Research › Search › Judgment

Rajasthan High Court · body

2009 DIGILAW 1388 (RAJ)

New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Asha Devi Garg

2009-05-21

MOHAMMAD RAFIQ

body2009
Hon'ble RAFIQ, J.—These four writ petitions have been filed by the petitioner-New India Assurance Company Ltd. against the common order dated 15.7.2008 passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal Jaipur dismissing its four applications filed for different purposes. First of these applications was filed under Order 14 Rule 5 CPC for amendment and/or for framing of additional issues. Second application was filed for summoning the record of the Regional Transport Authority. Third application was filed for amendment of the written-statement and fourth application was filed for a direction to proceed ex-parte against non-claimant No.1 Jai Gopal, who was driver of the offending vehicle. 2. Since all the four petitions were directed against the common order rejecting above referred to four applications, which were filed at the instance of the same petitioner, all these petitions were taken up together for hearing and are being now decided by this common order. 3. Factual matrix of the case is that on 27.3.1997, one Kishori Sharan Garg died in a road accident while driving a Maruti Esteem Car. The car driven by him collided with a truck on National Highway No.8 within the jurisdiction of Police Station Chandwaji, District Jaipur. A first information report bearing FIR No.23/97 for offence under Sections 279 and 304A IPC was registered with the Police Station Chandwaji District Jaipur clearly stating about involvement of above two and a third passenger bus. The truck bearing Registration No.HR-10/3976 was insured with the petitioner insurance company for the period from 24.8.1996 to 23.8.1997 and the cover note was issued covering this period. Claimants in this case filed claim petitions under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Jaipur on 24.8.2006 after more than nine years of the accident claiming a sum of Rs.181,74,80,000/-. The enormity of the claimed amount of compensation has alarmed the petitioner insurance company to contest the present matter tooth and nail which has filed above referred to four applications for different purposes. According to petitioner, it issued policy of insurance on the subject vehicle on the strength of such earlier policy issued by the National Assurance Company, which fact was duly recorded in the cover note dated 23.8.1996. According to petitioner, it issued policy of insurance on the subject vehicle on the strength of such earlier policy issued by the National Assurance Company, which fact was duly recorded in the cover note dated 23.8.1996. It appointed Investigator Shri Hawa Singh to verify the claim and examine all the peculiar circumstances; who visited office of Regional Transport Authority at Rohtak and Sonipath in the State of Haryana so as to ascertain genuineness and authenticity of the registration certificate. He submitted an application before the Regional Transport Authority at Rohtak seeking verification of the particulars contained in the registration certificate of the vehicle from their record. The Regional Transport Authority at Rohtak returned the original application with the remark that particulars of the aforesaid vehicle were not traceable in their records and that the Regional Transport Authority at Sonipath be consulted in the matter. When he visited office of Regional Transport Authority at Sonipath, it issued particulars of Registration Certificate on 8.5.2008 indicating that no transfer of this vehicle has been made till date as per their record and that the vehicle was originally registered in their records in the name of Anjit Singh S/o Omprakash and no NOC was issued by RA/RTA for its transfer after 6.9.1990. Another reason for filing the aforesaid application before the Tribunal was that claimants were vigorously prosecuting the insurance claim on the policy of the deceased with the United Assurance Company and petitioner New India Assurance Company. The claimants also filed an application before the Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum at New Delhi for damages caused to the car under the Consumer Protection Act, 2001. Even then the claim petition under Section 166 of the Act of 1988 was filed on 4.8.2006 belatedly after lapse of 9 years and 5 months. Despite there being no prescribed limitation, the Tribunal was still required to see whether the delay was satisfactorily explained because even in absence of period of limitation, claim petition was nonetheless required to be filed within reasonable time. Despite there being no prescribed limitation, the Tribunal was still required to see whether the delay was satisfactorily explained because even in absence of period of limitation, claim petition was nonetheless required to be filed within reasonable time. Third reason for the petitioner to move one of the aforesaid applications was that since the driver of the offending vehicle Jai Gopal was declared hostile in the criminal case pending against him before the court of learned Judicial Magistrate for offence under Section 304A IPC, proceedings against him in the motor accident claim case are liable to be held ex-parte notwithstanding filing of written-statement and vakalatnama on his behalf. On the basis of the aforesaid, petitioner made yet another application with the prayer that the Regional Transport Authority Sonipath as well as Rohtak be directed to produce entire record relating to registration and transfer of offending vehicles from 6.9.1990 till the date of accident. 4. Arguments have been canvassed for reversing and upholding the common impugned order by which aforesaid four applications were rejected, however, with a view to facilitate the disposal of these petitions in an effective manner, I deem it appropriate to deal with all the four petitions separately in the order in which such applications were considered and decided by the Tribunal. S.B.C.W.P. No.1812/2009:- 5. In this writ petition, petitioner has challenged the order by which its application for amendment of the existing issues and/or for framing of additional issues, was rejected. 6. Claimant respondents filed affidavit of the previous owner Shri Anjit Singh, who sold the vehicle in question to non-claimant Santraj Singh. Santraj Singh (owner) produced the National Permit issued in his name and also registration certificate to show that the vehicle already stood transferred in his name. He made an application to RTA on 5.6.2008 demanding ownership verification of the vehicle on which the said Authority made a remark to the effect that the Registration Certification was not available in their office however, registration of vehicle in question was transferred in the name of Santraj on the basis of National Permit granted in his name on the said vehicle which was valid from 4.6.1994 to 4.12.1999. Registration Certificate stands in the name of Santraj Singh. 7. Registration Certificate stands in the name of Santraj Singh. