JUDGMENT Iqbal Ahmed Ansari, J. 1. The material facts, leading to this writ petition, are set out as under:- (i) The Arunachal Pradesh Public Service Commission (in short, the APPSC) invited application, on 8.12.2006, from Arunachal Pradesh Scheduled Tribe Candidates for filling up of three posts of Assistant Director (Textile and Handicraft) under Textile and Handicraft Department, Government of Arunachal Pradesh. In terms of the advertisement, requisite educational qualification, for making appointment for the posts, were as follows: Educational Qualification: Candidate applying for the post must possess Bachelor Degree in the discipline of Textile/Handloom Technology/Fine Arts/Fashion and Design Technology/Fashion Management from a recognized University. (ii) All the three petitioners herein applied for selection and appointment to the said posts. The APPSC issued Admit Cards to the petitioners and, on the strength of the Admit Cards, so issued, the petitioners appeared in the written test held on 16th and 17th January, 2007. Thereafter, some candidates as well as employees of the said Department, who were diploma-holders in various field related to textile and handicraft, filed a writ petition assailing the said advertisement on the ground that the said vacant posts shall be directed to be filled up as per the relevant Recruitment Rules of 1999 and not as per amended Recruitment Rules of 2006. This writ petition gave rise to WP(C) No. 242 (AP) of 2007. By judgment and order, dated 5.3.2008, the said writ petition was dismissed by holding that the amended Recruitment Rules of 2006 would apply to the appointments to be made to the said three posts. (iii) While the petitioners were awaiting their call for interview, each of them was served with letter, dated 29.10.2008, issued to them by the Secretary, APPSC. In this letter, the APPSC informed the petitioners that while applying for the said posts, the certificates of educational qualification, which the petitioners had submitted, was not in respect of decree/graduation as required for the said posts. By the letter, dated 29.10.2008, aforementioned, the petitioners were also directed to furnish degree or equivalent certificate of their eligibility within a period of 20 days from the date of issue of the letter aforementioned or else, their candidature would be rejected as they are merely diploma-holders. By the letter, dated 29.10.2008, aforementioned, the petitioners were also directed to furnish degree or equivalent certificate of their eligibility within a period of 20 days from the date of issue of the letter aforementioned or else, their candidature would be rejected as they are merely diploma-holders. The petitioners, then, submitted certificates, dated 27.9.2007, issued by the Professor and the Head of the Department (Academic Affairs) National Institute of Fashion Technology (in short, the NIFT), wherein it was stated as under: NIFT has been recognized as the Institute of Excellence by the Indian Government vide an Act of Parliament, Government of India (NIFT Act 2006-No. 28 of 2006, dated 13th July, 2006) and given the status of a statutory body empowered to award degrees in the field of Fashion Design, Management and Technology. (iv) Ms. Kari Lombi, an alumnus of NIFT has passed her Graduate Professional Diploma program in Fashion Design in the year 2002-05. This program may be considered at par with any graduate program of the discipline. (v) As the APPSC announced the result of the written test on 11.3.2008, the private respondents were invited for interview/viva voce and, thereafter, the private respondents were selected as per the official select list published on 16.4.2008, the petitioners came to this Court seeking, with the help of the present writ petition made under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, to get set aside and quashed, inter alia, the impugned select list, dated 16.4.2008, published by the APPSC, and also seeking directions to be issued to the respondents/authorities concerned to allow the petitioners to appear for viva voce test treating them eligible for applying for selection and appointment to the said three posts. 2. I have heard Mr. K. Ete, learned Counsel for the petitioners, and Mr. R.H. Nabam, learned senior Government Advocate, appearing on behalf of the State respondents. None has appeared on behalf of the respondent No. 1, namely, APPSC. I have, however, heard Mr. M. Pertin, learned Counsel for the private respondents. 3. The controversy, raised in the present writ petition, is simple and precise, namely, as to whether the petitioners were eligible to apply for selection to the posts, in question. None has appeared on behalf of the respondent No. 1, namely, APPSC. I have, however, heard Mr. M. Pertin, learned Counsel for the private respondents. 3. The controversy, raised in the present writ petition, is simple and precise, namely, as to whether the petitioners were eligible to apply for selection to the posts, in question. While considering this question, it needs to be pointed out that NIFT has been established as a body corporate under Section 31 of the National Institute of Fashion Technology Act, 2006 (in short, the NIFT Act). The NIFT Act has, admittedly, come into force with effect from 1st January, 2007. Section 31 of the Act deals with the NIFT's power to grant degrees/diplomas/certificates and other academic distinctions. As Section 31 is material, it is reproduced herein below: 31. The Institute shall have the power to grant degrees, diplomas, certificates and other academic distinctions under this Act, which shall be equivalent to such corresponding degrees, diplomas, certificates and other academic distinctions granted by any University or Institute established or incorporated under any other law for the time being in force. 