JUDGMENT 1. - The petitioner, having been allotted 12' x 8' size strip of land in front of his house by the Municipal Council, Udaipur but having been denied permission to raise construction on this strip under the orders/communications dated 10.10.2007 (Annex. 4) and 23.01.2008 (Annex.5); and the appeal taken by him having been dismissed by the Collector, Udaipur on 06.05.2008 (Annex.7); and further, the revision petition filed by him having been dismissed by the Additional Divisional Commissioner, Udaipur on 23.08.2008 (Annex.9), seeks to question the orders aforesaid by way of this writ petition. 2. From the averments as taken in the writ petition and the material as placed on record, it appears that the petitioner has a residential house at Maldas Street, Udaipur and the said strip of land, admeasuring 12' x 8' in front of the house, was allotted to him by the respondent Municipal Council, Udaipur after charging Rs. 1,10,000/- towards premium and Rs. 55,000/- towards lease amount; and a lease deed was executed in his favour on 25.10.2004 (Annex.1). The petitioner filed a civil suit bearing No. 85/2006 in the Court of Civil Judge (Junior Division), Udaipur City (North), Udaipur for perpetual injunction with the averments that after purchasing the said strip, he had enclosed the same by a boundary wall but then, certain objections were raised and the Collector, Udaipur proceeded to instruct the Municipal Council to cancel the said lease deed. It was asserted that the petitioner was a lawful purchaser of the strip in question and the defendants were not entitled to interfere with the same or to obstruct its use and occupation by the petitioner-plaintiff. The learned Trial Court decreed the suit so filed by the petitioner on 21.12.2006 while issuing injunction to the following effect:- " vr% oknh dk okn fo:) izfroknhx.k lO;; Lohdkj fd;k tkdj izfroknh ds fo:) ;g LFkk;h O;kns'k tkjh fd;k tkrk gS fd izfroknhx.k oknh dks dz; dh xbZ Hkwfe iV~Vh ds cspku laca/k esa fujLrhdj.k dh dk;Zokgh u djsa ,oa u gh mDr Hkw&iV~Vh ij fdlh izdkj dh dksbZ rksM+QksM+ djs rFkk u blds mi;ksx ls oknh dks oafpr djs u gh oknh dks mDr Hkw&iV~Vh ls csn[ky djsA " 3. It appears further that the petitioner applied for permission to raise construction with projections on the said strip of land but such a prayer was declined by the Municipal Council by way of its communication dated 10.10.2007 (Annex.4) with the observations that the Committee concerned, after visiting the site on 09.08.2007, found the boundary wall having been raised covering excess land; and was of opinion that raising any construction by the petitioner would be creating obstruction in the chowk and disturbing the building line. The petitioner addressed a communication with reference to the decree of the Civil Court and asserted that he could not be deprived of the use of the land in question nor the sale could be cancelled; and that the communication of the Municipal Council was nothing less than disobedience of the order passed by the Court. The Municipal Council, in its communication dated 23.01.2008 (Annex.5), while admitting the fact that the Court had granted perpetual injunction in the matter wherefor the sale could not be cancelled and the petitioner could use the strip of land, asserted that so far the question of construction permission was concerned, the decision as taken by the Building Committee on 09.08.2007 after site inspection was proper and there was no reason to review the same nor there were any such directions of the Court. The Municipal Council said- " ------vki mDr Hkw&iV~Vh dk mi;ksx dj ldrs gSa ijUrq tgka rd Hkw&iV~Vh ij fuekZ.k dk;Z djokus gsrq Lohd`fr nsus dk iz'u gS ml ckjs esa Hkou fuekZ.k lfefr us fnukad 09-08-2007 dks LFky fujh{k.k dj Hkou fuekZ.k dh Lohd`fr ugha fn;s tkus dk tks fu.kZ; fy;k gS og mfpr gSA vr% ml ij iquZfopkj dk dksbZ dkj.k ugha curk gS ,oa U;k;ky; us ,sls dksbZ funsZ'k Hkh ugha fn;s gSA vr% Hkou fuekZ.k Lohd`fr tkjh ugha dh tk ldrh gSA " 4. Aggrieved of the communications aforesaid, the petitioner filed an appeal under Section 170(12) of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 1959 ('the Act of 1959') that was considered and dismissed by the learned Collector, Udaipur by the judgment dated 06.05.2008 (Annex.7) with the observations that Maldas Street was one of the congested places in the city and Neem-Ka-Chowk was the only open place; and according any construction permission would be creating difficulties for the residents of the locality. The petitioner took the matter in revision under Section 300 of the Act of 1959 before the Additional Divisional Commissioner, Udaipur but without success. The learned Additional Divisional Commissioner, while declining to interfere, proceeded to observe that in fact the strip of land was situated in an open chowk and, prima facie, it appeared to be a part of the chowk and the road. 5. Seeking to assail the orders aforesaid, it has strenuously been contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that once a lease deed has been executed in favour of the petitioner and the land has been allotted for commercial use, it is entirely unjustified and rather impermissible for the Municipal Council to deny him construction permission. It is also contended that the grounds as suggested by the Municipal Council in refusing the construction permission remain entirely baseless and are not even available to it once the allotment has been made and the petitioner has changed his position by depositing the amount demanded by the Municipal Council. It is submitted that permission could be refused only when construction would be offending the Rules and the By-laws; and there being no such allegation, construction permission could not have been refused at all. The learned counsel contended that the Municipal Council stands restrained from cancelling the said lease deed and from preventing use and occupation of strip of land by the petitioner and, according to the learned counsel, the attempt on the part of the Municipal Council to deny construction permission is calculated only to deprive the petitioner of the use of the land in an indirect manner. Learned counsel emphasised that what could not be done directly, is not permitted to be done indirectly. 