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that though the petitioner has proposed for framing of many additional issues however the application would show that the proposed additional issues No.1 to 7 seek to deal with one important aspect, namely; where there is no period of limitation provided by the statute, namely, Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, whether the claim petition under Section 166 filed after an inordinate and unexplained delay of more than nine years is per se maintainable without enquiring into the reasons for the inordinate delay and if not, what is its effect? It is contended that despite omission of sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 166 of the MV Act by Amendment Act of 2001, claim petition was still required to be filed within reasonable period of time. Reliance in support of this argument has been placed on the judgment of Apex Court in Pune Municipal Corporation vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors. ( AIR 2007 SC 2414 ), A.V. Papayya Sastry & Ors. vs. Govt. of A.P. & Ors. ( AIR 2007 SC 1546 ) and Rand M.Trust vs. Koramangala Residents Vigilance Group and others ( AIR 2005 SC 894 ). Learned counsel referring to the objects and reasons of the Amendment Act of 2001 raised argument that omission of sub-section (3) was intended to take care of claimants/injured or the legal heirs of the deceased, who are ignorant about the period of limitation during which application was to be preferred in case of death of the sole bread earner of the family and in many cases, such claimants are virtually on the streets and even in cases where the victims escape death, some of such victims are hospitalized for sufficiently long time. Mere omission of the provisions of limitation does not mean that claimants can file the claim petition at any time they like and that too even after delay of ten years. Law is well settled that even when there is no time limit prescribed for approaching the court or for filing a petition/application before the court, the aggrieved party should approach the court within reasonable time or else the petition / application /claim would be liable to be rejected for delay and latches. Law is well settled that even when there is no time limit prescribed for approaching the court or for filing a petition/application before the court, the aggrieved party should approach the court within reasonable time or else the petition / application /claim would be liable to be rejected for delay and latches. It is contended that in para 26 of the claim, claimant made a misleading statement that the claim application was within limitation whereas fact is that there was delay of 9 years and 5 months. Petitioner has also proposed an additional Issue No.8 on the premise that non-claimants No.1 and 2 respectively in their written-statement pleaded that accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of Maruti Car bearing No.RJ-14 1C 4788 being driven by the deceased, which collided with the Truck bearing No.HR-10 3976 due to inadvertence of a passenger bus. It is submitted that once it is known that there was contest on a factual aspect of the matter, the Tribunal ought not to have avoided framing issue on such factual contest appearing from the pleadings. It was argued that in the written statement filed by non-claimants No.1 and 2, reference was made about involvement of third passenger vehicle and this fact was very much stated in the first information report lodged with the police also. 8. Per contra, Shri Sagar Mal Mehta, learned Senior counsel appearing for all the non-petitioners argued that the insurance company in the present case has started raising every possible hurdles so as to delay the proceedings, which is evident from the fact that they have filed not one but four applications raising frivolous objections. Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 was properly amended by the Act of 1994 to do away with the provisions of limitation. There is therefore no justification for insisting that the claim petition was not filed within limitation or otherwise the delay was not satisfactorily explained. Learned counsel relied on the judgment of Supreme Court in New India Assurance Co.Ltd. vs. C.Padma and another : (2003) 7 SCC 713 = RLW 2004(1) SC 13 to argue that Supreme Court in that case clarified every contingency and held that even Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963 does not apply to the claims which were filed before the Tribunal under the MV Act. The Tribunal has already framed issue with regard to limitation as Issue No.3 and therefore more and additional issues touching upon the aspect of limitation could not be framed. Contention of the petitioner in this aspect was rightly rejected by the Tribunal. It was submitted that there was no question of framing an issue for dismissing the claim application on the ground of non-impleadment of driver/owner and insurer of passenger bus as respondents. Similar application for framing of additional issue was already rejected by the Tribunal vide order dated 27.4.2007 and therefore another application on the same subject matter was not maintainable. 9. Learned counsel for the petitioner in rejoinder has produced copy of the earlier application dated 16.6.2007 by which, it was prayed to frame additional issues. Issues proposed in that application was whether claim petition was time barred and second issue was whether the vehicle in question bearing No.HR-10/3976 was not insured with the petitioner on the date of accident i.e. 27.3.1997 and if so, what is its effect? It was argued that they were entirely different issues. On rejection of such application, it cannot be said that subsequent application would be barred. 10. Upon consideration of rival submissions made by the parties and perusal of the impugned order, I find that as far as objection with regard to delay vis-a-vis limitation is concerned, after deletion of sub-section (3) of Section 166 of the MV Act, there is as such no limitation prescribed for filing the claim petition but on that aspect of the matter, already Issue No.3 has been framed by the Tribunal. Framing additional issues on the question of delay may not be necessary. What however remains to be considered is that what would be the effect of filing of the claim petition belatedly. Petitioner has proposed not one but as many as seven issues on the question of delay alone. Cumulative reading of proposed issues reveal that insistence of the petitioner is that the claimants were required to satisfactorily explain inordinate delay of 9 years and 5 months and that Tribunal ought to have examined as to what would be the effect of such a delay specially when claimants are seeking Rs.181,74,80,000/- as compensation. Cumulative reading of proposed issues reveal that insistence of the petitioner is that the claimants were required to satisfactorily explain inordinate delay of 9 years and 5 months and that Tribunal ought to have examined as to what would be the effect of such a delay specially when claimants are seeking Rs.181,74,80,000/- as compensation. In my considered view, petitioner insurance company should not be over reactive to the quantum of compensation demanded as ultimately what compensation has to be awarded shall have to be decided by the Tribunal on the basis of the evidence led before it. Issue with regard to limitation having already been framed, ofcourse delay may have the effect on the payment of interest for the intervening period and this aspect of the matter can be duly taken care of by the Tribunal in the last issue framed as to what relief the claimants are entitled to and considering that issue, Tribunal may even decline to award interest for the period of delay so as to mould the relief which at the maximum would be the effect of enormous delay in filing of the claim petition. 