Judgment Though both the writ petitioners were employed under the respondent BCCL at Lodna Colliery, but during the pendency of their services, both of them were remanded to judicial custody in connection with a police case registered against them for alleged offences under sections 302/34 of the Indian Penal Code. Both of them were tried and were convicted for the aforesaid offences by the judgment of the Trial Court dated 27.5.2003 and sentenced to under imprisonment for life. The petitioners challenged the judgment of their conviction and sentence before the High Court by filing a Criminal Appeal No. 787 of 2003. Upon the admission of the appeal, and pending final disposal, both of them were granted bail by the High Court. Upon their release from jail, the petitioners reported at their respective places of work for joining duty. They were not allowed to join and on the other hand, they were served with a charge sheet dated 10.7.2003 and 12.9.2003 respectively on the charge that they had unauthorizedly absented themselves from their respective duties on and from 29.03.2003. The petitioners filed their show-cause replies but the same was not found satisfactory and a departmental proceeding was initiated against them. The petitioners participated in the departmental proceeding. During the pendency of the proceeding, both the petitioners preferred an application before the High Court in the aforesaid criminal appeal for suspension of their conviction. The prayer for suspension of their conviction was rejected, though with the following observations. “There is nothing on record to suggest that a person cannot rejoin the duty if convicted in a criminal case. There is nothing on the record to show that M/s BCCL has framed any Rule similar to proviso to Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India”. 2. At the conclusion of the departmental proceeding, each of the petitioners was served with the impugned letter of his dismissal from service (Annexures-5 and 5A). The petitioners have challenged the impugned orders of their dismissal from service and have prayed for quashing the same and also for issuance of a direction upon the respondents to allow the petitioners to resume their duties at their original post and to pay them their full back wages. 3. A counter-affidavit has been filed on behalf of the respondents. 4. Heard learned counsel for the petitioners and the learned counsel for the respondent BCCL. 5. 3. A counter-affidavit has been filed on behalf of the respondents. 4. Heard learned counsel for the petitioners and the learned counsel for the respondent BCCL. 5. Assailing the impugned orders of dismissal, Shri Mahesh Tiwari, learned counsel for the petitioners, would argue that the impugned orders of dismissal suffers from miscarriage of justice in as much as, even without adopting the procedure laid down by law, the petitioners have been terminated from service. Learned counsel explains that the disciplinary proceeding against the petitioners was conducted on the basis of a single charge namely, that they had unauthorizedly absented themselves from duty for the period indicated in the charge sheet. Yet, without appreciating the explanation offered by the petitioners for the reasons of their absence from duty, and without considering as to whether such absence could be adjusted against permissible leave to which the petitioners were eligible, the respondents have proceeded to terminate the petitioners’ service on an additional charge that both of them were convicted for criminal offences. Learned counsel argues further that such additional charge was never framed, nor was any inquiry conducted in respect of the same against the petitioners and furthermore, before proceeding to impose the extreme punishment on the basis of such extraneous considerations, the respondents have neither supplied any copy of the inquiry report, nor had served any show-cause notice to the petitioners to enable them to explain as to why they should not be warded the extreme punishment of dismissal from service. Learned counsel adds further that, as observed in the order of this court in the criminal appeal, the respondent BCCL had never produced any such Rule corresponding to the provisions of Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India and therefore, the petitioners could neither be prevented from resuming duty, nor can their services be terminated on the purported ground of their conviction for criminal offences. 6. Per contra, explaining the stand taken by the respondents, Shri A.K. Mehta, learned counsel for the respondents would argue that admittedly the departmental proceeding against the petitioners was conducted on the basis of a single charge that they had unauthorizedly absented themselves from duty. 6. Per contra, explaining the stand taken by the respondents, Shri A.K. Mehta, learned counsel for the respondents would argue that admittedly the departmental proceeding against the petitioners was conducted on the basis of a single charge that they had unauthorizedly absented themselves from duty. In their show-cause relies, submitted by the petitioners respectively, while explaining the reasons for their absence, they had also admitted that they were convicted for the offences under sections 302/34 of the Indian Penal Code and since such offence involves moral turpitude, it was within the competence of the respondent BCCL, as per the framed Rule which guides the service condition of the employee, to terminate the services of the petitioners and therefore, in this view of the matter, the impugned order of dismissal do not suffer from any illegality or perversity. Referring to the judgment of the Supreme Court passed in the case of Union of India and others vs. Ramesh Kumar [ (1997) 7 SCC 514 , learned counsel argues that it has been held by the Apex Court that the employer is entitled to dismiss the Government Servant who has been convicted on a criminal charge and the employee has no right to be reinstated in service without an order of suspension of his conviction and execution of sentence being passed in the Appeal. As such, as long as the conviction continues to remain operative, disciplinary action such as dismissal or removal from service on the basis of such conviction, cannot be assailed. 