M. Nagoor Mohideen v. The Secretary to Government of Tamil Nadu, Home Department & Another
2009-04-24
N.PAUL VASANTHAKUMAR, VASANTHAKUMAR
body2009
DigiLaw.ai
Judgment 1. The prayer in the Writ Petition is to quash the order dated 6. 1999 declining the request of the petitioner seeking promotion as Additional Superintendent of Police (Category-I) on the ground that the petitioner has retired from service on 30.4.1998 on attaining the age of superannuation. 2. The case of the petitioner is that, a charge memo was issued against the petitioner on 27. 1997 under Rule 17(b) of the Tamil Nadu Civil Service (Discipline and Appeal) Rules on certain allegation said to have taken place in the year 1994. When the regular panel for Deputy Superintendent of Police fit for appointment to the post of Additional Superintendent of Police (Category.1) was drawn, since the charge was pending against the petitioner, the petitioners name was deferred till the proceedings are concluded. The Government through letter dated 111. 1997 stated that after completion of the disciplinary proceedings, the petitioners name will be considered for inclusion in the said panel depending on the result of the disciplinary proceedings. The Enquiry Officer found that the charges framed against the petitioner were not proved. The Government through G.O.Ms. No.502 Home Department dated 24. 1998 decided to accept the finding of the Enquiry Officer and dropped further action against the petitioner on 24. 1998 i.e., one day prior to the date of retirement of the petitioner. When the petitioner submitted a representation seeking promotion, the same was rejected by the impugned order stating that the petitioner having retired on 30.4.1998, there is no chance to act and discharge the duties in the post of Additional Superintendent of Police (Category.l), therefore, the petitioners request cannot be considered. 3. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that when the petitioners name was earlier deferred due to the pendency of Rule 17(b) charge and the charge having been dropped, even though the petitioner is retired from service on 30.4.1998, the petitioner can be given promotion notionally so that the petitioner will be in a position to get revision of pension. 4. The learned counsel for the petitioner also cited the judgment made in W.P. Nos.825 and 826 of 2007 dated 21. 2008 and the decision of mine reported in A. Karunanidhi v. Government of Tamil Nadu, represented by its Secretary, P.W.D., Chennai, 2006 (2) MLJ 494 in support of his contentions. 5.
4. The learned counsel for the petitioner also cited the judgment made in W.P. Nos.825 and 826 of 2007 dated 21. 2008 and the decision of mine reported in A. Karunanidhi v. Government of Tamil Nadu, represented by its Secretary, P.W.D., Chennai, 2006 (2) MLJ 494 in support of his contentions. 5. In the reported judgment cited above, I have followed the decision of the Supreme Court reported in Delhi Jal Board v. Mahinder Singh, 2000 (7) SCC 210 and C.O. Arumugam and others v. State of Tamil Nadu and others, 1991 SLJ 185, wherein a direction was given to re-consider the claim of the petitioner therein within a period of four weeks by giving notional promotion from the date on which the junior of the petitioner was given promotion with all consequential benefits. 6. The Honourable Supreme Court in The Commissioner, Karnataka Housing Board v. C. Muddaiah. 2007 (7) SC 689, held that promotion can be ordered if the person is wrongly denied of promotion. Paragraphs 33 and 34 of the said judgment can be usefully extracted below: "33. The matter can be looked at from another angle also. It is true that while granting a relief in favour of a party, the Court must consider the relevant provisions of law and issue appropriate directions keeping in view such provisions. There may, however, be cases where on the facts and in the circumstances, the Court may issue necessary directions in the larger interest to justice keeping in view the principles of justice, equity and good conscience. Take a case, where ex facie injustice has been meted out to an employee. In spite to the fact that he is entitled to certain benefits, they had not been given to him. His representations have been illegally and injustifiably turned down. He finally approaches a Court of law. The Court is convinced that gross injustice has been done to him and he was wrongfully, unfairly and with oblique motive deprived of those benefits. The Court in the circumstances, directs the authority to extend all benefits which he would have obtained had he not been illegally deprived of them. Is it open to the authorities in such case to urge that as he has not worked (but held to be illegally deprived), he would not be granted the benefits?
The Court in the circumstances, directs the authority to extend all benefits which he would have obtained had he not been illegally deprived of them. Is it open to the authorities in such case to urge that as he has not worked (but held to be illegally deprived), he would not be granted the benefits? Upholding of such plea would amount to allowing a party to take undue advantage of his own wrong. It would perpetrate injustice rather than doing justice to the person wronged. 34. We are conscious and mindful that even in absence of statutory provision, normal rule is "no work no pay". In appropriate cases, however, a Court of law may, nay must, take into account all the facts in their entirety and pass an appropriate order in consonance with law. The Court, in a given case may hold that the person was willing to work but was illegally and unlawfully not allowed to do so. The Court may in the circumstances, direct the authority to grant him all benefits considering "as if he had worked". It, therefore, cannot be contended as an absolute proposition of law that no direction of payment of consequential benefits can be granted by a Court of law and if such directions are issued by a Court, the authority can ignore them even it they had been finally confirmed by the Apex Court of the country (as has been done in the present case). The bald contention of the Appellant Board, therefore, has no substance and must be rejected." 7. In W.P. Nos.825 and 826 of 2007, by order dated 21. 2008, Honourable Mr. Justice K. Chandru in a similar circumstance, held as follows: 21. Since the petitioner was denied his legitimate promotion only on the basis of the issuance of charge-memo issued under Rule 17(b) of the Rules and subsequently imposed with the punishment of stoppage of increment for one year, which itself has been held to be not valid by this Court and since no other reasons are pleaded to deny his promotion, the petitioner is directed to be given all his monetary benefits, which will accrue to him in the post of ACTO." 8. In G.O.Ms. No.368, P&AR Department, dated 110.
In G.O.Ms. No.368, P&AR Department, dated 110. 1993 it is specifically stated that if a Government Servant, whose promotion has been deferred, should be reopened after the disposal of the charges and appropriate orders should be passed i.e., by giving promotion, if he was proved innocent and exonerated or acquitted of the charges, if there are no other adverse facts to be reckoned. 9. In the light of the above decision and having regard to the fact that the petitioner is exonerated from Rule 17(b) charges even prior to his retirement, the respondents are bound to consider the claim of the petitioner for grant of notional promotion. 10. The prayer in the Original Application is to give notional promotion so that the petitioner will get revision of pension. In view of the undisputed facts, the impugned order is set aside and the first respondent is directed to reconsider the claim of the petitioner seeking notional promotion to the post of Additional Superintendent of Police (Category-I) and pass orders in the light of the Government Order and the Judgments cited supra, within a period of four weeks from the date of receipt of copy of this order and revise the pension of the petitioner and pay arrears of pension, within a period of eight weeks from the date of receipt of copy of this order. No costs.