11. All those judgments of the Supreme Court cited on behalf of the petitioner on the point of law that even where there is no period of limitation prescribed for availing of a remedy, aggrieved person should approach the court within reasonable time, shall have to be therefore examined on the touchstone of the intention of the Parliament in seeking to deliberately delete sub-Section (3), which earlier provided limitation of six months from the date of cause of action arise. Supreme Court in Dhannalal vs. D.P. Vijayvargiya and others : (1996) 4 SCC 652 = RLW 1996(2) SC 119 held that when sub-section (3) of Section 166 has been omitted, then the Tribunal has to entertain a claim petition without taking note of the date on which such accident had taken place and even went to the extent of holding that Section 6-A of the General Clauses Act as well as Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963 cannot be invoked before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal because the Motor Vehicles Act is a beneficial legislation and is a self-contained Act which prescribes the mode of filing the application, procedure to be followed and award to be made. Since the object is to give effective relief to the victims and the families of the motor accidents untrammeled by the technicalities of the limitation, invoking of Art. 137 would defect the intendment of the legislature. 12. Considering, however, pleadings of the parties, especially of the written-statement filed by non-claimant No.2, I find that in para 2 of the additional pleas, it has clearly been stated that accident had taken place due to rash and negligent driving of the non-passenger bus and maruti car which was driven by the deceased himself and that accident took place because driver of the passenger vehicle/bus overtook the maruti car, from the wrong side, as a result of which, driver of the maruti car lost his control of his vehicle and dashed the car into the truck, which was coming on the correct side in conformity with the traffic rules. In my considered view, according to the requirement of Order 14 Rule 1 CPC, issues arise when a material proposition of fact or law is affirmed by the one party and denied by the other and according to sub-Rule (2), material propositions are those propositions of law or fact, which a plaintiff must allege in order to show a right to sue or a defendant must allege in order to constitute his defence. Sub-section (3) of Order 14 provides that each material proposition affirmed by one party and denied by the other shall form the subject of a distinct issue. According to sub-Rule(4), issues are of two kinds: (a) issues of fact and (b) issues of law. When specific pleading was made by the non-claimants No.1 and 2 in their written-statement, Tribunal, in my considered view, could not avoid framing of issues on that aspect just because this objection had not been raised by the insurance company or that such objection could not be raised by the insurance company. Law, which is to be ultimately applied on the question of correctness or otherwise on the objection, could not have been considered at the stage of framing of additional issues. Law, which is to be ultimately applied on the question of correctness or otherwise on the objection, could not have been considered at the stage of framing of additional issues. Regard being had to enormity of claim and there being such factual assertion in the pleadings, and considering that there was a contest on this factual aspect, which had an important bearing on the ultimate outcome of the claim petition, in my opinion, the Tribunal has erred in law in not allowing the application for framing additional issues on this aspect of the matter. Moreover the Tribunal also could not refuse to frame such issues on the premise that owners and drivers of the vehicles are unknown. This is a matter of evidence and it was the burden of concerned party to prove this fact by required degree. The Tribunal would however be free to take its own view of the matter on the basis of evidence led. It cannot however shirk its responsibility in framing the issue arising out of the pleadings of the parties. 13. The Tribunal was not justified in observing that burden of proof for this plea or issue that accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of Truck No.HR-10/3976 would be on the claimants and if in rebuttal respondents at that stage produce evidence showing that accident took place on account of rash and negligent driving of the aforesaid passenger vehicle, claim petition would be liable to be rejected. Tribunal at the stage of framing of issues/additional issues could not decline framing of such additional issue because the evidence in rebuttal obviously would be led confined to the issues framed and if despite pleadings that there was involvement of an unknown passenger bus which overtook the maruti car being driven by the deceased from wrong side, this was obviously an important fact necessitating framing of issue. Evidence in rebuttal would naturally be then liable to be read in support of one or the other party. 14. Evidence in rebuttal would naturally be then liable to be read in support of one or the other party. 14. Issues No.8, 9 and 10 as proposed by the petitioner can be combined together thus, “Whether in view of the pleadings contained in para-2 of the additional pleas of written-statement filed by non-claimant, the accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the maruti car bearing No.RJ-14-1C-4788 driven by the deceased and unknown passenger vehicle/bus and if so, what is the effect of non-impleadment of owner and driver of such unknown passenger vehicle/ bus? 15. The writ petition filed by the insurance company to that extent deserves to be allowed and its application before the Tribunal filed under Order 14 Rule 5 CPC deserves to be allowed in part. S.B.C.W.P. No. 1813/2009: 16. This writ petition has been filed by the petitioner insurance company against the order rejecting their application by which it requested the Tribunal to proceed ex-parte against the non-claimant No.1 Jai Gopal, the driver of the vehicle. This application was grounded on the fact that the said driver was facing a criminal trial in the court of learned Civil Judge (Junior Division) Cum First class Jaipur and that he absconded and for that reason, the trial court declared him as absconder and issued standing warrant against him. Since he is not appearing to face the trial, the proceedings were directed to be initiated under Section 83 for attachment of his property. This application merely reflects an over zealous approach on the part of the insurance company, which had no justification to make such application before the Tribunal as the non applicant was duly represented before it by an authorised advocate and also filed written-statement. Filing of the application was wholly uncalled for and the learned Tribunal, in my considered view, was fully justified in rejecting such application. The insurance company when engaged in litigation before the Tribunal in a claim petition demanding compensation for death, is expected to behave responsibly and sensibly and not like an ordinary litigant raising such pleas, which are ex-facie frivolous and baseless. The insurance company when engaged in litigation before the Tribunal in a claim petition demanding compensation for death, is expected to behave responsibly and sensibly and not like an ordinary litigant raising such pleas, which are ex-facie frivolous and baseless. Whatever be the effect of the driver having been declared absconder in criminal trial, so long as he is duly represented by his advocate in the present case having filed written-statement, he cannot be proceeded ex-parte even in the proceedings before the Tribunal if he fails to adduce any evidence. 