ORDER (Per G. Bhavani Prasad, J.) The insurer filed the petition for review of the judgment, dated 12-10-2007 in C.M.A. NO.380 of 2006. 2. The review petitioner desires to have the judgment reviewed on the ground of the assessment of loss having to be confined to the supervisory capacities only and the contribution by the deceased having to be assessed at a much lower level than two-thirds of the income in case of an agriculturist and a businessman. The reliance placed by the Court on the charge-sheet also has to be reconsidered and hence, the review petition relying on the precedents cited by the learned counsel for the review petitioner in the grounds of review and his written submissions. 3. Sri Kota Subba Rao, learned counsel for the review petitioner in his oral and written arguments desired preference to be given to EX.A-2 first information report but not EX.A-1 charge-sheet and when the deceased was not getting any salary, the income from business and agriculture has to be assessed with reference to the precedents cited. When the land still remains with the claimants as the legal heirs, the normal rule of deprivation of income is not strictly applicable to agricultural income. Similarly, there must be documentary evidence to establish business income. When there is no convincing evidence or proof of ownership of agricultural land, only notional income of Rs.15,000/- has to be taken into account and the appropriate multiplier for 38 years is 12. The judgment has to be delivered in accordance with the first information report under Rule 476 of the Andhra Pradesh Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 (for short "the Rules"). 4. The point for consideration is whether the impugned judgment is susceptible to any review. 5. Point: Under Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for short "the Act"), the Claims Tribunal shall give the parties an opportunity of being heard, hold an inquiry into the claim and make an award determining just compensation, etc. In holding any such inquiry, Section 169 of the Act mandates the Tribunal to follow such summary procedure as it thinks fit subject to rules. The Tribunal was conferred with the powers of a civil Court for the specified purposes and under Rule 476 of the Rules, the Claims Tribunal was directed to follow the procedure of summary trial as contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The Tribunal was conferred with the powers of a civil Court for the specified purposes and under Rule 476 of the Rules, the Claims Tribunal was directed to follow the procedure of summary trial as contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The Tribunal was cautioned not to reject any application on the ground of any technical flaw and was also obligated to obtain whatever information necessary from the police, medical and other authorities. It is true that sub-rule (7) of Rule 476 of the Rules states that the Claims Tribunal shall proceed to award the claim on the basis of registration certificate of the motor vehicle, insurance certificate or policy, copy of first information report, post-mortem certificate or certificate of inquiry from the medical officer and the nature of treatment given by the medical officer. 6. The said sub-rule obviously refers to the relevant dependable criteria for assessment of the compensation, which is patently illustrative and can never be considered to be exhaustive. This Sub-rule stating the basis to award the claim, is obviously subject to the prohibition against depending on any technical flaw and the procedure for summary trial to be followed by the Tribunal. The said sub-rule cannot travel beyond the statutory obligation imposed on the Tribunal to determine the just compensation after an inquiry, in which an opportunity of being heard is given to the parties. The judicial determination of the questions in controversy before the Tribunal in terms of Sections 168 and 169 of the Act cannot be confined to consideration of the five documents referred to in sub-rule (7) of Rule 476 of the Rules alone and exclude any other oral or documentary evidence. The procedure of summary trial under the Code of Criminal Procedure which the Tribunal shall follow under Rule 476 of the Rules itself mandates taking all such evidence as may be produced by both sides in support of their respective versions, apart from the evidence which the Court, of its own motion, causes to be produced as per Section 262 read with Sections 254 and 255 of the said Code. Sub-rule (7) to be understood in the light of the object and scheme of the Act, is a directory provision referring to some of the documents which can offer guidance to the Tribunal in discharge of its statutory duty and the word "shall" used in the said: subrule has to be necessarily understood as "may". 7. That apart, to say that the, first information report alone should be the conclusive basis for determining the manner of the accident, even in spite of the availability of other dependable evidence on record on that aspect, will be offending the plain language of the statute and if that were the purport of sub-rule (7), it cannot be considered valid, as any such delegated legislation cannot travel beyond the legislation itself. 