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Madhya Pradesh High Court · body

2009 DIGILAW 1382 (MP)

State of M. P. v. Antram Uike

2009-12-16

RAKESH SAKSENA, SUSHMA SHRIVASTAVA

body2009
JUDGMENT : Smt . Sushma Shrivastava ,J. -- Thisorder shall dispose of Misc. Criminal Case No. 12531/09 and Criminal RevisionNo. 1839/09 arising out of the common judgment dated 7.9.09 passed by SessionsJudge, Mandla in S.T. No. 105/08 acquittingrespondent Antram under Sections 376(1) and 506, PartII of IPC. 2.Being aggrieved by the aforesaid order of acquittal, State of M.P. has preferred a petition for leave to appeal bearing M.Cr.C .No. 12531/09, while the prosecutrix has preferredCriminal Revision No. 1839/09. 3.Respondent was tried for the offences under Sections 376(1) and 506, Part II ofIPC for committing rape on the prosecutrix andcommitting criminal intimidation, before Sessions Court. As per prosecutionallegations, respondent was a tenant in the house of the father of prosecutrix . He developed physical relations with the prosecutrix . In the month of August 2007, respondent cameto the prosecutrix and proposed to. her that he loved her and wanted to marry her and forciblycommitted sexual intercourse with her. On her shouting, respondent gagged hermouth and intimidated to kill her in case of shouting. The matter was reportedto the Police by the prosecutrix on 4.4.08. On thebasis of her report, an offence was registered against the respondent at PoliceStation, AJK, Mandla and wasinvestigated. After due investigation, respondent was prosecuted and put totrial. 4.Learned Sessions Judge, after trial and upon appreciation of the evidence, cameto hold that the prosecutrix was an adult lady ofabout 23 years of age and as per her evidence, she was having sexual relationswith the respondent from’ 2004 to 2007, but lodged the FIR nearly after threeyears without any satisfactory explanation. The Trial Court after scrutinising the evidence of the prosecutrix found that the prosecutrix continued physicalrelations with the respondent despite having learned subsequently that he was amarried person with children and complained against him only after respondentleft tenanted house. The Trial Court also held, thatthough the prosecutrix claimed that the respondentcommitted rape on her on the false assurance of marriage, but her conductrevealed that she was a consenting party; therefore, acquitted the respondentof both the charges under Sections 376(1) and 506, Part II of IPC. 5.Learned counsel for the State as well as learned counsel appearing on behalf ofthe prosecutrix submitted that the Trial Court didnot appreciate the evidence in proper perspective and failed to consider thatthe respondent sexually exploited the prosecutrix under false assurance of marriage and it was not a case of free consent. 5.Learned counsel for the State as well as learned counsel appearing on behalf ofthe prosecutrix submitted that the Trial Court didnot appreciate the evidence in proper perspective and failed to consider thatthe respondent sexually exploited the prosecutrix under false assurance of marriage and it was not a case of free consent. 6.We have gone through the impugned judgment and considered the reasons foracquittal assigned by the Trial Court. Prosecutrix (P.W-3) was admittedly a fully grown adult lady and, as discussed in theimpugned judgment, she had continued physical relations with the respondent, atenant in her house, for a period over three years andlodged the report after three years when the respondent left her house, despitehaving come to know that the respondent was a married person having children.In these circumstances, it could not be said that the prosecutrix consented to the sexual acts simply under false assurance of marriage or it wasnot a case of free consent or consent under misconception of fact. The TrialCourt has critically discussed the evidence of the prosecutrix in detail and held that the prosecutrix was aconsenting party. The view taken by the Trial Court is plausible view on thebasis of evidence on record and is not perverse or illegal so as to warrantinterference in the order of acquittal of the respondent. The Trial Court hasrecorded cogent reasons for acquittal of respondent. 7.No case for grant of leave to appeal or interference in the impugned order ofacquittal within the limited scope of revision by a private party is made out. 8.Accordingly, the petition for leave to appeal filed by theState as well as Criminal Revision filed by the prosecutrix are dismissed.