4. A bare reading of the provisions, contained in Section 31, makes it clear that NIFT has the power to grant, amongst others, degrees, which shall be equivalent to such degrees as are granted by any University or institute established or incorporated under any law in force in India. Thus, NIFT is competent to grant degrees of fashion technology and such degrees would be equivalent to the degrees as may be granted, in this regard, by any University established under the law. 5. What is, however, of immense important to note is that the provisions of Section 31 have come into force with effect from 1.1.2007. The petitioners have not been able to produce before this Court any material whatsoever to show that prior to coming into force of the NIFT Act, NIFT had the power to grant degrees or diploma, which could be treated equivalent to the degrees or diplomas as may be granted by any University, which is established or incorporated under an enactment. This apart, the educational qualification required for the post, as per the advertisement itself, was a Bachelor Degree in the discipline of Textile/Handloom Technology/Fine Arts/Fashion and Design Technology/ Fashion Management from a recognized University. This apart, the educational qualification required for the post, as per the advertisement itself, was a Bachelor Degree in the discipline of Textile/Handloom Technology/Fine Arts/Fashion and Design Technology/ Fashion Management from a recognized University. The petitioners do not, admittedly, hold any bachelor degree in any of the disciplines aforementioned, which is recognized by any University. What they have completed is graduate professional diploma program in Fashion Designing from NIFT as it existed before the enforcement of the NIFT Act. 6. Coupled with the above, it can also be pointed out that the petitioner No. 1 attended the said programme from 1996-99, petitioner No. 3 attended the programme from 2000-03 and petitioner No. 2 from 2002-05. Thus, the certificates of graduate professional diploma programme, which the petitioners have received, were all issued before the NIFT Act came into force on 1.1.2007. Above all, the petitioners do not hold any bachelor degree; what they held is a certificate of diploma. 7. What surfaces from the above discussion is that the petitioners were not in the light of the conditions of recruitment, as mentioned in the said advertisement, educationally qualified to apply for the said posts. The fact, that the petitioners were allowed to appear in the written test, cannot cloth the petitioners with any indefeasible right to demand that they must be treated as candidates, who were eligible to apply for the said posts. When the petitioners were, according to the advertisement, not eligible to apply for selection, their appearance in the written test did not vest in them any right to demand that they shall be treated as eligible candidates. 8. Though it has been contended by Mr. Ete that as the petitioners have been allowed to sit in the written test treating them as eligible candidates, they cannot be subsequently denied opportunity to participate in the complete selection process, it is important to point out that when a candidate, who was ineligible to participate in a selection process, is allowed to participate by mistake or otherwise, he or she cannot be treated to have become eligible, or his/her eligibility cannot be treated to have been waived, merely because of the fact that he or she participated in the selection process. The mere fact, therefore, that the petitioners were allowed to appear in the written test will not vest, in them, the right to be treated as eligible candidates, when they are ex facie ineligible. A reference may, in this regard, be made to the case of T. Jayakumar vs. A. Gopu and another, AIR 2008 SCW 6620 , wherein the Supreme Court has observed and held thus: 10. We are not aware of any principle of law under which once a candidate is allowed participation in the selection process the selection authority is precluded from examining whether his application was complete, in order, within time or otherwise acceptable. A defect in the application from that renders the candidate ineligible might be overlooked in the initial screening and as a result he may be called for interview and may get a chance to take part in selection process but that alone does not mean that the candidate cannot be held ineligible for selection at a later stage once the defect in the application comes to light. It is surely open to the Tribunal to examine whether the reason assigned by the selection authority for holding a candidate ineligible for selection was valid or unreasonable and arbitrary. If the reason for excluding a candidate from the selection process is found to be unreasonable or arbitrary the Tribunal may certainly intervene but if the reason itself is valid the Tribunal cannot interfere simply because the candidate was allowed participation in the selection process by being called for interview. The principle of estoppel has no application in such a case. 9. The fall-out of the above discussion is that the petitioners, not being educationally qualified to apply for the posts, can neither demand that they be called for viva voce nor can they challenge the selection and appointment of the private respondents. 10. In the result and for the reasons discussed above, this writ petition fails, the same is not admitted and shall accordingly stand dismissed. 11. No order as to costs. Petition dismissed.