ORDER 1. On 6.3.2005 before Lok Adalat, District Court, Sagar, the petitioner and respondent in pursuant to their joint application under section l3B of Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, which they had filed on 29.7.2004 in the Court of District and Sessions Judge, Sagar ,recorded their consent for a mutual divorce, accordingly decree was drawn in the following terms: ^^;g fd Jherh eatw "kekZ iq=h ukFkwjke "kekZ] lkfdu cM+k eysgjk ftyk Nrjiqj ,oa Jh jkt cgknqj "kekZ iq= Jh jke fd"kksj fuoklh cl LVs.M] iqjkuh Vsdjh] Vhdex<+ ds e/; fganw fookg ,DV] 1955 dh /kkjk 13ch ds varxZr fookg&foPNsn dh fMØh ikfjr djrs gq, vkt fMØh fnukad ls nksuksa dk fookg fo?kfVr fd;k tkrk gSA** 2. The petitioner alleging force, fraud and the undue influence practised in obtaining said decree, has filed this petition seeking quashment of order/ decree dated 6.3.2005. 3. Facts briefly are that, the petitioner and respondent got married on 28.1.2003 at Bada Malehra, District Chhattarpur in accordance with Hindu rites and customs. After marriage petitioner came to live with respondent in his parental house at Tikamgarh. The respondent being employed as Constable in the Police Department, State of Madhya Pradesh was posted at Shahgarh, District Sagar. The petitioner did not accompany the respondent, but continued to live at Tikamgarh with her in-laws. 4. Contradictory averments are made by the petitioner and the respondent. The petitioner submits that there was a consummation of marriage consequent whereof the petitioner was twice pregnant, which was got terminated firstly on 28.10.2004 and second time on 29.3.2005. The respondent, however, denied that there was consummation and submits that after marriage the petitioner expressed that she was forced to marry against her wishes and, therefore, did not accompany her to Shahgarh as a result whereof both of them were living separately since the date of marriage, i.e., 28.1.2003 and no relationship of husband and wife could be established. 5. Be that as it may, the fact as is called out from the pleading and also not disputed by the petitioner as well as respondent is that though married on 28.1.2003, the petitioner did not live with the respondent at the place where he was posted, but continued to live at respondent's parental house at Tikamgarh and intermittently at her parent's house in Chhatarpur. 6. 6. The couple, on 29.7.2004 jointly presented an application under section BB, Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 before the District Judge, Sagar. The couple was directed to remain present personally in the Court on 2.8.2004. And as directed, the statement of the petitioner was recorded on 2.8.2004 whereon she deposed about filing of joint application dated 29.7.2004. The matter was thereafter posted for 15.2.2005 with a direction to the petitioner to remain present with her father. 7. On 1 5.2.2005, though the petitioner was present but her father was not present, the couple expressed that the matter be posted before Lok Adalat which was to be held on 6.3.2005. Before Lok Adalat on 6.3.2005 couple was present in person and on their consent, divorce decree was drawn which is being questioned in this writ petition. 8. Shri Umesh Trivedi, learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the consent which was obtained from the petitioner was under undue influence and was not a free consent. It is contended that the petitioner was harassed by the respondent and his family members who compelled and forced her to file petition under section 13B of the Act. It is urged that on all occasions, viz., 29.7.2004, 28.4.2005, 15.2.2005 and 6.3.2005, the petitioner, who was living at Tikamgarh, was taken to Sagar under undue pressure. It is contended that on 15.2.2005 though the Court directed the petitioner to be present with her father, the respondent, however, did not inform her father and got the matter posted before Lok Adalat. It is further stated that though the petitioner was living at Tikamgarh, the respondent kept visiting and the petitioner became pregnant by cohabiting with respondent; who got her aborted on 28.10.2004 from one Dr. Johari at Tikamgarh. It is contended that second time also when the petitioner was pregnant, respondent got her aborted on 29.3.2005 by Dr. Nuna Tikamgarh at Tikamgarh. It is contended that even after filing of the application under section 13B respondent maintained physical relationship with the petitioner. The learned counsel further contends that the respondent played a fraud on the Court and obtained the decree of divorce under the garb of mutual consent. Learned counsel for the petitioner, therefore, submits that the same may be quashed. 9. It is contended that even after filing of the application under section 13B respondent maintained physical relationship with the petitioner. The learned counsel further contends that the respondent played a fraud on the Court and obtained the decree of divorce under the garb of mutual consent. Learned counsel for the petitioner, therefore, submits that the same may be quashed. 