8. The reliance on Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Premlata Shukla1 by the review petitioner is necessarily out of context, as in that case, the first information report and consequential police investigation could not trace the truck involved in the accident, while a claim petition is filed as though an identified Tempo Trax was involved in the accident. The Tribunal disallowed the claim due to absence of proof, but the High Court relying on oral evidence, opined the driver of the Tempo Trax to be guilty brushing aside the first information report as not legally proved. It was in that context that the Apex Court upheld the reliability of the first information report referred to in the claim petition itself and from which the factum of the accident was considered proved. However, the Apex Court itself made it clear that mere marking of an exhibit does not automatically prove the contents thereof and the insistence of the Apex Court to accept the entire first information report as done by the Tribunal, was obviously due to the absence of any contrary dependable evidence for the claimants to accept the belated oral claim of two witnesses. Therefore; the plea that the first information report admitted in evidence should exclude all other evidence concerning the manner of accident, cannot be accepted. 9. In fact, the decision in Pallavan Transport Corporation v. Saroj Goyal referred to in the grounds of review is an answer to the contentions of the review petitioner. Therefore; the plea that the first information report admitted in evidence should exclude all other evidence concerning the manner of accident, cannot be accepted. 9. In fact, the decision in Pallavan Transport Corporation v. Saroj Goyal referred to in the grounds of review is an answer to the contentions of the review petitioner. Hon'ble Sri Justice P. Sathasivam (as His Lordship then was) speaking for the Division Bench, made it clear that though the claimants failed to place the first information report, sketch relating to the scene of accident, inasmuch as the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal must take special care to see that innocent victims did not suffer and owners and drivers do not escape liability merely because of some doubt here and there, culpability must be inferred from the circumstances where it is fairly reasonable. While noting that even in the absence of materials Le., police records, first information report, sketch, etc., if the evidence of eye witness who was said to have witnessed the occurrence is acceptable, the Tribunal can safely rely upon the said evidence, it was made clear that merely because the eye witness did not inform the police nor made any specific complaint, did not diminish his statement before the Court regarding the manner of accident, if the evidence of the said witness is cogent, natural and probable. The Division Bench also referred to with approval an earlier Division Bench decision of the High Court of Mysore holding that merely because the witness was not examined by the police or that he was not examined in the connected criminal case, it cannot be said that his evidence should not be relied upon. 10. In the present case, the first information report and the inquest report were not based on any personal knowledge of any of the persons connected with them due to their being eye witnesses, while the independent investigation by the statutory investigating agency resulting in EX.A-1 charge-sheet against the driver of the tractor, cited P.W.2, who corroborated the claim as an eye witness. R.W.1 trying to take advantage of the first information report and the inquest report, was consequently not believed and the conclusions of the Tribunal and this Court on this aspect cannot, therefore, be considered to be factually or legally so defective as to warrant a review, merely because EX.A-2 first information report was marked on behalf of the claimants obviously to probablise the happening of the accident. 11. EX.A-1 charge-sheet does not suffer from the infirmities from which the chargesheet under consideration in APSRTC v. N. Krishna Reddi and other suffered. The conclusion of the learned Judge in that case about the investigation being a table investigation was based on lacunae in the investigation detailed by the learned Judge with none of such factors being present in the present case. 12. Branch Manager, United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Kondakotla Saroja concerning the non-liability of an insurer in respect of unauthorised passengers under an Act policy, has no relevance due to the deceased herein not answering any such description on facts. 13. Coming to the principles of assessment of just compensation, in State of Haryana and another v. Jasbir Kaur and others, the Apex Court emphasized that it has to be borne in mind that compensation for loss of limbs or life can hardly be weighed in golden scales, while it is also not expected to be a windfall for the victim. The Apex Court pointed out that there can be no golden rule applicable to all cases for measuring the value of human life or a limb and measure of damages cannot be arrived at by precise mathematical calculations. It would depend upon the particular facts and circumstances, and attending peculiar or special features, if any. The determination has to be rational by judicious approach. The Apex Court noted in that case that the land possessed by the deceased still remains with the claimants as his legal heirs and the normal rule about deprivation of income is not strictly applicable to cases where agricultural income is the source and hence, attendant circumstances have to be considered. 