwalior State Samvat 2001" was in force at the time of alleged execution of Ex.P-1. Section 119 of the said Act reads as under.- "For the purpose of making a gift of immovable property, the transfer must be effected by registered instrument signed by or on behalf of the donor, and attested by at least two witnesses. For the purpose of making a gift of movable property, the transfer may be effected either by a registered instrument signed as aforesaid or by delivery. Such delivery may be made in the same way as goods sold may be delivered." Perusal of the aforesaid provision makes it clear that -gift of immovable property could not have been made at the time of execution of Ex. Such delivery may be made in the same way as goods sold may be delivered." Perusal of the aforesaid provision makes it clear that -gift of immovable property could not have been made at the time of execution of Ex. P-l except by registered instrument. ( 12. ) Apart from the aforesaid,Qanoon Registry,Riyasat Gwalior Samvat 1971 was also in force in the erstwhile State of Gwalior. Its Section 9 reads as under: Aforesaid provision further makes it clear that gift of an immovable property could not have been effected at the time of Ex.P-1 without registered document. Ex.P-1 is neither stamped nor registered. Thus, the same is insufficient and incompetent in law so as to confer title of the suit property on the plaintiff/respondent. Ex.P-1 could have been construed merely as a licence, had there been no conferral by it of right to sell/mortgage. This right as per Ex.P-1 was not merely conferred on the plaintiff/respondent alone but was granted in perpetuity i.e. from generation to generation. Thus, obviously, this document could not be treated in law as merely a licence. It cannot be treated anything except gift. It is obviously hit by Section 119 of the Transfer of Property Act Gwalior State Samvat2001and Section 9 of Qanoon Registry,Riyasat Gwalior Samvat 1971. ( 13. ) Shri. Shukla,learned counsel, contended that Ex.P-1 may be considered for collateral purpose. This is again a misconceived submission because the suit of the plaintiff is based on title on the basis of Ex.P-1. Restoration of possession has been sought on the basis of title, said to have been acquired vide Ex.P-1. Thus, purpose of Ex.P-1 is not collateral. ( 14. ) In view of the aforesaid discussion, this Court has no hesitation in holding Ex.P-1 a gift deed and in further holding that for want of registration, plaintiff/respondent did not acquire any title to the suit property. Resultantly,the appeal is allowed by deciding substantial question of law in favour of the defendant/appellant. Judgment and decree of the learned lower appellate judge is hereby set aside restoring that of the Trial Court. Accordingly, the suit of the plaintiff/respondent stands dismissed, however, with no order as to costs. Appeal allowed.