9. Shri Pranay Verma, learned counsel for respondent on his turn, submits that the petition is not tenable because the decree of divorce is drawn on mutual consent before the Lok Adalat. It is contended that right from the day of filing joint application under section 13B, the petitioner was personally present in Court on all dates fixed and on 15.2.2005 she consented that the matter be placed before the Lok Adalat and on 6.3.2005 the decree was drawn after recording her concession. Learned counsel further submits that since the date of marriage, i.e., 28.1.2003 there was no relationship as husband and wife and the petitioner since day of marriage had been insisting that the marriage was against her wishes and, therefore, she joined in the application under section 13B, which was filed without force, fraud or undue influence. 10. The respondent further denies the allegation of undue influence in extracting the consent. It is submitted that the petitioner in her deposition on 2.8.2004 has categorically stated that, the decision for divorce has been mutually arrived at. It is urged that the statement given by the petitioner before the learned District Judge on 2.8.2004 and the consent before Lok Adalat on 6.3.2005 is a sufficient proof of the fact that the consent was a free consent and was not obtained by force or undue influence. It is accordingly urged that the petition deserves to be dismissed. 11. Considered the submissions put-forth by respective counsels and the principle of law laid down in various judgments relied upon during the course of hearing which will be dealt with while taking up various issues which crop up for consideration. 12. First question is whether the petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is maintainable against a consent decree drawn before the Lok Adalat. 13. In this context relevant it would b6 to note the relevant' provisions of Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987. Section 19 whereof provides for organization of Lok Adalats. 12. First question is whether the petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is maintainable against a consent decree drawn before the Lok Adalat. 13. In this context relevant it would b6 to note the relevant' provisions of Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987. Section 19 whereof provides for organization of Lok Adalats. Section 19(5)(i) of the Act of 1987 provides for that a "Lok Adalat shall have jurisdiction to determine and to arrive at a compromise settlement between the parties to a dispute in respect of any case pending before any Court for which Lok Adalat is organized". Section 20 relats to cognizance of cases by the Lok Adalats. Sub-section (I) refers to the Lok Adalats taking cognizance of cases referred to by Courts and sub~section (3) stipulates that "where any case is referred to a Lok Adalat under sub-section (1) or where a reference has been made to it under sub-section (2), the Lok Adalat shall proceed to dispose of the case or matter and arrive at a compromise or settlement between the parties. Sub-section (4) provided for every Lok Adalat shall, while determining any reference before it under this Act, act with utmost expedition to arrive at a commpromise or settlement between the parties and shall be guided by the principles of justice, equity, fair play and other legal principles. 14. In this context worth it would be to note the observation by their Lordships in the State of Punjab v. Jlakerh Singh [ (2008)2 SCC 660 ], that: "9. .... The endeavour and effort of the Lok Adalats should be to guide and persuade the parties, with reference to principles of justice, equity and fair play to compromise and settle the dispute by explaining the pros and cons, strengths and weakness, advantages and disadvantages of their respective claims." It was further observed by their Lordships: "12. .... It is true that where an award is made by the Lok Adalat in terms of a settlement arrived at between the parties (which is duly signed by parties and annexed to the award of the Lok Adalat), it becomes final and binding on the parties to the settlement and becomes executable as if it is a decree of a civil Court, and the appeal lies against it to any Court. If any party wants to challenge such an award based on settlement it can be done only by filing a petition under Article 226 and/or Article 227 of the Constitution, that too on very limited grounds." Clause (bb) of sub-section (1) of section 23 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 stipulates that the decree in a proceedings therein would be valid "when a divorce is sought on the ground of mutual consent, such consent has not been obtained by force, fraud or undue influence". Necessary concomitant of this provision would be that if force, fraud or undue influence is practised in obtaining the decree for divorce on mutual consent, its validity can be questioned. The "limited grounds" in view of the provisions contained under section 23(1)(bb) of the Act of 1955 would be, in the considered opinion of this Court, is force, fraud and undue influence practised in obtaining a I decree of divorce by consent. 