14. The Apex Court noted in that case that the land possessed by the deceased still remains with the claimants as his legal heirs and the normal rule about deprivation of income is not strictly applicable to cases where agricultural income is the source and hence, attendant circumstances have to be considered. 14. In Ponnumany v. V.A. Mohanan, the Supreme Court pointed out that when the claimant owned the land, it cannot be said that there is a total loss of income due to the injury suffered by the appellant/claimant and calculation of the amount of compensation on the basis of notional income of a non-earning person according to the Second Schedule to the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 cannot be faulted with. 15. In United India Insurance Company Limited v. Dandugula Bheem Bar, the learned Judge had no reliable evidence on record including any documentary or independent evidence to show that the deceased had lands of his own or on lease, due to which, any compensation towards loss of supervisory charges was held not to arise. There was also no evidence of the deceased doing business or contracts by producing any documents like sales tax registration or licence or account books, etc. It was the total absence of evidence that led the learned Judge to take the average income of a coolie as the basis for assessment of compensation. 16. In Tamil Nadu State Transport Corporation Limited v. S. Rajapriya, it was reiterated that the Second Schedule to the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 is to serve as a guide but not as an invariable ready-reckoner for choice of a multiplier and it was held that central to the calculation is the probable length of the deceased's working life at the date of death and that the choice of 'the multiplier is determined by the age of the deceased (or that of the claimants, whichever is higher) and by the calculation on capitalizing the multiplicand by appropriate multiplier. It was also pointed out that in every case, it is the overall picture that matters and much of the calculation necessarily remains in the realm of hypothesis since there are so often many imponderables. 17. It was also pointed out that in every case, it is the overall picture that matters and much of the calculation necessarily remains in the realm of hypothesis since there are so often many imponderables. 17. It cannot be even remotely said that the principles laid down by the above decisions were given a go-by by the Tribunal and this Court in assessing the compensation in this case, while it should also be remembered that strict rules of evidence do not govern the proceedings under the Act. 18. The claim that the deceased was earning Rs. 2,00,000/- per annum from AC.10-00 of agricultural land and as Managing Partner of a dall mill, was not accepted due to the absence of documents and it was on the strength of Exs.X-1 to X-4 documents that the status of the deceased with reference to the partnership firm and his probable income were suitably assessed by the Tribunal. The Tribunal was cautious in not acting on the claims of P.Ws.1 and 3 and Exs.X-1 to X-4 at face value and assessing the annual income from the mill as Managing Partner at Rs. 1,00,000/-, while rejecting the claims about owning or cultivating agricultural land of Ac.10-00. While no agricultural income was, thus, taken into account, the annual income as assessed by the Tribunal was not divorced from the evidence, in which an element of guess and estimate becomes inevitable. The higher multiplier adopted by the Tribunal was reduced in the judgment sought to be reviewed to the relevant multiplier under Section 166 of the Act as per precedential law and the assessment of the compensation on the basis of the earnings of the deceased as the Managing Partner of the dall mill, which income was purely personal to the deceased, did not offend any of the principles stated in the above cited precedents and the question of any loss of supervisory capacities alone being assessed or the contribution to the claimants being less than two-thirds of the assessed income, etc., do not arise. Just, fair, reasonable and adequate compensation is what was granted by this Court in modification of that awarded by the Tribunal. 19. Just, fair, reasonable and adequate compensation is what was granted by this Court in modification of that awarded by the Tribunal. 19. The question of a review arises only on discovery of any new and important matter or evidence or on some mistake or error apparent on the face of record, or for any other sufficient reason, none of which can be claimed to be present herein. Merely because the insurer feels it proper to differ from the appreciation of evidence by this Court or the conclusions arrived at by it, the same cannot be a valid or good ground for review and this petition has to fail. 20. Hence, this petition is dismissed without costs.