17. The Tribunal was therefore perfectly justified in rejecting the application by which petitioner insurance company had requested to proceed ex-parte against the driver Jai Gopal. The present writ petition filed by the insurance company therefore deserves to be rejected with costs which is quantified at Rs.5,000/-. S.B.C.W.P. No. 1814/2009: 18. This writ petition has been filed by the insurance company against the order rejecting application by which it prayed for a direction to the Regional Transport Authority of Sonepat and Rohtak to produce all the relevant and necessary original records with regard to registration and transfer of vehicle No.HR-10/3976 from 6.9.1990, when it was first registered and till the date of accident on 27.3.1997. 19. Learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that even though the original record relating to registration/transfer of truck in question was not available with either of the registering authorities at Sonipath or Rohtak, the Tribunal has yet recorded a finding that the registered owner of the vehicle in question was non-claimant Santraj Singh. Learned counsel contended that action of the petitioner to request the Tribunal for summoning the record and seeking amendment in the written-statement was actuated on account of the report of their investigator Shri Hawa Singh and specially on the basis of Certificate issued by the Registering Authority at Sonipath on 8.5.2008. 20. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the Tribunal illegally ignored the certificate dated 8.5.2008 issued by the RTA Sonipath and also omitted to consider an undisputed letter dated 4.6.2008 issued by the Finance Company, which originally financed the said vehicle. The Tribunal simply proceeded to record a conclusive finding on this aspect of the matter relating to certificate dated 5.6.2008 that it has rightly been issued by RTA Rohtak. The Tribunal simply proceeded to record a conclusive finding on this aspect of the matter relating to certificate dated 5.6.2008 that it has rightly been issued by RTA Rohtak. Even in that certificate, it is clearly stated that original record relating to RC transfer was not traceable and that the certificate stands issued in the name of Santraj Singh only on the basis of the record of the National Permit available in that office, according to which, national permit was issued in the name of Santraj Singh. It is submitted that when existence of primary evidence is disputed, secondary or collateral evidence could not be considered. However, in any case, Tribunal at this stage was not called upon to record a finding one way or the other. Only prayer that was made to summon the record. 21. Learned counsel contended that the Motor & General Finance Ltd., New Delhi, the financer of the said vehicle bearing Registration No.HR-10-3976 when the same was originally purchased by Shri Anjit Singh, in its letter dated 4.6.2008 certified that said vehicle was financed to Shri Anjit Singh on higher purchase agreement dated 23.7.1990 and they have received full and final payment for the same on 27.10.1994 and HPT & Form 35 has already been issued on 27.10.1994. It was argued that the said certificate clearly reveals the condition stipulated in the certificate issued by RTA on 5.6.2008 stating that the RC of the said vehicle was transferred in the name of Santraj Singh and that this was done on the basis of national permit granted in the name of Santraj Singh which was valid from 4.6.1994 to 4.12.1999. It is contended that in view of the certificate issued by the Finance Company that the vehicle was financed to Anjit Singh on higher purchase agreement and it has received full and final payment and signed NOC on 27.10.1994, the national permit for the period commencing earlier than 27.10.1994 could not possibly be issued in the name of Santraj Singh. Very genuineness of national permit is therefore in doubt. The authenticity of certificate issued by the financer was never disputed nor even questioned by the Tribunal. 22. Very genuineness of national permit is therefore in doubt. The authenticity of certificate issued by the financer was never disputed nor even questioned by the Tribunal. 22. Shri S.M. Mehta, learned senior counsel appearing for the claimants has argued that once the RTA at Rohtak has issued certificate to the effect that registration of the abovesaid vehicle stands in the name of Santraj Singh and on that basis, national permit was also issued to him, these objections cannot be permitted to be raised by the petitioner-New India Assurance company Ltd. specially when it has insured the said vehicle taking Santraj Singh as its owner. When vehicle met with an accident and non-claimant No.2 Santraj Singh filed claim petition for compensation, the same was investigated into by the petitioner insurance company, which while accepting non-claimant Santraj Singh owner, paid compensation. It was argued that even when award of interim compensation was passed under Section 140 of the MV Act, no such objection was raised by the petitioner insurance company at that relevant point of time. Learned senior counsel further submitted that according to GR 34 of the Indian Motor Tariff, it is clear that once the insurance policy is issued and admitted by the insurance company, it cannot shirk from its responsibility in any manner when a policy of insurance is in existence. Alternatively, learned counsel for the claimants submitted that even from the perusal of the application, it is clear that petitioner insurance company did not disclose particulars or details of the documents which it intended to be summoned and in absence thereof, even otherwise, no such application was tenable because obviously the entire record maintained by the RTA could not be summoned. Learned counsel submitted that the insurance company could not be in view of statutory provisions contained in Section 149(2) of the MV Act permitted to take such defence. 23. After accident, vehicle was delivered to non-claimant No.2 on superdiginama and this very vehicle was also insured with the petitioner insurance company by Cover Note dated 19.8.1995 accepting non claimant Santraj Singh as its registered owner. Even petitioner National Insurance Company in the present legal proceedings treated Santraj Singh as its registered owner and issued notice to him under Section 133 of the MV Act. Application for summoning of record was rightly rejected. 24. Even petitioner National Insurance Company in the present legal proceedings treated Santraj Singh as its registered owner and issued notice to him under Section 133 of the MV Act. Application for summoning of record was rightly rejected. 24. I have given my anxious consideration to the rival submissions and perused the impugned order. 