15. In the case at hand there are specific allegations of force, fraud and undue influence, in view whereof the present writ petition against the consent decree drawn before Lok Adalat is thus maintainable. The first question is accordingly answered. 16. The next question for consideration is whether in the given facts of the present case an inference of "force", "fraud" or "undue influence" can be drawn to nullify a decree of divorce on consent. 17. Trite it is that "fraud" vitiates all proceedings· as was observed by their Lordship in S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu v. Jagannath [ AIR 1994 SC 853 ], that: "It is the settled proposition of law that a judgment or decree obtained by playing fraud on the Court is a nullity and non est in the eyes of law. Such a judgment/decree by the first Court or by the highest Court has to be treated as a nullity by every Court, whether superior or inferior. It can be challenged in any Court even in collateral proceedings." 18. Whether the facts of the present case are sufficient to lead to a conclusion that, the decree of mutual divorce is an outcome of that force, fraud or undue influence? Learned counsel for the petitioner has pressed the facts that the respondent though cohabited with the petitioner and yet on false assumption and pleading that they have been living separately for a period of one year had filed the application under section 13B. Learned counsel for the petitioner has pressed the facts that the respondent though cohabited with the petitioner and yet on false assumption and pleading that they have been living separately for a period of one year had filed the application under section 13B. It is further contended that the District Court, Sagar before which the application under section 13B of the Act of 1955 was filed was not having the jurisdiction to entertain the same and that on all occasions when the matter was posted by the learned District Judge the respondent applied undue influence by causing threat and applying force on the petitioner. Learned counsel referred to contentions in the petition to bring home these submissions. 19. The allegation regarding co-habitation and the petitioner getting pregnant twice as pleaded in the writ petition is not specifically denied by the respondent. Sub-section (1) of section 13B of the Act of 1955 stipulates: "(1) Subject to the provisions of this Act a petition for dissolution of marriage by a decree of divorce may be presented to the District Court by both the parties to a marriage together, whether such marriage was solemnized before or after the commencement of the Marriage Laws (Amendment) Act, 1976 (68 of 1976), on the ground that they have been living separately for a period of one year or more, that they have not been able to live together and that they have mutually agreed that the marriage should be dissolved." 20. Thus, for having a divorce by mutual consent the couple must be (i) living separately for a period of one year or more (ii) that they have not been able to live together and (iii) they have mutually agreed that the marriage should be dissolved. Thus, for having a divorce by mutual consent the couple must be (i) living separately for a period of one year or more (ii) that they have not been able to live together and (iii) they have mutually agreed that the marriage should be dissolved. Besides, it is incumbent upon the Court to be satisfied after hearing the parties and after making such enquiries as it thinks fit, as is required to be under sub-section (2) of section 13B of the Act or 1955, which provides for: "(2) On the motion of both the parties made not earlier than six months after the date of the presentation of the petition referred to in sub-section (1) and not later than eighteen months after the said date, if the petition is not withdrawn in the meantime, the Court shall, on being satisfied, after hearing the parties and after making such inquiry as it thinks fit, that a marriage has been solemnized and that the averments in the petition are true, pass a decree of divorce declaring the marriage to be dissolved with effect from the date of the decree." 21. In the case at hand the order-sheet dated 2.8.2004 reveals that the Court in exercise of its discretionary powers directed the petitioner to remain present along with her father; however, on the date fixed, i.e., on 15.2.2005 there is no mention of the presence of petitioner's father and instead the couple got the matter posted before Lok Adalat on 6.3.2005. It is alleged that the respondent deliberately did not inform petitioner's father to remain present in Court on 15.2.2005. There is no specific denial of these allegations by respondent. Though it was for the Lok Adalat to have ensured the compliance of statutory requirements of sections 13B, instead, the matter was dealt with melancholically and a decree of divorce by mutual consent was passed. 