7. Facts as appearing from the rival submissions, reflects two outstanding features. The first is that both the petitioners, upon their being remanded to judicial custody, could not attend to their duties as long as they were under detention. Both of them were convicted and sentenced for the offences under sections 302/34 of the Indian Penal Code. Pending appeal against the order of their conviction and sentence, the petitioners were released on bail. Where-after, they had reported for duty, but they were refused to join duty. The second aspect is that the disciplinary proceeding was conducted against both the petitioners on the solitary charge that they had unauthorizedly absented themselves from their duty. Pending appeal against the order of their conviction and sentence, the petitioners were released on bail. Where-after, they had reported for duty, but they were refused to join duty. The second aspect is that the disciplinary proceeding was conducted against both the petitioners on the solitary charge that they had unauthorizedly absented themselves from their duty. Though the petitioners had sought to explain the reasons for their absence, but at the conclusion of the inquiry, a finding was recorded by the Inquiry Officer that the charge relating to unauthorized absence from duty against the petitioners, was proved. While accepting the findings of the Inquiry Officer, the Disciplinary Authority appears, however, to have adverted also to the judgment of the criminal court passed against the petitioners and recorded his observation that the petitioners were convicted and sentenced for criminal offences involving moral turpitude, which was in violation of the provisions of the certified standing orders of the Respondent Company under Para-26.1.19, which appears to have compounded the gravity of the charge perceived to be highly serious and deserving the punishment of termination of the services of the petitioners. 8. Apparently, the conviction of an employee for any criminal offence involving moral turpitude, is deemed to be in violation of certain specific clauses contained in the certified standing orders of the Respondent Company. If this was so, and conduct of the employees were considered to be a misconduct under the certified standing orders, then no doubt, the employer had the authority to take appropriate disciplinary action which such violation of the provisions of the certified standing orders, would invite. However, the proposed disciplinary action has always to be made in accordance with the stipulated Rules of Procedure. The substance of accusation relating to such misconduct has to be stated by way of a specific charge and the delinquent employee has to be given adequate opportunity to defend himself by offering his explanation, which in this case, does not appear to have been done. Furthermore, had any proposed disciplinary action been confined to the proof of the solitary charge of absenteeism for which the petitioners were proceeded against, then the matters for consideration would have been confined only to such charge and to the explanation offered by the proceedee, thereto. Furthermore, had any proposed disciplinary action been confined to the proof of the solitary charge of absenteeism for which the petitioners were proceeded against, then the matters for consideration would have been confined only to such charge and to the explanation offered by the proceedee, thereto. As it appears, while considering the findings of the Inquiry Officer, the Disciplinary Authority had allowed himself to be influenced by the additional fact beyond the charge framed, that the petitioners were convicted for criminal offence involving moral turpitude. It also appears that before proceeding to inflict the extreme punishment, the petitioners were neither served with a copy of the inquiry report, nor was any show-cause notice served upon them to explain as to why they should not be awarded extreme punishment of dismissal from service. The plea of the respondents that no separate charge was needed to be framed in respect of the conviction of the petitioners for criminal offence involving moral turpitude in view of their own admission, in my opinion, is not correct. As stated above, conviction of the employee for any criminal offence involving moral turpitude, may, in itself, be an act of misconduct under the provisions of the certified standing orders of the respondent BCCL, but before proceeding to take any disciplinary action on such acts of misconduct, the mandatory procedure has to be adopted and the same cannot be dispensed merely on the ground that the employee had admitted certain facts. 9. In the light of the above discussions, I am of the view that the impugned orders of dismissal from service have been passed without adherence to the principles of natural justice and without following the procedure laid down under the law as well as the Rules applicable to the employees of the respondent BCCL. As such, both the impugned orders (Annexures-5 and 5A) are hereby quashed. The matter is remitted back to the concerned authorities of the respondents to record a fresh decision on the basis of the findings in the inquiry report relating to the charge for which the disciplinary proceeding was conducted against the petitioners. Such decision must be taken within two months from the date of receipt / production of a copy of this order. Such decision must be taken within two months from the date of receipt / production of a copy of this order. The Disciplinary Authority shall be at liberty to take any appropriate action in accordance with the Rules of Procedure for any other acts of misconduct on the part of the petitioners, if found in violation of the provisions of certified standing orders. Such action if contemplated, shall be taken and concluded within four months from the date of this order. With these observations, this writ application is disposed of. Let a copy of the order be given to the learned counsel for the respondents.