25. It is no doubt true that the registering Authorities of Sonipath and Rohtak in their certificates dated 8.5.2008 and 5.6.2008 have stated that the original record relating to transfer of vehicle was not traceable but nevertheless it is difficult to comprehend what was the occasion for the petitioner insurance company to make an application for summoning of the record at the preliminary stage. There was no justification for filing this application for two reasons; first is that it had simultaneously applied for amendment of pleadings in the written-statements raised on the basis of these very documents and amendments to the above effect were required to be incorporated in the pleadings in keeping with the provisions of Order 6 Rules 1 & 2 of CPC so that evidence adduced on that point could be read in support of such pleadings. Secondly, in the present case, it is admitted by both the parties that evidence of claimants was yet to be recorded and then would start to the stage of the evidence of the non claimants getting recorded. The application makes a general prayer that RTA at Sonipath as well as Rohtak be directed to produce all necessary record of registration and transfer of vehicle in question for the period from 6.9.1990 when it was first registered and till the date of accident on 27.3.1997. No specific particulars, as rightly argued on behalf of the respondents, of any document or record was given but in any case, filing of this application by the New India Assurance Company appears to have been motivated by its over anxiousness as to the quantum and enormity of compensation claimed by the claimants in the claim petition. The insurance company when engaged in litigation with regard to a death claim, is rather expected to contest the same with a sense of duty and not like ordinary litigant who for understandable reasons can raise all kinds of pleas genuine or otherwise, to avoid its liability. The application was obviously filed at a premature stage. The insurance company when engaged in litigation with regard to a death claim, is rather expected to contest the same with a sense of duty and not like ordinary litigant who for understandable reasons can raise all kinds of pleas genuine or otherwise, to avoid its liability. The application was obviously filed at a premature stage. At the same time however, it goes without saying that mere rejection of application would not be mean that the insurance company cannot adduce its evidence on this aspect of the matter and make an appropriate application at the appropriate level by specifying documents which it intends to be requisitioned in support of its case, which shall be dealt with by the Tribunal in accordance with law at that stage. 26. The writ petition therefore deserves to be dismissed, with the afore discussed observations. S.B.C.W.P. No.1815/2009: 27. This writ petition has been filed by the petitioner challenging rejection of the application seeking amendment in the written-statement/reply to the claim petition. 28. Learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that the application was filed because those amendments in the written-statement were necessary in view of the subsequent developments showing that the original record relating to registration certificate and its transfer was not available either with RTA Sonipath or RTA Rohtak. The registration certificate only showing the name of Santraj Singh, could not be proved directly but it was stated to be issued on the basis of the collateral evidence of national permit. The Tribunal was not justified in rejecting the application seeking amendment based on subsequent developments. On the contrary, the Tribunal finally decided the issues against the insurance company and in favour of the claimants even before parties have adduced their evidence. Learned counsel in view of the submissions made in support of SBCWP No.1812/09, submitted that Tribunal has recorded a finding with regard to correctness of the registration certificate in favour of non claimant No.2 Santraj Singh even in the absence of full fledged evidence led before it. 29. Learned counsel in view of the submissions made in support of SBCWP No.1812/09, submitted that Tribunal has recorded a finding with regard to correctness of the registration certificate in favour of non claimant No.2 Santraj Singh even in the absence of full fledged evidence led before it. 29. It was submitted that the Motor & General Finance Ltd., New Delhi, the original financer of the said vehicle bearing Registration No.HR-10-3976 which was originally purchased by Anjit Singh in its letter dated 4.6.2008 certified that said vehicle was financed to Anjit Singh on higher purchase agreement dated 23.7.1990 and they have received full and final payment for the same on 27.10.1994 and HPT & Form 35 has already been issued on 27.10.1994. It was argued that the said certificate clearly transpires the condition stipulated in the certificate issued by RTA on 5.6.2008 stating that the RC of the said vehicle was transferred in the name of Santraj Singh and that this was done on the basis of national permit granted in the name of Santraj Singh which was valid from 4.6.1994 to 4.12.1999. It is contended that in view of the certificate issued by the Finance Company that the vehicle was financed to Anjit Singh on higher purchase agreement and it has received full and final payment and issued NOC only on 27.10.1994, the national permit for the period commencing earlier from 27.10.1994 could not possibly be issued in the name of Santraj Singh. The authenticity of the certificate of Finance Company was never disputed by the claimants nor questioned even by the Tribunal. 30. Learned counsel submitted that by amendment application, it also sought deletion of preliminary Objection No.2 with regard to policy of the insurance company. In fact, in the originally written-statement itself, petitioner insurance company had clearly reserved the right to seek amendment in the written-statement because it was continuously trying to search the relevant records and once the record could be searched and the certificate was obtained from the RTA, the application was made. In fact, in the originally written-statement itself, petitioner insurance company had clearly reserved the right to seek amendment in the written-statement because it was continuously trying to search the relevant records and once the record could be searched and the certificate was obtained from the RTA, the application was made. With reference to the certificate issued by RTA Sonipath and RTA Rohtak and also by the Motor & General Finance Ltd., New Delhi, it was argued that in view of the certificate issued by the Motor & General Finance Ltd., it become doubtful whether national permit was issued to Santraj Singh because full and final payment was received by the financer on 27.10.1994 and HPT & Form 35 has already been issued on 27.10.1994 and the vehicle was sold on higher purchase agreement to Anjit Singh. It was therefore that the additional plea was also sought to be added as Plea No.5 that the vehicle was being driven without any national permit and the provisions of the MV Act. Learned counsel relied on the judgment of Supreme Court in Dr.T.V. Jose vs. Chacko P.M. And others : 2001 ACJ 2059 (SC) = RLW 2002(1) SC 48 in which Supreme Court held that the person shown as registered owner in the record of the R.T.O. continued to remain liable to third parties as his name continued in the records of R.T.O. as owner. Such a person could not escape that liability. It is argued that non claimants No.1 and 2 have now joined hands with the claimants and that in the peculiarity of the circumstances the amendment become necessary because petitioner apprehends a huge liability of compensation demanded. 