22. The facts as adverted to reveal that the couple had been cohabitating even when the joint application was filed thus disentitling them for a divorce by mutual consent. This fact i.e. of cohabitation was not disclosed before the Court, because had that been, the very application u/s 13B of the Act of 1955 was not maintainable. This fact as brought on record of present writ petition is specifically on record of present writ petition and not specifically denied by respondent husband. This fact i.e. of cohabitation was not disclosed before the Court, because had that been, the very application u/s 13B of the Act of 1955 was not maintainable. This fact as brought on record of present writ petition is specifically on record of present writ petition and not specifically denied by respondent husband. Therefore, there was a misrepresentation by the couples before Court and the said consent decree was obtained on such misrepresentation. Such a decree is non est in the eyes of law. 23. Furthermore, the facts as are unfolded in the petition, the petitioner continued to live at Tikamgarh, the parental house of the respondent, and he kept visiting her where she got pregnant and got aborted twice·, on 28.10.2004 and on 29.3.2005, there is no specific denial of this fact in the return. Thus, admittedly the petitioner wife was not residing within the territorial jurisdiction of District Court, Sagar. Though the respondent submits that he was posted at Shahgarh within the territorial jurisdiction of District Court, Sagar, but unless the ingredient" as contained under section 19 of the Act of 1955 is satisfied the application under section 13B was not entertainable at Sagar. Section 19 of the Act of 1955 stipulates: "19. Court of which petition shall be presented. -- Every petition under this Act shall be presented to the District Court within the local limits of whose ordinary original civil jurisdiction. (i) the marriage was solemnized, or (ii) the respondent, at the time of the presentation of the petition, resides, or (iii) the parties to the marriage last resided together, or (iv) the petitioner is residing at the time of the presentation of the petition, in a case where the respondent is, at that time, residing outside the territories to which this Act extends, or has not been heard of as being alive for a period of seven years or more by those persons who would naturally have heard of him if he were alive." 24. The learned counsel for respondent though have placed reliance on the judgment rendered in Hira Lal Patni v. Sri Kali Nath [ AIR 1962 SC 199 ], Bahrein Petroleum Co. Ltd. v. P.J. Pappu and another [ AIR 1966 SC 634 ], Koopilan Uneen daughter Pathumma and others v. Koopilaan Uneen Son Kuntalan Kutty dead by LRs and others [ AIR 1981 SC 1683 ], R.S.D. V. Finance Co. Ltd. v. P.J. Pappu and another [ AIR 1966 SC 634 ], Koopilan Uneen daughter Pathumma and others v. Koopilaan Uneen Son Kuntalan Kutty dead by LRs and others [ AIR 1981 SC 1683 ], R.S.D. V. Finance Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. Shree Vallabh Glass Works Ltd. [ AIR 1993 SC 2094 ], New Moga Transport Co., through its Proprietor Krishan Lal Thanwar v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. and others [ (2004)4 SCC 677 ], to bring home the submissions based on the principles of section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 that: "21(1) No objection as to the place of suing shall be allowed by any appellate or revisional Court unless such objection was taken in the Court of first instance at the earliest possible opportunity and in all cases where issues are settled, at or before such settlement and unless there has been a consequent failure of justice." 25. It is submitted that three conditions are to be satisfied, viz., (i) that objection regarding places of suing was taken in the Court of first instance at the earliest possible opportunity; (ii) in all cases where issues are settled then at or before such settlement of issues; (iii) there has been a consequent failure of justice; before an objection regarding placing of suing can be sustained. 26. Shri Trivedi, learned counsel for the petitioner on the other hand submits that present being a case under the provision of Hindu Marriage Art, 1955, the competency to try the case is derived from section 19. It is urged, that the exceptions carved out by section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 is not attracted. Learned counsel for the petitioner places reliance 00 the judgment rendered by learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of Kishori Bari Arun Verma v. Arun Kumar Raghunath Prasad Verma [ 1998(1) MPLJ 619 ]. It was observed therein: "7. Mrs. Menon, appearing for the husband, submits that the permanent place of abode of the husband is to be construed as a place where the parties last resided together. It was observed therein: "7. Mrs. Menon, appearing for the husband, submits that the permanent place of