6. It is also submitted that the so-called report of the Building Committee could not have been made the basis of rejection the prayer of the petitioner inasmuch as the petitioner had never been afforded any opportunity of hearing in relation to such report nor was permitted to put his defence there against. 6. It is also submitted that the so-called report of the Building Committee could not have been made the basis of rejection the prayer of the petitioner inasmuch as the petitioner had never been afforded any opportunity of hearing in relation to such report nor was permitted to put his defence there against. It is further submitted that the observations as made by the Additional Divisional Commissioner that the land in question is part of public chowk or road are contrary to the sale already made and even contrary to the decree as passed by the Civil Court; and in any case, the Municipal Council cannot take such a stand because that would be contrary to the perpetual lease granted by it. 7. Having given a thoughtful consideration to the entire matter, this Court does not feel persuaded to consider any interference in the writ jurisdiction in this matter. 8. It is noticed that even when the petitioner has been granted the lease in relation to the said strip of land admeasuring 12' x 8', it has consistently been found that the proposed construction by the petitioner on the said strip would be causing obstructions and congestion and would be contrary to the public interest. Such observations on the factual aspects do not appear to be suffering from any perversity nor any such fact has been pointed out where for such observations by the concerned authorities on the relevant and material facts could be said to be incorrect in any manner. 9. In the face of such finding of fact that the proposed construction would be causing obstructions in a narrow and congested area; and further, in the face of the finding that the proposed construction would be disturbing the existing building line, there does not appear any reason to entertain this writ petition so as to consider granting of construction permission to the petitioner on the said strip of land. 10. This Court is unable to countenance the suggestion that once the lease deed has been executed in favour of the petitioner regarding the strip of land, the Municipal Council is bound to accord a construction permission to him. The Municipal Council has rejected the prayer for raising construction on relevant considerations; and it cannot be said that the Municipal Council has been attempting to do something indirectly or in contravention of the decree of the Civil Court. The Municipal Council has rejected the prayer for raising construction on relevant considerations; and it cannot be said that the Municipal Council has been attempting to do something indirectly or in contravention of the decree of the Civil Court. So far the use and occupation of the strip by the petitioner is concerned, the Municipal Council has not denied the same but it cannot be said that use and occupation could only be by way of raising construction; nor the petitioner gets the right to raise the construction merely for the aforesaid decree for injunction as passed by the Civil Court. 11. The hyper-technical submission regarding denial of opportunity of making submissions against the Committee's report are also baseless. The Committee concerned being entrusted with the task of examining the application for construction permission seems to have visited the site and pointed out the problems likely to be created by the proposed construction. Noticeable it is, again, that neither before the Appellate Authority nor before the Revisional Authority, the petitioner had been able to point out any fundamental error in the Committee's report particularly on the factual aspects nor the submission in this petition point out any such fundamental or basic error particularly on the facts that the construction in question would be obstructing the chowk and would be coming out of the existing building line. 12. The suggestion as made in the writ petition that the petitioner has changed his position and made the deposit of the amount after the Municipal Council agreed to sell the strip hardly made out any case of infringement of any legal right. It had been the choice of the petitioner that he asked for allotment of such strip of land by moving an application; and it is the case of the petitioner that the said strip lies only in front of his house. If the Municipal Council at all chose to grant the application moved by the petitioner and extended him perpetual lease regarding the said strip on his application, the petitioner does not appear justified in claiming any estoppel against the Municipal Council. 13. In any case, so far the question of grant of construction permission is concerned, the Municipal Council, the Appellate Authority and then, the Revisional Authority have dealt with the matter in accordance with law; and there does not appear any reason to consider interference in the writ jurisdiction. 13. In any case, so far the question of grant of construction permission is concerned, the Municipal Council, the Appellate Authority and then, the Revisional Authority have dealt with the matter in accordance with law; and there does not appear any reason to consider interference in the writ jurisdiction. 14. The writ petition does not merit admission and is, therefore, dismissed summarily.Writ Petition Dismissed. *******