31. Shri Sagar Mal Mehta, learned senior counsel appearing for the claimants opposed the writ petition and argued that the petitioner has been throughout accepting non-claimant No.2 Santraj Singh as owner and issued insurance cover note in his favour and even admitted the insurance policy and paid compensation for the accident. Now, stand taken by the petitioner that he is not the registered owner of the vehicle, cannot be accepted. It was argued that this vehicle was also insured with the National Assurance Company wherein also Santraj Singh was shown as registered owner. Even at the time of passing of interim order/award under Section 140, Santraj Singh was taken as owner and no objection at that stage was taken by him. It was argued that this vehicle was also insured with the National Assurance Company wherein also Santraj Singh was shown as registered owner. Even at the time of passing of interim order/award under Section 140, Santraj Singh was taken as owner and no objection at that stage was taken by him. He did not seek to challenge the interim award. It was argued that during the course of argument on the aforesaid application, affidavit of earlier owner Anjit Singh was also submitted who admitted having transferred the vehicle in favour of Santraj Singh. National permit was also issued in favour of Santraj Singh. Report of the investigator appointed by the petitioner has therefore no meaning. Learned counsel relied on the judgment of Supreme Court in New India Assurance Co.Ltd. vs. Kiran Singh and others and Kiran Singh and others vs. New India Assurance Co.Ltd.: (2004)10 SCC 649 = RLW 2004(2) SC 308 and submitted that Supreme Court in that case held that insurance is a covenant of good faith, where both parties covenant to abide by the terms and conditions of the policy. In this case the Company has made a deliberate attempt to escape the liability by introducing a copy of the policy other than the insured. It was further observed that often, the terms and conditions are being respected more in breach than observance. Insurance companies must bear in mind that they are the trustee of the public; keepers of the public coffer. Often, even genuine claims are being hotly contested in a routine manner by dragging the parties to courts, wasting enormous time and money for the claimants to get there claims settled. An Act like the Motor Vehicles Act being a beneficial legislation is aimed at quick redressal of the victims of accident arising out of the use of the motor vehicles, the attitude routinely adopted by the insurance companies would render the object of the Act frustrated. 32. Learned counsel relating to Sections 145 and 146 of the MV Act argued that once the insurance company has issued cover note in the name of Santraj taking him owner and received payment, it cannot shirk from its liability with respect to third party interest due to accident. Learned counsel referred in particular to sub-section (5) of Section 147. 32. Learned counsel relating to Sections 145 and 146 of the MV Act argued that once the insurance company has issued cover note in the name of Santraj taking him owner and received payment, it cannot shirk from its liability with respect to third party interest due to accident. Learned counsel referred in particular to sub-section (5) of Section 147. Reliance was placed upon the judgment of Supreme Court in National Assurance Company Ltd. vs. Laxmi Narain Dhut : (2007) 3 SCC 700 = RLW 2007(3) SC 2012 and the observations made in paras 17 and 18 of the judgment to argue that there is no contractual relation between the insurance company and the third party. The liabilities and the obligations relatable to third parties are created only by fiction of Sections 147 and 149 of the Act. Learned counsel also relied on the judgment of Supreme Court in Assurance Company Limited vs. Abhaysingh Pratapsing Waghela and others : (2008)9 SCC 133 and argued that in that case, Supreme Court observed that once the cover note is issued, it remains valid till it is cancelled. According to GR 34 also, it is clear that once the insurance policy is issued and admitted by the insurance company, it cannot shirk from its responsibility in any manner when a policy of insurance is in existence. Learned counsel submitted that the insurance company could not in view of statutory provisions contained in Section 149(2) of the MV Act be permitted to take this defence. Section 149(2) only specifies defences which are available to insurance company to a limited extent, insurance company cannot be go back or resile from the cover note standing in the name of the non-claimant No.2 Santraj Singh. Learned counsel also relied on the judgments of Supreme Court in 2009(1) SCC 558 and United India Insurance Co.Ltd., Shimla vs. Tilak Singh and others : (2006)4 SCC 404 = RLW 2006(3) SC 1781. It is therefore prayed that the writ petition be dismissed. 33. I have given my anxious consideration to the arguments raised by the parties and perused the impugned-order. 34. It is therefore prayed that the writ petition be dismissed. 33. I have given my anxious consideration to the arguments raised by the parties and perused the impugned-order. 34. Perusal of the impugned-order reveals that the learned Tribunal has rejected the application seeking amendment almost for the same reason for which it rejected the application for summoning of the record, in that the insurance company having insured the vehicle taking Santraj Singh as owner, not once but twice and reflecting his name as such in the cover note, cannot be allowed to incorporate such amendment. It held that when prima-facie, it is evident that Santraj Singh was only owner of the vehicle, desired amendment cannot be said to be bonafide and if allowed, it would create only confusion and delay the proceedings. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners and respondents have both addressed the issue on the point of view whether the defence which the insurance company is seeking to incorporate in written-statement by way of amendment are available to it in view of the provisions contained in Section 149 of the MV Act, 1988, in which there are limited defences available to the insurance company and by these amendments, the insurance company would be raising such defences, which are not statutorily permissible to be raised. Since the matter was contested before the Tribunal on this line by the parties, the Tribunal has also fallen into the error of law in not adjudging the question of allowing amendment or otherwise, but deciding the matter from that angle only. In doing do, the Tribunal has gravely erred in recording the finding on some of the issues, which it was not justified to do at the interlocutory stage of deciding amendment application. It is trite law that object of Order 6 Rule 17 CPC is that court may at any stage of the proceedings allow either party to alter or amend his pleadings in such manner and on such terms as may be just, and all such amendments shall be made as may be necessary for the purpose of determining the real questions in controversy between the parties. It is trite that though an amendment cannot be claimed as a matter of right under all circumstances, yet the power to allow the amendment is wide and can be exercised at any stage of the proceedings in the interest of justice. It is trite that though an amendment cannot be claimed as a matter of right under all circumstances, yet the power to allow the amendment is wide and can be exercised at any stage of the proceedings in the interest of justice. It is equally well settled that unless serious injustice or irreparable loss is likely to be caused to the other side, the court should adopt liberal approach and not a hypertechnical approach, particularly in a case where the other side can be compensated with costs. Dominant object to allow the amendment in pleadings liberally is to avoid multiplicity of proceedings. 