abode of the husband is to be construed as a place where the parties last resided together. In support of the aforesaid submissions, learned counsel has placed reliance on a judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of Pushpa Datt v. Archana Mishra [ 1992 MPLJ 466 ], and my attention has been drawn to the following paragraph from the said judgment: "Understanding the words "last resided together" in the context of marriage relationship, one has to keep in mind that a Hindu wife, after the marriage, is expected to live with the husband at the place of the husband. The traditional concept of a Hindu wife is. The literal meaning is that she has always to be in company of the husband and to follow wherever he goes. In the modern society, however, husband and wife both may seek service, gain employment and work at different places away from each other, but even in such cases, the marital home would be the place where the husband lives. The place where the wife is posted in service cannot be said to be her marital home. The place where the husband is posted can be, in my opinion, taken to be the marital home of the parties and a visit of the wife to that place can be taken to "be visit to the place of their residence". It is true that in this case, the wife is stated to have lived with the husband at Balod, when he was posted there for a brief period of 20 days. But, it is not the question of duration of that stay. The question is whether the place where the husband lives, can be said to be the place where they are expected to live together? If that is the place where they last resided together, that would be sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the Court of that place. The place where the parents of the husband live or the place from which the husband hails cannot be said to be their matrimonial home or their place of residence. If that is the place where they last resided together, that would be sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the Court of that place. The place where the parents of the husband live or the place from which the husband hails cannot be said to be their matrimonial home or their place of residence. Even if the version of the wife is accepted that both of them lived together last at Buxwaha in the parental house of the husband in November, 1983, it cannot be the place where they can be said to have, in law, last resided, within the meaning of section 19(iii) of the Act. The Court has not totally disbelieved the husband that the wife had lived with him in July, 1982 at Balod. But the lower Court has treated the spouses to have last resided together, in the parental home at Buxwaha in Chhatarpur District. I also do not find any justification to take a contrary view and disbelieve the husband that the wife had come to live with him when he was posted at Balod in August, 1982." (Emphasis supplied) In my opinion, even if the place where the husband is posted is taken to be the matrimonial home of the parties, this itself shall not confer jurisdiction on the Court which has territorial jurisdiction over that place. At this stage, it is, apt to refer to section 19 of the Hindu Marriage Act which provides for the Court where the petition is required to be presented. This reads as follows: · "19. Court to which petition shall be presented. At this stage, it is, apt to refer to section 19 of the Hindu Marriage Act which provides for the Court where the petition is required to be presented. This reads as follows: · "19. Court to which petition shall be presented. -- Every petition under this Act shall be presented to the District Court within the local limits of whose ordinary original civil jurisdiction - (i) the marriage was solemnized, or (ii) the respondent, at the time of the presentation of the petition; resides, or (iii) the parties to the marriage last resided together, or (iv) the petitioner is residing at the time of the presentation of the petition, in a case where the respondent is, at that time, residing outside the territories to which this Act extends, or has not been heard of as being alive for a period of seven years or more by those persons who would naturally have heard of him if he were alive." For the purpose of conferring territorial jurisdiction it is not the place where the marital home is situated, but the place where the parties last resided together. In the case of Pushpa Datt (supra), itself, this Court has clearly stated that the place where they last resided together would be sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the Court of that place. Therefore, residing is sine qua non for conferring jurisdiction. This being lacking, even if it is held that the marital home is at Bhopal, as observed by this Court in the case of Pushpa Datta (supra), the same will not confer jurisdiction to Bhopal Court." 