35. Supreme Court in Rajesh Kumar Aggarwal and others vs. K.K. Modi and Others : (2006) 4 SCC 385 = RLW 2006(3) SC 1882 held that the court always gives leave to amend the pleadings to a party unless it is satisfied that the party applying was acting malafide. The amendment to pleading should be liberally allowed since procedural obstacles ought not to impede the dispensation of justice. The court should also take notice of subsequent events in order to shorten the litigation, to preserve and safeguard the rights of both parties and to subserve the ends of justice. Here in the instant case, petitioner insurance company when applied for amendment pointedly stated in such application that it was seeking the amendments in the written-statement based on the subsequent developments, which are matter of record, for the purpose of ensuring determination of real questions and controversy between the parties. Here in the instant case, petitioner insurance company when applied for amendment pointedly stated in such application that it was seeking the amendments in the written-statement based on the subsequent developments, which are matter of record, for the purpose of ensuring determination of real questions and controversy between the parties. I am not inclined to uphold the findings recorded by the Tribunal that the amendments prayed for by the insurance company were not bonafide and that is because, apart from seeking above referred to amendments, petitioner insurance company also sought to delete preliminary objection raised in the originally filed written-statement where it had questioned correctness of policy of the insurance and submitted that since non applicant No.3 in proceedings on 21.6.2008, it has admitted the original cover note which has been produced in the court in criminal case, therefore the said preliminary objection be allowed to be deleted and second reason for my this conclusion is that in preliminary objection No.3, petitioner insurance company reserved the right to apply for amendment in the written-statement at the appropriate stage stating that it had appointed an investigator to go and examine the available record of Regional Transport Authority at Sonipath and Rohtak. It is on the basis of such investigation that above referred to facts came to their notice which indeed was a subsequent development relating to the matter. The question therefore arise that subsequent developments and endorsement made by the transport authorities of Sonipath and Rohtak in certificates dated 6.5.2008 and 8.5.2008 stating that the original records regarding registration certificate of its transfer were not traceable and that they certified non-applicant Santraj Singh as the owner on the basis of record of national permit, factual contents of these developments would be necessary to be incorporated in the written-statement at the instance of the petitioner insurance company because such amendment would be necessary for bringing the controversy between the parties to the fore. If allowed, it is not likely to cause any grave injustice to the claimants which cannot be compensated by way of costs or otherwise delay the proceedings. If allowed, it is not likely to cause any grave injustice to the claimants which cannot be compensated by way of costs or otherwise delay the proceedings. There is a peculiar feature of this case that here the claimants now joined by the owner and driver of the vehicle are resisting the prayer of the insurance company for the desired amendment primarily on the ground that such amendment cannot be allowed to be made; as by doing so, the insurance company is seeking to introduce additional grounds of defence which are not permissible in law. Before therefore answering the first question, it would be appropriate to deal with the second question first because whether the Tribunal has proceeded on the assumption that such amendments, even if allowed, defence sought to be set up thereby could not available to the petitioner insurance company by virtue of second proviso of Section 149 of the Act. Question therefore arise whether this could be examined at the stage of considering the amendment application? 36. Supreme Court in Usha Devi vs. Rijwan Ahamd and Others : (2008) 3 SCC 717 , in para 16 of the judgment while rejecting similar submission, albeit with regard to amendment of the plaint, held that the amendment will render the suit non-maintainable because it would not only materially change the suit property but also change the cause of action held that in order to allow the prayer for amendment, the merit of the amendment is hardly a relevant consideration and it will be open to the respondent-defendants to raise their objection in regard to the amended plaint by making any corresponding amendments in their written-statement. 37. In Andhra Bank vs. ABN Amro Bank N.V. and Others : (2007) 6 SCC 167 , the Supreme Court held that court cannot go into the question of merit of amendment sought for and it can only consider whether such amendment would be necessary for decision of real controversy between the parties. In that case, defendant sought amendment only to take an additional defence that in view of Section 230 of the Contract Act, the suit filed was not maintainable. Prayer for amendment was rejected by the High Court. In that case, defendant sought amendment only to take an additional defence that in view of Section 230 of the Contract Act, the suit filed was not maintainable. Prayer for amendment was rejected by the High Court. Supreme Court held that at the time of considering the prayer for amendment of the written-statement, it was not open to the court to go into the fact whether in fact the suit in view of Section 230 of the Contract Act was or is not maintainable. Arguments that have been advanced on behalf of the respondents in the present writ petition that such defence of the petitioner insurance company seeking to raise in the written-statement would not be available to it, would be hardly relevant for deciding the application seeking amendment and at that stage, such application has to be considered with reference to the settled law on interpretation of Order 6 Rule 17 CPC and the principles governing such prayer. 38. Coming now to the first question, it must be held that court deciding application for amendment should normally allow amendment which do not cause any injustice to the other side and which may be necessary for the purpose of determining the real controversy between the parties. It is trite that though amendment cannot be claimed as a matter of right in all the circumstances, yet the power to allow the amendment is wide and can be exercised at any stage of the proceedings in the interest of justice. Supreme Court in State of A.P. and Ors. vs. Pioneer Builders, A.P. (2006) 12 SCC 119 while consi-dering the available law on the subject starting from AIR 1922 PC 249 (Ma Shwe Mya vs. Maung Mo Hnaung and Ors. subsequent judgments of Supreme Court in para 21 of the judgment, observed as under:- “Principles governing amendment of pleadings are well settled. Order 6 Rule 17 CPC deals with the amendment of pleadings and provides that the court may at any stage of the proceedings allow either party to alter or amend pleadings in such a manner and on such terms as may be just and all such amendments shall be made as may be necessary for the purpose of determining the real questions in controversy between the parties. It is rue that though an amendment cannot be claimed as a matter of right under all circumstances, yet the power to allow the amendment is wide and can be exercised at any stage of the proceedings in the interest of justice. It is equally well entitled that unless serious injustice or irreparable loss is likely to be caused to the other side, the court should adopt liberal approach and not a hypertecnical approach, particularly in a case where the other side can be compensated with costs. Dominant object to allow the amendment in the pleadings liberally is to avoid multiplicity of proceedings. (See L.J. Leach & Co. Ltd. V. Jardine Skinner & Co, Ganga Bai vs. Vijay Kumar and B.K. Narayana Pillai vs. Parameshwaran Pillai.) Nevertheless, one distinct cause of action cannot be substituted for another nor the subject-matter of the suit can be changed by means of an amendment. The following passage from the decision of the Privy Council in Ma Shwe Mya vs. Maung Mo Hnaung succinctly summarises the principle which may be kept in mind while dealing with the prayer for amendment of the pleadings: (IA pp-216-17) “All rules of court are nothing but provisions intended to secure the proper administration of justice, and it is therefore essential that they should be made to serve and be subordinate to that purpose, so that full powers of amendment must be enjoyed and should always be liberally exercised, but nonetheless no power has yet been given to enable one distinct cause of action to be substituted for another, nor to change, by means of amendment, the subject-matter of the suit.” 39. In North Eastern Railway Administration, Gorakpur vs. Bhagwan Das (dead) by LRs (2008) 8 SCC 511 , Supreme Court reiterating its view expressed by earlier three Judge Bench in Pirgonda Hongonda Patil vs. Kalgonda Shidgonda Patil : 1990(1) SCC 166 held as under:- “that all amendments ought to be allowed which satisfy the two conditions : (a) of not working injustice to the other side, and (b) of being necessary for the purpose of determining the real questions in controversy between the parties. Amendments should be refused only where the other party cannot be placed in the same postilion as if the pleading had been originally correct, but the amendment would cause him an injury which could not be compensated in costs.” 40. Amendments should be refused only where the other party cannot be placed in the same postilion as if the pleading had been originally correct, but the amendment would cause him an injury which could not be compensated in costs.” 40. In Baldev Singh and others vs. Manohar Singh and another : (2006) 6 SCC 498 = RLW 2006(4) SC 3360 also, the defendants sought to amend the written-statement. It was held that an amendment of a plaint and amendment of a written-statement are not necessarily governed by exactly the same principles. It is true that some general principles are certainly common to both, but the rules that the plaintiff cannot be allowed to amend his pleadings so as to alter materially or substitute his cause of action or the nature of his claim has necessarily no counterpart in the law relating to amendment of the written-statement. Adding a new ground of defence or substituting or altering a defence does not raise the same problem as adding, altering or substituting a new cause of action. In the case of amendment of written-statement therefore the courts are inclined to be more liberal in allowing amendment of the written-statement than of plaint and ques-tion of prejudice is less likely to operate with same rigour in the former than in the latter case. In that case, Supreme Court even allowed the inconsistent pleas to be raised in the written-statement and even permitted to raise plea with regard to limitation by way of amendment. 41. In my considered view, therefore, the learned Tribunal was not justified in not permitting the defendant to amend the written statement based on the subsequent developments. What would be the effect of the defences sought to be set up by the insurance company thereby and whether such defence would at all to be available to it, in view of catena of precedents cited before the Tribunal and before this Court, would still be required to be considered by the Tribunal, if and when such an occasion arise but those precedents could not be relied to reject the prayer for amendment, which otherwise appear to be bonafide. Contention that such amendments would create confusion and would delay proceedings, also cannot be accepted because if such amendments are based on subsequent developments, mere pleadings cannot be taken as substitute of the proof and parties would have still to prove their case set up in the pleadings. So far only issues have been framed and parties are yet to lead their evidence therefore as far as the inconvenience caused to the claimants is concerned, they can be suitably compensated by awarding reasonable amount of compensation which in the facts of the case is quantified at Rs.5,000/-. Result: 42. In the result, SBCWP No.1812/2009 is partly allowed. The application filed by the petitioner-insurance company before the Tribunal filed under Order 14 Rule 5 CPC is allowed in part as indicated above. There shall be in this case, no order as to costs. 43. SBCWP No.1813/2009 filed by the petitioner insurance company against the said order therefore is rejected with costs which is quantified at Rs.5000/- which amount the petitioner shall be required to deposit with the District Legal Aid Committee Jaipur and produce receipt thereof before the Tribunal within 30 days from the date of receipt of copy of this order. 44. SBCWP No.1814/2009 filed by the petitioner insurance company for summoning of record is dismissed with the observations made above and with no order as to costs. 45. SBCWP No.1815/2009 filed by the petitioner insurance company is allowed subject to petitioner insurance company paying to the claimant-respondents a sum of Rs.5,000/- as costs. The impugned-order rejecting application for amendment of written-statement is accordingly set-aside and the amendment application is allowed. As this judgment comes to a close, I deem it appropriate to clarify that observations made in this judgment and in the impugned-order should be treated as only tentatively made for the purpose of deciding the above referred to four applications and the Tribunal would after recording of evidence by the parties be to take any view of the matter in accordance with law.