8. As a last straw Mrs. Menon submits that in the present case the local limits of jurisdiction of Court being uncertain, the petition was rightly entertained by the Bhopal Court, in view of section 18 of the Code of Civil Procedure. She contends that the provision of the Code of Civil Procedure being applicable in relation to all the proceedings under the Hindu Marriage Act, recourse to section 18 of the Code of Civil Procedure can be taken into consideration. I am afraid, the submission of the learned counsel is devoid of substance for more than one reason. Section 18 of the Code of the Code of Civil Procedure is attracted only when the local limits of jurisdiction of Court are uncertain. Here this is not the position. I am afraid, the submission of the learned counsel is devoid of substance for more than one reason. Section 18 of the Code of the Code of Civil Procedure is attracted only when the local limits of jurisdiction of Court are uncertain. Here this is not the position. Secondly, section 21 of the Hindu Marriage Act contemplates of regulation of proceedings under the Hindu Marriage Act as far as may be by the Code of Civil Procedure. However, the application of the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code has been made subject to the other provisions of the Act. Section 21 of the Hindu Marriage Act reads as follows: "21. Application of Act 5 of 1908. -- Subject to the other provisions contained in this Act and to such rules as the High Court may make in this behalf, all proceedings under this Act shall be regulated, as far as may be, by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908." A plain reading of the aforesaid section makes it abundantly clear that the application of the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure is subject to the other provisions contained in the Hindu Marriage Act. Section 19 of the Hindu Marriage Act provides for the place where the petition is to be presented. In that view of the matter provision of section 18 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot be pressed into service. I negative this submission of Mrs, Menon." 27. In this context worth it would be to note the statement of the petitioner and the respondent recorded on 2.8.2004. In that view of the matter provision of section 18 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot be pressed into service. I negative this submission of Mrs, Menon." 27. In this context worth it would be to note the statement of the petitioner and the respondent recorded on 2.8.2004. The petitioner states: ^^jktcgknqj "kekZ ds lkFk esjk fookg fnukad 28 tuojh 2003 dks lEiUu gqvkA fookg ds ckn eSa vius llqjky xbZ ogk¡ eSa 15 fnu jgh] mlds ckn eSa vius ek;ds vk xbZA tc esjh "kknh gqbZ rc esjs ifr jktcgknqj "kkgx<+ Fkkus esa vkj{kd ds in ij dk;Zjr FksA eSa "kkgx<+ vius ifr ds lkFk dHkh ugha jghA jktcgknqj "kkgx<+ esa fdjk, ds edku esa jgrs gSa eSa viuh llqjky Vhdex<+ esa jg jgh gw¡A** The respondent stated : ^^eSa vkosfndk eatw "kekZ dks tkurk g¡w] tks vkt U;k;ky; esa mifLFkr gSA fnukad 28 tuojh 2003 dks esjh "kknh vkosfndk eatw "kekZ ds lkFk lEiUu gqbZ FkhA "kknh ds ckn esjh iRuh esjs ?kj vkbZ Fkh og yxHkx nks eghus esjs ?kj jgh fQj lk{kh us dgk fd og djhc 15 fnu esjs ?kj jgh fQj og ek;ds pyh xbZA nks eghus ckn og ek;ds ls fQj llqjky vkbZA "kknh ds le; ds igys ls eSa Fkkuk "kkgx<+ esa inLFk gw¡A esjh iRuh dHkh Hkh esjs lkFk "kkgx<+ esa vkdj ugha jghA "kkgx<+] esa eSa igys izkbosV edku esa jgrk Fkk ysfdu vc iqfyl ykbZu "kkgx<+ esa DokVZj fey x;k gSA tc eSa "kkgx<+ jgrk gw¡ rc esjh iRuh Vhdex<+ esa esjs ?kj jgrh gSA "kknh ds ckn eSa NqfV~V;ksa esa vius ?kj Vhdex<+ vkrk tkrk gw¡A 28. Thus, on 29.7.2004 when, the application under section 13B of the Act of 1955 was filed at Sagar, only the husband i.e. respondent who was applicant was residing at Shahgarh within the jurisdiction of District Court, Sagar. It was, therefore, incumbent upon the District Court to have first examined regarding the maintainability of the petition. 29. Thus, on 29.7.2004 when, the application under section 13B of the Act of 1955 was filed at Sagar, only the husband i.e. respondent who was applicant was residing at Shahgarh within the jurisdiction of District Court, Sagar. It was, therefore, incumbent upon the District Court to have first examined regarding the maintainability of the petition. 29. In the given facts of present case since none of the ingredients of section 19 of the Act of 1955 is satisfied, the petition under section 13B in the Court of District Judge, Sagar was not tenable and since the Court lacked the inherent jurisdiction to try the petition, the reference to Lok Adalat and the subsequent decree of divorce even by consent was a nullity, because a consent cannot confer ajurisdiction on a Court which under the statute does not have. 30. In Hakam Singh v. Gammon (India) Ltd. [ AIR 1971 SC 740 ], it was held by their Lordships: "3. ....It is not open to the parties by agreement to confer by their agreement jurisdiction on a Court which it does not possess under the Code...." 31. Upshot of above analysis is that the order/decree dated 6.3.2005 being a nullity is hereby quashed. The petition is allowed. However, no costs.